Terrorism, Love and Delusion

In this posting I want to examine terrorism. As a philosopher rather than a psychologist I won’t examine the means by which potential terrorists might become radicalised, instead I will examine one of the conditions which might make some people might susceptible to radicalisation. Terrorists are sometimes seen as idealists, albeit with warped ideals. I will argue that ideals are vital to us as persons and that if someone lacks ideals that this lack creates a condition in which she becomes susceptible to radicalisation.

Usually the ideals that are important to a terrorist are grand political ideals. I’m interested in the time before she acquires such grand ideals, I’m more interested in the mundane ideals that shape people’s everyday lives. I want to link ideals mundane or otherwise to what someone loves. I will assume, as Harry Frankfurt does, that someone who loves nothing at all has no ideals (1). An ideal is something someone finds hard to betray and as a result limits her will. Love also limits the will. Love need not be grand romantic love but can sometimes simply be seen as ‘caring about’ something in a way that limits the carer’s will. I would suggest if someone loves something this something forms a sort of ideal for her as she must try to ensure the thing she loves is benefited and not harmed. If this wasn’t so she would remain indifferent to her supposed beloved rather than loving it. It is impossible for someone to be indifferent to her ideals. However accepting the above doesn’t mean that ideals have to be grand ideals, indeed someone’s ideals can be quite modest.

I now want to argue that ideals, as defined by what we love above, are essential to us as persons. According to Frankfurt someone without ideals,

“can make whatever decision he likes and shape his will as he pleases. This does not mean that his will is free. It only means that his will is anarchic, moved by mere impulse and inclination. For a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity.” (2)

Let us accept that ideals are essential to us as persons and I would suggest that someone without ideals has a sense of simply being. I would further suggest that this sense of simply being, simply existing, is one that most people would find unbearable. According to Christine Korsgaard human beings by their very nature are condemned to choosing (3). Someone without ideals has no basis on which to choose and as Frankfurt points out is ruled by impulse and inclination. It seems the combination of the need to choose even if that choice is an unconscious one and the lack of a basis for that choice is what makes simply being, simply existing, unbearable.

If one accepts the above then the need to love something, have ideals, expresses a quite primitive urge for psychic survival. I would suggest that in some cases this need to love something creates the conditions which makes some people vulnerable to radicalisation. Of course this need to love something might be met in other ways, perhaps even perhaps in such mundane ways such as keeping a pet. However the young, perhaps especially young men, want to feel important and perhaps this feeling causes them to prefer grand rather than mundane means in order to satisfy this need. In some cases the combination of the need to love and feel important creates the conditions in which some people become especially vulnerable to radicalisation.

I now want to argue that choosing to be a terrorist in order to satisfy the primitive urge to love something is a form of self-delusion. It is a self-delusion due to the nature of love. Love is not simply a matter choosing to love. According to Frankfurt, “love is a concern for the well-being or flourishing of a beloved object – a concern that is more or less volitionally constrained so that it is not a matter of entirely free choice or under full voluntary control, and that is more or less disinterested.” (4) Now if we accept Frankfurt’s position then when someone chooses to become a terrorist in order to satisfy her urge to love something she is deluding herself for two reasons. Firstly, love is not a matter of choice and it is impossible for someone to choose to love in order to satisfy this need. Secondly she is not really choosing a cause because she cares passionately about it but rather she is choosing in order to satisfy her need to love something. She is choosing to relieve her unbearable feeling of just existing.

It might be objected that I am exaggerating the importance of the need to love and underestimating the need to feel important. I will now argue even if this is so, which I don’t accept, that some of the same considerations apply. To terrorists the feeling of importance is connected to violent action. Terrorists want to be considered as heroes by some people. I have previously defined a hero as someone who chooses to recognisably benefit someone else or society in ways most people could not, in addition her actions must be beyond the call of duty and must involve some real sacrifice on her part, see Hobbs and Heroes . Now what motivates a true hero is a need to benefit someone else or society, it is not to satisfy some need to be seen as a hero. Some who pushes someone into a river in order to rescue them certainly isn’t a hero. Someone might choose to become a hero but if the motivation for her actions is a desire to be a hero then she is deluding herself about her actions even if this desire is an unconscious one because no real sacrifice is involved. Indeed it is even possible to argue that someone who resists her desires to be seen as heroic might be better seen as a hero even if a minor one.

