Historic wrongdoing, Slavery, Compensation and Apology

   

Recently the Trevelyan family says it is apologising for its ancestor’s role in slavery in the Caribbean, see The Observer .King Charles also wants to better understand the part the royal family played in past slavery. In this posting I will use the Trevelyan case to examine apology and compensation for past wrongs. I will conclude that many people and organisations apologise, when they don’t need to, because saying sorry is easy, which it shouldn’t be, and fail to compensate when they should because it is expensive.

Let us consider compensation first. I would suggest that if compensation is due that three conditions must be met First someone or something must have benefitted from some wrongful action, it is important to note that they don’t have done anything wrong themselves. For instance receiving stolen goods when the receiver is unaware that they have been stolen. Secondly someone or something has been harmed by this action. Lastly there is someone who has been harmed who can benefit from any compensation. Do the Trevelyan family satisfy the first condition? It seems obvious that past members of the family became richer due to slavery. It also seems likely that present day members of the family have benefitted from this increased wealth, the Trevelyan’s aren’t a poor family. It seems that the Trevelyan family satisfy the first condition. It might be argued that some nations satisfy the first condition, Great Britain for instance. I’m doubtful if such an argument can succeed. It is difficult to show that a nation is more prosperous now due to a colonialist past. For instance the British with a long colonial past aren’t more prosperous than the Danes with none. Let us now consider the second condition. Cleary the Trevelyan family have damaged slaves and satisfy this condition. Do they satisfy the third condition? Clearly they cannot compensate those they harmed directly but have their past actions harmed people living now? Has the development and prosperity of some Caribbean islands been adversely affected by past slavery? This might be difficult to show but if it can then the Trevelyan family is right in offering compensation.

I now want to consider whether the Trevelyan family is right to offering an apology for past slavery. When is an apology required? Intuitively we might think an apology should be offered whenever compensation is owed under the three conditions outlined above. An example will show our intuition are unsound. Let us assume that a young man steals a great work of art from a museum and as a result becomes very rich. Later he marries and has a family who are unaware of his past. Much later when her parents are dead his daughter learns about the true source of her wealth and offers the museum compensation. She is right to do so but she has no reason to apologise. For someone to have reason to apologise it isn’t sufficient that she has benefitted from some wrongful action she must also have played a part in or endorsed the wrongdoing. Apology seems to be connected to guilt about the wrongdoing. The third condition needed for compensation is that there must be someone who can be compensated. Does the above mean that an apology is only needed when there is someone to apologise to? I’m not sure for apologising might benefit the apologiser. In the light of the above I would suggest that individual members of the Trevelyan family have no reason to apologise to Caribbean islanders affected by the past wrongs of slavery. It is important to distinguish between regret and apology. Regret comes from sympathy whilst apology originates in guilt.  The Trevelyan family might of course feel sympathy and express regret for their past actions but apology is inappropriate by present day individual members of the family aren’t guilty of any wrongdoing. Apologising is mistaken or even a form of moral grandstanding.  

Let us accept that individual members of the Trevelyan family haven’t any reason to apologise but in theory they do have a duty to compensate the victims of slavery. T\he amount of compensation cannot be assessed accurately but provided the amount is meaningful the duty will have been satisfied. Let us turn to a slightly different question does the family rather than individual family members have reason to apologise? Governments apologise for past wrongdoing so why shouldn’t families? I will now argue families don’t.

The first condition needed for an individual to have a duty to apologise is that she has done some wrong. Let us accept that this condition should also apply to families. However it is harder for families to satisfy this condition than individuals. Consider the Trevelyan family at the time of slavery. Did all members approve owning slaves or did some disapprove? If some members disapproved then it seems wrong to blame the family even if individual members can be blamed. This suggests that a fourth condition must be satisfied for any family to have a duty to apologise. Families must be united at the time of their wrongdoing for them to have a duty to apologise. This is a hard condition to satisfy but I will now argue that even if families are united at the time of wrongdoing and had a duty to apologise that this doesn’t mean that the family retains this duty several generations later. I would suggest for a family to retain a duty that not only must it be united at the time of wrongdoing but also over time. Of course a family such as the Trevelyans is united by a name but simply having a name doesn’t impose any duties for if it did it would apply to infants. A family might be united by inherited wealth but this seems to raise a duty to compensate rather than a duty to apologise. After several generations individual family members are linked to numerous other families, can someone be united with multiple families? However even if a family can be united in some way thus doesn’t mean it has a duty to apologise for past wrongdoing. For a family to apologise it must be united in its apology for a disunited apology is an individual one. An apology for being a member of the family rather than one on behalf of the family. It follows that a family cannot apologise for the wrongdoings of past members and that any such apology is mistaken or not inauthentic.

