In previous
postings I have suggested that prisoners serving life sentences have a right to
be assisted to commit suicide, see Prisoners
serving Life Sentences. In this posting I will argue that this right should
only apply to assisted suicide and should not extend to euthanasia. Before
commencing my argument I will make some definitions I will use clear. Euthanasia
means someone deliberately ends another’s life to end his suffering.
Involuntary euthanasia means this is done when he does not consent. Non
voluntary euthanasia means this is done when he is incapable of giving consent.
Voluntary euthanasia means this is done with his consent. Assisted suicide
means someone deliberately provides the means for another to end his own life. I
will assume without any further argument that involuntary and non voluntary
euthanasia are inapplicable to prisoners serving life sentences. In what
follows I argue voluntary euthanasia should also be inapplicable to such
prisoners.
Let us
consider a prisoner serving a life sentence for some gruesome murder of an
innocent person. Let us further assume this prisoner decides he wants to die.
Why if he fully consents shouldn’t someone end his life? One reason might be
that, unless the prisoner was suffering, doing so would not be a case of
voluntary euthanasia. Moreover, unless the prisoner was suffering, it is not
clear what would be the motive of whoever carried out the act. The motive could
not be one of punishment for punishment should not depend on the wishes of the prisoner.
However let us now assume our hypothetical prisoner is suffering. Why in these
circumstances, provided the prisoner fully consents, shouldn’t someone end his
life? One reason might be that the prisoner’s suffering could and should be
relieved by other means. If his suffering is caused by poor penal conditions
then these should be addressed. Voluntary euthanasia should never be used to
tackle poor penal conditions; even if it tackles overcrowding! Let us now further
assume that the prisoner’s suffering is not caused by poor penal conditions.
Perhaps his suffering is caused by mental health problems. If a prisoner
suffers from a physical illness such as diabetes then his suffering should be
addressed by medical means. Similarly I would argue if a prisoner suffers from
mental problems his suffering should be addressed by mental health experts.
Voluntary euthanasia should not be used to address mental health problems.
Lastly let us consider a scenario in which the prisoner’s suffering is not caused
by penal conditions or any mental health problems. Perhaps he simply does not
want to spend the rest of his days in prison or more unlikely perhaps he suffers
from remorse because of the terrible crimes he committed. Surely if assisted
suicide is permissible in such circumstances then so should voluntary
euthanasia? I will now argue that voluntary euthanasia should also remain
inapplicable even in these circumstances.
In my previous
postings I have argued that a prisoner should retain some limited autonomy.
Part of that limited autonomy is the right to commit suicide. As the state
deprives a prisoner of the means to commit suicide it should provide him with these
means in a controlled environment. The prisoner’s right to be assisted to
commit suicide depends on his ability to make an autonomous decision. At this
point an objector might point out voluntary euthanasia also involves an autonomous
decision. She might proceed to argue, if I use a prisoner’s retention of
limited autonomy to justify assisted suicide that, the same justification could
apply to voluntary euthanasia.
I have two
responses to my objector’s argument. Firstly I would suggest we have no need to
kill someone provided he can be assisted to commit suicide. My objector might
respond by suggesting that there is no real moral difference between killing
and assisting someone to die. This is simply a variation of the acts and
omissions problem and I will not deal with his suggestion here. My second
response carries more weight. I would suggest we can never be completely
certain whether someone’s decision is an autonomous one or not. I will then
argue we can be more certain that someone has made an autonomous decision to
commit suicide than when he gives informed consent to voluntary euthanasia. I
will base my argument on the importance of what we care about when making
autonomous decisions, see (1). Frankfurt
argues autonomous decisions are decisions the agent cares about. I have
suggested that autonomous decisions are decisions which are not discordant with
what the agent cares about, see autonomous
decisions . However I would agree with Frankfurt
by suggesting an agent’s actions are better indicators of his autonomous
decisions than the choices he makes or what he decides to do. The choices he
makes and what he decides to do are only intentions. Sometimes when we come to
act we find we cannot carry out our prior intentions because it was not clear
to us what we really care about until we came to act. A prisoner giving
informed consent to voluntary euthanasia is making a choice and deciding what
would be best for him. His intentions are of course an indicator of an
autonomous decision. However in the light of the above a prisoner’s actions in committing
assisted suicide are a much better indicator of his autonomous decision.
- Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About.
Cambridge University Press, page 84.
