- Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 65.
- Danaher John, 2019, Automation and Utopia, Harvard University, page 231
- Danaher, page 234
- Bennett Helm, 2010 Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press
- Gwen Bradford, 2015, Achievement, Oxford University Press
- Danaher, chapter 7.
This blog is concerned with most topics in applied philosophy. In particular it is concerned with autonomy, love and other emotions. comments are most welcome
Thursday, 18 June 2020
Games, Sport and Drugs
Wednesday, 16 January 2019
Nietzsche, Sport and Suffering
Sport is a passion for many people in the past this was
mostly men but this is changing and many women enjoy sport. In this posting I
want to examine the reasons for this passion and what we find admirable about sportspersons.
I will argue what we find admirable is that sport helps enhance character and
that this enhancement is connected to some of Nietzsche’s thoughts about
suffering and struggle. My discussion will be confined to sport but some of it
could also be applied to the arts, especially music.
Nietzsche argued that which doesn’t kill you makes you
stronger. He linked this to suffering which he argued makes someone a better
person,
“Examine the life of the best and most productive men and
nations, and ask yourselves whether a tree which is to grow proudly skywards
can dispense with bad weather and storms. Whether misfortune and opposition, or
every kind of hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, distrust, severity, greed, and
violence do not belong to the favourable conditions without which a great
growth even of virtue is hardly possible? (1)
It is important to note that Nietzsche is not saying all
suffering benefits someone but that if she is to live up to her potential some
suffering is necessary. Chronic illnesses doesn’t benefit the sufferer. However
it is worth noting that some people such as Havi Carel argue that even chronic
illness can bring some limited benefits (2). Let us agree with Nietzsche that
some suffering can indirectly lead to some benefits. Consider the Eloi in H G
Well’s book ‘The Time Machine’. The Eloi appear to lead a life of ease with no
need to struggle in order to exist. However they lack natural curiosity and
their lives seem to be lacking in some essential elements making such lives
seem pointless to us. Of course the Eloi’s lives might seem pointless to us
simply because they lack curiosity rather than because they fail to struggle to
protect themselves from the Morlocks. I would suggest that if someone has to
struggle in her life that she must consider how to overcome her problems and
this facilitates her curiosity and by doing so might possibly even facilitate
her wisdom. I now want to follow Michael Brady by arguing that suffering can
facilitate other virtues. (3) I would suggest that if someone struggles to
overcome her suffering that this struggle will enhance her courage, fortitude,
resilience and patience. These virtues are instrumental virtues and that
someone who possesses might be said to possess grit. I would argue that we enhance these virtues
by exercising them in much the same way as an athlete enhances her muscles by
exercise. If someone struggles to overcome her suffering then she will need to
exercise her courage, fortitude, resilience and patience. Of course no one admires
someone simply because she suffers, one pities her. We admire someone who struggles
to overcome her suffering. I would suggest that we should find her character
admirable because it displays the above virtues. To summarise the above simply
to suffer doesn’t benefit anyone, however if someone struggles to overcome her
suffering she enhances some elements of her character helping her to flourish.
I now want to consider what we find admirable about
sportspersons. Sport is connected to competition. I go out alone on my bike I
am exercising rather than taking part in sport. Sport concerns competition.
However sport is not simply about competition and winning for after all wars
are about winning and wars aren’t sport. Winning is important in sport because
it sets the goal in some competition. However wars are also about competition.