Let us accept that it is important to understand how people become radicalised and the conditions which make this radicalisation possible. One of the conditions which makes some people susceptible to radicalisation is a sense of simply being, simply existing, due to a lack of ideals. Other conditions may play a part but what might be done to alleviate this lack of ideals? Unfortunately there seem to no easy or quick solutions because real ideals must be acquired rather than given. In spite of these difficulties I will offer some rather tentative solutions. Firstly good parenting; good parenting should always involve love. Some deprived and inarticulate parents find it hard to give or to express their love even if they are excellent parents in other ways. Some parenting skills can be taught but loving can’t. It follows we should encourage social conditions conducive to the emergence of love. Perhaps also we should actively encourage policies that promote happiness, see action for happiness . Secondly education must be more broadly based. Education should not only be focussed on the skills valued by employers but also on the skills that help all pupils to flourish. For instance the skills needed in sport and music should not be considered to be on the educational periphery. Education should be broad enough so that all have the opportunity to acquire skills to enable them to be good at something rather just acquire skills that are good for employment. Even if terrorism can be defeated by other means or collapses due its inherently stupid doctrines the solutions outlined above would remain useful in building a more cohesive society. 

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 114.
2. Frankfurt, page 114.
3. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 1.
4. Frankfurt, page 165.

Meaning and the Midlife Crisis

In this posting I want to investigate the midlife crisis and use my investigation to examine what is meant by having meaning in life. The starting point for this for investigation is Kieran Setiya’s paper on the midlife crisis .

What do we mean by the midlife crisis? The term midlife crisis was first used by Elliot Jaques in 1965 to describe a period of unstable mental or emotional health occurring in the middle of someone’s life. This period might be triggered by someone becoming aware of her own mortality, the death of someone close or a sense of lack of achievement in life and other factors. In this posting I want to consider the midlife crisis from a philosophical viewpoint. According to Setiya the midlife crisis, is a crisis of meaning, someone suffering from the midlife crisis finds his life lacks meaning. In what follows I will adopt Setiya’s definition.

Adopting this definition has several consequences. Firstly it means that whilst becoming aware of one’s own mortality might well trigger a midlife crisis, this awareness is not an essential element of that crisis. Indeed an immortal might suffer such a crisis as Setiya suggests. Secondly a midlife crisis does not of necessity have to occur in midlife. Setiya considers John Stuart Mill’s nervous breakdown to be a midlife crisis even though this occurred when Mill was only 20. It should be remarked Mill learnt Greek aged 3 and read Plato at 7 so perhaps he was older mentally than his 20 years.  Thirdly it is important to be clear that Setiya does not consider a lack of meaning to mean that someone suffering from a midlife crisis believes everything lacks value. It is perfectly possible to imagine a doctor suffering from a midlife crisis who nonetheless believes her practise of medicine is of value to her patients.

I now want to consider some of the reasons given for this lack of meaning in someone’s life. Mill was a social reformer and believed in remedying society’s ills. It possible to imagine that his midlife crisis depended on the thought that if all these ills were remedied that his life would become meaningless. Accepting the above would mean a world lacking all ills, a semi perfect world, would be one lacking a sense of meaning, such an idea is dealt with in fiction by Matt Haig in his book “The Humans”. It follows that whilst some people might find remedying the ills of society a sufficient condition for a meaningful life it is not a necessary one. Setiya considers that someone might believe her life is “just one dammed thing after another” and that this belief is the cause of her life lacking meaning. If this is the causes a lack of meaning and triggers a midlife crisis it is easy to see an immortal might suffer from such a crisis. It might be suggested that if someone has a sense of narrative about her life that she will not lack a sense of meaning. Setiya is sceptical about of such a suggestion. He believes it is perfectly possible for someone to lead an episodic life lacking narrative and unity and nonetheless have a meaningful life. For instance someone might see herself as a child then a parent followed by being a parent and then a grandparent.

Of course I accept that there are episodes in someone’s life. Nonetheless I believe that a completely episodic life is a meaningless life. Christine Korsgaard believes that by choosing we constitute ourselves (1). It seems to me that someone must choose on the basis of what we ‘cares about’ or loves. If she doesn’t then it further seems to me that she must lead a wanton or meaningless life. According to Harry Frankfurt,

“caring about oneself is essential to being a person. Can something to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all.” (2)

The way I use the term ‘caring about’ here means that if someone ‘cares about’ something she invests in it and identifies herself with what she ‘cares about’ because she makes herself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending on whether what she cares about is harmed or benefitted (3). I regard ‘caring about’ as a basic form of love, see The Structure of Love and Anti-Love Drugs . Let us accept that caring about ‘caring about’ or loving is essential to being a person. I now want to argue that because ‘caring about’ something is constitutive of being a person that someone cannot lead a purely episodic life. Intuitively if someone ‘cares about’ something this ‘caring about’ must have some persistence. Let us assume that people usually ‘care about’ several things and that ‘caring about’ different things has differing persistence. It follows that to be a person someone must have a sense of persistence, of narrative. It further follows that the episodes in someone’s life must be connected or our ‘caring about’ would have no persistence. Perhaps someone who sees herself progressing from being a child to a grandparent might view this progression as a series of connected chapters in her life rather than unconnected episodes.

