In the New Scientist of 28/04/12 Laura Spinney examines
whether too high self esteem damages us. Self-love is related to though not
identical to self esteem. In this posting I will argue some forms of self-love
are damaging but not by being excessive like too much self esteem. Rather I
will argue that damaging forms are in some ways incomplete forms of self-love.
Before setting out I must make it clear I believe we must of necessity love
ourselves to some degree. For instance Frankfurt
believes caring about and loving are equivalent. (1) He suggests caring about
oneself is necessary to be a person,
“perhaps caring about oneself is essential to being a
person. Can something to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in
the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all. Perhaps nothing that is
entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how
intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be.
There could not be a person of no importance to himself.” (2)
If we accept Frankfurt ’s
position, which I do, it follows a person must of necessity love himself.
However if a person loves himself so much that he ignores or even harms those
close to him his self-love is damaging.
Unfortunately the idea of love as based simply on ‘caring
about’ isn’t a very useful concept in examining damaging forms of self-love. If
we accept Frankfurt ’s account of love then a
damaging form of self-love is perhaps one in which someone simply ‘cares about’
himself too much. But Frankfurt ’s account
offers us no idea of how much self-love is too much. In order to overcome this
problem I will turn to Bennett Helm’s account of love (3). I will argue that
damaging forms of self-love are not defined by the degree of love but rather by
a lack of something. I will argue that damaging self-love is deficient.
Helm holds like Frankfurt
that if someone is to be considered of as a person at all he must of necessity
love himself. However unlike Frankfurt he does
not believe that everything someone cares about is a form of love and defines
him as a person. Helm links our identity to the things we value, our values. It
is important to note what we value need not be identical with the values we explicitly
identify with. Cocaine may be of value to me but when I reflect I might wish it
wasn’t. Helm believes valuing is not just caring about something a lot, it is
caring about something which is connected to your identity. According to Helm,
“for something to have value for one is for it to be the
focus of a projectible pattern of felt evaluations. Because what is at stake in
one’s values are oneself and one’s own wellbeing as this person, and because
values involve an implicit understanding of the kind of life it is worth one’s
living, the felt evaluations constitutive of this pattern …. are emotions like
pride and shame.” (4).
A felt evaluation is an emotion which is focussed on
something linked in some rational way to other emotions with the same focus.
For instance, if I feel anxiety focussed on driving in dense traffic then it is
rational that I should feel relief when driving in traffic if the traffic is
less dense than I had anticipated. Helm argues when my focus is on me, on my
values, the felt evaluations are pride and shame together with some second
degree emotions, emotions about emotions. Helm holds someone’s pride and shame
are a kind of attention, a kind of vigilance, about himself and his identity
and that this attention or vigilance is a form of self-love. I don’t want to go
into Helm’s position in greater detail but I do want to accept that someone who
cannot feel pride and shame cannot truly love himself.
Accepting
Helm’s ideas about the importance of pride and shame means we are now in a
position to be able to see why some forms self-love might be damaging. It might
be suggested that if someone has too much self-love he has excessive pride.
However if someone must of necessity love himself then from the above he must
at least have some pride. Nonetheless it is clear pride can damage us.
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus is a deficient character who is damaged by what most
people describe as his excessive pride. I will now argue what is usually
described as excessive pride might be better described as either empty or exclusive
pride. I will start my argument with empty pride. If someone is proud about
something then intuitively it should be something which he believes to be good,
which he desires and something or some quality he believes he possesses. If his
pride is simply focussed on himself, rather than some of the attributes he
possesses or values he holds, then it seems to me his pride is of a deficient
form. Helm argues someone’s pride in his values helps to form his identity; it
follows that if someone’s pride bypasses his values and simply focuses on
himself it doesn’t really focus on anything at all and as a result is an empty
and hence deficient form of pride.
I now want
to turn to what I mean by exclusive pride. Coriolanus had real achievements to
be proud of and so his pride was not simply empty pride. Nonetheless Coriolanus
was damaged by his pride. An excellent discussion of Coriolanus and his pride
is given by Gabriele Taylor (4). Taylor
argues Coriolanus’ pride was an arrogant pride and that it was this arrogance
that damaged him. I do not disagree with Taylor
that Coriolanus’ arrogance damaged him but would suggest that his arrogance was
due to the exclusivity of his pride. Helm argues if someone genuinely loves
himself that he must feel both pride and shame. I would define exclusive pride
as the pride someone feels who doesn’t or is incapable of feeling any shame. If
we accept that someone must of necessity love himself and that Helm is correct,
when he argues that to truly love oneself someone must be capable of feeling
both pride and shame, then someone who feels exclusive pride is damaged as a
person. Taylor
suggests Coriolanus is damaged as a person because he lives in a world apart
seeing himself as sole arbitrator of right and wrong. Coriolanus has limited
perspective meaning he does not have the ability to change his focus. This
inability to broaden his perspective is caused by his exclusive pride which
excludes shame. I would suggest that the same argument can be applied to
exclusive shame but I will not repeat the argument here.
Let us
accept that the ability to feel both pride and shame is necessary for us if we
are to love ourselves in a way that doesn’t damage us as individuals. In
practice of course most people do feel both pride and shame. Nonetheless it
appears to me that the balance between them has shifted and shame plays a less
important part in most people’s psyche. Perhaps this shift was needed in the
past. For instance in the past some Gay people were ashamed of their
homosexuality and this unjustified shame led them to lead inauthentic lives.
However it also seems to me this shift has gone too far so that it damages both
individuals and society. For instance the fact that this shift has occurred at
the same time as drunken behaviour in major UK cities has increased might well
be significant.
1. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity,
Volition, and Love, Cambridge
University Press. Page
129.
2. Necessity, Volition, and Love, page 90
3. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford .
4. Helm, page 109.
5. Gabriele Taylor, 2006, Deadly Vices, Oxford , chapter 5.
6. Taylor , page 79.