The competition in war and sport differs. All competition is about winning but
in war the way the war is won isn’t central whilst in sport winning matters but
the way someone wins is of central importance. A war should be a just war but
the rules of war play no part in the definition of war. If some country wages
war by massacring innocent civilians and ignoring the rules of war we would
still say it was waging war, we might of course add that it wasn’t waging a
just war. Sport is by definition must be played according to some rules. Sport
must also be fair. If a team of professional footballers play an under 13 years
old girls team even if this was played paying scrupulous attention to the rules
this game would not be regarded as sport. Fairness is central to the definition
of sport and this is reflected in the organisation of sport. Able bodied
Olympians don’t compete with Para-Olympians, heavyweight boxers don’t compete
with lightweights and golfers have handicaps to ensure fair competition. Let us
accept that sport is concerned with winning and fairness. Winning and fairness
are in some ways an odd combination. We find fairness admirable because it
fosters justice. We find winning admirable because it represents achievement. I
would suggest that we find sportspersons admirable because the combination of
winning and fairness found in sport allows them to exhibit and develop certain
characteristics connected to good character. This suggestion seems to be
supported by the way we talk about sport, especially football, we talk about
determination, patience, courage and not letting one’s head drop which seems to
me to be a form of resilience.
Let us accept that one of the main reasons why we find
participation in sport admirable is that it allows sportspersons to exhibit and
develop character. In what follows I will only consider sport and the
development or enhancement of good character. I have argued above that
suffering helps develop courage, fortitude, resilience and patience. I now want
to argue that sport develops these virtues by suffering. It might be objected
that many professional sportspersons don’t suffer. Professional sportspersons
are well paid, have trainers, dieticians, physiotherapists and even sports
psychologists help them achieve their goals. I accept some sportspersons aren’t
deprived people. However it is important to note that some people embrace sport
as a way out of deprivation. For such people sport and suffering are directly
connected. I now want argue that even well paid professional sportspersons
suffer. What does it mean to suffer? To suffer means someone is in some
unpleasant state she would rather not be in. This definition is not a complete
definition of suffering but I believe it is adequate for the purposes of this
posting. Sport helps develop good character because sportspersons have to
struggle to master their sport and this involves courage, fortitude, resilience
and patience. If someone is completely satisfied she has no need to struggle.
Someone struggles only when she is dissatisfied with something. Being
dissatisfied is an unpleasant state which someone wishes she wasn’t in. All
struggling is a reaction to some suffering even if this suffering is mild. It follows
that if what we find admirable about sport is that it enhances character and
that this enhancement is achieved by struggling which is facilitated by
suffering. This struggle might be of especial importance to disabled athletes as
their greater struggle leads to greater character enhancement and empowerment.
I have argued above that one of the main reasons we find
participation in sport admirable is that it helps sportspersons to exhibit and
develop good character. It might be objected that I’m presenting a very limited
picture. My objector might suggest that the main reason we find participation
in sport admirable is that it simply that it allows sportspersons to exhibit
their skills without any reference to character. I accept that people enjoy
exhibiting or the exhibition of sporting skills. However I am examining what
people find admirable about participation in sport and admiration isn’t the same
as enjoyment. Do we really admire the exhibition of these skills without
reference to character? Would we admire the exhibition of these skills if they
were exhibited by a robot? Would we admire them if they had been acquired
solely by the use of performance enhancing drugs? I would suggest we would not.
My objector might respond by suggesting that we wouldn’t only because the use
enhancement drugs is cheating rather than anything to do with sportsperson’s
character. Cheating and character are linked. Let us assume some sport permits
the use of performance enhancing drugs and that taking these drugs ceases to be
cheating. I would suggest that we would find little to admire about
participation in such a sport. Nonetheless might we find the exhibition of sporting
skills involved in this sport enjoyable? Perhaps we might enjoy the exhibition
as a spectacle but it would be hard to enjoy as a sporting contest as the any
contest has moved from the sportspersons involved to the scientists producing
the enhancers.
Let us accept that being involved sport helps fight obesity
and fosters good health and for this reason active participation in sport
should be encouraged I have argued that the reason why we find participation in
sport admirable is that it allows sportspersons to exhibit and develop
character. It might be objected that I’m idealising some impossible Corinthian
picture of sport which has no relevance in the modern era. In response I point
out that character matters to both to amateur and professional sportspersons.
Andy Murray is a professional tennis player and I would suggest that we admire
him just as much for his struggle to win Wimbledon as for the victory itself.