I now want to return to Setiya’s analysis of the midlife crisis. Setiya starts his analysis by considering our activities. Some of our activities are done for some other end, these are classed as telic activities. I walk from home to the bus stop in order to get to work. Some of our activities a done for no other end, these are classed as atelic activities. I go for a walk simply because it’s a nice day and I fancy being out in the sunshine. It follows the same activity can be telic or atelic. Interestingly an activity might be telic and atelic at the same time. I might walk from home to the bus stop in order to get to work and because it’s a sunny day whilst I usually get a lift to the stop. According to Setiya the midlife happens when someone makes an excessive investment in telic activities, as ends, and not means.

What are the implications of accepting Setiya’s definition of a midlife crisis? Setiya’s definition allows us to see why an immortal might suffer a midlife crisis and why someone suffering from such a crisis can still see value in the world. However does such an understanding allow us to offer advice to someone suffering from a midlife crisis or help her to help herself? It seems clear that we offer advice. You can advise someone to seek more atelic ends in her life. Simple we can resolve the midlife crisis! Unfortunately this isn’t simple because whilst someone may seek more atelic ends her seeking doesn’t mean she can simply acquire atelic ends. For something to become someone’s end she must love or ‘cares about’ it. According to Frankfurt “the will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice.” (3) It follows someone cannot simply decide to love something, acquire atelic ends, in order to acquire meaning in her life and by doing so cure a midlife crisis. In Meaning Love and Happiness I suggested whilst we cannot simply choose to love that we might situate ourselves in situations in which love might grow naturally. It follows the best advice we can give someone in life is to place herself in situations in which love, as defined by ‘caring about’ can grow naturally and hope by doing so she may acquire some atelic ends. In conclusion we might point several things that might lead to more atelic ends such as, friendship, parenthood, the pursuit of knowledge and caring for others.

1. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 24.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 90
3. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 83.
4. Frankfurt, 1999, page 135.

Meaning, Love and Happiness

In this posting I want to examine the relationship between meaning, love and happiness. Most psychologists seem to believe that there is no relationship between meaning and happiness, see for instance Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker and Garbinsky (1). They often look for such a relationship by asking subjects to complete surveys about how happy they are and how meaningful they find their lives. The subjects are often free to use their own definitions of meaning and happiness. Psychologists usually find there is no relationship between the two. This lack of a relationship leads most psychologists to adopt the separation thesis which holds that meaning and happiness are unconnected. It seems to me that there is a negative relationship which questions this separation thesis. This negative relationship holds that having a life devoid of meaning and being unhappy are correlated.

Before examining this negative relationship we must be clear what concept of meaning we are using. Firstly meaning can be defined in an objective way. This objective sense of meaning holds that certain things on a list give someone’s life meaning. For instance someone’s life might be said to have meaning if he does useful things, has loving relationships and is optimistic. Secondly meaning can be defined in a subjective way. For someone’s life to be meaning is roughly for him to find it meaningful, for her to judge it as meaningful. In what follows I will only be concerned with meaning defined in a subjective way. Whilst I will not pursue the matter further here I believe someone whose life contains certain items from an objective list is more likely to have a happy life than one whose life does not. However let us now consider someone who believes his life to be meaningless. Someone who simply lives from moment to moment. I have suggested in the past such a person would suffer fro the unbearable lightness of simply being, see my posting on riots and the unbearable sense of simply being . I would suggest such a person is a dissatisfied person and as a consequence is not a happy person. It is important to note that I am not suggesting here that satisfaction is linked to happiness, I will do so latter, but I am suggesting dissatisfaction is linked to unhappiness. It might be objected that whilst I have suggested that someone who lives from moment to moment is likely to be unhappy, I have provided no argument to support my suggestion. My objector might now suggest it is perfectly possible for someone to be a ‘happy go lucky person’ who pays no attention to either his past or future. In response I would follow Christine Korsgaard by arguing our nature as human beings means we have a psychic necessity to choose (2). I would further argue that we cannot choose if we don’t care about anything and that we cannot care about anything if we don’t have some sense of meaning in our lives. Someone who is happy go lucky chooses this lifestyle.

