Anne Jacobson wonders whether sexual activity always
requires the capacity to consent, see sex in
the country of the aged. In this I posting will examine what sort
of consent is needed for sexual relations. I will argue what counts as consent
varies with the relationship between the parties involved. In medicine consent
is always necessary. If I go to the doctors and she takes my blood pressure I
simply roll up my sleeve and hold my arm out. My consent is implicit. If I am
about to have a transplant my consent is not implicit or even verbal but
signed. Moreover in order for my signature to be valid I must understand both
the nature and possible outcomes of the procedure. In a medical setting how
detailed my consent needs to be depends on the procedure. Procedures vary and
different procedures have different consent requirements. In what follows I am
only concerned with consent to non-exploitative sexual relationships and will
exclude bizarre relationships. These relationships will include gay and lesbian
ones. I am also only concerned with non-harmful relationships. These
relationships exclude ones in which an unwanted pregnancy might occur or harm
due to unprotected sex which might occur if one of the partners was HIV
positive. In such relationships, unlike medical procedures, because all of them
require much the same understanding and carry little risk of harm it would
appear to follow that the consent requirements should be the same in all cases.
However even if the understanding required and risks
involved vary very little the partners might. For instance two students on a
blind date are very different from partners who have lived together for twenty
years. I will now argue that adequate consent to sex varies with the
relationship between the partners involved. I want to look at sexual consent
from the viewpoint of friendship. It might be objected not all sexual
relationships take place between friends. The strength of this objection
depends on what we mean by friends. I want to differentiate between act being
done in friendship and an act being part of friendship.
I will consider sexual acts done in friendship first. Aristotle
suggested that there could be friends of utility. That is people might be bound
together because together they might reach their own respective goals. A one
night stand between two students could be understood as done in the friendship
of utility. Each partner is simply seeking to satisfy his/her sexual desires. I
would suggest that provided each partner is capable of consenting that this
consent can be implicit. For instance undressing or acting in a sexually
provocative manner might be regarded as giving implicit consent to sex. However
it is conceivable that one partner might misread the signals so it is important
that both partners are capable of consenting. If someone is capable of
consenting then he/she is capable of refusing consent by saying no. I would
suggest if both partners are capable of refusing consent that implicit consent
should count as valid consent. I would further suggest that if one of the
partners later thinks that he/she should have said no does not invalidate that
consent. A patient’s consent to heart surgery is not invalidated if he latter
regrets his decision due to the outcome caused by unforeseeable circumstances.
Let us consider the question of competence further. It is just
about possible to view sex between a client and prostitute as an act done in
the friendship of utility even though they have different goals. The client is
seeking to satisfy his sexual desires whilst the prostitute is seeking
financial reward. However few prostitutes, if any, are happy hookers. It is
possible to argue that even though the prostitute can easily say no, her social
situation means she is not competent to give real consent. I suggested above if
both two people are capable of refusing consent that implicit consent should
count as valid consent. The above example shows it is relatively easy to
ascertain if someone consents but that it is much harder to ascertain if he/she
is competent to give consent. Tightening the consent requirements will not
change this difficultly so in the rest of this posting it will be assumed implicit
consent between competent adults is valid consent.
I now want to examine some of the consequences of accepting
the above assumption. Let us now consider whether someone can give adequate
consent if he/she is under the influence of alcohol or another drug. Sex often
takes place between those who are mildly intoxicated with only implicit consent
and I would suggest such consent is perfectly valid. Let us consider one
partner is very intoxicated. I would suggest in this case even if he/she gives explicit
consent that his/her consent is invalid as he/she is not competent to give
consent. Clearly there are difficult cases in which it is hard to ascertain
whether someone to competent to give consent. Because of these difficult cases
an objector might suggest that implicit consent is inadequate consent and as a
result suggest that consent requirements need to be explicit. Someone must say
yes. I would reject such a suggestion because it doesn’t address the real
problem; whether someone is competent to say yes. My objector might nonetheless
maintain that because competence is sometimes hard to ascertain, especially in
retrospect and that implicit consent given by a competent person is an
inadequate standard to apply. In response I would reply drink means it is
difficult to assess whether someone is competent to drive a car and an
arbitrary standard is applied. My objector might now respond such an arbitrary
standard is not available when determining competence to consent to sexual
relations. I accept this point. However there is no arbitrary standard to
assess competence to give consent in a medical setting and a patient’s
competence usually can be assessed. In difficult cases it is usually left to
the courts to determine competence. It seems to me even if it is difficult to
assess someone’s competence in borderline cases that implicit consent between
competent parties should be regarded as valid consent. Lastly someone who has
been taking drink or drugs should not enter into in any sexual relation not
only because he/she cannot give competent consent but also because he/she
is not capable of understanding of whether his/her partner is giving consent or
capable of giving consent.