I have argued that it is difficult or impossible for families to apologise for historic wrongdoing due to a lack of unity but it might be argued that collective responsibility means governments and other organisations might do so. In what follows government means government or organisation. Collective responsibility means even if a member of a government argues against some policy and it is adopted that she must endorse it or resign. It follows that governments can make united decisions and if these decisions prove to be wrong have a duty to apologise. However governments are only united for a limited time. A government is unlikely to be united with previous governments several generations ago. It follows governments can’t apologise for historical wrongdoing. Lastly if apology is based on guilt and a government is not unites over time a past government night have a duty to apologise whilst the present one has none, it might of course have a duty to express regret but this is based  on sympathy rather than guilt..

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? First compensation is due in many cases when no apology is required. Secondly apologising for historic wrongs is mistaken or inauthentic in most cases because apology is based on guilt rather sympathy. Lastly perhaps some governments might apologise because it is a cheaper option than compensation even if this is due.

Afterthoughts 

Too many people the practice of apologising when no apology is needed is harmless even if unwarranted. I would suggest this isn’t so as apology plays a vital role in forgiveness. Some might argue that I’m mistaken because we can forgive unconditionally, no apology necessary. Forgiveness aims to restore good relations between the victim and the wrongdoer. If a wrongdoer fails to accept his wrongdoing to himself or the victim then these relations cannot be restored. If a wrongdoer accepts his wrongdoing then he must show his acceptance to the victim by apologising.  Forgiveness requires apology. Unwarranted apologies diminish the power of apology and weaken the importance of forgiveness.

Engaging with Robots

 

In an interesting paper Sven Nyholm considers some of the implications of controlling robots. I use the idea of control to ask a different question about robots and AI more generally, in what follows the term robot will refer to robots and AI in general. Using the word control hints at agency. We talk of driving cars, operating machinery but of controlling ourselves, others, crowds and even our pets. If the things we control have agency then what and how we control them matters morally. Self-control is a virtue and controlling another competent adult a vice. Who we control matters for humans and what we are controlling matters for robots. The question this posting will consider is how can we know the nature of what we are controlling when considering robots.

 

If a robot is simply a tool then using a robot is an extension of our agency and when controlling a robot we are controlling our own agency. In this context controlling a robot raises questions as to how well we can understand our own agency which I won’t consider here. Can a robot have some sort if agency? I will assume here that for something to possess agency it must have some consciousness, some might disagree. If we accept the above then when considering controlling robots it is important to consider whether a robot can be conscious.

 

I am somewhat pessimistic about the chances that a robot might be conscious and certainly believe that none of today’s robots are. However most animals are material creatures and appear to be conscious and it seems possible that we might be able to construct other conscious material creatures such as robots. At the preent time we don’t understand what makes us conscious any better than Descartes did. It is possible that there are some things we can never know as shown by Turing’s halting problem, we shall return to Turin later/. The nature of consciousness might be one of these things. However most people seem to believe we might sometime be capable of understanding the nature of consciousness. If we can understand the nature of consciousness then it seems probable that we could create conscious robots and that my pessimism about doing so is unjustified. Of course such robots might be constructed from materials other than metal and silicon. If at some future date we ask how we should we control robots then we should first ask whether we are trying to control a conscious or unconscious robot. This question is matters morally. For instance how we should control and treat a sex robot would depend on whether it was conscious or not. Accepting this of course doesn’t mean how someone treats an unconscious sex robot doesn’t matter morally, see Inner Virtue . The rest of this posting will consider how we might tell       whether a robot is conscious or not.

 

Because we don’t have a theory of consciousness it is difficult to de design a test to decide if someone or something is conscious. If someone is in a coma we might simply prod her but this is unlikely to work with robots because of their construction. At this point someone might question whether we need such a test. He might point out that by the time such a test is needed that we might have a viable theory of conscious. In this scenario if we desire a conscious robot we simply build it in accordance with the theory.  I accept my objector’s point but in turn point out that we don’t have such a theory yet. Perhaps one way of building such a theory would be to attempt building a conscious robot In this scenario we would need a test for robot consciousness.  Because of these difficulties we might fall back on the Turing test. This basically involves having a conversation through a terminal with a robot and if we cannot tell the difference between this conversation and one with a person then we should assume that the robot is conscious. If we are going to apply the test them we assume that we can have a conversation with a robot. But must we accept this assumption? First someone with locked in syndrome suggests the possibility that a robot might be conscious but unable to communicate. However because we design and build robots I find such a scenario unlikely and won’t pursue it here. However there is another reason why a robot might be conscious and unable converse. According to Wittgenstein if a lion could speak we couldn’t understand him because of different ways of living. The same argument might be applied to robots. Robots might use language we can’t understand or inhabit a radically world. In response I would suggest that the worlds robots and we live in touch and that any creatures that live in worlds that touch can communicate to some degree, see if a lion could speak . Let us accept that we might use the Turing test as a test for robot consciousness. Unfortunately this isn’t a very reliable test as some unconscious bots seem able to pass it. How might we sharpen it up?