Let us accept that someone who has no subjective meaning in life is likely to be a dissatisfied and unhappy person. It follows there is a correlation between meaning and unhappiness. This correlation gives us a reason to at the very least question the separation thesis. Why then should Baumeister and his associates report no correlation between happiness and meaning? Antti Kauppinen argues that this correlation is dependent on the concept of happiness employed. On a purely hedonic account of happiness there is indeed no correlation but with a broader definition there is a correlation. For someone to be happy according to Haybron is,

“for one’s emotional condition to be broadly positive – involving stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement – with negative central affective states and mood propensities only to a minor extent.” (3)

Kauppinen offers a slightly different account of happiness which he calls ‘the affective condition account of happiness’. His account is a multidimensional account comprised of predominantly positive affect, mood, emotion, and hedonic quality together with an absence of negative affect, see Meaning and Happiness . Both of these accounts of happiness seem to allow some room for meaning. Let us assume that Haybron is correct in believing that being happy includes someone endorsing his positive emotional condition. Let us also accept that it is impossible to endorse anything without some sense of meaning. If nothing matters, nothing has meaning, then we have no basis on which to endorse it. It follows if we accept accounts of happiness such as those of Haybron and Kauppinen that the separation thesis is false.

Prior to examining the correlation between subjective meaning and non-hedonic accounts of happiness I want to examine further what is meant by subjective meaning. I defined someone’s life to have subjective meaning above as a life the liver of that life finds meaningful or judges it to be meaningful. I now want to differentiate between someone finding and judging a life as meaningful. Consider a glutton who claims that eating as much as he can gives his life meaning. I would not consider such a person as leading a subjectively meaningful life. A subjectively meaningful life is not one that someone judges or even thinks is meaningful. In the rest of this posting a subjectively meaningful life is one that someone finds or experiences as meaningful. To find something meaningful, is to find something as important, and if something is important it must be loved. In order for someone to have a subjectively meaningful life he must love something.

At this point I must make it clear what I mean by love. I do not simply mean romantic love, romantic love is type of love but does not define all types of love. In my postings I often make use of Harry Frankfurt’s concept of love as caring about and identifying with someone or something. This concept means someone who loves is vulnerable to losses if his beloved is harmed and benefits if his beloved flourishes. The lover is satisfied with his beloved and has no desire to change his beloved. He may of course be dissatisfied with his beloved’s condition. If his beloved is unhappy he will share this unhappiness. If his beloved is an institution in decline then this decline will distress him. According to Frankfurt the fact someone is in love, in this meaning of love, shapes his motivational structure and guides his conduct (4). It might be argued such a concept of love is too simplistic. Bennett Helm argues someone doesn’t love every thing he cares about (5). Does someone really love ice cream or is this just mere rhetoric? Helm argues we love the things we feel pride and shame about. Helm would agree with Frankfurt that we identify with the things we love. However according to Helm identification does not simply require a passive satisfaction but a more active feeling of pride and shame. Perhaps as I have argued elsewhere there are different forms of love, see the structure of love . Or perhaps there aren’t different forms of identification, only different degrees of identification. I would suggest even if there are different forms of love that underlying all forms must be basic form of ‘caring about’ in the way Frankfurt uses the term.

I have argued above that if we accept a concept of happiness such as those of Haybron and Kauppinen that the separation thesis is false. I will now suggest that if we accept Haybron’s concept which includes endorsement that we must also accept that it is a necessary condition for happiness that we love in some basic way. It is important to be clear what I am not suggesting here. I am not suggesting that basic loving is a sufficient condition for happiness. According to Haybron’s account of happiness for someone to be happy means his emotional condition is broadly positive, this means even if loving increases his positive emotional state this increase might be outweighed by other factors. Nor am I suggesting that being loved is necessary for happiness. I do however believe being loved usually increases someone’s happiness. However this is not true in all cases, for instance someone might be loved by another who is not his partner and this love may cause him unhappiness. I am simply suggesting that basic loving is a necessary prerequisite for someone to be actually happy. Once again it is important to note what I am not suggesting. I am not suggesting a disposition for basic loving is sufficient for happiness. A hostage held by terrorists may have a disposition to love, but be far from happy. I am simply suggesting that actual basic loving is necessary for happiness. A disposition for basic loving of course forms part of a disposition to be happy.

If it is accepted that the ability to love is a necessary element of happiness it might be thought that enhancing this element will increase our happiness. I have argued in ‘meaning and happiness’ that this is not so. It is not so because someone cannot simply decide to love someone or something. Love is not a matter of choice. Perhaps the best we can do is to situate ourselves in circumstances in which love might grow naturally.

1. Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Vohs, Jennifer Aaker & Emily Garbinsky, 2013, Some key differences between a happy life and a meaningful life, The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2013, volume 8(6)
2. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, section 1.1.1.
3. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 147.
4. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.
5. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 129.

