Love Revisited

Love or ‘caring about’ is a constant theme of this blog. In previous postings I have discussed love in relation to keeping dogs, dissident IRA republican killers and arranged marriages. In this posting I want to examine the nature of love rather than any of its affects. It was suggested to me by Ian Law of Birmingham University in discussion that love is simply an emotion. In this examination I want firstly to discuss whether Ian was correct and secondly what this discussion tells us about emotions.

Before discussing the nature of love it must be clear what is meant by love. I consider love to be ‘caring about something’ as defined by Frankfurt.
“A person who cares about something is, as it were invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced” (1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 84).
The question I now wish to address is whether equating love with such ‘caring about’ is compatible with love being regarded as an emotion? Frankfurt would argue it is not,
“That a person cares about something or that he loves something has less to do with how things make him feel, or his opinions about them, than the more or less stable motivational structures that shape his preferences and guide his conduct” (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 129).
Why does Frankfurt believe love is not an emotion? Because he believes love must have some persistence and he also believes emotions do not have persistence. It seems clear that love cannot be turned off and on like a tap. It is also clear that emotions unlike love can quickly change. For this reason I accept love cannot be simply regarded as an emotion. Accepting the above of course does not mean love is unconnected to the emotions. Indeed I will now argue love must of necessity be connected to the emotions. I will argue love might be seen as a persistent emotion, a disposition to have an emotion or a sentiment.

If a lover identifies himself with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to the losses and susceptible to the benefits of love then love can be a motivation to act. Indeed if a lover can act to protect or benefit his beloved and fails to do so for no good reason it might be questioned whether he is a genuine lover. Love appears to be a matter of the will. Hume famously argued reason is the slave of the passions, the emotions in current parlance, and that reason alone gives us no motivation to act. It would appear to follow if we accept that reason alone gives us no reason to act and that love is a motivation for action then love must be an emotion. However I have accepted above that because love requires persistence and emotions are not necessarily persistent love is not simply an emotion. There are two ways this impasse might be avoided. Firstly it might be argued that love is connected to someone’s will. It might then be further argued that someone’s will is simply a stable motivational structure independent of both reason and emotion. This I believe would be Frankfurt’s position. Adopting such a position seems to me to be unnecessary and makes the will an unexplainable entity. For this reason I believe the second way of avoiding this impasse is preferable, this way assumes love is not simply an emotion but that it is connected to the emotions in some way.

How can love be connected to the emotions? I have suggested that love might be seen as a persistent emotion, a disposition to have some emotion or a sentiment. In what follows I will consider having a sentiment as being the same as having a disposition to feel some emotion. Accepting the above raises two questions. Firstly what exactly is an emotion; are emotions purely physical sensations or are emotions in some way intentional? Secondly if love is a persistent emotion or a disposition to have an emotion what is the actual emotion involved? There is a continuing philosophical debate as to whether emotions contain a cognitive element or are purely physiological states. Philosophers such as Nussbaum and Solomon would argue emotions are intentional and as a result must have a cognitive element. Others such as Prinz, would argue emotions are simply physiological states (2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford). People don’t just love randomly. It appears to follow love is intentional in some way. Prima facie it might then be suggested that any emotion underlying love must also be intentional. I believe this suggestion is doubtful. Clearly some emotions such as disgust are non intentional and are simply physiological states. It might then be pointed out not all emotions are the same and that some emotions may be intentional and include a cognitive element. However when assigning a cognitive element to an emotion we must be sure we should assign this element to the actual emotion rather than to the cause of the emotion. If for instance I eat too many strawberries this might cause me to have a stomach ache, a purely physiological state. Similarly if I am fearful, because I perceive a tiger approaching me, my perception is the cause of my fear. Moreover I see no reason why my fear must include the concept that tigers are dangerous. In light of the above I will assume there is no reason why all emotions, including persistent ones, should not be regarded as purely physiological states. It follows if love is intentional, as I believe it is, then I was wrong to argue with Law that love might be regarded as a persistent emotion. I now believe love might be better regarded as a disposition to feel some particular emotion. A disposition to feel a particular emotion partially causes this emotion. Further a disposition to feel an emotion may be based on certain beliefs and as a result this disposition might well contain a cognitive element even if the actual emotion does not.

If love is not an emotion, persistent or otherwise, but rather a disposition to feel a particular emotion then the question as to which of the emotions is involved must be addressed. I suggested above if a lover can act to protect or benefit his beloved and he fails to do so it might be questioned whether he is a genuine lover. Accepting the above means neither lust nor sympathy can be the emotion underlying love. The lustful feel no need to benefit the objects of their lust. Sympathy involves understanding the suffering of others. However it is possible to act sympathetically without addressing the desires of others, see Nichols. (2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford, pages 38, 39). Hence a sympathetic person may be unable to truly benefit the object of his sympathy. An empathic person both understands and feels the desires of the object of his empathy. It follows an empathic person will act to protect or benefit the object of his empathy. For this reason I suggest love would be best defined as a disposition to feel empathy.

I now wish to address three problems associated with adopting this definition of love. Firstly it might be argued that by defining love as a disposition to feel empathy we fail to accommodate one of our intuitive ideas of personal love. Love it might be argued is often limited, personal and private whilst empathy appears to have a much larger writ. Empathy does however have the property that it diminishes with distance. This distance might involve physical distance, time or just degree of acquaintance. For instance I may feel some empathy for protestors being crushed in Iran but I felt far greater empathy for my wife when she was admitted to hospital. This property of distance seems to allow us to account for the intuitive idea of love as personal whilst at the same time accepting the definition of love as a disposition to feel empathy. For instance it makes sense to say we can love the residents of our home town in an impersonal way whilst at the same time loving our children in a personal way to a far greater degree.

Secondly it might be argued accepting the above definition means we cannot learn to love. Some recent research suggests that mirror neurones play a central part in our ability to feel empathy. If this is so then it might be argued the ability to feel empathy, to love, depends on the physical structure of our brains rather than our brain states. It seems likely we can alter our brain states by learning. However it seems unlikely we can alter the physical structure of our brains to any great degree by learning. I have used the word unlikely above because we can alter to some degree the physical structure of our body by exercise and training. Accepting the above means it is unlikely we can learn to love. Autism might be advanced as an additional reason why if the definition of love, as a disposition to feel empathy, is accepted we cannot learn to love. In using the example of autism I am not necessarily connecting autism to mirror neurones or arguing autistic children cannot feel some form of sympathy. I am however arguing those suffering from autism cannot feel true empathy for others. Some parents of autistic children might argue their children can feel love and as a result would reject this definition of love. I would merely note it is possible that these parents’ empathy for their children may project non-existent love onto them. It might be argued good parents want their children to learn to love but if this definition is accepted learning to love is impossible for the two reasons outlined above. My starting point in this posting was Frankfurt’s definition of love. Frankfurt himself argues love is not a matter of choice and this seems to support the above argument, see (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, page 135). However if the above definition of love is accepted does it really matter if we cannot learn to love? I would argue it does not. I would argue that under normal circumstances our natural capacity to love develops. I would further argue that in practice parents do not teach their children to love but rather that most parents create the circumstances in which their children’s natural capacity for love develops. I would further suggest that those parents who do not or are unable to create these circumstances should be helped to do so, see my posting of 30/03/09 concerning dissident IRA killers.

The third problem with defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is that the definition seems to be an inadequate definition. People don’t just love people. We can love cities, pieces of music and nature for instance. We are however unable to feel empathy for cities, pieces of music or nature. There seem to be two strategies for dealing with the inadequacy of this definition. Firstly it might be denied that we actually love these inanimate things. For instance can we actually love a city which has lost all its inhabitants forever? Perhaps when we love a city we do feel empathy but this is not empathy for a city devoid of its inhabitants but rather for these inhabitants. I find such a strategy unconvincing because it would be hard to apply to nature. Perhaps it might be better argued we feel empathy for life in general. However I still find this amended strategy unconvincing. Secondly it might be argued defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is an incomplete definition; the reason being that the concept of love is not a simple concept but rather a hybrid concept. The love of animate and inanimate objects is not the same. If this is accepted then defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is a definition limited to the love of animate objects.

