David Cameron the British Prime Minister has declared war on pornography, see telegraph . He believes pornography corrodes childhood. He therefore proposes that every internet user in the UK will be asked whether they wish to receive pornography and that the default position will be they do not. In this posting I will not consider the effectiveness of his proposal or consider it’s implications on our freedom. I agree pornography corrodes but would argue this corrosion is not limited to children. In this posting I will argue that pornography might damage someone’s sense of personhood, that it might mean he is a deficient sort of person and that it always corrodes character.
In a thoughtful piece in the Independent Archie
Bland says he is pretty confident that he is able to keep
fantasy and reality distinct. I now want to examine this split. Of course we
must be able to split fantasy from reality or else we would go round in a dream
state. Moreover there is nothing wrong with some fantasies. There is nothing
wrong with someone fantasying about what he would do if he won the lottery
provided of course such a fantasy did not come to dominate his life. I will now
argue not all fantasies are the same. Fantasies such as becoming rich need not
harm others even if they became true. In such cases if the split between
fantasy and reality becomes blurred or ceases no harm is done. The
split between fantasy and reality is not essential. This is not true of
much of pornography. In what follows for the sake of simplicity I will assume
that men are the main users of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst
being aware some women may also use pornography. I will also assume women are
the objects of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst again being aware
that many other forms exist. Much of pornography portrays women as being
dominated or harmed. These forms of pornography would be harmful if the
fantasies involved became true. I will accept some forms of pornography in
which women or others are not dominated or harmed may not be harmful to third
parties. In the rest of this piece pornography will refer to pornography which
involves fantasies which imagine dominating or harming others unless stated
otherwise. It follows for these forms of pornography any blurring of the split
between fantasy and reality might be harmful to others. In this
context the maintenance of the split between fantasy and reality is absolutely
essential. The maintenance between fantasy and reality may also be
essential in another context. There now an increasing use of sexbots. Sex with
a robot is a kind of fantasy. If this fantasy involves domination and harm then
once again any blurring of the split between this fantasy and reality might be
harmful to others.
Bland is confident that he is able to keep fantasy and
reality distinct but this might not be true for all men. It appears to follow
the use of pornography is dangerous and a case can be made for the state
attempting to control pornography in order to limit this danger. Of course it
might be argued the state should not do so as any such attempt would limit
personal freedom. I will not pursue this argument here as I am mainly concerned
with the type of harm pornography causes. It might be objected at this point
that men who are already likely to harm women use pornography, rather than
pornography causes some men to become more likely to harm women. Personally I
am extremely doubtful about my objector’s point. Nonetheless I must accept that
whether pornography causes harm to women or men who use pornography harm women
is an empirical question which can only be settled by good evidence and not by
philosophy. However even if my objector is right I still believe splitting
fantasy and reality is damaging to the user of pornography.
I suggest the use of pornography by a man damages his
relationships with women in general. Firstly the use of pornography may limit
his real engagement with women. Perhaps more importantly someone, who may be
able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality so he will not harm
women, will nonetheless find that this split taints his engagement with women.
He sees women both as objects that may be used as he wills and creatures who
are essentially the same as himself and limit his will. At this point my
objector might suggest there is a distinction between fantasy women who may be
used and real women who limit a man’s will and it is possible for someone to
completely separate the two in his mind. If this is so my objector might
conclude we have no reason to believe a man’s use of pornography will taint his
engagement with real women. In theory my objector may be correct but as above I
remain extremely doubtful. Moreover in this case there seems to be some
evidence to support my doubts. If the separation between fantasy women and real
women is complete then there is no reason why a man who uses such pornography
should keep it secret. If his partner asks him if he uses such material he has
no reason to lie. I would argue he has two reasons to lie. Firstly let assume
he is truthful. If he is truthful it seems probable his relationship with his
partner will be damaged. His partner is unlikely to believe he can maintain the
separation between fantasy and real women in his mind and as a result sees him
as someone who sees her as someone who can be used. Secondly the man involved
will not be truthful because he feels ashamed. But why should he be ashamed if
the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete? I have
previously argued there are two
types of shame . One type of shame is anxiety about
social disqualification as suggested by Velleman, see (1). Another type of
shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves.
Because pornography is regarded socially as reprehensible it follows a user of
pornography may fear social disqualification even if he is able to maintain the
split between fantasy and reality. He might also feel shame because deep down
he feels this separation is incomplete.