Gratitude and the Emotions

Recent research has shown that wisdom and gratitude go hand in hand suggesting it makes sense to be grateful, see is it wise to be grateful? Research also shows that gratitude appears to increase someone’s happiness, see for instance how to increase positive emotions . In the light of the above it would appear we have reason to cultivate a disposition to be grateful. Unfortunately cultivating this disposition might not be easy. In previous postings I have argued it is beneficial to us to love. However if someone simply seeks to love, for the benefits love confers on him, then he isn’t really loving at all. A similar state of affairs would seem to pertain to gratitude. If someone attempts to be grateful in order to in order to boost his happiness he isn’t being grateful. For instance if he receives a present and expresses his thanks merely to boost his happiness or intelligence then he is not really being grateful he’s simply attempting to boost his happiness or intelligence. In this posting in the light of the above worry I want to examine if it is even possible in practice to increase our disposition to be grateful and in doing so examine our emotions in general.

Before I commence my examination I must make it clear what I mean by gratitude. Being grateful can have several meanings. Among these meanings it can for instance mean, acting virtuously, experiencing a certain kind of emotion or simply having good manners. Let us consider whether a well mannered person is a grateful person. Such a person is likely to be thankful for things that benefit him. He certainly expresses his gratitude but his expressions of gratitude do not mean he feels gratitude. He may have been taught his good manners from an early age and these have become purely automatic. When expressing his thanks for some benefit he may feel no positive emotion. Christine Korsgaard likens such a person to a good dog whose desires and inclinations have been trained to perfection (1). It seems clear that good manners or mere expressions of gratitude expressed in isolation are only a small part of gratitude; gratitude shorn of its essence. Intuitively to be grateful someone must feel grateful and this feeling must include some positive emotion.

However gratitude is not simply just some positive emotion. After all someone can feel a positive emotion contemplating the supper he’s cooked for himself. Gratitude is a positive emotion framed by a particular set of circumstances. Let us assume X feels grateful to Y and consider the circumstances which validate her positive emotion. Firstly Y must have done or given something to X which seems good to her. This something could be help in solving a problem, giving good advice or perhaps a present. Secondly Y must have sought to benefit X by giving her something. For instance even if Y passes on an unwanted gift as a present when this present benefits X and is intended to benefit X then this present might still possibly provide a reason for X to be grateful. Thirdly Y’s actions must have gone beyond the call of duty and self interest. Giving someone a gift simply because conventions demand it or the giving of a gift in hope of a return of the favour should not be a cause for gratitude. It follows the giving of an unwanted gift as a present when this present benefits X and is intended to benefit X merely to get rid of the gift would not be a reason for X to be grateful. Of course good manners may require the expression of gratitude but as I have suggested above this expression is only a small part of gratitude. Basically I would suggest that gratitude is connected to the recognition of the love of someone else and reaction to this love, provided we regard love as simply ‘caring about’.

Let us accept that an essential element of gratitude has to be the feeling of some positive emotion in the circumstances outlined above. Let us also accept that a grateful person is one who has a disposition to feel this emotion framed by the circumstances outlined above. The answer to the question as to whether someone can increase his disposition for gratitude seems dependent on the nature of emotion. Some philosophers such as Jesse Prinz (2) argue an emotion is simply a bodily sensation reliably caused by a set of circumstances. Fear for instance might be an unpleasant bodily sensation caused by the approach of a mugger. Gratitude might then be seen simply as a pleasant bodily sensation caused by someone benefiting us for beneficent reasons and these reasons go beyond the requirements of duty. If we accept such a definition of the nature of the emotions it is hard to see what someone could do to increase his disposition to feel any particular emotion including gratitude.

However I am attracted to a different concept of an emotion as developed by Michael Brady (2). I will very briefly outline Brady’s concept. Brady argues that emotions are somewhat analogous to fire alarms. Emotions draw our attention to the things that are important to us. This is done in two ways. Firstly emotions capture our attention and point it in a certain direction. This capture means the attention we pay to other things diminishes. For instance, if I hear a noise downstairs in the dark at night when I’m going to sleep this noise will make me anxious and capture my attention making my dreamy contemplation of a pleasant day vanish. Secondly emotions have some persistence or as Brady puts it consume our attention. For instance whilst I lie in bed listening for further noises I start thinking whether my anxiety is justified and what could explain the noise. In this case my anxiety might be increased or diminished by further thought or information. Perhaps my wife calls out she is home and my anxiety vanishes as I remember she was going out tonight. Perhaps I hear a breaking sound and this sound increases my fear and further focuses my attention. How might Brady’s ideas work when I experience a feeling of gratitude? If I feel the emotion of gratitude this emotion consumes my attention making me consider the reasons why I’m grateful. Accepting the above explains why very young children are not truly grateful, they have not yet fully acquired the abilities needed to consider the reasons for their gratitude. Accepting the above would also suggest that my initial worry that we cannot increase our disposition to be grateful is unfounded. For if Brady is correct and we give serious consideration to the reasons as to why we are grateful then we should be able to increase our disposition to be grateful. If when I feel the emotion connected to gratitude and I reflect on how someone has gone beyond the call of duty to benefit me then this reflection is likely to increase my disposition to reflect in a similar manner in a similar situation.

