In a posting in philosophical
disquisitions John Danaher wonders whether work makes us happy.
Happiness matters to us so this is an important question. Moreover, as Danaher
points out increasing automation might mean that there will be less work in the
future which adds further importance to the question. In this posting I will
argue work can make us happier but that this depends on what we mean by work.
Hannah Arendt makes a distinction between labour and work.
According to Arendt we labour to meet our basic biological needs. In this
posting I won’t be concerned this this basic idea of labour but the broader
concept of work. Perhaps we might try to define work simply as making an effort
for some economic reward or hope of such a reward. Perhaps some people are
lucky and enjoy such work but for many people work so defined is simply a chore
which takes up time they could use to enjoy themselves in other ways. Work for
many people is simply a job. They work for money to enable them to do the
things they really want to, work is instrumental in allowing them to do these
things. However, we don’t have to define work in this way. A stay at home mum
works. Someone else might work in his garden simply because doing so brings him
pleasure. Work, so defined, has intrinsic value. It would seem all work
involves effort. However, we might make an effort for something and in this
case work has instrumental value or we might make an effort at
doing something and work has intrinsic value. It follows that work can be
defined in two ways, either as making an effort for something, working for, or
making an effort at doing something, working at.
Let us now consider the first definition of work, work
defined as making an effort for something. Let us assume that the goods we seek
by work could be delivered by automation. Let us further assume that these
goods could be shared reasonably equitably. Perhaps in the future the state
might introduce a basic income guarantee UBI which would be large enough to
allow people to obtain the goods which previously their income from work provided
for. A guaranteed UBI might only work provided the goods people seek are not
subject to over inflation. If people want ever bigger cars, houses and even
more exotic holidays a guaranteed UBI might prove to be insufficient to deliver
the goods they seek, it should be noted that in such a context work also might
provide insufficient funds to provide these goods. Such a guaranteed UBI is
highly speculative but for the sake of argument let us assume such a guarantee
is both affordable by some future state and can deliver the goods people seek
from work. In this situation it might be suggested, that because the things
people value can be delivered without work and ‘work for something’ has no
intrinsic value that working would not contribute to people’s happiness.
In his posting Danaher considers one argument as to why we
should reject the above suggestion. The argument he considers was made
initially by Nicholas Carr (1). This argument depends on three premises.
Firstly it is assumed that the ‘flow’ state is an important part of human
well-being. The idea of flow has been made popular by Mihaly
Czikszentmihalyi. When
someone is in a flow state she is performing an activity in which she is
fully immersed, losing any feeling of reflective self-consciousness and she has
an energised focus. This state leads to positive emotions making someone happy
whilst in the state. Secondly it is assumed that people are bad judges of what
will get them into such ‘flow’ states. Thirdly it is assumed that working for
something sometimes gives people a flow state. It appears to follow that work
for something is desirable not only because it delivers the means to achieve
the goods we seek but also sometimes gives people a flow state which increases
their happiness. It appears to further follow that vastly increased automation,
leading to large scale unemployment, would be a bad thing because it would lead
to a decrease in many people’s happiness even if they still obtained the goods
they had previously obtained by working because they would experience a
decrease in flow states. Other arguments could be made as to why work might
contribute to someone’s happiness, for instance the workplace might be conducive
to friendship. However, in what follows I will only consider Danaher’s
argument.
I now want to argue the above appearance are false. I am
prepared to accept the first two premises of the above argument. Flow is an
important element of human wellbeing and that people generally aren’t very good
at judging what gets them into a flow state. I am also prepared to accept that
some work can sometimes deliver a flow state. When I’m writing I occasionally
enter into a flow state and perhaps someone who is fully engaged playing some
sport might do likewise. In these circumstances someone is working at something
which she believes has intrinsic value. Can someone enter into a flow state if
she is working for something in a purely instrumental way in a low skilled job?
Let us assume someone works at a job she finds completely uninteresting solely to
support her family. In these circumstances achieving flow is not part of her
goal. Nonetheless it might be suggested that even in this scenario such a
person might sometimes enter into a flow state meaning her work has some
intrinsic value even she isn’t consciously aware of this value. It appears
conceivable that in these circumstances working for something has both
instrumental and intrinsic value.
Let it be assumed that in some circumstances when the goods
we seek are available without working for them the instrumental value of work
vanishes. Nonetheless in the light of the above it might be suggested that even
in these circumstances work retains some intrinsic value. Let us accept that
work only has some intrinsic value when we work at something we care about. In
addition, if we work at something we care about it seems highly probable that
this work will provide some flow. However, I now want to argue that the above suggestion
that, if work has no instrumental value and we work at something we don’t care
about or even dislike that nonetheless such work might retain some intrinsic
value, is unsound. Purposeless work is unlikely to provide us with any flow.
Let us accept that if we work in a completely aimless
fashion at something we don’t care about that such work will not result in a
flow state. Let us also accept that if work is to provide flow that this work
must be goal orientated and that this goal must be something we care about. For
instance, someone might work to provide for her children she cares about. Let
us now assume that the state provides a basic income so she doesn’t have to
work to support her children and satisfy her other needs. Let us further assume
she continues to work and that her sole goal is to obtain a flow state in order
to increase her happiness. All the things she cares about can be provided by
automation and that she finds the work she undertakes to be dreary. Nonetheless
she persists in working with the goal of achieving flow in order to increase
her happiness. I will now argue by analogy that such work would not result in a
flow state. I would suggest just as we cannot choose to be in love, love is
constrained, so we cannot just choose to be in a flow state. Love just comes to
us and similarly a flow state only comes to us when we work at what we love or care
about. Accepting this suggestion means that if automation removes the
need to work for the goods we care about that continuing to work solely to
obtain some flow is impossible.
However even if the above is accepted it might be argued
that working still retains some value. Some people might find, if they have no
work, they have an unbearable sense of simply being, simply existing. It seems
probable such a state would make them unhappy. Work doesn’t simply have value
because any resultant flow state makes people happy, work also has value
because it helps to stop people becoming unhappy. It appears to follow that if
automation removes the need for work that it should be resisted. However, if we
accept the above argument it seems we must also accept that someone might work
at a boring repetitive job in order not to be bored. Such an implication seems
nonsensical. Nonetheless it remains true that if automation removes the need to
work for something that it can also lead to boredom and a resultant decrease in
happiness. Such a scenario is both possible and important. In response I
would argue that automation requires a broader focus in education.
Automation might mean education should focus less on educating people to work
for something and more on educating them so they are enabled to work at
something they love or care about. Increasing automation might lead to an
increased importance of the humanities. Universities and schools might need to
give greater emphasis to the humanities and life-long learning.. However
caution is needed when considering changes in education we mustn’t be over
elitist, music, crafts and sport all matter.
