Showing posts with label Authenticity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Authenticity. Show all posts

Wednesday 29 June 2016

Outsourcing Ethical Decision Making and Authenticity



In a previous posting I questioned whether algorithmic assisted moral decision making is possible. Let us assume for the sake of argument that AAMD is possible. Using such a system might be considered as an example of algorithmic outsourcing of our moral decision making. Such outsourcing according to John Danaher means taking away the cognitive and emotional burden associated with certain activities, see Danaher . Intuitively outsourced moral decisions are inauthentic decisions. In this posting I will argue that under certain conditions outsourced ethical decisions using AAMD could be authentic ones.

Before proceeding I must make it clear what I mean by algorithmic assisted moral decision making, outsourcing and authenticity. Any moral decision simply made by an algorithm is not an authentic decision. In my previous posting I suggested when initialising an AAMD system we should first use a top down approach and install simple human values such as avoiding harm. However once initialised such a system should be fine-tuned by the user from the bottom up by adding his personal weights to the installed values. This primitive system might then be further modified from the bottom up using of two feedback loops. Firstly, the user of a system must inform the system whether she accepts any proposed decision. If the user accepts the proposed decision, then this decision can form a basis for similar future decisions in much the same way as in the legal judgements set precedents for further judgements. If the user doesn’t accept a particular decision, then the system must make it clear to the user the weights which are attached to the values it used in making this decision and any previous decisions employed. The user might then further refine the system either by altering these weights or highlighting differences between the current decision and any previous decisions the system employed. According to Danaher outsourcing can take two forms. Cognitive outsourcing means someone using a device to perform cognitive tasks that she would otherwise have to perform himself. Affective outsourcing means someone using a device to perform an affective task that she would otherwise have to perform himself. I will assume here that an authentic decision is a decision that the decision maker identifies herself with or cares about.

According to Danaher taking responsibility for certain outcomes is an important social and personal virtue. Further, someone only takes responsibility for certain decisions if he voluntary wills his chosen outcomes of these decisions. Authenticity is an important social and personal virtue. Getting an app to automatically send flowers to someone’s partner on her birthday doesn’t seem to be an authentic action because the sender doesn’t cause the action. However, here I am only interested in outsourcing our ethical decisions, does outsourcing such decisions damage their authenticity?

I will now argue the answer to the above question depends not on outsourcing, per se, but on the manner of the outsourcing. Let us assume that in the future there exists a computer which makes decisions based on a set of values built into it by a committee of philosophers. Let us consider someone who outsources his moral decisions to this computer. I would suggest that if she implements a moral decision made in this way that his decision is an inauthentic one. It is hard to see how someone in this situation could either identify with the decision or consider herself to be responsible for the outcome. Let us now consider someone who outsources her moral decision making to a AAMD system which is finely tuned by the user as outlined above, are her decisions also inauthentic? I would suggest someone who makes a moral decision in this way is acting authentically because she can identify with his decision. She is able to identify with the systems decisions because, once initialised, the system is built from the bottom up. Her weights are attached to the incorporated values and her past decisions are built into its database.

I suggested that some who uses such a system must accept or reject its decisions. Someone might object that someone who simply accepts the systems decisions without reflection is not acting authentically. In response I would point in virtue ethics someone can simply act and still be regarded as acting authentically. My objector might respond by pointing out Christine Korsgaard pictures the simply virtuous human as a sort of Good Dog (1). Perhaps someone who simply accepts the results of an AADM system might also be pictured as behaving as a good dog with the system replacing the dog’s owner. Surely such a person cannot be regarded as acting authentically. In response I would suggest what matters is that the agent identified himself with the system’s decision. To identify with a decision someone has to be satisfied with that decision. What does it mean to be satisfied with a decision? According to Frankfurt satisfaction entails,

“an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change.” (2)

I’m not sure that an absence of restlessness or resistance with a decision is sufficient to guarantee its authenticity. I would suggest authentic decisions are ones that flow from our true self. I have argued our true self is defined by what we are proud or ashamed of, see  true selves do they exist . Let consider someone who accepts the recommendation of an AAMD system without feeling any shame, is her acceptance an authentic one or simply not an inauthentic one? I have argued that there are two types of shame . Type one shame is anxiety about social disqualification. Type two shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things she cares about, loves and identifies with. Let us accept someone must feel type two shame when she acts in a way which harms the things she cares about, loves and identifies with. In the above situation if someone simply accepts the recommendation of an AAMD system without feeling any type two shame then he is acting in accordance with what he loves and identifies with and is acting authentically.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above. If someone outsources some of his moral decision making to a computer, she may not be acting authentically. However, if she outsources such decision making to an AAMD system designed using a bottom up approach as outlined above it is at least conceivable that she is acting authentically.

