In the western world the idea of honour seems to be
becoming less important. Politicians make promises and feel no shame when they
break them, others offer apologies without feeling any sense of shame. In a new
book Tamler Sommers argues that honour matters. Let us accept that honour
matters. Sommers argues that in our cosmopolitan culture we have replaced
honour by dignity and that this replacement damages society. In this posting I
will argue that some of the goods honour delivers can be outweighed by other goods
delivered by a dignity based culture. I will then argue that honour can matter in
a dignity culture albeit in a modified form.
Why does honour matter? Sommers lists three main
disadvantages of living in a culture without honour. Firstly he argues that such
a culture makes us fearful. Secondly he argues that the rampant individuality
of contemporary western leaves us without a sense of solidarity. Lastly that such
a society diminishes the power of shame. Honour matters to Sommer because it
gives us courage to combat fear, it helps to form our identity and it gives us
a stronger disposition to feel shame. Honour matters because these goods are
valuable.
Let us accept that courage is valuable, Martha Nussbaum
like Sommers argues that we are damaged by living in a fear driven culture (2).
However it might be argued that in a cosmopolitan society courage has
diminished because the need for courage has diminished. For herders or hunter
gatherers courage helped them to survive in a harsh environment. For a citizen
in ancient Greece or Rome courage helped flourish in brutal times. However most
of us no longer need courage to survive even if we might need it to flourish.
Perhaps as the need for courage diminishes so does its value. It might be
concluded that in a cosmopolitan society because we have less need for courage that
this is on balance a good thing. It might be objected that some inner city
dwellers live in a harsh and brutal environment which means that the need for
courage remains. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why gangs persist in these
areas. I would suggest what this objection shows is not that there is still an
undiminished need for courage in a cosmopolitan society but rather that the
domain of such a society is limited. A truly cosmopolitan society must address
the needs of all of its citizens. I would further suggest that in an efficient
cosmopolitan society which addresses the needs of all its citizens that there
is less need for courage and that as a result the value of courage diminishes.
However even if it is accepted that there is less need for
courage in a cosmopolitan society this does not imply we have no need for
courage. It is sometimes remarked lose it or use it. If there is less need for
courage in such a society does this damage our capacity to display courage when
needed? I am prepared to accept it does but would suggest that any harm done by
a lack of courage in a dignity based society is more than offset by living in a
more peaceful society which protects its citizens. Perhaps the harm done by
living in a fearful society might be better addressed by hope supported by
faith as suggested by Nussbaum (3). In this context faith might regarded as the
realistic
optimism of Tiberius. Nonetheless I still believe courage should be
fostered. Our educational systems seem to be becoming solely concerned with
preparing people for work rather than life perhaps with more emphasis on sport
and perhaps even the teaching of philosophy might foster courage.
Is Sommers right when he suggests that the rampant
individuality of contemporary western leaves us without a sense of solidarity?
It might be argued that a dignity culture means that all are valued. Perhaps all
being valued gives all of us a basic sense of solidarity. However this is a
very basic sense of solidarity and I accept Sommers is right and that rampant
individualism can damage solidarity. A sense of solidarity can have various
roots. It might be rooted in a profession, a religion, class, a nation or even
a tribe. However even if a sense of solidarity has benefits it might have
shallow roots. Let us accept our identity is linked to solidarity. We identify
with those who are similar to us. If our sense of identity is rooted in some
class, nation or tribe then our identity is passively determined and our sense
of solidarity is easily acquired. Such a sense of dignity might increase
solidarity with our own in group but lessen our sense of solidarity with others
and lead to a decrease in toleration. Perhaps these harms outweigh the
solidarity an honour culture fosters. Can a dignity based culture deliver a
sense of solidarity other than a very basic form? In a dignity based
cosmopolitan society we determine our identity to some degree. We might do so
explicitly by choosing profession, such as joining the police force, or
choosing a religion, perhaps by becoming a Buddhist. We might also do so implicitly
by the actions we choose. I would suggest that if we choose our identity, even
if our choice is implicit rather explicit, that we are more authentic than if
are identity is acquired passively by being, born in some particular place or
class. I would argue that even if solidarity is of value that the loss of
solidarity in a cosmopolitan society might be more than offset by the value of
authenticity. However at this point courage re-enters our discussions for
someone wants to be true to himself must have the courage of his convictions. Does
someone in this situation really need raw courage or would fortitude be more
useful? I would also argue that a cosmopolitan society might increase a
stronger sense solidarity in some cases. I have suggested above if we passively
acquire our sense of solidarity that this is easily acquired. I have suggested
that identity and solidarity are linked. If our sense of identity is based on
partly on the choices we make we might feel a stronger sense of solidarity with
those who have made a similar choice rather than those who are simply members
of our class, nation or tribe.
Sommers argues that we are less likely to experience shame
in a dignity culture than in an honour culture. I agree with Sommers that the
ability to feel some form of shame is valuable but what form of shame? What do
we mean by shame? I have previously argued that there are two types of shame.
Firstly David Velleman defines shame as “anxiety about social disqualification”
(4). This seems to be the sort of same fostered by an honour based culture. Secondly
shame might be defined as someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares
about or loves and is linked to character. If we accept Velleman’s account of
shame then a cosmopolitan society does indeed damage our ability to feel shame.
A cosmopolitan dignity based culture seeks to include rather than exclude. But
is Velleman’s type of shame really valuable? Consider a high caste Brahmin in
India who has come into contact with something unclean and feels no shame. Has
he done anything wrong and would social disqualification ever be valuable in
this scenario? Shame is valuable but I would suggest that the type of shame
which is valuable is linked to character. But shame linked to character is
linked to authenticity which is perhaps best fostered in a cosmopolitan society
than an honour culture. If we accept the above then shame matters and the shame
that matters is connected to character. Such shame is not the shame fostered by
an honour basis.
Let us accept that Sommers is right and that a loss of a
sense of honour damages society. He argues honour is connected to being a
member of some organisation such as a profession, a religion, class, a nation
or even a tribe. If honour is only connected to some social group then in a
dignity based society honour becomes irrelevant and fades away. I have argued
if honour depends on the above bases that the goods delivered by a cosmopolitan
outweigh the damage done by losing our sense of honour. Sommers argues that
honour is damaged by an excessive focus on dignity. Perhaps it’s not our
excessive focus on dignity but our excessive focus on rights, rather what it
means to be a good person, which damages our sense of honour. I would suggest
being a virtuous person is connected to being a good person. I would further
suggest that being virtuous is not incompatible with living in a dignity or
rights based society. I would still further suggest honour can be based on
acting virtuously. Indeed it might be argued that virtue based ethics is impossible
without some idea of honour. Moreover acting virtuously sometimes requires
courage, gives us a sense of identity and if we fail a sense of shame. Such
thoughts might have pleased Jane Austin. If we accept the above that being
honourable means acting virtuously then honour is possible in in a dignity
based or rights based society. Perhaps to promote honour we don’t need to encourage
a greater sense of solidarity in our cosmopolitan society as suggested by
Sommers but rather by encouraging people to be good persons by acting
virtuously.
- Tamler Sommers, 2018, Why Honor Matters, Basic Books, chapter 2
- Martha Nussbaum, 2018. The Monarchy of Fear, Oxford University Press
- Nussbaum , chapter 7
- David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95