Sport and Disability

In western culture sportsmen and women are usually admired. In the past I held the view that, even if all sport is equally good in delivering health benefits, that nonetheless we have less reason to admire Paralympic and disabled sportsmen and women in general. Admittedly I formed this view without much reflection. Perhaps I held this view because intuitively I viewed sport as purely some sort of competition in which a combination of physical prowess and skill was all important. However after some reflection I believe my view was mistaken and that able bodied and disabled sport give us the same reasons to admire the athletes involved.

In order to see why I changed my mind it is necessary to examine why sportsmen and women are admired. It seems clear my initial view that we only admire successful sportsmen and women because of their physical prowess and skill is flawed. Consider a sprinter who naturally has larger muscles than her competitors and as a result wins all her races with ease. Do we admire such a runner? The answer to this question depends on which of the two meaning of admire we use. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to admire, has the following meanings. Firstly it means to regard with respect or warm approval and secondly to look at with pleasure. In my example of the sprinter we may indeed look with pleasure at her muscles or the speed at which she runs. It follows we admire her in second meaning of the word. Let us also consider a golfer who has a great natural ability for putting. This golfer does nothing to enhance this natural ability but nevertheless wins many tournaments because of it. Once again we may look with pleasure at the golfer’s skills and admire them but our pleasure with these skills gives us no reason to respect or to look at her with approval. These two examples suggest we only admire sportsmen and women’s prowess and skill in the second way by looking at them with pleasure. Indeed it might even be questioned whether we are actually admiring the sportsmen and women. It might be argued we are simply admiring their physical prowess and skills in much the same way as we would admire a mountain view. The above suggests that when admiring persons we can only really do so in the first way by respecting or approving of them. It is of course possible to respect a person by simply treating her as an end rather than as a means. However this is not what we normally mean when we say we respect sportsmen and women. For the above reasons I believe when we say we admire some sportswomen we mean we simply approve of her.

What reasons could we have to approve of sportsmen and women? It might be suggested that we approve of sportsmen and women because sport is instrumentally good in delivering health benefits. However consider someone who takes certain pills to lower her blood pressure. Taking these pills is instrumentally good in delivering a health benefit but the fact that someone takes these pills does not seem to give us a reason to approve of her as a person. We of course might expect her to take these pills. Expecting someone to do something is not the same as approving of someone doing something. It might then be argued by analogy that even if sport is instrumentally good in delivering health benefits this fact alone gives us no reason to approve of sportsmen and women. Prima facie it might be assumed there are no reasons why we should approve of someone for doing something that is purely in her own self interest. However such an assumption would be unsound. Consider someone who diets because she is overweight. Clearly the dieter is acting in her own health interests, in the same way as the person reducing her blood pressure, but nevertheless we may well have reason in this case to approve of the dieter’s character. Dieting is not easy and requires determination. The above suggests that when we approve of someone’s actions we do so because we approve of those parts of her character connected to these actions. The above leads me to conclude that when we admire sportsmen and women, using the first meaning of admire, we do so because of what sport tells us about their character.

Accepting my above conclusion automatically leads to two further conclusions. Firstly the taking of drugs to enhance an athlete’s performance cannot lead to an admirable performance. A drug enhanced performance is not admirable because of what it tells us about the athlete’s character. She is prepared to cheat. It might be objected that provided the rules governing a sport are changed to permit drugs that such a drug enhanced performance might then be regarded as admirable. Naturally the question might be asked why we should find such a performance admirable. It seems to me we would have no reasons to approve her character connected to her athletic performance, for a more detailed reply to this objection see Austin (1). The second further conclusion is that we have just as much reason to admire disabled sportsmen and women as we do to admire their able bodied compatriots. This follows because what we really approve of is their character as demonstrated by their athletic performance. Character demonstrated by athletic performance is not directly proportional to the actual performance but rather to the determination needed to achieve it.

I have argued that when we admire sportsmen and women we do so because of the things sport tells us about their character. What we admire about sportsmen and women are certain traits of character or virtues. I would further argue that we should approve of sport because it encourages these traits of character or virtues. Two objections might be raised to the approval of sport in this way. Firstly it might be objected accepting the above means that in general sport should be seen as non-competitive. It might then be pointed out such a pale wishy washy view of sport is at odds with our everyday ideas. I can see no reason why I should accept such an objection. Sport is concerned with someone’s will, controlling and channeling her will by determination, hard work and sometimes even courage. These are some of the traits or virtues we admire in sportsmen and women. These traits are fostered by competition. It therefore follows far from discouraging competition, if we admire sport, we should actively encourage competition. The second objection is that sport may lead to obsession. Let it be accepted sport fosters someone in controlling and channeling her will by determination and hard work. It might then be argued that in certain cases this determined channeling of her will causes her to neglect other important considerations such as family and friends. I am prepared to accept that in certain cases sport may well cause some people to become obsessed damaging both themselves and others. However I am not prepared to accept that this occurs in most cases. In most cases I believe the determined channeling of someone’s will helps her to become a better person. It therefore follows that sport is on the whole beneficial even if it does lead to some cases of obsession. Perhaps sport could lessen these cases of obsession by fostering the old fashioned attitude that what matters in sport is taking part rather than winning. What matters is doing one’s best not necessarily being the best.

1. Austin (2009) Magnanimity, Athletic Excellence and Performance Enhancing Drugs, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 26(1)

Marriage

Historically marriage could be roughly described as a stable relationship between a man and a women lasting beyond the propagation and raising of children. Furthermore this relationship was recognised by society of the time in some way. More recently recognition by the state has been added to that of society. State recognition is essential to marriage. Couples may live together, but regardless of how they view their relationship, they are not married unless their relationship is recognised by the state. The state regulates the major conditions governing a marriage. Most importantly these regulations lay down who can marry and what conditions must be meet before a marriage can be dissolved. In the last few decades these state sanctioned conditions have been subject to change. For instance some countries including Holland and some states in the USA have recognised same sex marriages, sometimes called gay marriages. This change might be considered to be a broadening of the domain of marriage. It is important to note gay marriage is not yet possible in the UK even though the courts recognise civil partnerships which give the partners involved the same rights as a married couple. A further change has occurred with the gradual easing of the conditions needed to dissolve a marriage. In this posting I will examine whether the broadening of the domain of marriage together with the easement of marriage conditions weaken the concept of marriage. I will argue that the broadening of the domain of marriage does not erode the concept of marriage but that it does abuse the concept. I will further that argue the gradual easement of marriage conditions does erode the concept of marriage. In what follows the conditions of a marriage will refer exclusively to state sanctioned conditions unless stated otherwise. My examination will involve considering civil partnerships, pre nuptial agreements and covenant marriages which are currently available in some American States.

The state may sanction marriage but the concept of marriage arose because it benefited both individuals and society. It might be argued recent changes to the conditions of marriage have increased the number of people who might benefit from the institution whilst at the same time reducing some of the burdens associated with the traditional concept of marriage. For instance, if the conditions of marriage are changed to permit gay and lesbian couples to marry this might be seen as extending the benefits of marriage. Likewise making divorce easier and more equitable might be seen as easing of some of the burdens a traditional marriage places on women by a mostly patriarchal society. However these changes to the conditions of marriage will only add benefit provided they don’t damage the benefits which the concept of marriage originally delivered. Moreover it might be questioned if these original benefits are eroded or lost whether the concept of marriage remains meaningful. What then are the things that originally made marriage beneficial? Firstly any meaningful marriage must include long standing sexual exclusivity. This condition may have originally only been useful to men in ensuring the paternity of their children but never the less any concept of marriage would be meaningless without it. Secondly marriage is beneficial in the raising of children. These two conditions, for sexual exclusivity and mutual support in order to raise children, might be seen as some sort of implicit contract between individuals concerned. In this scenario an arranged marriage seems to be a perfectly acceptable marriage. It may of course not be a loving relationship, see my previous posting. However it seems to me that any meaningful concept of marriage, at least in the western world since the middle ages, would be incomplete without the inclusion of an exclusive affective element. People don’t normally marry strangers in order to obtain the benefits of marriage. We have a period of courtship to see if we care about our future partners. If ones cares about one’s spouse and children it is not possible to care about one’s spouse and another adult in the same way if the marriage is to be regarded as meaningful. It follows the type of affection involved in marriage should also be exclusive. To summarise the things that made a traditional marriage beneficial were firstly both persistent sexual exclusivity and affection and secondly mutual assistance in the raising of children.

