Existential threats, Enhancement and Enfranchisement

Many of my postings deal with enhancement. Enhancement is important for two reasons. Firstly some people believe being enhanced will benefit them personally. Some people such as Michael Sandel believe these benefits might be illusory. They believe we should simply accept who we are and feel a sense of giftedness for our natural state. I would suggest that part of our natural state is a desire to improve our circumstances. One way of improving our circumstances is to enhance ourselves. It might then be argued that enhancement is natural for human beings even if some of the methods employed might not be. However this posting for the most part will not be concerned with enhancement for personal reasons. Persson and Savulescu suggest that pharmacological moral enhancement might be necessary if we are to combat existential threats such as global warming (1). Clearly decisions made by us now will have an affect on global warming, will have an affect on the interests of future persons. Persson and Savulescu base their suggestion on the fact we always seem to favour our short term interests. In this posting I want to consider a different means of dealing with such existential threats.

Let us accept that Persson and Savulescu are correct in their assertion that we favour our short term interests. Accepting this means that we must also accept that we might fail to adequately consider the interests of future people. Persson and Savulescu believe that pharmacological moral enhancement would mean that those who are so enhanced would be more likely to consider the interests of their successors. In this posting I will suggest that there is an alternative means of making the present generation more likely to consider the interests of their successors. I will suggest that we should enfranchise future generations.

Children don’t have a vote. However our children will have to deal with the results of our short term attitudes to threats such as global warming or pandemics. Perhaps then our short term attitudes might be alleviated if children had a vote. The extension of the franchise to children is usually known as Demeny voting after Paul Demeny (2). The fact that children have a vote would not mean that they could exercise this vote, this would be a proxy vote exercised by their parents. It would be hoped that a parent when casting a proxy vote on behalf his child would consider that child’s long term interests. It might be objected that this is a too complicated task for a parent as it is hard to judge what is in the long term interests of his child. In response I would point out even if not all of a child’s long term interests are apparent to a parent some are. It is in the interests of any child to live in a world without the dangers associated with global warming, the fear of avoidable pandemics and the threat of nuclear annihilation. It is possible therefore that a parent could consider some of the long term interests of his child when casting a proxy vote on her behalf. Unfortunately I am doubtful as to whether this would occur in practice. Most people understand what is in their long term interests but do not always act in a way that promotes these interests. For instance most people understand being obese is not in their long term interests but continue to eat junk food. It follows if people disregard their own long term interests that they might also disregard the long term interests of their children. Demeny voting might not combat our short term attitudes.

Perhaps if the enfranchisement of our children by Demeny voting fails to adequately address our short-termism then perhaps a more radical form of enhancement might work. Writing in the magazine Aeon Thomas Wells argues that because future people will have interests that will be affected by our current policies that they should have some affect on our election procedures, see votes for the future . Clearly future people cannot affect our election processes directly as they don’t yet exist and we don’t even know how many of them will exist. Their influence as with Demeny voting must be through a proxy. Who or what would be a suitable proxy? Wells suggests that civic organisations, such as charitable foundations, environmentalist advocacy groups or non-partisan think tanks might cast proxy votes. He further suggests that such a block vote might account for 10% of the electorate. Such a scheme might face difficulties in implementation but for the sake of argument I will assume that these difficulties might be overcome. I will also assume that some of the interests of future people are clearly discernible, interests such as living in a world without the dangers associated with global warming, the fear of avoidable pandemics and the threat of nuclear annihilation. It seems to me that such organisations would not be deterred by short term interests from pursuing the interests of future people.

Let us assume we have a duty to consider the interests of future people and that we would be failing in our duty if we left these people a ravished planet as our legacy. The question I now wish to address would pharmacological moral enhancement as suggested by Persson and Savulescu or the radical change to the franchise as suggested by Wells best fulfil this duty? At this juncture I will point out that at the moment there is no safe guaranteed means of pharmacological moral enhancement. Indeed there may never be such a means. It might therefore be assumed that we should be prepared to accept a radical change to the franchise as suggested by Wells to help us fulfil our duty. However it seems to me there are two reasons why moral enhancement might be preferable. Firstly at the beginning of this posting I suggested that our nature causes us to seek to enhance ourselves even if some of the means adopted might be regarded as unnatural by some people. It follows if seeking pharmacological moral enhancement is going to happen anyway that there is no reason to radically change the franchise. Secondly radically changing the franchise to allow the interests of future people are taken into account seems to limit our autonomy. If we freely choose to enhance our morals by pharmacological means then a decision to consider the interests of future people would be an autonomous one. It might be objected that we might only have a natural desire to enhance our cognition and longevity. Perhaps, but it seems to me that we are naturally moral creatures, I may of course be mistaken.

1. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulesu, 2012, Unfit for the Future, Oxford University Press.
2. Paul Demeny, 1986, Pronatalist Policies in Low-Fertility Countries: Patterns, Performance and Prospects, Population and Development Review, vol. 12

Moral Character Enhancement and Moral Status

Intuitively most people seem to believe that provided we could morally enhance people it would be a good thing to do so. After all this is exactly what moral education is trying to do? In the age of Trump and his supporters the question of moral enhancement assumes greater importance. Many people also seem to think that provided this enhancement could be done by pharmaceutical means without any adverse side-effects that it should be attempted. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu support these intuitions and in addition argue there is an urgent need to enhance the moral character of humanity, see Persson and Savulescu. However Nicolas Agar argues that whilst it may be possible to enhance moral status that it would be wrong to do so, see Agar. Moral enhancement has two aspects, the enhancement of moral character and the enhancement of moral status. In this posting I will assume it is possible to enhance the moral character of people. I will firstly examine whether character enhancement need be linked to moral status enhancement. I will secondly examine whether, provided character enhancement is of necessity connected to the enhancement of moral status, any such character enhancement can be justified.

Before commencing my examination I must make an attempt to make some definitions clear. Firstly what is meant by enhancing the moral character of someone and secondly enhancing her moral status? Let us accept without argument that enhancing the moral character of someone means improving the ways she acts with respect those things that have moral status. To Agar for something to have moral status means someone has certain rights which others must respect. It follows to enhance moral status would simply mean to increase her rights. Agar sees these rights as meaning something is entitled to certain forms of beneficial treatment and a reduction in its eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. I would question whether Agar’s definition of moral status is a complete one. Of course someone’s moral status contains rights about her entitlement to benefits and her eligibility for harm but might it not also include respect for her knowledge concerning moral questions. I would argue such respect must include understanding. If we respect someone for her moral knowledge then we respect her because she can point us in the right direction. We respect her because she can highlight some of the important features attached to our moral understanding or give us an example which might make things clearer to us. We should not respect someone who simply tells us to do something for moral reasons if after some effort we cannot understand these reasons. To respect someone’s moral status because of her superior moral knowledge means we must be able to understand her moral reasoning even if she has to draw our attention to this reasoning.

There are four questions attached to moral enhancement. Firstly why should we enhance moral character? Secondly how can we enhance moral character? Thirdly why should we enhance moral status? This seems to be the question Agar is concerned with. Lastly how can we enhance moral status? Let us assume for the moment that there is no need to answer the first question for we accept the need for moral education. It appears provided there are no unforeseen adverse consequences that it is always good to enhance moral character. Improving our moral character, like improving our happiness, is always good. Let us also assume there is no need to answer the fourth question provided we accept Agar’s definition of moral status. To increase someone’s moral status we simply increase her rights to certain beneficial treatment and decrease her eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. If we accept the Agar’s definition then we are left with two important questions concerning moral enhancement. How can we enhance moral character and why should we enhance moral status? Prima facie the reasons why we should we enhance someone’s moral status seems to be unconnected to how we could enhance her moral character. It appears to follow if we enhance someone’s moral character that this enhancement should not affect her moral status.

Such a conclusion would be premature for it might be the way in which someone’s moral character is enhanced automatically leads to an increase in moral status. If this is so we must be able to justify an increase in moral status if we are to justify character enhancement. There are two ways in which someone’s moral character might be enhanced. Firstly her cognitive abilities might be increased. Secondly her capacity for empathy might be increased. If someone’s cognitive abilities could be increased it might be thought that this increase would increase her ability to understand moral problems and help her to resolve them. I’m doubtful whether cognitive enhancement alone will actually lead to moral character enhancement. For instance someone might simply use her increased cognitive abilities to exploit others. It is only when her increased cognitive abilities are directed at moral problems that this increase might actually lead to moral enhancement. Nonetheless let us put my worries to one side for the moment and assume that cognitive enhancement alone can lead to moral enhancement. Does the moral enhancement of the character, by increasing people’s cognitive abilities automatically increase their moral status? It might do so provided respect for greater moral understanding is part of moral status as I have suggested above. But such an increase in moral status based on respect would not affect the entitlement of any of the things of moral concern to certain forms of beneficial treatment or lead to any reduction in their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. It follows it would not be wrong to enhance someone’s moral character, by increasing her cognitive abilities, provided this increases her moral status based solely on respect.