If we accept that character matters in sport then we have a further reason to
encourage active participation in sport. The struggle involved in sport helps
to enhance certain virtues which are instrumentally useful to us. Clearly
enhancing someone’s courage, fortitude, resilience and patience benefits her
but I would argue such individual enhancement also benefits society as a whole.
It follows society has an interest in promoting participation in sport and that
government policies which reduce the sporting facilities which enable people to
do so are mistaken. Playing fields and other sporting facilities matter. Of
course not everyone wants to participate in sport but I would suggest that other
activities involving struggle such as learning to play a musical instrument can
be equally beneficial. In the light of the above discussion I would further suggest
that some struggle in life is important for us all and can lead to more
widespread benefits. In ‘The Coddling of the American Mind’ Haidt and Lukianoff
endorse an anti-fragility type of parenting. (4) I would interpret
anti-fragility parenting to mean not overprotecting or coddling children but
rather encouraging them to struggle to achieve things in life. Socrates
famously argued that the unexamined life wasn’t worth living perhaps a life
without some struggle might be worth living but none the less be a deficient
sort of life. Perhaps such a life might be worth living but would it be a happy
life? Perhaps Seligman is right when he suggests that accomplishment matters
for happiness if so a happy life requires some struggle, some suffering. Lastly
I would suggest that whilst we admired Steven Hawking for increasing our
knowledge of the universe that we also admired him because of his struggles to
overcome adversity.
- The Gay Science : First Book, 19
- Havi Carel, 2013, Illness, Routledge
- Michael Brady, 2018, Suffering, Oxford University Press
- Haidt & Lukianoff, 2018, The Coddling of the American Mind, Penguin Press
Thursday, 21 September 2017
What do We Mean by Work?
It is always important to be clear about what we are talking about when discussing philosophical questions. What we mean by work is important because it raises some interesting philosophical questions. For instance, John Danaher wonder whether work makes us happy, Tim Douglas wonders whether the future is workless (1), or perhaps robots will mean that in the future we will have no need to work. In this posting I want to consider what we mean when we discuss work.
The Cambridge online dictionary defines work as “an activity, such as a job, that a person uses physical or mental effort to do, usually for money.” Work seems tied to the idea of a job. In might appear that we could improve our definition of what we mean by work by considering what we mean by a job. Unfortunately, what we mean by a job, is like that of work, far from clear, moreover sometimes the definitions of work and a job seem to be intertwined. For these reasons I will restrict my discussion to what we mean by work. Let us consider an old fashioned couple, the husband works on a farm providing them with an income whilst his wife does the housework in their home. This example raises several interesting questions. Are both doing the same thing at some basic level? If they aren’t it would appear that there is a family of related definitions of what we mean by work. Examples of members of such a family are easy to imagine, working for a wage, housework, schoolwork and someone working on improving her game or garden. Indeed it would seem perfectly natural for someone to say she is going to work in her garden. If we accept such a family of meanings do all members of this family have equal worth or does the value of work vary depending on which member of the family we are considering?
I want to reject the idea that the meaning of work is really a family of related meanings for two reasons. First, the apparent appearance of a family of different meanings might be an illusion. It seems entirely plausible that work might have only one meaning and that the appearance of a family of meanings is not due to any difference in meaning but rather to the different domains work is carried out in. Farmwork is not conceptually different from housework, the apparent difference is due to the different domains each is carried out in. Secondly let us assume that what we mean by work is a family of related meanings. If we accept the above, then it should be possible to say something about the relationship between family members. However, if we can say something meaningful about this relationship between family members then perhaps what we say could form the basis of a common definition for all forms of work.