Would the broadening of the domain of marriage so as to include gay and lesbian couples be beneficial? Intuitively extending the benefits of marriage to gay and lesbian couples would appear to be a good thing to do. Certainly on a consequentialist account of morality this extension would appear to be the correct thing to do. What benefits does a gay couple seek from marriage? They seek equal treatment in a wide range of legal matters with married couples and as I have argued above persistent sexual exclusivity and affection. In the UK since 2004 it is possible for gay and lesbian couples to enter into a civil partnership. A civil partnership confers on the partners all the material benefits of marriage and is often referred to as a gay marriage. The only real differences between a civil partnership and a traditional marriage are that the former is purely a civil affair whilst the latter may be a religious one and that a civil partnership is completed by the partners signing rather than by a verbal declaration. It might then be argued all the benefits a gay couple seek from marriage may be obtained from a civil partnership. Accepting this of course does not mean a gay couple should be unable to marry. Indeed it might be argued a gay couple have a right to be recognised as a married couple in exactly the same way a heterosexual couple are except for their sexual orientation. The question I now wish to address is this. Would the broadening of the domain of marriage to include gay and lesbian couples erode the concept of marriage?

All couples, gay or heterosexual, are interested in any material benefits marriage brings. I have argued above the things that originally made marriage beneficial were firstly persistent sexual exclusivity and affection and secondly mutual assistance in the raising of children. However in practice most gay couples are only interested in sexual exclusivity and affection. It follows there is a real difference between the things most gay and a heterosexual couples seek from a marriage. It might then be concluded that because of this difference gay and lesbian couples might have a different concept of the benefits of marriage and perhaps the concept of marriage itself. It might be argued this conclusion is mistaken as some gay couples, even if the numbers are very small, want to raise children of their own.

Gay couples are incapable of having children who are directly biologically related to both partners. It follows the question as to whether there should be any difference between the implicit contracts made in civil partnerships, gay marriage, and marriage might depend on the question as to whether gay couples should be able to use egg donation, AID, or adoption to help them conceive and raise a child of their own? I will now argue they should not. I will argue gay couples are more likely to see children as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Let it be accepted gay people should be treated with equality. However it often appears that gay couples desire, to have children in order to seen as the same as heterosexuals, seems greater than their simple desire to have children as such. Being treated equally means treating similar people in a similar way. It follows wanting to be treated equally does not imply someone should automatically be treated equally. If by having children a gay couple seeks to be treated in the same way as a heterosexual couple it follows their children are being used more as a means rather than as an end. Any couple adopting children or being aided by artificial means to conceive children should be capable of having a genuine loving relationship with any children they adopt or conceive. In my previous posting concerning loving relationships I expressed the concern that some loving relationships are distorted by bringing only loving being loved to a relationship rather than genuine disinterested love. This concern seems to apply particularity to gay couples who might love having children rather than simply loving children. If this is so once again children are being used as a means rather than an end. It might be objected there is no evidence to support my assertion that gay couples are any more likely to love having children rather than simply loving children than heterosexual couples. If this is true then my argument discriminates unfairly against gay couples. It is of course unfortunately true that, some heterosexual couples love having children rather than simply loving their children disinterestedly. None the less nature gives most biological parents a natural empathy with their children meaning it is more probable they will love their children in a purely disinterested way. For the above reasons it seems to me that gay couples should not be permitted to adopt or assisted in conceiving children. If it is accepted, that heterosexual couples should be able to adopt and assisted in conceiving children, then it follows there significant differences between the legitimate aims of gay and heterosexual couples.

Does accepting my argument that gay couples should not be assisted to conceive or adopt children mean gay couples to not be able rear children? It seems clear to me a gay couple should be able to rear any existing children who are the biological offspring of one of the partners. Consider a heterosexual couple with a child. Let it be assumed the father dies. The mother then enters into a lesbian relationship. It would seem to me the mother would usually have more natural empathy with the child than any others. It follows it would usually be in the child’s best interests that the lesbian couple should rear him. Let it be assumed instead of the father dying the couple separate. Once again the child’s best interests must be considered. This case is not so clear cut. However due to women’s greater natural empathy it is entirely possible that once again the lesbian couple should rear him. All of the above applies to a relationship between gay men though to a lesser degree due to most men’s lesser natural empathy with children. Finally I wish to consider whether a lesbian couple in which one of the partners conceives a child by natural means should be able to rear the resultant child. Clearly any attempt to stop lesbian couples conceiving a child in this way is an unacceptable limit on their freedom. It seems clear, due to reasons dependent on natural empathy outlined above, that this couple should normally be permitted to rear the child.

Even if some gay couples should be able to rear children there is usually a difference between the attitude of gay and lesbian couples towards children from that of heterosexual couples. Does this difference mean any extension of the concept of marriage so as to include gay couples would damage the concept of marriage itself? Both gay and heterosexual couples seek persistent sexual exclusivity and love from a marriage. It follows both gay and heterosexual couples seek some of the same benefits from a marriage. I will now argue if gay couples have the right to marry that this right does not of necessity erode the concept of marriage. I will further argue if gay couples have the same rights as heterosexual couples regarding children that these rights abuse the concept of marriage. Prima facie simply giving gay couples the right to marry does not damage the benefits of marriage for heterosexual couples. It follows giving gay couples the right to marry does not damage the benefits of marriage. It might then be suggested provided the benefits of marriage are not damaged that the concept of marriage is not eroded in any meaningful manner. However I have argued gay couples should not have the right to adopt or to be assisted in conceiving children. If marriage gives gay couples these rights then marriage gives these couples illegitimate rights. It follows in this situation even though the concept of marriage remains undamaged for most couples these illegitimate rights extend the concept too far. The concept of marriage is being abused. It further follows the traditional concept of marriage should not be broadened to include gay marriage. None of the above of course means gay couples should not be able to ‘marry’ by entering into civil partnerships. It still further follows that there should be clear differences between civil partnerships, gay marriage, and traditional marriage.

How can traditional marriage be differentiated from civil partnerships? One way this might be attempted would be to ease the conditions involving civil partnerships. Such an easement would render civil partnerships virtually meaningless. Almond points out that if marriage is regarded as a contract it is an extremely weak contract (Almond B, The Fragmenting Family, Oxford University Press, 2006). It might of course be objected marriage is not a contract. Regardless of whether marriage is some sort of contract it must at the very least be viewed as an agreement between the parties involved. If this were not so the entire concept of marriage would become meaningless. Almond points out if someone takes out a bank loan she agrees to pay the money back. She doesn’t agree to pay the money back only if she doesn’t change her mind. If this hypothetical situation applied in practice then the whole idea of bank loans would become meaningless and cease to exist. Prima facie it might be assumed this should also apply to any marriage agreement. Because currently when someone marries, the marriage agreement, mean in practice she only agrees to stay married provided she doesn’t change her mind. The above suggests marriage serves no useful purpose even if the institution continues to exist in some hollow way. It might be further suggested there are no meaningful differences between a couple living together and a married couple. Marriage brings certain tax and material benefits to the couple involved and it also sets out the conditions applicable if the marriage is to be dissolved. It follows being married is useful and that there are differences between living together and being married. It follows the above suggestions are not completely sound. Never the less if these are the only differences between being married and living together marriage seems to have become a somewhat hollow concept.

I have argued that the benefits of marriage are persistent sexual exclusivity and affection together with assistance in the raising of children. I have further argued marriage must at the very least be viewed as an agreement between the parties involved. In the past and in some non western cultures the constraint of sexual exclusivity applied mostly to women. However this is not now true in the western world and sexual exclusivity involving both partners is central to any marriage agreement. I will assume the same exclusivity applies to affection or love without argument. I have also demonstrated that marriage may currently be viewed as some sort of agreement between the partners involved to remain married until one of them decides not to. To love each other until one partner decides not to. Such a view of marriage is incompatible with genuine love. Love is one of the benefits marriage is supposed to encourage. It is a constant theme of mine that love must have some persistence, see my previous postings. If you love someone it therefore seems illogical to make an agreement to love her only until you decide not to do so. It is of course possible for love of someone to slowly fade. It might be suggested ‘gay marriage’ differs from more conventional marriage in the different ways the couples involved love each other. However I believe there is only one way of loving and that love cannot be short term and must have some persistence. Love of course may be expressed in different ways. Gay ‘lovers’, in particular gay men, often have many short term relationships. It follows any ‘love’ involved in such transitory relationships is not genuine love. Never the less I believe when gay people love in a disinterested way they love in an identical way to heterosexuals. It further follows there is no meaningful difference between gay and heterosexual love. Gay lovers entering into a civil partnership have just as much desire that their agreement persists as any heterosexual couple entering into a marriage. It follows as far loving one’s partner is concerned there is no difference between those entering into civil partnerships, gay marriage, and marriage.