However let us assume the moral enhancement of someone’s character, by increasing her cognitive abilities, would also enhance her moral status by increasing her entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment and further reducing her eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. Would such an enhancement of moral status be wrong? Someone might suggest such enhancement would create two kinds of moral status for people. People whose character has been enhanced, which means they are entitled to additional beneficial treatment and a reduction in their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment, and those who are not. She might proceed to suggest that the creation of two kinds of moral status for people would be wrong. Let us consider her first suggestion. Will moral character enhancement by increasing cognitive abilities lead to the creation of two kinds of moral status? I am doubtful. Let us assume that cognitive enhancement can be achieved by biomedical means or genetic engineering. If cognitive enhancement is to lead to the creation of two kinds of moral status then these means must not be available to all. However it is far from clear that these artificial means will not be available to all for technology moves at a very fast pace. Moreover even if these means become only available to a few, the fact that these few are cognitively enhanced should mean these means should in time become available to all. My objector might retort that the few who are cognitively enhanced will not spread these means to others and instead will exploit them. In reply I would simply point out we are only concerned with cognitive enhancement connected to the moral enhancement of the character and that because of this, this sort cognitive enhancement should not lead to the exploitation of others. Exploitation is incompatible with moral enhancement. It appears probable that if the cognitive enhancement of character does lead to an increase in moral status that this increased status will eventually apply to all. It further appears that even if enhancement leads to two types of moral status for people that worries about exploitation are unjustified.

Let us assume that the moral enhancement of the character, by increasing someone’s cognitive abilities, does produce two kinds of moral status for persons. My objector assumes this is wrong. What reasons could she advance for this wrongness? Firstly she might suggest that those of increased moral status would have their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment increased and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment reduced, whilst the entitlements of those of lower moral status would remain the same. She might then further suggest that this disparity is unfair. In reply I would question whether those of lower moral status have the right to deny those of higher moral status increased entitlements provided their own entitlements remain the same. Allen Buchanan makes the same point (1) and asks if we would be justified in delaying India’s development in order to allow Ethiopia catch up. Secondly my objector might suggest in a world of scarce resources that those of lower moral status would be given less of these resources; that is their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment would be reduced and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment increased. In reply I would simply reiterate that such a state of affairs would be one of exploitation and that the moral enhancement of character should preclude increasing the exploitation of others.

My objector might now suggest cognitive enhancement cannot simply be tied to the character enhancement as I have assumed above. She might then suggest that cognitive enhancement can be tied to both character enhancement and exploitation. She might proceed to argue what really matters is what someone’s increased cognitive abilities are directed at. I have myself suggested above that the cognitive enhancement of someone’s moral character can only occur if cognitive enhancement is directed at moral problems. It follows I must accept my objector’s suggestion that cognitive enhancement cannot simply be tied to the character enhancement. I must also accept that purely cognitive enhancement might lead to exploitation of the un-enhanced by the enhanced. It also follows that if the cognitive enhancement of moral character is to be justified that any increased cognitive powers must be directed at moral problems in some way. The way to achieve this direction I would suggest is to increase our capacity for empathy.

Let us assume that we can enhance someone’s moral character by increasing her cognitive powers and by directing at least some of this cognitive increase towards moral problems by increasing her capacity for empathy. Let assume such dual enhancement also increases her moral status. Could such a dual enhancement lead to exploitation? Exploitation of the un-enhanced by the enhanced would mean, either that their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment would be reduced and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment increased, or that their entitlement is not increased and their eligibility not reduced even when this is possible. However so doing seems incompatible with an enhanced capacity for empathy. For if the enhanced reduced the entitlement of the un-enhanced to beneficial treatment then we might question if their capacity to feel empathy really had been increased. It follows dual enhancement does not mean that the entitlement of the un-enhanced to beneficial treatment would decrease or their eligibility for harm increase. Indeed dual enhancement might mean their entitlements might increase and their eligibility decrease. The above leads me to tentatively conclude dual enhancement can be justified even if it leads to the un-enhanced people having a lesser moral status than the enhanced.

At this point someone might suggest that because of the dangers of exploitation we should only attempt to enhance our capacity for empathy. I would reject such a suggestion. Consider a paedophile who uses some artificial means to increase his capacity for empathy. This increased capacity for empathy does not rid him of his urges but it does allow him to resist most of them. Indeed this increased capacity for empathy might be regarded as a form of moral enhancement. However let us consider the unlikely possibility that the abuse of this paedophile commits does not physically harm a child. Let us further assume he comes into contact with a child who is a willing participant and even enjoys the encounter. It would seem in this case he has no reason not to abuse the child. It follows that moral character enhancement based solely on empathy is compatible with this abuse. Increasing someone’s cognitive abilities allows him to better understand the concepts of autonomy and consent and would help prevent such abuse. It follows the enhancement of someone’s cognition and empathy is preferable to moral enhancement based solely on increasing someone’s capacity for empathy.

1. Allen Buchanan, 2011, Beyond Humanity, Oxford University Press, page 53.