Joao Fabiano asks us to imagine that in the future humanity makes a major breakthrough, see Practical Ethics. He imagines that society develops a pill which rids our morality of all its faults. Without any side-effects, it vastly increases our ability to cooperate and to think rationally on moral issues, while also enhancing our empathy and our compassion for the whole of humanity. Such a pill would morally enhance us. Fabiano argues the use of such a pill would present us with grave dangers. In this posting I will consider Fabiano’s worries about pharmacological moral enhancement but with some slight modifications my comments might be applied to germline editing using CRISPR.
The pill Fabiano asks us to imagine has two functions.
Firstly it enhances our cognitive abilities. Secondly it enhances our capacity
for empathy. For the sake of argument I consider two pills, firstly one which
enhances our cognitive abilities and secondly one which enhances our capacity
for empathy. This separation means it would be possible to gain one of these
kinds of enhancement even if the other posed dangers. I will consider the
implications of using of each of these pills in turn.
Prima facie it might be assumed that increasing our powers of
reason would increase our capacity for morality. If reason allows us to see
others as much the same as ourselves then the domain of morality expands. It
might be argued this has happened over time. In ancient civilisations such as
that of the Greeks moral concern for the most part focussed on citizens of that
state. Over time this focus broadened to include women, slaves and even
animals. This seems to be the position adopted by Steven Pinker (1). However
this ability to see others as much the same as ourselves does not automatically
expand the domain of morality. Persson and Savulescu point out that reason and
self-interest could tell you to rob and kill an injured stranger in the
wilderness rather than help him or to abstain from returning a favour to someone
you will not ever see again rather than return it at some cost to yourself (2).
Moreover it might seem that a cognitively enhanced sociopath could do much more
harm than one who had been un-enhanced. It might be suggested that if a tyrant
such as Hitler or Mao had been cognitively enhanced that he could have
inflicted even greater suffering. In the light of the above it might be thought
I am not in favour of cognitive enhancement for moral reasons.
In fact if a pill became available, which simply cognitively
enhanced us without any adverse side effects, I would be in favour of us taking
such a pill for moral reasons. Firstly reason as pointed out by Hume reason
alone does not give us any reason to act. If reason alone gives us no reason to
act then cognitive enhancement will not alter someone’s ends. At this point an
objector might point out even if cognitive enhancement does not alter someone’s
ends it might enable an evil person achieve his evil ends more effectively. I
accept my objectors point but would also point out cognitive enhancement should
equally make it easier for a good person to achieve his good ends. In addition
I would suggest that because there are more good people rather than evil people
we should favour cognitive enhancement. However my objector might now suggest
that certain people, such as Hitler or Mao, could cause even greater suffering
if they were cognitively enhanced and that this suffering outweighs the more
modest good most cognitively enhanced people would be capable of. She might
then argue that because of this increased suffering which might be caused by a
small minority of cognitively enhanced people we should not favour cognitive
enhancement. In response I would doubt whether people such as Hitler or Mao
could cause greater suffering provided they were cognitively enhanced. Moral
monsters cannot cause great suffering alone. Let us accept my suggestion that
most people are good, even if only to some modest degree. It follows if most
people were cognitively enhanced that they would be less likely to aid moral
monsters such as Hitler or Mao further their ends. It further follows we should
favour cognitive enhancement. My second reason for favouring cognitive
enhancement is that it is inevitable. Even if it is impossible to cognitively
enhance us by pharmacological means we will nonetheless be enhanced by
education. We will experience an ever expanding knowledge basis even if the
speed at which we process this basis remains constant. It follows if
pharmacological means of cognitive enhancement are adopted we are merely
speeding up an inevitable process.
Let us consider the implications of using the second pill
solely to enhance our capacity for empathy. Fabiano worries whilst such an
enhancement might lead to an increase in our individual
tendency towards cooperation between individuals it might also lead
to an increase in competition between groups, this worry is shared by Paul
Bloom (3). He argues that what is important about enhancing morality is
increasing cooperation between groups. I accept Fabiano’s argument and find his
worry plausible. Evolution designed us to live in small groups and enhancing
our empathy might only lead to more social cooperation with people we know.