I have argued one of the benefits of marriage involves assistance in the raising of children. Good child-raising involves love and as I have argued above genuine love because it needs persistence is incompatible with the current concept of marriage. Children’s interests are damaged by the parents divorcing. Genuine parental love means if the children’s interests are damaged then so are the interests of the parents. It might be because of this reason some parents, whose love has faded and who genuinely love their children, agree to remain married until till the children grow up. It follows heterosexual couples have an additional reason based on love to remain together which gay couples do not. Two objections might be raised to this conclusion. Firstly it might be pointed out not all parents love their children. This objection is supported by the sad cases of Baby Peter and Sharon Mathews. It is not enough for parents to simply say, however sincerely they say it, that they love their children. Whether parents love their children depends on their actions. Secondly a parent whose love for his partner has faded and who genuinely loves his children may love someone else. In such a case it might be argued the parent also has a reason based on love not to remain with his partner. However if a parent genuinely loves his children it might be questioned whether such an additional love could grow. Indeed it seems possible in our self indulgent times all that has grown in this scenario is a degenerate form of love, love of being loved

Most parents genuinely love their children. It follows most married couples with children have an additional reason to stay together when compared to gay couples. There are no meaningful differences between civil contracts and traditional marriage. There is a meaningful difference between the goals of traditional and gay marriage. It follows there should be a difference between civil contracts and traditional marriage. Any easement in civil partnerships would render them meaningless and would run counter to the desires of gay couples entering into such partnerships. It further follows that traditional marriage should be harder to dissolve. It still further follows that the gradual easement in the conditions necessary for dissolving a marriage agreement over the years have damaged one of the major benefits a traditional marriage delivers. It can now be concluded that because of the easing in the conditions which need to be meet in order to dissolve a marriage have damaged the benefits marriage delivers this that this easement has eroded the concept of marriage. It might be objected to the above if my conclusions were implemented this would return us back to the bad old days when couples could become trapped in a loveless marriage unable to flourish. Indeed by suggesting that some couples should stay together, when their love has faded, because they love their children it might seem I am actually advocating such a return. Such an objection fails because our culture has changed. Firstly our culture has changed by allowing women more opportunities outside the home to flourish. Secondly our culture has changed so any stigma formerly attached to living together without being married has all but vanished. This second change together with the introduction of civil partnerships means marriage has genuinely become an agreement which is freely entered into. Lastly if a couple stay together, because they love their children, some love still exists in the marriage and even if their love for each other has faded their love for their children should permit them to continue a fairly harmonious relationship allowing each partner to flourish separately. Lastly I am not suggesting of course no divorce in marriage. I am only suggesting that it should become harder to dissolve a marriage.

In what ways should it be made harder to dissolve a marriage? Firstly it should not be made harder to dissolve a violent or abusive marriage. Violence or abuse should be grounds for the immediate dissolving of a marriage on safety grounds. However there are no safety grounds for the immediate dissolving of a marriage due to the gradual fading of love by one partner or his love of another. Love does not immediately cease at the flick of a switch and because one of the benefits marriage seeks is love nor should marriage. It seems to me that it should only be possible to dissolve a marriage after a reasonable amount of time or after counselling. It seems if a couple agree to love and support each other in marriage that this agreement was meaningless if after six months they decide to part. I accept promising to love is different to agreeing to pay back a bank loan. The conditions of a bank loan are simple but because love in some ways resembles something organic the conditions of love are far from simple. Never the less if a married couple agree to love and support each other this agreement should have some persistence. Perhaps such a couple should not be able to dissolve their marriage for two to four years. Most married couples have some difficulties in their relationships. This is only natural in any newly formed relationship. These difficulties can often be resolved by time and this supports my argument that any marriage agreement should have some persistence. Sometimes these difficulties may seem irresolvable to the couple involved but might be resolved by counselling. If a married couple seek counselling and their problems remain irresolvable then I believe this fact alone should be sufficient grounds for dissolving the marriage.

I have argued the gradual easement in the conditions needed to dissolve a marriage have damaged some of the benefits marriage delivers. For this reason I have argued it should become harder to dissolve a marriage and suggested ways this might be done. I now want to consider two alternatives to making it harder to dissolve a marriage. Firstly it might be argued that there are better solutions to the current problems associated with marriage than those I have suggested. It might be argued that pre-nuptial agreements or covenant marriage offer better solutions without the need to make marriage in general harder to dissolve. Pre-nuptial agreements will be considered in any divorce but are not legally binding in the UK. More over pre-nuptial agreements are primarily concerned with the division of assets on the dissolution of a marriage. Such agreements do not seem to address marriage’s current problems. None the less it might be argued that pre-nuptial agreements should be made legally binding and extended to cover more than how assets are to be divided if a marriage ends. If this was done then pre-nuptial agreements would become similar to covenant marriages which are encouraged by evangelical Christians and recognised by some states in the USA, Arizona, Arkansas and Louisiana. However there is a very low uptake of covenant marriages even in the states in which these are offered. More over three types of marriage, civil partnerships, normal, and covenant marriage seem to offer too may options. For these reasons it seems to me neither pre-nuptial agreements nor covenant marriage offer solutions to marriage’s current problems. Secondly it might be objected marriage’s problems are really problems about love and we should seek to encourage the conditions in which love can flourish rather than tinker around with the conditions of marriage. I myself have some sympathy for this position. I would point out however that marriage encourages love. It seems both of these alternatives to making marriage harder to dissolve ultimately fail. I therefore conclude marriage should be made harder to dissolve and that heterosexual couples who do not wish to accept these more stringent conditions should enter into civil partnerships which give them all the material protection of marriage. Marriage should only be dissolved in the case of violence, after a period of two to four years or after unsuccessful counselling.

Loving Relationships

In this posting I specifically want to examine loving relationships. It is generally accepted our lives are meaningless if we don’t love anything or anybody. Our lives are given meaning by loving a cause, a place, children, another person in another person an erotic manner and so on. Moreover even if we love are lives are still further enriched if we are also loved in a loving relationship. Someone can love a cause or country but she cannot be in a loving relationship with either. Only other creatures can love us. I have purposely used the word creature because it might be argued one reason why so many people keep pets is an overwhelming need to be loved. Accepting the above would explain why dogs are such popular pets. Dogs seem better able to return their owners love than other pets. However in what follows I am only interested in loving relationships between people. Loving places conditions on the lover. I will now set out these conditions and then examine how these conditions affect loving relationships.

I will assume that love is not merely some intermittent emotion or a disposition to feel some emotion. I will further assume that loving involves persistent disinterested “caring about” as envisioned by Harry Frankfurt (1). What constraints does Frankfurt’s concept of loving place on lovers? I suggest loving places three constraints on lovers. Firstly loving means the lover must disinterestedly care about her beloved. This in turn means the lover must identify herself with her beloved interests. A lover will be harmed if her beloved interests are damaged. It follows a lover must feel some empathy for her beloved. Secondly love must have some persistence. If you love someone you cannot simply stop loving her and walk away unharmed. It is of course possible for love to slowly fade or to end a relationship even if one continues to love the beloved. For instance one may continue to love someone and still end this relationship provided you believe that by doing so you are acting in the beloved best interests. However doing so will of necessity hurt the lover. The third constraint is that the lover must be satisfied with her beloved. This satisfaction is not a feeling of smug satisfaction. The satisfaction of the lover is simply a complete absence of any restlessness to change her beloved. For instance if you love a particular person you are satisfied with your love and have no desire to change even if someone who is more attractive becomes available. I will now consider how these conditions affect loving relationships.