Unfortunately the situation appears not to be as simple as I have painted it above. Let us accept that negative emotions do cause us to focus our attention more selectively. However this might not be true of positive emotions. Many positive emotions appear to give us a broad feel good factor with a broad focus of attention; see for instance positive affect increases the breadth of attentional selection . Gratitude is a positive emotion. It might then be argued because the feeling of gratitude is a positive emotion that any reflections caused by gratitude are unlikely to narrowly focus on our reasons to be grateful and hence are unlikely to increase someone’s disposition to feel gratitude. Brady suggests that the way in which attention is connected to emotion is complex. He further suggests that there is attention which is constitutive of the emotion involved and attention which focuses on the consequences of that emotion. He then goes on to suggest that the broad focus of positive emotions only involves consequential attention (4). If this is so then the attention that is constitutive of positive emotions need not differ from that of negative ones. I have some doubts about Brady’s suggestions for it seems to me evolution may well have evolved us to pay more attention to some emotions than others. For instance if one of our ancestors saw a lion approaching her this would grab her attention much more than any shame she felt at wandering off and not helping with childcare. In general it seems to me that primitive negative emotions are much more likely to capture and consume our attention than positive or social emotions. Moreover I am not sure we can constitutive attention and consequential attention. Nonetheless even if I am correct this does not mean we pay no attention to the reasons for positive or social emotions. We pay such attention, just a little less urgently. It follows we can still cultivate a disposition to feel gratitude. Tiberius suggests that if we wish to live well we should cultivate a disposition to change our reflective perspective from a broad one to narrow one (5). Such a disposition might aid us to become more attentive to the positive emotions such as gratitude.

1.  Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 3.
2.  Jesse Prinz, 2007, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS, Oxford University Press
3.  Michael Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.
4.  Brady, page 181.  
5. Valerie Tiberius, 2008, The Reflective Life, Oxford University Press, Chapter 4.

Prisoners serving Life Sentences and Assisted Suicide

In his posting on practical ethics Shlomit Harrosh connects the rights of death row inmates in certain states of the USA to choose the method of their execution and those of terminally ill patients choosing when to die, see Harrosh . Harrosh believes some personal autonomy is important even in the difficult circumstances of death row and that by choosing how to die a prisoner is to some limited degree choosing how to live as an expression of who he is and what he values as an autonomous agent.

“Like the choice of a last meal, the choice of method of execution is a final exercise in personal autonomy. Within limits, it gives prisoners the opportunity to choose the final experiences of their lives and express their values and preferences.”

Harrosh goes on to suggest that by choosing when to die terminally ill patients are making a similar choice.

“Terminally ill patients who choose voluntary euthanasia are similarly choosing how to live. The choice to hasten death is simply a means to an end: ensuring that their remaining time is lived according to their standards of a worthwhile life, expressing their values and preferences.”

Harrosh believes both of these rights have the same basis. He concludes if the right of death row inmates to choose between methods of their execution is permissible it follows that terminally ill patients have the right to choose when to die. I agree with Harrosh’s conclusion even though some might argue choosing when to die is not the same as choosing how to die.

The public at large appears to believe if some murderer, paedophile, terrorist or mass rapist attempts to commit suicide whilst in prison that no attempt should be made to prevent him doing so. In this posting I want to subject this common belief to some philosophical scrutiny. I will initially restrict my consideration to offenders who have committed terrible crimes which mean they will never be released from custody. In what follows offenders will specifically refer to those offenders who never be released from custody unless I specify otherwise. Harrosh makes a connection between the right of prisoners on death row to choose the method of their execution and the right of the terminally ill to choose when to die. I want to connect the right of terminally ill patients to choose when to die and a right of offenders to choose when to die. In what follows I will propose if terminally ill patients possess a right, to choose when to die, then so should these offenders. At the outset I must make it clear this is not an argument in support of capital punishment and that I personally do not believe in such punishment.