Enhancing our empathy might not lead us to have any more moral concern for
those separated by distance and time. It might not lead those of us in the more
affluent parts of the world to think more about those of the third world or
future generations, see (4). Let us assume our increased capacity for empathy
is only for people we know. This increase means we might see the wants and
needs of people we know assuming greater importance to us. This increased
importance might lead us to exploit those people we don’t know to benefit those
we do. For instance enhancing our capacity for empathy for those we know,
existing people, might lead us to disregard the needs of future generations to
serve the needs of the present one. In the light of the above it appears
Fabiano’s worries are justified and that we should not encourage empathic
enhancement for moral reasons.
If we should not encourage empathic enhancement for moral
reasons should we only encourage cognitive enhancement for these purposes?
Someone might suggest we should enhance our toleration of others. Indeed I
would suggest in more connected, multi-racial, multi faith world the capacity
for toleration is among most important moral capacities we can
possess. Unfortunately at the moment there appears to be no prospect of
simply enhancing our toleration by pharmacological means. In the light of
the above does this mean we should only attempt to enhance our morality
cognitively unless some means is found to enhance our toleration? I will now
argue it does not. However even if it is impossible to directly enhance our
toleration I would suggest any other type of moral enhancement should be judged
by its indirect effects on our toleration.
Let us return to considering enhancing empathy and
Fabiano’s worry that enhancing our empathy might lead to more group
competition. Basically it might lead to less toleration. I only share Fabiano’s
worry provided we only enhance our empathy. However if we can enhance our
empathy it seems probable we can also enhance our cognition. It follows that in
much the same way doctors use a drug cocktail to treat some diseases such as
cancer, we might use a pharmacological cocktail to address our moral
shortcomings. It might appear that provided we use a pharmacological cocktail
to enhance both our empathy and our cognition that
Fabiano’s worry might be misplaced. Let us accept that enhancing our empathy
should lead to more social cooperation with people we know. Now it seems to me
whether Fabiano’s worry is justified or not depends on what is meant by ‘people
we know’. It is certainly justified if we only mean family and friends. It’s
also justified if ‘people we know’ means people who share our particular
tastes, feelings and prejudices. However ‘people we know’ could just mean the
broader recognition of these people simply as people. That is they are capable
of love, being hurt and are the sort of creatures that can decide their own
future. It might appear that enhancing our cognition might change what we mean
by ‘people we know’ from friends and family or people who share our tastes to
people in the broader sense outlined above. However the above appearance might
be false. It is possible even if we enhance both cognition and empathy that our
enhanced empathy simply overwhelms our ability to act rationally. Whether enhanced
empathy might overwhelm someone’s cognitive abilities is an empirical question
and it should possible to design an experiment to answer this question.
Provided it can be shown that enhanced empathy doesn’t overwhelm someone’s
cognitive abilities and we adopt dual enhancement we have reason to believe
Fabiano’s worry is unwarranted.
In conclusion I want to consider the enhancement of our
empathy in more detail. In order to do so we must be clear about what is meant
by empathy. Being able to feel empathy roughly means one has the capacity to
understand and share the feelings of another. I have suggested above that the
ability to feel empathy must initially have a broad basis. We must see
others as being capable of love, being hurt and being the sort of
creatures who can decide their own future. It follows if I care about someone
in a purely empathic way I must care about what she cares about, rather than
what I think might be in her best interests. Understanding other people is not
always easy. Sometimes we mistake the feelings of another and substitute, what
we believe they feel or even what we think they should feel, for their true
feelings. We may do this because we are lazy. We simply don’t ask people how
they feel. Or we may do this because we simply assume others feel the same way
do. We suffer from epistemic arrogance. This substitution means we move from
empathic concern to sympathy. It also means we leave the initial broad basis
for empathy behind, see caring
and empathy. If a pharmacological means became available which
enhanced our understanding of others without leaving
this initial broad basis I see no reason why such a means should not be
adopted. Provided we retain this basis of empathic concern then I see no reason
why enhancing our empathy should lead to more group conflict as envisioned by
Fabiano.
- Steven
Pinker, 2011, The Better Angels of Our Nature, Allen
Lane, page 656.
- Ingar
Persson & Julian Savulescu, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford
University Press, page 107.
- Paul Bloom, 2016, Against Empathy, Ecco
- Michael Slote, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Routledge, page 2