I now want to consider a difficult case outlined by Mike
LaBossierre as follows.
“They’d now decided — mutually, she thought — just to be
friends. When he ended up falling asleep on her bed, she changed into pajamas
and climbed in next to him. Soon, he was putting his arm around her and taking
off her clothes. ‘I basically said, “No, I don’t want to have sex with you.”
And then he said, “OK, that’s fine” and stopped. . . . And then he started
again a few minutes later, taking off my panties, taking off his boxers. I just
kind of laid there and didn’t do anything — I had already said no. I was just
tired and wanted to go to bed. I let him finish. I pulled my panties back on
and went to sleep.’ talking
philosophy
Six weeks later the women reported she had been raped. If
we accept that valid consent can be implicit consent between competent partners
was she raped or did she change her mind? Clearly the women in question said no
but because she didn’t say no a few minutes later was she then giving her
implicit consent? The fact that afterwards she simply went to sleep seems to
support the idea that at the time she didn’t feel as though she had been raped.
Surely rape requires anger at the time of rape even if this anger has sometimes
to be suppressed. It appears to follow that she wasn’t raped and as a result
had given some form of implicit consent. I am somewhat reluctant to accept the
above conclusion. Implicit consent cannot be presumed from a lack of
resistance. I have suggested sexual relationships take place in some kind of
friendship, even this is only the friendship of utility. If one partner obtains
nothing from a sexual relationship then he/she is being used purely as a means.
To use someone simply as a means is wrong according to Kant, even though he
would have viewed sexual relationships very differently to the way I am doing
here. The above case did not take place in this type of friendship as having
sex was of no utility to the women in question and she was being used purely as
a means. It follows the above was a case of rape. My objector might suggest
that this example shows the need for explicit rather than implicit consent to
sexual relations. However accepting his suggestion might not have made any difference
in this case, the woman in question might have said yes simply to stop herself
being pestered in order to go to sleep. I would repeat my suggestion that
consent implicit or explicit must take place in a spirit of friendship even if
this friendship is only one of utility.
I now want to consider acts that are done as part
of friendship. According to Bennett Helm friendship should be
understood partly in terms of the friends forming a “plural agent”. This involves friends having a joint
evaluative perspective (1). A joint
evaluative prospect should mean such friends feel the same way about sexual
relations and that implicit consent between competent partners should be
regarded as valid consent. Sometimes of course even though the partners share
the same perspective the time might be wrong for one of the partners and he/she
should simply say ‘not now’. It might be thought that for a couple, such as a
married couple, who had been friends for many years all that would be required
would be implicit consent. Let us return to Anne Jacobson’s ‘country of the
aged’, is possible to have consensual sex if someone has dementia. Perhaps
prior to dementia the couple had a loving relationship and enjoyed good sexual
relations. Perhaps in these circumstances the prior relationship meant that
implicit consent was in place. Personally I wonder why someone should want to
have sex with someone suffering from dementia, such sex seems analogous to sex
with a non-responsive robot or if the personality has left the person a form of
masturbation. Regardless of these concerns such sex is non-consensual, because
one of the participants cannot say no, and should be regarded as rape. Implicit
consent is only valid consent if both partners are competent to say no.
The above leads to the following conclusions about the conditions
in which consensual sexual relationships should take place.
- Sexual relations must always take place in friendship. Even if this friendship must be seen as between friends of utility. It is important to clear that some relations between friends might not take place in a spirit of friendship as illustrated by the case of the two students used above. I would suggest that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
- Consent must be given even if this is only implicit consent. As consent must always be done in friendship it follows if there is any doubt as to whether implicit consent is being given it is required that the doubter satisfies his/her doubts.
- Consent given must be given by someone who is competent. He/she must understand what he/she is doing and the possible consequences.
- Lastly someone must be competent enough to understand if his/her partner is giving or capable of giving consent. This applies particularly in cases such as dementia, drink and drugs.
To conclude I have argued that the two examples I have used
above are cases of rape. Many would disagree with my conclusion especially in regard
to the first example. They might point out even if the student in the example
used the other only as a means to satisfy his sexual desires that his actions
were not the same as someone who uses force. Such worries seem meaningful to
me. However does this mean we need to reconceptualise rape? I'm not sure and will consider the question in another posting.
1. Bennett
Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship the Self, Oxford, page
282