Albert
Barqué-Duran wonders whether humanity wants
computers making moral decisions? In the face of the coronavirus outbreak when we are faced by difficult and complex moral decisions it might be suggested that we need all the help we can get. However is it even right to
outsource any of our moral decisions? If we can’t outsource at least part of our
moral decision-making, then the whole idea of applied philosophy has very shaky
foundations. I believe applied philosophy remains a meaningful discipline, even
if some of its practitioners seem to over-elaborate some things in an attempt
to justify both their position and the discipline itself. Let us assume
outsourcing some moral decisions can be justified. A doctor might for instance
trust a bioethicist. If we assume that it can be right to outsource some moral decision-making
to experts in some fields could it also be right to outsource some moral decision-making
to algorithms or machines? In this posting I want to consider this question.
What is a moral decision? It isn’t simply a decision with
ethical implications, computers can already make these, it is a decision based
on moral considerations. It is feasible that in the future computers might make
moral decisions completely by themselves or computers might aid people to make
such decisions in much the same way as computers now aid people to design
things. In this posting I want to examine
whether humanity might want computers
to make moral decisions. I will consider three reasons why it shouldn’t. Firstly,
it might be argued only human beings should make moral decisions. Secondly, it
might be argued that even if computers can make moral decisions that some of
these decisions would not in the interests of human beings. Lastly it might be
argued that computers might make decisions which human beings don’t understand.
First let us assume that some computers could make moral
decisions independently of human beings. A driverless car would not
possess such a computer as it makes decisions based on parameters given to it
by human beings and in doing so acts instrumentally to serve purely human ends.
Personally I am extremely doubtful, whether a computer which can acquire the
capacity to make moral decisions independently of human beings is feasible in
the foreseeable future. Nonetheless such a computer remains a feasibility
because human beings have evolved such a capacity. If we accept that such a
computer is at least a feasibility do any of the three above reasons justify
our fears about it making moral decisions? Firstly, should only human beings
make moral decisions? If any sentient creature has the same or better cognitive
capacities as ourselves then it should have the same capacity as we do to make
moral decisions. We seem quite happy with the idea that aliens can make moral
decisions. Prima facie provided a machine can become sentient then it should be
able and allowed to make moral decisions. In fiction at least we seem to be
quite happy about computers or robots making moral decisions. Secondly might
such a computer make decisions which are not in the interests of human beings?
It might, but I would suggest what really matters is that it takes into account
human interests. Let us accept that
the domain
of creatures we could
possibly feel sympathy for defines the domain of creatures that merits our
moral concern, this includes animals but not plants. If a computer tries to
make moral decisions without some form of sympathy then it might mistakenly
believe it is making moral decisions about rocks, shoes and even clouds. Once
again I would reiterate that at present a computer which feels sympathy is an extremely
fanciful proposition. Let us accept that a computer that cannot feel sympathy
cannot make moral decisions independently of human beings. Let us assume a
computer capable of feeling sympathy is possible. Let us also assume that such
a computer will also have the cognitive powers to understand the world at least
as well as we do. It follows such a computer might make some decisions which
are not in human interests but that it should always consider human interests,
surely this is all we can ask for. Thirdly might we not be able to understand some
of the moral decisions made by any computer capable of making moral decisions
independently of human beings? John Danaher divides this opacity into three
forms, intentional, illiterate and intrinsic algorithmic
opacity . I have argued above that any computer which can
make moral decisions must be capable of feeling a form of sympathy, because of
this I will assume intentional opacity should not be a problem. Illiterate
opacity means some of us might not understand how a computer reaches its
decision, but does this matter as long as we understand the decision is a
genuine moral decision which take human interests into account? Lastly
intrinsic opacity means there may be a mismatch between how humans and computers
capable making moral decisions understand the world. Understanding whether such a mismatch is possible is fundamental to
our understanding of morality itself. Can any system of morality be detached
from affect and can any system of morality be completely alien to us? I have
tried to cast some doubt on this possibility above by considering the domain of
moral concern. If my doubts are justified, then this suggests that any mismatch
in moral understanding cannot be very large.
Let
us accept that even if computers can make moral decisions independently of
human beings are possible that this possibility will only come into existence
in the future, probably the far distant future. Currently there is interest in
driverless cars having ethical control systems and we have computer aided design.
It follows that it is then at least conceivable
that we might develop a system of computer aided moral decision-making.
In practice it would be the software in the computer which would aid in making any
decisions so the rest of this posting will be concerned with algorithmic aided
moral decision making. Giubilini and Savulescu consider an artificial moral
advisor which they label as an AMA, see the
artificial moral advisor . In what follows AMA will refer to
algorithmic aided moral decision making. Such a system might emerge from a form
of collective intelligence involving people in general, experts and machines
I
now want to consider whether we should trust an AMA system I want to consider
whether we need such a system. Persson and Savulescu argue we are unfit to make
complicated moral decisions in the future and that there is a need for moral
enhancement (1). Perhaps such enhancement might be achieved by pharmacological
means but it is also possible our moral unfitness might be addressed by an AMA system
which nudges us towards improved moral decision making. Of course we must be prepared
to trust such a system. Indeed, AMA might be a preferable option to enhancing some
emotions because of the possibility that enhancing emotions might damage our
cognitive abilities (2) and boosting altruism might lead to increased ethnocentrism
and parochialism, see practical
ethics .