 

 

In the Turing test a person tries to decide if he is conversing with a machine or another person using a terminal and if he cannot then he assumes that he is talking to a person. Unfortunately human beings have a tendency to anthropomorphise things, for instance some might say it would be wrong to kick a robot dog. It follows that human beings might not be best placed to decide if a conversation is between two conscious creatures. Recently Edward Tian created an app that detects essays written by AI. This suggests that the Turing test might be amended as follows. A person would still have a conversation with another but the decision as to whether this conversation is between two conscious entities would be made by an AI program. I have previously argued that general or genuine AI must have a will, see emerging AI . Secondly the Turing test might be amended so the conversation with the unknown entity focusses on the will. To have a will any entity must care about something and perhaps the conversation should focus on what the unknown entity cares about. At this point it might be objected that what a robot cares about might be implanted and any will resulting from this implant isn’t genuine. In response I would argue that whilst a creatures is defined by what it cares about, whether it is conscious or not is determined by its reaction to this. Any creature in which what it cares about has been implanted isn’t authentic but it can still have a will and be conscious.  The Turing test might be amended so it probes what the unknown entity cares about and how it reactions to this in different situations. This amendment is interesting but I am doubt it would be useful at the present time in assessing conscious but it could be a useful tool for investigating the nature of consciousness. Lastly it might be suggested that a Turing test might not only be assessed by AI but be conducted by some AI system. Perhaps AI might find better questions than a human being. I would be reluctant to accept this suggestion for it might mean accepting an attribution of consciousness without any means of ascertaining the accuracy of the attrition.

 

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? First whilst how we collaborate with robots is an interesting question it raises two equally interesting potential questions. First what are we collaborating with and secondly how can we ascertain this. Both these questions may be illusory, probably are illusory, but if they are we need to be able show why. Trying to answer these questions is important for another reason it might shed some light in the nature of consciousness. It also highlights the problems of using the Turing test to answer these questions because if we accept that animals are conscious we cannot use a Turing test to ascertain this.

 

Ecological Refugees

 

Let us accept that global warming will lead to ecological damage and that in turn will lead to more refuges. In this posting I want to consider what sort of duties we have to ecological refugees that is those people who become refuges due to climate change. Initially my discussion will be a deontological one involving the right not to have one’s environment polluted by others and the duty to compensate for any such pollution we cause. My discussion will assume that we haven’t any duties to purely economic migrants or to refugees who have destroyed their own environment because we haven’t harmed them. Nonetheless some economic migrants, those whose poverty is caused by climate change can be regarded as ecological refugees.

I will now consider those people we have a duty to accept as refugee s. I suggested above that we don’t owe a duty to purely economic migrants. However some people might become poor due to global warming. For instance some farmers might be unable to reliably grow some traditional crops due to global warming caused by the western world making them poorer. We have harmed these people and as a result have a duties towards them but is one these duties the offer of refugee status? The answer to this question depends on how much damage we have causes and whether it can be rectified. For instance we might find that we can fulfil our duty in other ways than offering refugee status by genuine aid. Providing such aid shouldn’t be regarded as an easy option as it must reflect the views of the people we have harmed. Such aid isn’t charity. However we have a duty to offer refugee status to some people whose home has been destroyed, perhaps by a rise in sea level, or been made uninhabitable by desertification.

I now want to consider what is involved in offering refugee status. I have argued that we have a duty to offer refugee status to those whose homeland has been destroyed or made uninhabitable by global warming. However we also offer refugee status to some who suffer from persecution. Our duty to help those who are persecuted is less clear cut than that we owe to ecological refugees because we haven’t harmed them nonetheless we have a more general duty to aid humanity. Alternatively it is the virtuous thing to do, virtuous people or nations naturally help those who are persecuted. I will return to virtue with regard to ecological refugees later. Let us now consider the differences between what we should offer refugees fleeing from persecution and those damaged by global warming.

