In a previous posting I questioned whether algorithmic assisted moral decision making is possible. Let us assume for the sake of argument that AAMD is possible. Using such a system might be considered as an example of algorithmic outsourcing of our moral decision making. Such outsourcing according to John Danaher means taking away the cognitive and emotional burden associated with certain activities, see Danaher . Intuitively outsourced moral decisions are inauthentic decisions. In this posting I will argue that under certain conditions outsourced ethical decisions using AAMD could be authentic ones.
Before proceeding I must make it clear what I mean by
algorithmic assisted moral decision making, outsourcing and authenticity. Any
moral decision simply made by an algorithm is not an authentic decision. In my
previous posting I suggested when initialising an AAMD system we should first use
a top down approach and install simple human values such as avoiding harm.
However once initialised such a system should be fine-tuned by the user from
the bottom up by adding his personal weights to the installed values. This
primitive system might then be further modified from the bottom up using of two
feedback loops. Firstly, the user of a system must inform the system whether
she accepts any proposed decision. If the user accepts the proposed decision,
then this decision can form a basis for similar future decisions in much the
same way as in the legal judgements set precedents for further judgements. If
the user doesn’t accept a particular decision, then the system must make it
clear to the user the weights which are attached to the values it used in
making this decision and any previous decisions employed. The user might then further
refine the system either by altering these weights or highlighting differences
between the current decision and any previous decisions the system employed.
According to Danaher outsourcing can take two forms. Cognitive outsourcing
means someone using a device to perform cognitive tasks that she
would otherwise have to perform himself. Affective outsourcing means someone
using a device to perform an affective task that she would otherwise have to
perform himself. I will assume here that an authentic decision is a decision
that the decision maker identifies herself with or cares about.
According to Danaher taking responsibility for certain
outcomes is an important social and personal virtue. Further, someone only takes
responsibility for certain decisions if he voluntary wills his chosen outcomes
of these decisions. Authenticity is an important social and personal virtue. Getting
an app to automatically send flowers to someone’s partner on her birthday
doesn’t seem to be an authentic action because the sender doesn’t cause the
action. However, here I am only interested in outsourcing our ethical
decisions, does outsourcing such decisions damage their authenticity?
I will now argue the answer to the above question depends
not on outsourcing, per se, but on the manner of the outsourcing. Let us assume
that in the future there exists a computer which makes decisions based on a set
of values built into it by a committee of philosophers. Let us consider someone
who outsources his moral decisions to this computer. I would suggest that if she
implements a moral decision made in this way that his decision is an
inauthentic one. It is hard to see how someone in this situation could either
identify with the decision or consider herself to be responsible for the
outcome. Let us now consider someone who outsources her moral decision making
to a AAMD system which is finely tuned by the user as outlined above, are her decisions also inauthentic? I would
suggest someone who makes a moral decision in this way is acting authentically
because she can identify with his decision. She is able to identify with the
systems decisions because, once initialised, the system is built from the
bottom up. Her weights are attached to the incorporated values and her past
decisions are built into its database.
I suggested that some who uses such a system must accept or
reject its decisions. Someone might object that someone who simply accepts the
systems decisions without reflection is not acting authentically. In response I
would point in virtue ethics someone can simply act and still be regarded as
acting authentically. My objector might respond by pointing out Christine
Korsgaard pictures the simply virtuous human as a sort of Good Dog (1). Perhaps
someone who simply accepts the results of an AADM system might also be pictured
as behaving as a good dog with the system replacing the dog’s owner. Surely
such a person cannot be regarded as acting authentically. In response I would
suggest what matters is that the agent identified himself with the system’s
decision. To identify with a decision someone has to be satisfied with that
decision. What does it mean to be satisfied with a decision? According to
Frankfurt satisfaction entails,
“an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be
willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in
bringing about a change.” (2)
I’m not sure that an absence of restlessness or resistance with a
decision is sufficient to guarantee its authenticity. I would suggest authentic
decisions are ones that flow from our true self. I have argued our true self is
defined by what we are proud or ashamed of, see true
selves do they exist . Let consider someone who accepts the
recommendation of an AAMD system without feeling any shame, is her acceptance
an authentic one or simply not an inauthentic one? I have argued that there are
two types
of shame . Type one shame is anxiety about social disqualification. Type two
shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things she cares about, loves and
identifies with. Let us accept someone must feel type two shame when she acts
in a way which harms the things she cares about, loves and identifies with. In
the above situation if someone simply accepts the recommendation of an AAMD
system without feeling any type two shame then he is acting in accordance with
what he loves and identifies with and is acting authentically.
What conclusions can be drawn from the above. If someone outsources some
of his moral decision making to a computer, she may not be acting authentically.
However, if she outsources such decision making to an AAMD system designed
using a bottom up approach as outlined above it is at least conceivable that she
is acting authentically.
- Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 3.
- Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 103.