  1. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 3. 
  2. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 103.

Monday 1 September 2008

The Pharmacological Induction of Emotions


This posting is based on a paper by David Wasserman and Mathew Liao (1). In this paper they question whether the pharmacological induction of the emotions can satisfy reasonable conditions for authenticity. They conclude an induced emotion might well satisfy these conditions. I will argue what is important when considering an induced emotion is not simply whether the emotion is an authentic one but rather the ways in which an emotion might be induced. I will further argue we have no reason to reject some induced emotions which I would class as inauthentic.

Prior to setting out my arguments I first must briefly consider the intuitive meanings of authentic. Firstly we might intuitively say a person is simply authentic provided he is not a wanton. A wanton has no true self and bases his life on whims or the wishes. However this definition of an authentic person is no help in deciding whether an emotion is authentic or inauthentic. Secondly we might intuitively also say an action or an emotion is authentic if it accords, in some way, with the agent’s inner self. I would define someone’s inner self by the things he loves. Frankfurt would define the things someone loves by what he cares about.

“A person who cares about something is, as it were invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced.”(2)

Let us assume for now that an authentic emotion is one that accords with the things an agent cares about. It follows if we are investigate authentic emotions that we must be clear about the nature of the accordance between someone’s inner self and his authentic emotions if term authentic be useful.

Someone’s actions may be classed as authentic or inauthentic. I have suggested above that intuitively if someone is authentic then he leads his life in accordance with his own inner self. An authentic action might be defined as an action that accords with the agent’s inner self. It seems natural to define an action as according with someone’s inner self if it furthers the ends of his inner self. If this natural definition of accordance is accepted then an authentic action is simply one that furthers the ends of an agent’s inner self. It also seems natural to extend this definition of an authentic action to an authentic emotion. Let us accept our emotions are not just things we experience but reasons for action. This view holds that an emotion is not simply a physical feeling but combination of feelings behaviour and cognitions and is supported by Wasserman and Liao (3). A similar view is held by Michael Brady who argues emotions are analogous to alarms readying us for action (4). An authentic emotion might then be defined as an emotion that furthers the ends of the agent’s inner self.

Let us examine the above definition of an authentic emotion by the use of two examples. Firstly Wasserman and Liao use grief as an example of an emotion that it might not be wrong to induce pharmacologically. Let it be assumed it is possible to induce grief pharmacologically by taking a pill. Let it be further assumed someone does not feel genuine grief at the loss of a family member. However he may be aware society believes it right to grieve at the loss of a close family member. Such a person may care about what society cares about and thinks it right to take a pill to induce grief. In this case using the above definition of an authentic emotion this pharmacologically induced grief might be classed as not inauthentic and there seems to be no reason as to why it should not be induced. However not all authentic emotions using the above definition should be induced. Let us move from considering grief to considering love. Let it be assumed someone lusts after another but fails to love the other. Let it be further assumed he is unable to satisfy his lust because his beloved perceives this lack of love. Let it be still further assumed it is possible to pharmacologically induce love by taking a pill. Lastly let it be assumed this lustful person takes this pill in order to induce love so he can satisfy his lust. This pharmacologically induced love would be an authentic emotion according to the above definition, because it furthers the ends of the lustful lover. However the object of the lustful lover’s lust would not regard his emotion as authentic if she was aware his love was pharmacologically induced. Moreover it would seem wrong to induce love in these circumstances. It follows using my definition of authentic that not all authentic emotions should be induced.

Perhaps someone’s inner self or true self is an illusion. If this is true then there is no need to consider questions of authenticity. I would be reluctant to accept this position. Perhaps our inner self or true self is a purely cognitive construction. Once again there would be no need to consider questions of authenticity. And once again I would be reluctant to accept this position. I have suggested above that we are defined by what we care about. I will now argue we are not defined by all the things we care about. We are defined by those things which we care about and are either proud or would be ashamed of. Someone’s true self need not actually involve feeling shame but must include a disposition to feel shame in certain circumstance. Additionally I have suggested that actions which make someone proud are actions he can defend even if sometimes his defence can sometimes only be mounted retrospectively. Similarly someone must be able to give some reason for his shame, see true selves do they exist. Accepting this definition would mean someone’s true or inner self might include elements of which he is ashamed. Some of his actions might be authentic actions but would nonetheless be actions of which he is ashamed. Adopting this definition would mean someone’s true or inner self concurs better with third party assessments. For instance in my example of the lustful enhanced lover his love might be authentic but it is love he should be ashamed of, his beloved might concur.

