Moral Character Enhancement and Moral Status

Intuitively most people seem to believe that provided we could morally enhance people it would be a good thing to do so. After all this is exactly what moral education is trying to do? In the age of Trump and his supporters the question of moral enhancement assumes greater importance. Many people also seem to think that provided this enhancement could be done by pharmaceutical means without any adverse side-effects that it should be attempted. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu support these intuitions and in addition argue there is an urgent need to enhance the moral character of humanity, see Persson and Savulescu. However Nicolas Agar argues that whilst it may be possible to enhance moral status that it would be wrong to do so, see Agar. Moral enhancement has two aspects, the enhancement of moral character and the enhancement of moral status. In this posting I will assume it is possible to enhance the moral character of people. I will firstly examine whether character enhancement need be linked to moral status enhancement. I will secondly examine whether, provided character enhancement is of necessity connected to the enhancement of moral status, any such character enhancement can be justified.

Before commencing my examination I must make an attempt to make some definitions clear. Firstly what is meant by enhancing the moral character of someone and secondly enhancing her moral status? Let us accept without argument that enhancing the moral character of someone means improving the ways she acts with respect those things that have moral status. To Agar for something to have moral status means someone has certain rights which others must respect. It follows to enhance moral status would simply mean to increase her rights. Agar sees these rights as meaning something is entitled to certain forms of beneficial treatment and a reduction in its eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. I would question whether Agar’s definition of moral status is a complete one. Of course someone’s moral status contains rights about her entitlement to benefits and her eligibility for harm but might it not also include respect for her knowledge concerning moral questions. I would argue such respect must include understanding. If we respect someone for her moral knowledge then we respect her because she can point us in the right direction. We respect her because she can highlight some of the important features attached to our moral understanding or give us an example which might make things clearer to us. We should not respect someone who simply tells us to do something for moral reasons if after some effort we cannot understand these reasons. To respect someone’s moral status because of her superior moral knowledge means we must be able to understand her moral reasoning even if she has to draw our attention to this reasoning.

There are four questions attached to moral enhancement. Firstly why should we enhance moral character? Secondly how can we enhance moral character? Thirdly why should we enhance moral status? This seems to be the question Agar is concerned with. Lastly how can we enhance moral status? Let us assume for the moment that there is no need to answer the first question for we accept the need for moral education. It appears provided there are no unforeseen adverse consequences that it is always good to enhance moral character. Improving our moral character, like improving our happiness, is always good. Let us also assume there is no need to answer the fourth question provided we accept Agar’s definition of moral status. To increase someone’s moral status we simply increase her rights to certain beneficial treatment and decrease her eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. If we accept the Agar’s definition then we are left with two important questions concerning moral enhancement. How can we enhance moral character and why should we enhance moral status? Prima facie the reasons why we should we enhance someone’s moral status seems to be unconnected to how we could enhance her moral character. It appears to follow if we enhance someone’s moral character that this enhancement should not affect her moral status.

Such a conclusion would be premature for it might be the way in which someone’s moral character is enhanced automatically leads to an increase in moral status. If this is so we must be able to justify an increase in moral status if we are to justify character enhancement. There are two ways in which someone’s moral character might be enhanced. Firstly her cognitive abilities might be increased. Secondly her capacity for empathy might be increased. If someone’s cognitive abilities could be increased it might be thought that this increase would increase her ability to understand moral problems and help her to resolve them. I’m doubtful whether cognitive enhancement alone will actually lead to moral character enhancement. For instance someone might simply use her increased cognitive abilities to exploit others. It is only when her increased cognitive abilities are directed at moral problems that this increase might actually lead to moral enhancement. Nonetheless let us put my worries to one side for the moment and assume that cognitive enhancement alone can lead to moral enhancement. Does the moral enhancement of the character, by increasing people’s cognitive abilities automatically increase their moral status? It might do so provided respect for greater moral understanding is part of moral status as I have suggested above. But such an increase in moral status based on respect would not affect the entitlement of any of the things of moral concern to certain forms of beneficial treatment or lead to any reduction in their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. It follows it would not be wrong to enhance someone’s moral character, by increasing her cognitive abilities, provided this increases her moral status based solely on respect.