Let
us accept there is a need for AMA provided that this is feasible. Before
questioning whether we should trust an AMA system I need to sketch some
possible features of AMA. Firstly, when initialising such a system a top down
process would seem to be preferable because if we do so we can at least be
confident the rules it tries to interpret are moral rules. At present any AMA
system using virtue ethics would seem to be unfeasible. Secondly, we must consider
whether the rules we build into such a system should be deontological or
consequentialist. An AMA system using deontological rules might be feasible but
because computers are good at handling such large quantities of data it might
be preferable if initially we installed a consequentialist system ethics. In
the remainder of this posting I will only consider AMA based on a
consequentialist system of ethics. As this is only a sketch I will not consider
the exact form of consequentialist ethics employed. Thirdly, any AMA system operating
on a consequentialist system must have a set of values. Once again when
initialising the system, we should use a top down approach and install human
values. Initially these values would be fairly primitive values such as
avoiding harm. In order to initialise the AMA system we must specify what we
mean by harm. Perhaps the easiest way to specify harm would be to define it as
suffering by some creature or loss of some capacity by that creature. We might
specify the sort of creature which can be harmed by a list of sentient creatures.
Next we might simply specify suffering as pain. Lastly we would have to specify
a list of capacities of each sentient creature on our list of sentient
creatures
At
this juncture we have an extremely primitive system of AMA. This system could
be regarded as a universal system and in the same circumstances would always
make the same decision. A private morality is of course nonsense but
nonetheless we must identify with our moral decisions and a universal morality
might be hard to identify with. At this point the user of such a system might
modify it by adding weights to the built in values. For instance, a user might
give a greater weight to avoiding harm, acting beneficently, and a lesser
weight to respecting autonomy in situations in which these two values clash. At
this point we have a primitive system the user might identify with. This primitive
system might now be further modified by use in a more bottom up way by the use
of two feedback loops. Firstly, the user of a system must inform the system
whether she accepts any proposed decision. If the user accepts the proposed
decision, then this decision can be made a basis for similar decisions in much
the same way as in the legal judgements set precedents for further judgements.
If the user doesn’t accept a particular decision, then the system must make it
clear to the user the weights which are attached to the values it used in
making this decision and any previous decisions used. The user might then
refine the system either by altering the weights attached to the values
involved and/or feeding into the system how the circumstances the current
decision is based on differ from the circumstances of past decisions used.
Lastly in this joined up age the system’s user might permit the system to use
the weights attached to values and decisions made by other systems belonging to
people she trusts or respects. Employing such a system might be seen as
employing a system of collective intelligence which uses both humans and
algorithms in making moral decisions.
I
now want to return to my original question, should we trust the decisions such an
AMA system makes? I want to consider the three reasons outlined above as to why
we shouldn’t trust such a system. I will conclude each of these reasons appears
to be unsound in this context. Firstly, an objector might suggest if someone
relies on such a system she isn’t really making moral decisions. I suggested a
moral decision is a decision based on ethical considerations. The inbuilt
values of the system are moral values so it would appear any decision made by
the system is based on ethical considerations. However, my objector might now
suggest if someone makes a moral decision she must identify herself with that
decision. It would appear even if the accept my objector’s suggestion that because
the system relies on moral values built into it by the user that any decision
it makes must be based on values she identifies herself with. Secondly my
objector might suggest that such a system does not serve human interests. The
system sketched above is a consequentialist system and it might make decisions
which aren’t in the user’s self-interest, however because the values built into
it are human values the system should always acts in humans’ interests. It
might of course make bad decisions when trying to serve those interests but
then so do humans themselves. Lastly my objector might return to Danaher’s
opacity question and suggest that the user of such a system might fail to
understand why the system made a particular decision. I would suggest that
because the system has feedback loops built into it that this shouldn’t occur.
I would further point out that because it is always the user who implements the
decision and not the system that the user retains a veto over the system.
This examination has been extremely speculative. It seems
to me that whether we would want such computers to make moral decisions depends
on the background circumstances. All moral decisions are made against some
background. Sometimes this background is objective and at sometimes it includes
subjective elements. For instance someone’s decision to have an abortion
contains subjective elements and someone is unlikely to use AMA to help in
making such a decision. The covid-19 outbreak creates a number of moral
questions for doctors treating covid patients with limited resources which need
to be made against a mainly objective background. Such decisions are more
amenable to AMA and perhaps now would be a good time to start designing such
systems for emergencies.
- Imgmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.
- Christoph Bublitz, 2016, Moral Enhancement and Mental Freedom, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 33(1), page 91.