Let it be accepted that people benefit from both loving and being loved. For these reasons people seek to enter into loving relationships. I will define a loving relationship as one that involves both loving and being loved. It follows both parties in a loving relationship must be capable of loving. It further follows somewhat surprisingly that a mother’s relationship with her very young baby is not a loving relationship. The mother simply loves her baby. None the less parents can quickly enter into loving relationships with their children as quite young children can fulfil the three conditions needed for love outlined above. What do these three conditions outlined above mean to a loving relationship? First someone entering into a loving relationship must be prepared to increase her vulnerability. This follows as by identifying with her beloved’s interests, interests she cannot control, a lover risks being harmed. The second point is connected to the first. Because a lover identifies herself with her beloved’s interests and loving must have persistence any lover in a loving relationship must be prepared to give up part of her freedom. Lastly because a lover must be satisfied in her love she must accept her beloved as he is. Any lover who simply tries to change her beloved is not acting in a disinterested manner. This position is in stark contrast to the Platonic one. Plato held that a lover did not really love her beloved as such but rather loved the admirable qualities he possessed. It would appear to follow from this if a lover could find these admirable qualities in greater abundance in another beloved that she should not be satisfied and seek to change her beloved. I will now consider the practical implications of the above.

Many couples live together instead of marrying. Such relationships often are loving relationships. None the less some such couples often give the ease of ending their relationship as one of the main reasons for living together instead of getting married. However if such a relationship can be so easily ended, with no messy consequences, I would argue the partners do not make themselves vulnerable or cede any of their freedom in the relationship. It follows such a relationship is not a loving relationship. It is impossible to easily end a loving relationship without the lover’s being hurt. Let it be assumed a couple live together rather than get married, their reason being their relationship can be easily ended if they desire to do so and that theirs is in this particular case is a loving relationship. It follows this couple’s reason for living together instead of marrying carries no weight. Indeed I would argue, because love demands commitment and marriage also demands commitment, they would be better demonstrating their existing commitment by marrying.

People benefit from both loving and being loved for these reasons people seek to enter into loving relationships. However it is important to be clear, that when someone enters into a relationship she does so to seek love rather than because she already loves her beloved. If someone loves another then by definition she is already in a relationship with him. It is important to be clear what seeking love in a loving relationship requires. If someone seeks only being loved in a loving relationship and her beloved loves her then of course she is loved but she is mistaken if she believes she is in a loving relationship.  A loving relationship involves both partners loving and being loved. To create a loving relationship someone must not only seek to be loved but also to love. Furthermore even if someone brings love to a relationship she must bring the right sort of love, she must love her beloved. For instance someone might only bring loving being loved to a relationship. Indeed it seems in our current culture this is all some lazy and self-indulgent people seem capable of bringing to a so called loving relationship. Loving being loved is a distorted or perverted type of love. This is because loving being loved is not loving in a disinterested way. Admittedly it is not always easy to love someone in a disinterested manner. For example it is impossible for someone to love another simply by willing to love him however hard she tries. Some people believe we can achieve almost anything by sheer perseverance and acts of will. If they believe loving is one of the things that can be achieved in this manner they are deluding themselves. What we love is beyond our volitional control. We cannot make ourselves love someone. It follows we cannot turn a relationship into a loving relationship by simply willing to love our partner. If someone wishes her relationship with her partner will develop into a loving relationship the best she can do is encourage the circumstances in which love is likely to occur naturally. To do this she should try to encourage her natural sympathy, or preferably empathy, for her partner.

I now want to consider loving relationships that are incomplete or corrupted. Such relationships involve both partners loving and being loved to some degree. However such a relationship is incomplete because one of the partners is unwilling or unable to accept that genuine love constrains him and hence makes him vulnerable. The lover in such a relationship wants love and is indeed prepared to love; but only on his own terms. The fact this lover only wants to love on his own terms suggests to me that the love he brings to this relationship is incomplete. I have argued that a lover must disinterestedly care about his beloved. A lover who only wants to love on his own terms does not genuinely disinterestedly care about his beloved. Such a lover does not genuinely love his beloved. None the less there are degrees of disinterestedness and this lover may love his beloved to some lesser degree. Because of this I have suggested his love is incomplete. In many cases a lover wants to love on his own terms because he wants to retain power in the relationship. Wanting to retain power in a loving relationship corrupts the relationship because one partner’s love is incomplete. Wanting to retain power in a relationship is usually, but not exclusively, connected to men. The above seems to suggest that marriages in some cultures in which husbands retain power over their wives, such as Moslem culture, are at best concerned with corrupted loving relationships. I will not consider in this posting whether a marriage should be based on a loving relationship.

I have argued we cannot will ourselves to love and that any attempt to do so fails to understand the constraints of love. I have argued in a corrupt loving relationship some love still exists. It follows in such a relationship something might be done to help the relationship. I have defined such a relationship as one in which one of the partner’s only wants to love on his own terms because he is unable or unwilling to make himself vulnerable. If a lover is unable to love except on his own terms then perhaps little might be done to improve the relationship. Perhaps as I have suggested above the circumstances in which love might grow should be encouraged. If a partner is unwilling to love except on his own terms more might be done. Let it be assumed that such a lover genuinely wants to love. The reason why he is unable to do so is his unwillingness to make himself truly vulnerable to his beloved’s interests. The lover might fear that by doing so he would weaken himself. Let it be accepted if a lover makes himself vulnerable he requires courage. Fear weakens someone and courage strengthens him. It might then be pointed out to a lover, who only wishes to love on his own terms, that genuine committed love might actually make him stronger. It might be further pointed out to men in particular who fear losing power that this fear actually weakens them.

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, chapter 14.

Terrorism, Love and Self Delusion

Recently Irish republican dissidents have murdered two British soldiers and a policeman. It is important to combat these crimes; this of course involves law enforcement. But these crimes can also be combated by preventing the circumstances in which they are likely to arise. As a philosopher I believe in order to do this it is necessary to try and understand the motives of the people involved. These murders have been condemned as cowardly by Gordon Brown and large sections of the British Press. However if we are to understand the motives of these people then we must be accurate in the way we describe them. It seems to me to be both inaccurate and intellectually lazy to describe such people as cowardly. It takes courage to commit suicide; cold blooded murder, however wrong, also takes courage. In this posting I intend to examine the murderers’ motives from a philosophical standpoint. In particular I will suggest these murderers’ motives are often linked to their self esteem.

Ask these murderers about their motives and they would probably say it is to drive the British out of Ireland and bring about a united state in which all Irish people can live in happy harmony. The question must then be asked can any rational person believe, after truthful reflection, that killing soldiers and police officers is likely to further this cause. The answer is an emphatic no. This no is evidenced by the change in attitude of Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and the provisional IRA. It follows our murderers are either not truthful or irrational. They appear to be rational enough to plan and execute their murders. It further follows if they are not irrational then they are untruthful. However they are not untruthful in a straightforward way by lying to others. They are untruthful to themselves. They are deluding themselves as to their true motives.

If we are to understand the motives of these murderers then we must first of all understand them as people. This means we must be careful with our rhetoric and not get carried away by regarding them as cowardly animals totally unlike ourselves. It seems evident such people are failing to flourish and suffer from a poor self image. This failure to flourish may be due in part to a deprived background. This deprivation may be due to poor educational opportunities or a lack of meaningful jobs. However it may also be due to a lack of love. The two are not unconnected poor and poorly educated parents who lack meaningful opportunities may sometimes find it hard to love. The natural response by those suffering from a poor self image is to try and improve it. One way such people may try to improve their self image is by devoting themselves to a cause such as a prosperous United Ireland. By doing so they might see themselves as heroes. I have suggested above if they do so they are dishonest with themselves. The way in which they are dishonest with themselves is that they fail to give adequate weight to all their reasons for action. This failing may be simply due to laziness or self indulgence. A failure to consider all the means that possibly might achieve their goal allows them to select a means specifically intended to indulge an image of themselves as heroes. Moreover this indulgent self image is self deceiving because it is not a true self image. An accurate self image depends on the agent considering all the options open to him, including the unpalatable ones. However an accurate self image is not the one these people seek, rather they seek an image of which they themselves approve.

I have argued these people have the virtue of courage. But courage is a self regarding virtue, an instrumental virtue, that can be used for good or evil. The virtue such people lack is love as they seem unable to feel empathy or sympathy for their victims. It might be objected the above conclusion is false and that they love the cause of a United Ireland. In order to address this objection it is necessary to briefly consider the nature of love. The love in question is not of course erotic love but rather the love of a mother for a child or perhaps, with particular resonance to this posting, the love of a patriot for his country. This type of love is a type of “caring about” in the way considered by Frankfurt.