Do terminally ill patients have the right to choose when to die? Most people working in applied philosophy would accept this right and as a consequence I will only present a brief argument to support the right. Harrosh believes terminally ill patients have this right because they have the right to choose how to live their lives. I agree with Harrosh and would further argue these patients have the latter right because we should see such patients as the same sort of creatures as ourselves. Harry Frankfurt believes the intrinsic value of our autonomy is connected to the recognition of us by others as the kind of creature capable of determining its own destiny (1). Christine Korsgaard believes that by choosing we determine our identity (2).  If we accept that Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s views are correct then were we to deny terminally ill patients the right to choose when to die then we appear to be failing to accept these patients as the same sort of persons as ourselves. Someone might object this appearance is false and that we do see these patients as the same sort of persons as ourselves even if we deny them the right to choose when to die. He might argue we see ourselves as the sort of persons who can normally choose how to live our own lives but whom, if we became terminally ill, would have this choice restricted. I would counter argue due to our identity being so closely tied to our ability to choose if someone becomes terminally ill and his health is damaged and as a result his choices are restricted then even though he remains a person he is treated as a damaged person. I would suggest damaged health should not automatically mean a damaged person.  My objector might now argue my argument carries little weight because I have failed to adequately specify what I mean by a damaged person. I accept his argument. I suggested above our identity as persons is closely tied to our ability to choose. I would now suggest this ability to choose is not just the ability to make any choice but an ability to make an autonomous choice. The above means a damaged person might be defined as one whose capacity to make autonomous decisions has been damaged. I see no reason why most diseases or injuries must of necessity damage someone’s autonomy, diseases of or injuries to the brain might be exceptions. It follows even if disease or injury damages someone’s health that it does automatically damage him as a person and that we should continue treating him as such. Let it be accepted without any further argument that terminally ill patients do have the right to choose when to die because they have the right to choose how to live their lives. However, it is certainly not true that offenders have the same rights as the rest of us. My objector might now argue even if not all terminally ill patients are damaged persons all offenders are. I would reject such an argument as I have defined damaged persons as people whose capacity to make autonomous decisions has been damaged. I would suggest for the most part these offenders are damaged moral persons rather than damaged persons. Korsgaard would disagree with my suggestion. However I must accept some offenders are damaged persons unable to make autonomous decisions due to physiological or psychological conditions. I believe such offenders should be in secure mental health institutions such as Broadmoor rather than normal prisons. In the light of the above I will limit my discussion further to offenders in a normal prison who will never be released. I believe we should see such offenders as basically the same sort of people as ourselves, autonomous persons. Indeed history teaches us that evil is not usually perpetrated by people who are vastly different from ourselves. The Milligram Experiment further supports this point, see my previous posting. It follows even though these offenders have committed some terrible crimes they are not damaged as autonomous persons. The recognition of such offenders as undamaged autonomous persons means we should accept that they retain some choice about how to live their lives provided these choices will not harm others. For instance they may have the choice of attending religious services, which library books they choose or attending literacy classes. Should these limited choices include the right to choose to die? 

The answer to the above question depends on why we send offenders to prison. We send offenders to prison for three reasons; firstly to protect ourselves, secondly to punish the offender and lastly to rehabilitate him before he is released. We can disregard the last reason in this discussion. Prima facie if we should treat offenders as persons like ourselves then these offenders should retain all choices about how to live their lives provided these choices don’t endanger the public at large or detract from any punishment involved. Clearly giving offenders, who will never be released from prison, the right to choose when to die will not endanger us. The only question that remains to be answered is whether giving such offenders the right to choose to die detracts from their punishment? The answer to this question is not clear cut. Let it be accepted our sense of common humanity, our sense of seeing others as persons rather than monsters, does not permit us the option of cruel punishments such as simply putting an offender in a cell and metaphorically throwing away the key. It follows we must give offenders some quality of life including limited choices about how to live their lives. Provided prisoners must have some quality of life and enjoy certain limited choices it seems to me giving offenders the right to choose to die does not detract from their punishment. In the light of the above it might be concluded because the terminally ill have a right to choose when to die then so do offenders who will never be released from prison. 

I will now consider four objections to the above conclusion. This Blog is concerned with applied philosophy and someone might object it is pointless to give rights to people who will never use them. In particular it might be argued even if such offenders are the given the right to end their lives that in practice they will never avail themselves of this right. However there is some empirical evidence to show that at least some such offenders desire to die. Consider for instance consider the cases of Fred West the Gloucestershire builder who murdered 12 people and Harold Shipman who had 215 murders ascribed to him who both committed suicide in prison. Further evidence is provided by the need to place some prisoners on suicide watch.

