Showing posts with label Sherman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sherman. Show all posts

Friday, 16 May 2008

Justified Anger and Empathy


This posting is concerned with justified anger. It is partly a response to Chapter 5 of Nancy Sherman’s “Stoic Warriors” (1). It is all too easy to become angry. However it is much more difficult to switch anger off. Indeed it might be argued being angry is like being on a slippery slope. We are unable to control anger in the same way an alcoholic cannot control her drinking. Just as an alcoholic damages both herself and others so an angry person damages both herself and others. According to the ancient stoic philosophers the response of a wise person to her potential anger should be an attempt to eliminate this anger. The question this posting addresses is this, are the stoics correct and should we also attempt to eliminate anger in our lives?

Anger is usually aroused by some negative event occurring in our lives. I will argue that due to the various causes of negative events some anger may be justified and some anger may not. In the vintage TV series Fawlty Towers the hotel’s proprietor Basil beats his car in anger with a stick when it breaks down. Intuitively such anger seems to be inappropriate. Sherman considers the anger of Hugh Thompson in response to the massacre at My Lai during the Vietnam War. Thompson’s anger helped him to courageously save others from being massacred. Clearly Thompson’s anger was not inappropriate. However the question might be asked was his anger necessary to help stop the massacre? Might not a calm rational moral person also have helped to stop the massacre? I will argue not. I will argue Thompson’s anger was not only an appropriate reaction to the massacre but was also a necessary condition needed by him in order to help stop the slaughter.

In order to fully understand whether anger is justified we must examine the circumstances in which negative events occur in our lives. Basically there seem to be two types of negative events which cause anger. Firstly events which we regard as morally wrong, for example the My Lai massacre. And secondly events which frustrate our desires or ambitions, for example Basil Fawlty’s car breaking down so frustrating his desire to drive from A to B.

I will consider first whether our anger is justified at events which we regard as morally wrong. I will now argue briefly that both a consequentialist and a deontologist would agree anger serves no useful purpose in reacting to events which they regard as morally wrong. I will then further argue any morality based on empathic caring would regard anger at such events not only as justified but also a necessary condition the agent needs in order to act well. Consequentialist ethics believes in maximising some good in the world. This good might be happiness, satisfied lives, the choices available to people and so forth. What form this actual good takes need not concern this discussion. Whatever good consequentialistism seeks to maximise, someone’s actual choice, about how to maximise this good, is a purely rational decision. It follows an agent’s anger plays no part in making her decision. It further follows anger is not a necessary condition in order to act well. If morality is conceived of as simply comprised of rights and relevant duties then someone’s anger again plays no part in her actual decision. She simply sees her duty and acts upon it. It might of course be true that her anger acts as a catalyst making doing her duty easier. It follows in any deontological system of morality being angry is also not a necessary condition for an agent to act well. It might be argued by not expressing anger at such events might damage the agent and that by not expressing anger she does not express her true self. It seems to me that because under any consequentialist or deontological system of morality the expression of anger does no useful work any such expression is not only unnecessary but might also be considered as mere posturing.

In previous postings I have suggested that intuitively morality is based on acting in accordance with our empathic concerns as outlined by Slote. Let it be accepted that morality is indeed based on empathy for others. It follows,

“Actions are morally wrong and contrary to moral obligation if, and only if, they reflect or exhibit or express an absence (or lack) of a fully developed empathic concern for (caring about) others on behalf of the agent.” (2)

The question that must now be addressed is this, is it possible to have a fully developed empathic concern for others when these others are being wronged and not have some anger? Empathic concern for others is clearly not based on rationality. Empathic concern for others is based on the ability to experience the feelings of others. Let it be accepted if some person is wronged she must feel some emotion. If the above is not accepted then the whole idea of basing morality on empathic caring becomes nonsense. Someone who is wronged may feel various emotions such as pain, grief and sorrow but must she also feel anger? Let anger be defined as a sense of displeasure at some perceived wrong. It might be objected this definition is too weak and anger should be defined as a strong sense of displeasure at some perceived wrong. However anger can vary from mild anger, annoyance, to extreme anger, uncontrollable rage. It follows anger can be defined as having some sense of displeasure at some perceived wrong. I fully accept such a definition is an incomplete definition in the case of extreme anger such as rage. I suggested above it would be impossible for someone who has been wronged to feel no emotion. This emotion must be a negative emotion giving her a sense of displeasure. It follows if someone has been wronged that she must feel some anger. It further follows from the definition of empathy, if I have empathic concern for someone who has been wronged then I must feel some anger. Let it be accepted morality is based on empathic caring It can be concluded if an agent is to act morally in response to some moral violation then it is a necessary condition for her action that she feels some anger with regard to the violation. It can be further concluded Hugh Thompson’s anger was not only an appropriate reaction to the massacre at My Lai but was also necessary condition for him to help stop the massacre.

Finally I will consider whether anger caused by events which merely frustrate our desires or ambitions can be justified. It seems to me the answer to this question simply depends on whether our anger is useful in helping us satisfy our desires or achieve our ambitions. Basil Fawlty seemed to have no justification for beating his car with a stick. Such behaviour did not aid him in furthering his desire to go from A to B. Indeed such behaviour might have frustrated this desire. However someone’s anger at being passed over for promotion may be justified. She might use her anger as encouragement to work harder and achieve promotion at a later date. In these circumstances someone’s anger can be justified provided she is able control her anger. If however she is unable to control her anger, like the alcoholic who is unable to control her drinking, she should attempt to eliminate this anger.


  1. Nancy Sherman, 2005 Stoic Warriors, Oxford.
  2. Michael Slote, 2007, The Ethics of Caring and Empathy, Routledge. 

Engaging with Robots

  In an interesting paper Sven Nyholm considers some of the implications of controlling robots. I use the idea of control to ask a different...