However let us assume the moral enhancement of someone’s character, by increasing her cognitive abilities, would also enhance her moral status by increasing her entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment and further reducing her eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. Would such an enhancement of moral status be wrong? Someone might suggest such enhancement would create two kinds of moral status for people. People whose character has been enhanced, which means they are entitled to additional beneficial treatment and a reduction in their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment, and those who are not. She might proceed to suggest that the creation of two kinds of moral status for people would be wrong. Let us consider her first suggestion. Will moral character enhancement by increasing cognitive abilities lead to the creation of two kinds of moral status? I am doubtful. Let us assume that cognitive enhancement can be achieved by biomedical means or genetic engineering. If cognitive enhancement is to lead to the creation of two kinds of moral status then these means must not be available to all. However it is far from clear that these artificial means will not be available to all for technology moves at a very fast pace. Moreover even if these means become only available to a few, the fact that these few are cognitively enhanced should mean these means should in time become available to all. My objector might retort that the few who are cognitively enhanced will not spread these means to others and instead will exploit them. In reply I would simply point out we are only concerned with cognitive enhancement connected to the moral enhancement of the character and that because of this, this sort cognitive enhancement should not lead to the exploitation of others. Exploitation is incompatible with moral enhancement. It appears probable that if the cognitive enhancement of character does lead to an increase in moral status that this increased status will eventually apply to all. It further appears that even if enhancement leads to two types of moral status for people that worries about exploitation are unjustified.

Let us assume that the moral enhancement of the character, by increasing someone’s cognitive abilities, does produce two kinds of moral status for persons. My objector assumes this is wrong. What reasons could she advance for this wrongness? Firstly she might suggest that those of increased moral status would have their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment increased and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment reduced, whilst the entitlements of those of lower moral status would remain the same. She might then further suggest that this disparity is unfair. In reply I would question whether those of lower moral status have the right to deny those of higher moral status increased entitlements provided their own entitlements remain the same. Allen Buchanan makes the same point (1) and asks if we would be justified in delaying India’s development in order to allow Ethiopia catch up. Secondly my objector might suggest in a world of scarce resources that those of lower moral status would be given less of these resources; that is their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment would be reduced and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment increased. In reply I would simply reiterate that such a state of affairs would be one of exploitation and that the moral enhancement of character should preclude increasing the exploitation of others.

My objector might now suggest cognitive enhancement cannot simply be tied to the character enhancement as I have assumed above. She might then suggest that cognitive enhancement can be tied to both character enhancement and exploitation. She might proceed to argue what really matters is what someone’s increased cognitive abilities are directed at. I have myself suggested above that the cognitive enhancement of someone’s moral character can only occur if cognitive enhancement is directed at moral problems. It follows I must accept my objector’s suggestion that cognitive enhancement cannot simply be tied to the character enhancement. I must also accept that purely cognitive enhancement might lead to exploitation of the un-enhanced by the enhanced. It also follows that if the cognitive enhancement of moral character is to be justified that any increased cognitive powers must be directed at moral problems in some way. The way to achieve this direction I would suggest is to increase our capacity for empathy.

Let us assume that we can enhance someone’s moral character by increasing her cognitive powers and by directing at least some of this cognitive increase towards moral problems by increasing her capacity for empathy. Let assume such dual enhancement also increases her moral status. Could such a dual enhancement lead to exploitation? Exploitation of the un-enhanced by the enhanced would mean, either that their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment would be reduced and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment increased, or that their entitlement is not increased and their eligibility not reduced even when this is possible. However so doing seems incompatible with an enhanced capacity for empathy. For if the enhanced reduced the entitlement of the un-enhanced to beneficial treatment then we might question if their capacity to feel empathy really had been increased. It follows dual enhancement does not mean that the entitlement of the un-enhanced to beneficial treatment would decrease or their eligibility for harm increase. Indeed dual enhancement might mean their entitlements might increase and their eligibility decrease. The above leads me to tentatively conclude dual enhancement can be justified even if it leads to the un-enhanced people having a lesser moral status than the enhanced.

At this point someone might suggest that because of the dangers of exploitation we should only attempt to enhance our capacity for empathy. I would reject such a suggestion. Consider a paedophile who uses some artificial means to increase his capacity for empathy. This increased capacity for empathy does not rid him of his urges but it does allow him to resist most of them. Indeed this increased capacity for empathy might be regarded as a form of moral enhancement. However let us consider the unlikely possibility that the abuse of this paedophile commits does not physically harm a child. Let us further assume he comes into contact with a child who is a willing participant and even enjoys the encounter. It would seem in this case he has no reason not to abuse the child. It follows that moral character enhancement based solely on empathy is compatible with this abuse. Increasing someone’s cognitive abilities allows him to better understand the concepts of autonomy and consent and would help prevent such abuse. It follows the enhancement of someone’s cognition and empathy is preferable to moral enhancement based solely on increasing someone’s capacity for empathy.

1. Allen Buchanan, 2011, Beyond Humanity, Oxford University Press, page 53.