In my last posting I examined whether we should morally
bio-enhance psychopaths. I concluded that we should encourage such
enhancement. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that there is a need for
a much more widespread moral enhancement in order to counter the existential dangers
our modern world poses (1). They argue that because our morality developed in
small communities it is unsuitable for combatting these dangers. I accept that
there is a need for such enhancement. In this posting I want to examine how widespread
such enhancement needs to be in order to be effective and how such enhancement might
be implemented.
Some might argue that if we change our society by becoming
more tolerant then we will naturally morally enhance the members of society. If
someone lives in a brutal society then she is more likely to act in a brutal
manner, whilst if she lives in a tolerant society her toleration is likely to increase.
Stephen Pinker argues that this is already be happening (2). I believe society
can change people, enhance people, but that this change is extremely slow. The existential
dangers we face are pressing and it seems likely that moral enhancement by
creating a more tolerant society might be too slow to combat these dangers.
Persson and Savulescu favour moral
bio-enhancement. According to them provided such enhancement is proven to be
safe then,
“some children should be subjected to moral
bio-enhancement, just as they are now subjected to traditional moral education.”
(3)
What exactly do Persson and Savulescu mean by moral
bio-enhancement? They argue that moral bio-enhancement should seek to increase
our dispositions for altruism and justice They argue moral bio-enhancement
should do so by making,
“men in
general more moral by bio-medical methods through making them more like the men
who are more like women in respect of sympathy and aggression, but without the
tendency to social forms of aggression.” (4)
Such bio-enhancement is aimed at changing our
dispositions in respect to empathy or sympathy but does not seek to change our
cognitive abilities. Let us accept that such enhancement is safe. I now want to
examine two questions regarding this form of enhancement. First is it likely to
be effective and secondly should such enhancement be mandatory or voluntary.
If we simply enhance our disposition for
empathy is such an enhancement likely to combat the dangers facing us? Some
have argued that enhancing someone’s empathy simply increases the degree of
empathy she feels, but doesn’t expand the domain of her empathy. Paul Bloom
questions the benefits of empathy by suggesting that increasing people’s
empathy is more likely to increase tension between different groups rather than
diminish it. (5) If we accept Bloom is correct then we have reason to believe
moral bio-enhancement based solely on enhancing our capacity for empathy would
not be very effective. However, I believe there are reasons why dual
enhancement involving both our capacity for empathy and cognitive abilities might
be more effective, see moral character enhancement . It seems possible that if we enhance our cognitive abilities whilst at
the same enhancing our capacity for empathy that such dual enhancement might
lead to a broadening of the domain of our moral concern. Bloom holds that it is
useful to compare empathy with anger.
“Both are universal responses that emerge in
childhood. Both are social, mainly geared toward other people, distinguishing
them from emotions such as fear and disgust, which are often elicited by
inanimate beings and experiences. Most of all, they are both moral, in that
they connect to judgments of right and wrong.” (6)
Judgments are based on the way we view some situation. The
way we view some situation depends to some degree on our cognitive abilities. It
follows if judgments are similar in some way to empathy that empathy might
also depend to some degree on our cognitive abilities. In the light of the
above it might be sensible to also enhance our cognitive abilities if we are
going to enhance our capacity for empathy. In the light of the above I would suggest that
provided it can be shown that cognitive enhancement enlarges the domain of our
empathy that any moral bio-enhancement should be dual enhancement.
Let us accept that dual moral bio-enhancement
is desirable and that the means of such enhancement are safe. In these
circumstances should such enhancement be mandatory or voluntary? In my previous
posting I argued that any moral bio-enhancement of psychopaths should be
voluntary in order to respect their autonomy. I will now argue the same is true
of more widespread moral bio-enhancement. It might be objected that the need to
counter the threats posed by climate change and nuclear armageddon should trump
respecting autonomy. Indeed, my objector might point out if we don’t deal with
these existential threats there will be few people left whose autonomy we
should respect. In response to my objector I would suggest that there is no
need to make moral bio-enhancement mandatory in order to counter these threats.
It has been assumed that such enhancement has been thoroughly tested and proved
to be both safe and effective. In these circumstances it might appear that any
decision about becoming morally bio-enhanced is simply a no brainer. Surely we
all want to be good people? In response my objector might point out that
vaccines have thoroughly tested and proved to be both safe and effective and in
spite of this some people refuse to have their children vaccinated even though
they desire that their children enjoy good health. She might then argue by
analogy that much the same would apply to any moral bio-enhancement. I am
prepared to accept that my objector is correct in her assessment that some
people would not voluntarily morally bio-enhance themselves. However, I will now
argue that her analogy is unsound. For any vaccination program to be effective
a high percentage of the population need to be vaccinated. For moral
bio-enhancement to be effective, in order to counter existential threats, I
would suggest that only a majority of people need take such enhancement in a
democracy. A majority is all that is needed to enact legislation to counter
these threats. I would further suggest that provided moral bio-enhancement is
proven to be safe and effective a majority of people would take it. It follows
that even if a substantial minority refuse to take such enhancement that there
is no need for such enhancement to be mandatory.
My objector now might raise a further
objection. She might argue that cost of such enhancement might deter a majority
of people from taking it. If the costs of any bio-enhancement are high then I
am prepared to accept my objector’s objection, but I am doubtful whether in practice
such costs would be high. If the majority of the population take such
enhancement, then these large numbers should lower these costs. However, let us
assume I am wrong and that the costs would be high. Let us accept that
civilised society has duty to protect both itself and its citizens from anarchy
and possible destruction. It follows if society faces anarchy and destruction
due to these existential threats which could be avoided by moral
bio-enhancement provided the costs of such enhancement were lower, that society
should subsidise or freely provide moral bio-enhancement. In addition, such
enhancement would carry further benefits for society. If someone is morally
bio-enhanced, then it seems probable that she will be less likely to commit
crime. More fancifully moral bio-enhancement might reduce the threat of
terrorism. Reduced crime would be a saving for society. It follows that society
has financial incentives to encourage moral bio-enhancement. In the light of
the above it seems improbable that the cost of moral bio-enhancement is going
to prevent the majority of people taking it provided it is safe.
In the above it has been assumed that moral
bio-enhancement is safe. This assumption may be false because all drugs have
some side effects. In these circumstances we would still be faced with
existential threats and a morality which seems incapable of addressing these
threats. In these circumstances there is a further alternative we might
consider. Perhaps we might use algorithms to guide our decision making in
response to these threats. It might be objected that the use of algorithms
threatens our autonomy. I response I would argue whether this threat is
meaningful depends on how we use any such algorithms. I am not suggesting we
simply use algorithms to make these difficult decisions for us but rather to guide
our decision making. I am suggesting that we might possibly use algorithms in
assisting us in making moral decisions. Such assistance should be interactive
and the algorithms in question might evolve in response to our interactions. I have
dealt with algorithmic assisted moral decision making at greater length in a
previous posting. Perhaps using algorithms in such a way does not threaten our
autonomy.
- Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.
- Stephen Pinker, 2011, The Better Angels of our Nature, Viking.
- Persson & Savulescu, page 113.
- Persson & Savelescu, page 112.
- Bloom, Paul. Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (pp. 207-208). Random House.
- Bloom, page 207.