“Love is, most centrally a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and what is good for it. The lover desires that his beloved flourishes and is not be harmed; and he does not desire this just for the sake of promoting some other goal.” (Frankfurt, H. 2004, The Reasons of Love, Princeton University Press, page 42)

It is important to be clear what is meant by disinterested in this context. Disinterested does not mean the lover is not harmed if his beloved is harmed. It follows natural empathy can be an example of love. Love of this sort is characterised by a kind of satisfaction according to Frankfurt.

“What satisfaction does entail is an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change” (Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 103)

We are now in a position to see why the sort of love possessed by the people who kill others in the cause of a United Ireland is not a genuine kind of love. The reason being it is not a disinterested kind of love. Their love of Ireland originates in a need to bolster their self image. In addition this love is not characterised by simply being satisfied but rather by a need to be self satisfied.

I have argued that the sort of love possessed by dissident republican killers is not genuine love. However I have also argued it is wrong to characterise such people as cowardly and that indeed they may act bravely. The question might then be raised do these people need the excuse, of loving a United Ireland in order to consider themselves, or to be considered by others, as heroes. It seems clear that bravery alone is not enough for someone to be considered as a hero. Bank robbing is not for the timid. One needs some courage to rob a bank but bank robbers are no heroes. Intuitively a heroic action is an action is carried out for some cause. An agent’s self interest is not a suitable cause. Someone may be a hero for saving someone from drowning none the less he is not a hero for saving himself from drowning. It follows the cause must be something the hero is concerned about in a disinterested way. It further follows if we adopt Frankfurt’s concept of love used above then by definition a hero is someone who acts bravely because of love. It might be objected my definition is too restrictive because it means a soldier fighting for a clearly unjust cause can never be considered to be a hero. I believe this objection to be groundless. A soldier who acts with extreme bravery in the pursuit of unjust cause he does not love is no hero. Indeed it might be questioned whether he is very rational and that his bravery might be better directed elsewhere. Never the less a soldier fighting for unjust cause he does not love may still be a hero. He might act bravely to save colleagues he loves for instance. A dissident republican murderer does not act to save colleagues he loves. It follows if my definition of a hero is accepted that it is not justifiable to consider such people to be heroes as they lack genuine love.

If my analysis of the motivation of these murderers is accepted does it allow us to take any useful steps, in addition to law enforcement, to reduce such crimes? This might be attempted in two ways. Firstly by helping to reduce the number of people suffering from low self esteem. And secondly by showing violence in practice hinders the cause of a United Ireland.

I have argued one of the causes of low self esteem is deprivation. This deprivation may be due to a lack of meaningful opportunities or parental love. It is of course true not all people who lack opportunities or who have suffered from poor parenting lack of self esteem. Never the less deprivation does play some part in the development of low self esteem. All good governments as a matter of course seek to improve the number of meaningful opportunities open to their citizens. It follows my considerations of self esteem are not useful with regard to meaningful opportunities. Self esteem also depends on being loved and wanted. Deprived and inarticulate parents often find it hard to give or to express their love. It is difficult to help deprived parents who are unable to love. However more might be done about inarticulate parents unable to express their love. The government’s SureStart program, the responsibility of the devolved assembly in Northern Ireland, seeks to improve health and emotional development of young children, see www.surestart.gov.uk. This Program seems a good place to help mostly mothers, but also fathers, express their love as the emotional development of children is part of SureStart’s remit. If the SureStart program is to successfully fulfill this part of its remit then any SureStart scheme for pre school children must not be simply seen as a form of childcare enabling mothers to work and get off benefits. It must encourage the mother’s active participation. This participation should mean mothers participating with children and other mothers rather than taking part in any form of administration. Such participation alone might aid inarticulate mothers express their natural love for their children and so foster self esteem.

If parents express love for their children these children will automatically feel wanted. However a few parents even with help might find this hard to do. Perhaps then schools should also help children to feel wanted and by so doing help increase their pupil’s self esteem. Almost all schools have policies concerning pupils respecting other pupils and teachers. It might be argued such a policy of respect naturally fosters self esteem. Any such argument seems to me to be simply rhetoric. Respect is important but self esteem depends on feeling loved and wanted. It is perfectly possible to respect someone without any feelings of love for that person or needing her. Schools are not in the business of loving. It might be objected if loving is the same as Frankfurt’s “caring about” then schools should be in the business of loving. Regardless of whether schools are in the business of loving they can foster a sense of being wanted by their pupils. This sense of being wanted cannot be fostered by only respecting their pupils but must involve actively seeking to include all pupils in a school’s activities. Great stress is now placed on pupils achieving five good GCSE passes. Helping pupils obtain such passes is important but it does not contribute to making them feel wanted. To make pupils feel wanted schools must have a broad range of activities so at least one of these activities will be of interest to most of their pupils. If pupils can contribute to something which interests them then they are more likely to feel wanted by their school and this in turn might help bolster their self esteem. This range of activities should include drama, sport, music, participation in the community and craft or trade based options for the less academically able. It might be argued this would be difficult to do in the present economic circumstances. I believe this broadening of activities should be attempted even if money has to be diverted from more academic concerns. It might be argued by some that my concern as to whether or not schools make their pupils feel wanted has very little connection with terrorism. I would disagree recent research by Traci Wike and Mark Fraser on American school massacres, suggests the more attached a school’s pupils are to the school, the more they feel needed, the lower the risk of a school massacre, see New Scientist of 21/03/09.

The above measures are long term but none the less it is important that they are implemented now if future generations are to be protected from terrorism. Are there any more short term measures which might prove useful? It seems self evident that a campaign of violence will never result in a United Ireland due to the large number of Protestants living in Ulster; though perhaps a United Ireland might be reached slowly by other means. I have argued that dissident republican killers seek to improve their self image by devoting themselves to the cause of a prosperous United Ireland and by so doing they see themselves as some sort of heroes. In so doing they delude themselves. It is difficult or nigh impossible to reason directly with the deluded. However it is also nigh impossible for someone to delude himself unless he has at least some others supporting his delusion. For instance it would be almost impossible for a paedophile to believe his actions cause no harm due to the lack of any others supporting his belief. The above suggests if those who support the killers’ delusions can be shown, that the cause of a United Ireland is set back by violence and hence cease to give their tacit support for this belief, then perhaps such peoples’ delusions might be indirectly eroded. In conclusion I have dealt only with dissident republican terrorists in this posting but my comments can easily be transferred to other terrorists groups such as Al Qaida.

Assisted Suicide, Slippery Slopes and Empathic Caring

This posting is in part a response to a program on BBC 1 on Sunday 25 January 2009. This program is about the death of Dr Anne Turner who ended her life in Switzerland with the help of the Dignitas clinic. I want to use the death of Dr Turner as a starting point to examine slippery slope arguments. I will argue the success or failure of these arguments depends upon the moral background involved. However before proceeding it is important to make some distinctions. Euthanasia usually means helping severely-ill people die. This can be done at their request, voluntary euthanasia, or by taking a decision to withdraw their life support systems. Voluntary euthanasia can occur in two ways. Firstly actively killing the patient or secondly by providing him with the means by which he can end his own life. The latter might be more accurately described as assisted suicide. Clearly Dr Turner’s death was a case of assisted suicide.

There are generally two types of argument employed against the permissibility of assisted suicide. The first type is faith based. These arguments are usually based on beliefs concerning the sanctity of life or that God alone can decide whether someone should die. It might be remarked that many born again Christians, especially in the USA, have such beliefs but bizarrely also believe in capital punishment. It would seem that to some people such faith based arguments are in reality convenient rather than deeply held. I intend to ignore all faith based arguments and treat them as irrelevant. The second type of arguments, commonly used against the permissibility of assisted suicide, are slippery slope arguments. The central concern of this posting is whether slippery slope arguments against the permissibility of assisted suicide are good arguments.