At this point my objector might point out not all
pornography is used by heterosexual men, homosexuals also use pornography.
Moreover some homosexual pornography portrays others as being used and harmed.
He might question whether lesbian pornography portraying women being used and
harmed damages the relationships of women who use it with other women. If it
does not he might then ask why only pornography used by men which portrays
women being used or harmed damages the user’s relationships with women? At the present
time I cannot provide a satisfying answer my objector’s question, perhaps
someone else can. I would now simply suggest that the use of pornography
damages the user’s relationships with others because he/she is likely to lie
about his/her use for the reasons outlined above.
I now want to argue the use of pornography damages the user
even if it doesn’t damage his relationship with others. A common theme in my
postings is that someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. As
always in my postings to ‘care about’ means someone identifies with
what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to
benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced.
Frankfurt argues that caring about oneself is essential to being a person and
that someone who doesn’t care about himself can’t really be considered as a
person
.
“Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is
really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other
respects similar to persons it may be. There could not be a person of no
importance to himself.” (2).
Let us accept someone’s identity is defined by what he
cares about. Frankfurt goes on to argue that ambivalence is a disease
of the will,
“the health of the will is to be unified and in this sense
wholehearted. A person is volitionally robust when he is wholehearted in his
higher order attitudes and inclinations, in his preferences and decisions, and
in other movements of the will.” (3).
Now pornography forces someone to maintain a split between
fantasy and reality. If someone uses pornography this split threatens the unity
of his will and is damaging to his identity. I would further suggest a user of
sexbot risks damaging his identity for the same reason.
My objector might raise two objections to the above.
Firstly he might argue a user of pornography might not really care about
pornography and as a result its use plays no part in forming his identity. It
just a something he has a taste for much the same as ice cream. In my last
posting I suggested that an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about
but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. I
further suggested if someone continually buys ice cream that his liking for ice
cream plays a part, albeit a small part, in the creation of his identity. So in
reply to my objector I would suggest if someone continually uses pornography
this use forms part of his identity to some degree. Secondly my objector might
accept that a user of pornography cares about its use but argue this use does
not damage his identity. He might point out we all compartmentalise our lives
and the user of pornography may put his usage into a safe compartment. He might
point out Frankfurt believes that the formation of someone’s will is most
fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his
coming to care about some of them more than others (4). He might then argue if
someone is able to order the things he cares about by how much he cares about
them that his use of pornography need not harm his identity. At this point I must
accept that the use of pornography may, at least in theory, not damage the
user’s identity as a person provided he is able to fully order the things he
cares about. However I believe this would be hard to achieve in practice and
for this reason the use of pornography remains dangerous to someone’s identity.
Let us accept that for someone to be a person of any sort
he must care about something. But according to Helm such an account of a person
is incomplete and for someone to be a person he must have some values (5). I
would argue this means he must care about what he cares about. According to
Helm such meta-caring about must involve feelings of pride and shame. I believe
the simple ability to care about is all that is necessary for someone to be a
person. Nonetheless I believe that most people do care what they care about.
They care not just about being a person but being a good person
and this caring does involve feelings of pride and shame. Let us accept without
argument that it is better to be a good person than simply a person who cares
about things but has no pride or shame in what he cares about. It follows
someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in some way a deficient
person.
Let us accept that someone who doesn’t care about what he
cares about is in a deficient kind of person. Let us also return to pornography
which portrays women as being used or harmed and consider a man who uses such
pornography. Let us assume this man cares what he cares about. It seems to me
such a man must wish he didn’t care about pornography. Because by using
pornography he is caring about using and harming others. Anyone who cares about
what he cares about must have some conception of the good. He must also care
about the good. I would suggest any conception of the good must exclude using
or harming others for no benefit. I would further suggest this exclusion must
include imaginary harm. It follows such a man is likely to feel shame at his
use of pornography. This is not the type of shame as anxiety about social
disqualification. It is anxiety about harming the things he cares about, in
this case his conception of the good. In the light of the above I would suggest
that the user of pornography, who cares about what he cares about, sees himself
as a deficient person as he fails to be the sort of person he aspires to be.
The character he aspires to be is corroded.
1. David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University
Press, page 95.
2.
Harry
Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University
3.
Frankfurt , page 100.
4.
Frankfurt , 1988, The
importance of what we care about, Cambridge University Press, page 91,
5.
Bennett
Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship, & the
Self, Oxford University Press, page 128.