How then are emotions linked to someone’s true self as defined above? It might be objected that there is no connection. Someone can have emotions but can’t have emotions about emotions. In reply I would point out pride and shame are meta-emotions. Schadenfreude is pleasure at another’s discomfort is surely an emotion one should feel some shame about. In addition if our lustful lover enhances his love to mislead his beloved then surely he should feel some shame at his tainted love. Let us divide emotions into two types. Firstly emotions we feel no pride or shame about are inauthentic emotions. Secondly emotions we feel some pride or shame about, even if only slightly, are authentic emotions. It might be objected that emotions we feel shameful about feeling, such as schadenfreude, are inauthentic emotions rather than authentic emotions. In response I would point out if we have a disposition to take pleasure at another’s discomfort that this is part of our essential character, even if we wish it wasn’t, and as such is an authentic disposition to feel a particular emotion. Most of us have some incompatible elements in our character and part of being a person is being able to come to care about some things rather than others (5). We want to eat cream cakes and remain thin.

Let us first consider emotions that are inauthentic, emotions that someone feels no pride or shame about. Let us accept that at some future date it is possible to induce love or compassion perhaps by the use of oxytocin. It seems clear that sociopaths lack compassion. Love and compassion are not connected to a sociopath’s true self. Let it be assumed some sociopath is given pharmacologically induced compassion. This induced emotion would be an inauthentic emotion at the time of its induction using the above definition because a sociopath feels no shame at his lack of compassion. However this induced emotion might be regarded as a moral enhancement that appears to benefit both society and the individual concerned. Provided of course the sociopath continues to take his drugs. It therefore seems possible to conclude that some induced emotions which are inauthentic, when they are induced, should be encouraged. Accepting this conclusion does not of course mean that all induced emotions which are inauthentic, when induced, should be encouraged. Consider again the lustful lover. Clearly his induced love should not be encouraged. Let it also be accepted that there some are harmful emotions such as spite and envy should never be induced in anyone. However there are some usually beneficial emotions for which there seems to be no reason, based solely on the nature of emotion, as to why they should not be pharmacologically induced. I suggest that we should permit the pharmacological induction of beneficial emotions which are inauthentic as defined above provided their induction is not intended to deceive. One way of safeguarding against these induced emotions deceiving would be to make the induction public knowledge.

It might be argued my safeguard is unnecessary because an inauthentic pharmacologically induced emotion might become an authentic one over time. Consider again the lustful lover whose love is clearly inauthentic when induced. It might argued, provided this lover persists in taking the drugs that induce his love, that his inauthentic love at the time it was induced becomes authentic love after a period of time. In reply I would suggest a beneficial induced emotion only becomes authentic provided the agent starts to take pride in feeling the emotion; time is irrelevant. I would further suggest authenticity is also irrelevant, all that matters is that the induced emotion is beneficial and does not deceive; my safeguard should help prevent deception.

Lastly I want to consider authentic emotions. These emotions cause the agent to feel some pride or shame. Such emotions cannot be induced but one or more of them might be enhanced. Enhancement might alter the balance between these emotions causing a shift in someone’s true self. It might be argued such a shift causes a change in authenticity, in his character. Is such a shift harmful? People try to change their character and stop doing or feeling the things they are ashamed of. Changing one’s character is hard and most people’s attempts are unsuccessful. I see no reasons why someone’s autonomous decision, driven by his authentic shame, shouldn’t be assisted by pharmacological means. However such enhancement carries dangers. Let us consider a homosexual man. Perhaps he feels shame at his homosexuality and perhaps some sort of emotional enhancement might curtail his desire for other men. Let us accept that homosexuality has some genetic basis it follows any change in sexual orientation is contrary to his nature. In order to safeguard against such dangers we need to be sure such decisions are autonomous and that the shame that drives them is authentic and not induced by others.


  1. David Wasserman, Mathew Liao, Issues in the Pharmacological Inductions of Emotions, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3)
  2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 83.
  3. Wasserman and Liao, page 17.
  4.  Michael S. Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.
  5. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.
  6.  Frankfurt, 1988, page 91

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