Our objector might advance a second objection. He might point out there are a lot of mentally unstable people in prison and invariably among these people there will be some offenders who will never be released. Some of this mental instability may be due to depression. He then might argue if we give these offenders the right to choose to die rather than face life long imprisonment that some of those who exercise this option will not have made an autonomous choice due to depression. Indeed he might still further argue that if this option is made available some of offenders might feel they are being pressurised into taking it. If offenders are simply offered this choice then I believe this is a perfectly good argument. However I believe the argument loses its validity provided some safeguards are introduced. These safeguards must ensure that only offenders capable of making an autonomous decision are offered this choice. Our objector might now introduce a counter argument. He might argue these safeguards would involve counselling the offenders to ensure they can make an autonomous decision and that counselling is expensive. He might then proceed by arguing such offenders do not merit such expense and hence conclude these safeguards should not be introduced. In reply to this counter argument I would make two points. Firstly I would point out keeping people in prison for a lifetime is very expensive. If an offender who will never be released chooses to die his choice saves the taxpayer a great deal of money even if this choice includes expensive counselling. Secondly and I believe more importantly I would question whether these safeguards really need to include expensive counselling. For I would suggest all that is needed for a decision to be autonomous is that it is wholehearted and un-ambivalent. I would suggest if an offender expresses a constant un-ambivalent desire to die over a period of a few months, then his decision is an autonomous one and as such ought to be respected. Our objector might respond that my suggestion means a severally depressed offender might choose to die. In reply I would simply point out being depressed may well be the natural state of affairs for such an offender and suggest his depression does not preclude him from making an autonomous decision to die.

I have argued the reason why we should allow such offenders the right to die is based on their autonomy. I further argued that the basis of autonomy is seeing others as basically the same sort of persons as ourselves. However our objector might mount a third objection. He might argue if we allow these offenders the right to die then we are sending them a message that even at this basic level they are not the same sort of persons as ourselves. He might point out if we saw someone about to jump from a high building we would try and talk him down rather than simply pass by or tell him it’s his choice whether to jump or not. Indeed our objector might accuse us of double standards. The same objection might also be made if we allow terminally ill patients to choose when to die. I would reject his objection by arguing the difference in our attitudes is due to a difference in circumstances rather than a supposed difference in persons. An offender may be depressed and as I have suggested this depression may be both natural and normal considering his circumstances. His depression may be natural because his ongoing circumstances will not significantly change.  Someone about to jump from a building may also be depressed but his depression may not be natural and certainly need not be ongoing as his circumstances might change. These different circumstances mean the offender’s decision, subject to certain safeguards, is an autonomous one whilst the decision of the man about to jump from a high building may not be. An autonomous decision is a constant un-ambivalent decision. If we permit an offender to die we can be fairly certain his decision is an autonomous one because the prison authorities would require that he had expressed an un-ambivalent desire to die over a period of some months. The same requirement cannot be applied to someone about to commit suicide by jumping from a high building.

Our objector might now point out, offenders do not have a handy means of suicide readily available, and that if my conclusion is accepted the means of suicide would have to be approved of and brought into prison by the relevant authorities under strictly controlled conditions. I accept the objectors point. He might then use this point to raise a fourth objection to my conclusion. He might argue accepting my conclusion reintroduces capital punishment by the back door and once again accuse me of double standards due to my stated opposition to capital punishment. In reply I would reject his argument by firstly pointing out capital punishment is imposed and not simply optional. Secondly I am not proposing that the prison authorities kill these offenders even with the offender’s approval. I am proposing that the prison authorities make the means of suicide available to such offenders in controlled circumstances. These circumstances might be the much the same as those in the Dignitas clinic in Geneva. The person committing suicide in this clinic takes an anti sickness drug followed half an hour later by the overdose that kills him. In similar circumstances the offender would not have the drugs administered to him but would have them provided for him to take them himself. The fact that these drugs would be self administered would be an important additional safeguard of the offender’ autonomy, for often someone may believe he should take some course of action but when he tries to implement this action finds he cannot. For as Frankfurt points out someone’s decision only show what he intends to will and that when he attempts implement his decision he might be surprised to find out his decision does not in practice represent his will (3). In the above circumstances it would be hard to characterise the assisted suicide of an offender as capital punishment. Recently in Belgium Frank Van Den Bleeken who is serving a life sentence for rape and murder has been allowed by a court to undergo euthanasia, see bioedge . However I agree with Frankfurt that someone’s decision only show what he intends to will and in practice his decision may not always truly represent his will. For this reason whilst I believe offenders should have the right to commit suicide I would be doubtful whether this right should extend to euthanasia. 

In conclusion it appears all my imagined objector’s objections remain unconvincing. Finally I wish to consider an additional reason to that of the offender’s limited autonomy to support my position. Harrosh suggests if a prisoner on death row chooses a method of execution involving greater suffering that his choice can be a form of atonement. I would extend Harrosh’s suggestion further by suggesting if an offender chooses to die this might also be a form of atonement. In practice I don’t believe the need for atonement would be a major factor in decision making of most these offenders’ decisions to die. Rather it would be a desire to escape from life long imprisonment. None the less I believe it might be a factor in some such cases. Such atonement should be accepted not only because it is an expression of an offender’s limited autonomy but also because the acceptance of responsibility by the offender for his offences is something which may benefit the victim or victim’s relatives.

 

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 163.
2. Christine Korsgaard,  2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press.
3. Frankfurt 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 84