There are basically two types of slippery slope arguments. Firstly some minor action may be wrong. Tolerating such a minor action leads to a slippery slope opening the way to some unwanted consequences. However it seems provided we ignore faith based reasons against the permissibility of Dr Turner’s assisted suicide that her action was not a wrong action when considered in isolation. Indeed I would argue when considered in isolation her action was both good and brave. Secondly some action, though not wrong in itself, causes other unwanted consequences. For instance it might be argued if we permit people like Dr Turner to undergo assisted suicide then old and vulnerable people will be encouraged to seek assisted suicide even if this contradicts their true wishes. It is only this second type of slippery slope argument I wish to consider.

Let us first consider the validity of the slippery slope argument in the context of a consequentialist account of morality. In this context the unwanted consequences of the slippery slope are harm to others. I will assume that if Dr Turner’s assisted suicide was considered in isolation it would be justified in consequentialist terms. Further it seems clear that the manner of her death cannot be said to directly cause vulnerable old people to seek assisted suicide against their true wishes. However let it be assumed Dr Turner’s assisted suicide means it is more probable that vulnerable people might be encouraged to seek assisted suicide against their wishes. The question to be answered is this, if we accept both the above assumption and adopt a consequentialist account of ethics is the slippery slope argument a good argument? Before answering this question I want to qualify the above assumption. It is clearly dangerous to equate someone’s wishes with his so called ‘true wishes’ when we in part define his ‘true wishes’ to be the wishes he would have had provided he thought more rationally about these wishes (1).  Clearly some people have a wish to end their lives peacefully and we disrespect them if we believe this to be a false wish. However I accept that Dr Turner’s assisted suicide means it is possible that some vulnerable people will be encouraged to seek assisted suicide against their wishes. It follows though Dr Turner’s action was not wrong when considered in isolation it might cause harm to others. Accepting the above leads to the following conclusion; provided the benefits of permitting assisted suicide are outweighed by the harms caused to vulnerable elderly people means the slippery slope argument may well be a good argument in a consequentialist context.

I now want to consider Dr Turner’s action in a different moral context. This context assumes that the basis of morality is based on caring. Further this caring is affective being based on either sympathy or empathy. Once again I will assume that Dr Turner’s action was not wrong in isolation. Is the practice of assisted suicide permissible in this moral context? Michael Slote defines an action to be morally wrong and contrary to moral obligation if and only if it reflects, exhibits or expresses an absence of a fully developed empathic concern for (caring about) others on behalf of the agent (2). I believe this definition adequately defines any system of caring morality subject to suitable substitutions, for instance sympathetic concern might be substituted for empathic concern. Prima facie it might be concluded using the above definition that any action, prohibiting a terminally ill patient who genuinely wishes to undergo assisted suicide from doing so expresses an absence of a fully developed empathic concern for the person involved. It follows in this context prohibiting assisted suicide is wrong and that Anne Turners actions were perfectly justified if we ignore any possible slippery slope arguments.

Are slippery slope arguments good arguments if our moral concerns have an affective basis? It is important to note that in an affective context slippery slope arguments take a slightly different form to the one used in a consequentialist context. In a caring context the unwanted consequences of the slippery slope are actions, not the consequences of actions, which fail to exhibit a fully developed empathic concern for others. It might be objected that in a caring context harm to others should be of prime importance. Prima facie it would seem that if caring actions are of prime importance that harm to others will be automatically considered. I will now consider two objections to the above conclusion. The first objection does not involve any slippery slopes. It might be objected empathic caring involves more than simply helping satisfy someone’s desires. For example desires such as Anne Turner’s desire to be assisted when committing suicide. Empathic caring is a deeper concept than it initially appears to be. Accepting this objection might mean it is possible to prevent someone from undergoing assisted suicide whilst still exhibiting empathic concern towards him. Secondly it might be objected, using a slippery slope type of argument, that if we permit assisted suicide due to our empathic concern for some individual we are lead to exhibit a lack of empathic concern for others in particular old and vulnerable people. I will consider the first objection first. There are two points that count against this objection. I have pointed out above it is dangerous to equate someone’s wishes with his so called ‘true wishes’ when we in part define his ‘true wishes’. If we come to equate empathic caring with being concerned with someone’s deeper desires might we not ourselves be partly defining these desires? In these circumstances might we not be accused of exhibiting epistemic arrogance? See my posting of parenting and excessive guidance . My second point is connected to my first and concerns autonomy. I am happy to concede empathic caring involves more than simply helping satisfy someone’s desires. However I am not prepared to concede empathic caring requires that we might give priority to acting beneficently, as defined by us, towards someone over respecting his autonomy. Indeed true beneficence would seem to be impossible without considering an agent’s autonomous desires, see for instance (3) I believe true empathic caring requires that we must give priority to respecting someone’s autonomy over acting beneficently, as defined by us, towards him; see my posting of caring, empathy and love. Once again if we fail to respect someone’s autonomy and instead satisfy his ‘true needs’ we might be accused of epistemic arrogance. It follows that prohibiting a terminally sick person who genuinely wishes to undergo assisted suicide from doing so expresses an absence of a fully developed empathic concern for that person. However the above arguments would fail if our moral concern was based on sympathy rather than empathy. It is possible to act sympathetically towards someone provided we suffer from epistemic ignorance.

It follows that in an emotive moral context whether assisted suicide is justifiable might depend on whether the emotion involved is sympathy or empathy. My remarks concerning epistemic ignorance suggest I prefer a morality based on empathy. I accept that our natural sympathy is the initial basis on which children start to make moral decisions. However as children develop they acquire greater cognitive skills and empathic caring augments their natural sympathy. Moral development is a natural process. Due to this natural moral development I believe empathic caring can form the basis of our moral concern.

I will now consider the second objection to the above conclusion. This objection argues that if empathic caring forms the basis of our moral concern then we might exhibit a lack of empathic concern for the old and vulnerable by permitting assisted suicide. It might be counter argued empathic caring naturally involves giving more weight to immediate concerns rather than theoretical or distant concerns. For instance we naturally have more empathy for someone we actually know rather than people we just know about. This is true but none the less someone might point out our more limited empathic concern about a large number of distant people might still outweigh our immediate concern for some individual we personally know. It appears to follow even if we have great concern for someone who wishes to undergo assisted suicide we might have greater still concern for the large number of vulnerable people who might be encouraged to seek assisted suicide counter to their actual wishes. However it seems to me anyone who employs this counter argument fails to properly understand empathic caring for two reasons. Firstly anyone weighing concerns as suggested above seems to be doing a calculus of empathic caring. Empathic caring employing such a calculus seems to become merely another form of consequentialism. Empathic caring is not a form of consequentialism, indeed it is partly a reaction to consequentialism. Secondly it might be questioned whether prohibiting assisted suicide is indeed a form of empathic caring for old and vulnerable people. I have suggested above that empathic caring might be a deeper concept than it initially appears to be. It seems to me true empathic caring involves actual involvement with old vulnerable people rather than simply banning some action which might or might not harm them. It follows from the above if our moral concerns are based on empathic caring that slippery slope arguments are not good arguments for the impermissibility of assisted suicide.

1. Berlin,1969, Four essays on liberty, The Clarendon Press, page 32.
2. Slote, 2007. The Ethics of Caring and Empathy, Routledge, page 31
3. Welie and Welie, 2001, Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 4(2), page 130

Evil and Empathy

In my last posting I associated evil with moral disability rather than moral insanity as proposed by Grayling in the New Scientist of 17/05/08. I stated it is hard to be angry with someone who is disabled due to her disability. However it appears to follow if my definition of moral disability is accepted that it becomes hard to associate anger with evil. Intuitively anger seems to be a justified reaction to evil, perhaps even a necessary reaction, see Hugh Thompson's  anger in response to the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. Further accepting my definition might imply that if someone is morally disabled it is hard to hold her morally accountable for her actions. In this posting I will further examine the ideas of moral disability and understanding in an attempt to resolve these two problems.

In  moral insanity  I defined someone to be morally insane if she acted contrary to accepted moral dictates she understood due to her inability to feel empathic concern for others. In that posting I argued moral disability is a more useful definition than that of moral insanity. I defined someone to be morally disabled if she did not have the capacity to feel sympathy for others when making moral decisions. Critical to both these definitions is what is meant by moral understanding. I have previously argued moral understanding depends on an affective element. It might be objected of course moral understanding should not be dependant on our emotions. Moral understanding should be based solely on reason. This would certainly be the Kantian position. Let it be accepted that moral understanding is based on reasons. Reason and reasons need not be identical. Reasons may be purely logical or simply based on our feelings, emotions. It follows if moral understanding is based on reasons that moral understanding might at least include an affective element.