Let us accept that offering refugee status shouldn’t be simply an act of charity but should include a consideration of the refugee’s needs. Ecological refugees need a new home whilst those fleeing from persecution need sanctuary. These different needs can be satisfied in different ways. Those fleeing from persecution hope to return to their homelands and only need temporary refugee status and needn’t fully integrate with their hosts. They need support, this can be provided directly or by the right to work. They also might need education for their children but they don’t need the right to vote.

Let us accept that those fleeing from persecution or war need a temporary home and that those fleeing from ecological disaster need a permanent home. Let us also accept that if we partly created the disaster that we have a duty to aid them find a new home. Cara Nine agues that the Lockean proviso means a people who have their homeland destroyed, or made uninhabitable by climate change due to global warming have a theoretical right to a new homeland. She argues that other states have a duty to provide for this homeland by ceding part of their sovereign territory (1). I have previously argued that we don’t have a duty to cede territory for a homeland, see ecological refugees  but I accept we that we have a duty to assist ecological refugees find a new permanent home. In light of the above it would seem that we must accept that this home must be within our own society.

What is entailed if we accept that we have a duty to provide ecological refugees with a permanent home within our society? What must we offer and how will this change our existing society? Let us accept that in any just society that all competent adults should have equal rights. Afghanistan under the Taliban is an unjust society as women don’t have equal rights. Any society in which any group such as women are denied the rights of others is unjust. It follows if any host nation doesn’t offer ecological refuges the same rights as the rest of its population that it is an unjust nation. These rights include any rights others have to education and healthcare, an immediate right to work and the right to vote. Someone might object that these rights go too far and that they would radically change the host nation, health and education services might be overwhelmed and the right to vote might profoundly change the nature of the existing society. I have two responses to my objector. First I would suggest that the number of ecological refugees we need to offer a new permanent home to won’t be very large. Global warming will cause great ecological damage but it is doubtful if many places will be made completely uninhabitable by rises in sea level or desertification. If this is so and we make an effective effort to aid those we have harmed by global warming then the small number of ecological refugees won’t radically change the society of the host nation. However for the let us assume that the number will be large and that these numbers mean that society in the host nation will be radically changed. In order to alleviate these changes it might be argued that we should only offer limited rights to ecological refugees. I have two responses to the above. First if we only offer limited rights we will create an unjust society, any society which doesn’t offer full rights to all competent members is an unjust one. My objector might respond by arguing we only need provide sanctuary to ecological refugees and not full membership of our society. I would counter argue that we are not offering temporary nut permanent sanctuary and that permanent sanctuary must involve full members of our society. Indeed it might be argued that we shouldn’t offer ecological refugees refugee status but full membership of our society. Membership of society shouldn’t have to be earned but is owed for after all children don’t have to earn membership of the society they live in. My second responses is that the need to change our society to accommodate ecological refugees is not caused by the refugees but by the harm we have caused. The damage our lifestyle has caused creates the need to change our future lifestyle, our society. Lastly I would that if we adopt a deontological approach to our duties connected to climate change we must accept living in a more cosmopolitan society. 

In the light of the above my objector might suggest that we should adopt a caring approach to helping the victims of climate change rather than a rights based one. He might suggest that a caring approach is more natural and better suited to human beings than a deontological one. He might continue by suggesting that if we did so we don’t need to offer full rights to ecological refugees. With a deontological approach it is clear how much is required of us to compensate for the harm we caused. Unfortunately this isn’t true of a care based approach. How is the amount of caring required related to the degree of harm caused? If we offer ecological refugees only limited rights are we really caring? This difficultly might lead my objector to suggest adopting a virtue based approach. Once again he might point out that this is a more natural approach for human beings. It is by no means easy to apply virtue ethics to nations and societies but I will put this difficulty to one side. However even if we adopt a virtue ethics based approach towards  our duty to ecological refugees it is uncertain if doing so would satisfy my objector’s desire to lessen the rights of ecological refugees. Indeed it might increase the burden. I argued above that we don’t have a duty to aid those who have harmed themselves using a deontological approach but if we adopt a virtue ethics based approach then a virtuous person or nation might feel that they have a duty to act beneficently towards such people. Secondly justice is a prime virtue and a virtuous person must act justly. I argued above that if a society doesn’t offer all competent adults equal rights it is an unjust one. It follows that virtuous people and societies must offer ecological refugees living among them equal rights and that this includes the right to vote.

1. Cara Nine, 2010, Ecological Refugees, States Borders and the Lockean Proviso, Journal of Applied Philosophy; 27(4)