In order to get a better grip on the idea of moral understanding we must examine moral reasons. Internalism about moral judgement holds if someone makes a moral judgement that x is wrong then she has a motivation not to do x. I believe internalism concerning moral judgements is true. Moreover I doubt if someone who judges that doing x is wrong but has no motivation not to do x truly understands the meaning of moral judgement. In what follows I hold if I have moral reasons not to do x then I am also motivated not to do x. For instance if I believe stealing is wrong I am motivated not to steal. I have argued moral reasons might include an affective element. This affective element can be incorporated into moral theories in different ways. For instance Shaun Nichols believes we base our moral judgements on a set of moral norms and on an affective response to these norms, he calls this system of moral judgement a sentimental rules system (1). A different approach is taken by Jesse Prinz who argues that a moral judgement is right or wrong simply if the agent has dispositions to feel approbation or disapprobation towards it (2). It is important to note that in all moral theories based on our emotions the affective element plays an essential part in moral understanding, remove the affective element and the theory ceases to be a moral theory. Because our emotions play an essential part in our moral understanding according to these theories it follows these same emotions motivate us morally. It further follows my account of moral disability seems to be a perfectly adequate account. Unfortunately it also appears follow if someone is morally disabled using my definition then it is hard to hold her morally accountable for her actions even if she fully understands that society holds that these actions are morally wrong.

Let it be accepted that internalism concerning moral judgements is true. This means if someone makes a moral judgement that x is wrong she has a motivation not to do x. Let it be assumed someone makes a judgement that x is wrong and she has a non-affective motivation not to do x. The question I wish to explore is whether such a judgement could be regarded as a moral judgement. In order to answer this question we must ask why someone judges doing X is wrong. There would seem to be two possible reasons why she should be motivated not to act. Firstly she might judge doing x is wrong for him due to self interest. For instance he might believe stealing is wrong only because he believes she will be caught and punished. In this context her judgement would not be a moral judgement. I will not pursue this option. Secondly someone might judge doing x is wrong because society says doing x is immoral. In this second context she might also be motivated not to do x out of self interest. The question now becomes this, is she making a moral judgement in this second scenario? The answer to this question is important because if we believe she is making a moral judgement we can hold her morally accountable. If we accept Kohlberg’s account of moral development then she is indeed making a moral decision. Stage one of his account is based on an agent simply acting out of obedience or because she fears punishment. In stage two an agent is acting out of self interest. Accepting Kohlberg’s account of moral development means my account of moral disability would need re-examining. Someone whose moral decisions are affect free might be best described as someone whose moral development is stunted. Moral disability then might be a matter of degree much the same as physical or mental disability. It appears to follow that someone might be held morally accountable for some of his moral decisions and not for others. It further follows that not all moral decisions require an affective element. It would still further follow my account of moral disability is at best an inadequate account.

However accepting Kohlberg’s account of moral development creates a problem. This problem occurs because if decisions are made using the means available at stage 1 and 2 of his system there seems little, if indeed anything, to differentiate moral decisions from more conventional decisions. Consider a child who is taught not to hit his younger sister when she pulls his hair. His parents achieve this by withholding their approval and scolding him when he does so. He learns not to hit his sister because he wants his mum and dad’s approval, he acts out of self-interest. When he decides not to hit his sister if she pulls his hair his decision is a moral decision, albeit a primitive one, according to Kohlberg’s account of moral development. Now let us consider the same boy when he learns to use a knife and fork for eating as opposed to his hands. Once again his parents do so by withholding their approval and scolding him when he eats with his hands. Let it be assumed he decides to use a knife and fork for the same reasons he decides not to hit his sister. It follows the structure of his decision-making is identical in both cases. His decision not to hit his sister is a primitive moral decision according to Kohlberg’s account whilst his second decision appears to be one of simple etiquette. However it seems ridiculous to equate moral decisions with those of etiquette. Moreover children soon learn to distinguish between decisions prohibiting harm and more conventional decisions concerning etiquette at an early age, usually between the age of two and three. Further it seems highly improbable that a child learns to make this distinction due to an increase in her cognitive powers because sociopaths who have much greater cognitive capacities than her seem unable to make this distinction. This leads me to conclude that Kohlberg was mistaken in his belief that decisions motivated simply by obedience or self interest can be moral decisions. Moreover the fact that someone can make understand the difference between moral and more conventional decisions at an early age suggests that Kant was wrong to believe moral decisions must be rational decisions. It would seem that moral decisions must include an affective element. It follows my definition of moral disability might be an adequate definition.

Accepting that a moral decision must include an affective element has important implications. Firstly it would seem that some people are totally morally disabled if they feel no adverse emotions at all when harming others. Sociopaths would seem to be totally morally disabled. Secondly I have argued Kohlberg’s account of moral development at stages one and two does not concur with experimental evidence concerning children’s abilities to distinguish between decisions prohibiting harm and conventional decisions. But accepting my conclusion does not imply moral development doesn’t occur and that people cannot be partially morally disabled. Moral development might still occur in two ways. First we might develop new moral emotions. We might for instance come to have feelings of approbation towards those who act altruistically. Secondly we might learn how to understand the contexts, in which moral decisions are made as our cognitive powers increase, better. For instance we might come to see animals as capable of suffering and hence worthy of inclusion in the moral domain. It therefore seems that my initial account of moral disability is an incomplete account and that moral disability might be better described as follows.

1. Someone is totally morally disabled if she does not have any capacity to feel sympathy when making moral decisions.
2. Someone is partially morally disabled if she has only limited capacity to feel sympathy when making moral decisions or lacks the cognitive abilities to fully understand the contexts in which these decisions are made.

In the light of my revised definitions of moral disability I will now consider the two questions I posed at the start of this posting. Firstly if my revised definition is accepted is it appropriate to express anger when the totally or partially morally disabled commit evil acts? The discussion above suggests this question is inappropriate. I have argued if we judge an act as morally wrong that this judgement must include an affective response. It follows judging an act to be evil means we must of necessity feel some emotion. It seems natural to me that this necessary emotional response should be one of anger. It follows anger is an unavoidable response by us if we judge something as evil.

The second question I posed is this. If someone is morally disabled can I hold her responsible for her evil actions? I will answer this question in two parts. First let it be assumed that someone who is morally disabled acts in a mean or evil manner towards me or others and that her actions are not criminal actions. Perhaps for example they spread malicious gossip about me. Let it be further assumed this person is either totally or partially disabled as defined above, perhaps she is autistic. In such a case I believe I should make allowances for the person concerned and not apportion blame. I will of course be naturally angry as argued above. The second part of my answer to the above question is of much greater practical importance. Should we apportion blame to someone who is morally disabled and commits some evil crime? Our legal system is concerned with whether such a person is responsible for her actions. The cognitively impaired and young children are held to not responsible for their actions. The Courts may still take action even if they do not apportion blame. For example a sociopath may be sent to Broadmoor rather than punished. The criteria used in deciding if attaching blame is appropriate are based on determining whether the defendant has and is capable of using the requisite cognitive powers. Sometimes these cognitive powers may be overwhelmed and the legal system allows for this. For instance the case of B who refused to give informed consent to a caesarean section due to her fear of needles (3). In cases such as that of B the question the Court considered whether the defendant’s passions override her cognitive abilities. However in the light of the above I would suggest someone may have perfectly adequate cognitive powers and these are not overwhelmed yet still be morally responsible for her actions. She is morally disabled because she has limited affective capacities to guide her cognitive capacities. Someone who is cognitively disabled cannot be held responsible for her actions. I would suggest similarly someone who is affectively disabled should not be held fully responsible for her actions I would further suggest our legal system should not only be interested in whether a defendant has excessive passions overwhelming her cognitive capacities but also whether she has only limited affective capacities to guide her cognitive capacities. It might be argued that in practice this assessment is difficult, but is it any more difficult than assessing someone’s cognitive abilities? A defendant might well hide her cognitive abilities in order to be found not guilty due to diminished responsibility.

1. Shaun Nichols, 2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford University Press.
2. Jesse Prinz, 2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford University Press.
3. Re B (Adult; Refusal of medical treatment) [2002] All ER 449