Let us accept that there is something common to the meaning of work in different domains. Work is different from play. If considering what is meant by a job doesn’t help us to define work, then perhaps considering the differences between work and play might do so. Both are forms of work and most forms of play can be fun but play is never serious whilst all work is serious. What do I mean by serious? If someone plays at something she can simply stop playing at will because play isn’t serious. If someone works at something she can’t simply stop working for no reason because work is serious. Of course she might dislike work and be glad to stop working but work matters to her and she must have a reason to stop working. If we accept the above, then even if professional footballers are playing a game they are also working. Indeed, someone whose garden matters to her might be said to working in her garden.
Let us accept that work must matter to the worker. Accepting the above doesn’t mean the worker must like her work. Indeed, in some circumstances the worker might hate her job. I have suggested someone can simply stop playing and that stopping has no important consequences for her. The same is not true of work. Someone might well stop working at her dead end job but stopping has consequences for her that matter. Her work matters even if this is only for instrumental reasons, these reasons might simply be making a living or buying the things she values. For someone who loves her garden stopping gardening might mean the garden she loves becomes neglected. Work was defined by the Cambridge online dictionary as “an activity, such as a job, that a person uses physical or mental effort to do, usually for money.” In light of the above work might be better defined as an activity requiring physical or mental effort and that activity matters to the worker. Adopting the above definition would mean working for a wage, housework, schoolwork and playing professional sport could all be regarded as work in the same way and need not be regarded as a family of loosely connected definitions and any apparent differences could be due to the different domains the work is carried out in.
I have argued the definition of work above means that we don’t have to accept a family of loosely connected definitions. The definition I have adopted above depends on the idea that work matters, work is something we care about. Accepting this definition means we had workers before our modern ideas about workers, a Neanderthal hunter might be regarded as a worker. However, even if work might be defined one way we might care about work in two ways. First, someone might work in order to make a living or to obtain the things she desires. Work matters to her for instrumental reasons. Someone working solely to make a living would be a good example of the instrumental value of work. Secondly, someone might work at something because this something matters directly to her. Work has a kind of intrinsic value to her. Someone working in a garden she loves would be good example of such work. Work might matter for what it enables us to obtain or work might matter because we care about what we are working at. Someone working solely to make a living and someone working in a garden she loves are extreme examples and many forms of work might matter to someone because of both values. For instance, someone might drive a bus in order to make a living whilst also take pride in her driving abilities.
Let us accept that work might be defined as an activity requiring physical or mental effort that matters to the worker and that work might matter to the worker for two reasons or some combination of the two. What are the consequences of accepting the above? The first of these is that we must reject the idea that work is a family of loosely related definitions. Of course there are different kinds of work, the work of a banker is different to that of the cleaner in the bank. However, at a basic level both are undertaking some activity, requiring physical or mental effort, which matters to both of them. Of course the complexity of the activity and the domain in which the activity is carried out matter, but these considerations don’t affect this basic definition. Secondly if work must of necessity matter to someone, work isn’t play, then work must be of some value in her life. I argued above that work can have instrumental or intrinsic value, we can work for something or work at something. If someone works at something simply because it matters to her then work gives her life meaning. Moreover, the reason why it matters does not alter the fact that working at something gives someone’s life meaning. For instance, someone might work at providing relief to the starving because she believes it’s a good thing to do whilst someone else might work at studying quasars simply because she finds quasars interesting. Both of these persons work at something for different reasons, but for both of them their work has intrinsic value giving their lives meaning. Let us now consider someone who works for its instrumental value. If someone simply work for something, then this something permits her to pursue the things that matter in life to her, the things that give her life meaning. If someone works as a cleaner, then this might enable her to feed the family she loves. Lastly let us assume that work gives our lives meaning and that automation might destroy many jobs. What are the likely consequences of accepting these assumptions and how should we deal with them? Let us first consider those workers who work instrumentally to obtain the things that matter to them. Clearly some will be unable to make a living which might lead to social unrest. One solution to the above could be the introduction of some sort of universal basic income (UBI). I would suggest that in such circumstances even capitalism has an interest in introducing UBI as it is dependent on some sort of social cohesion. Unfortunately, even if automation does destroy jobs and a UBI is introduced this introduction by itself might be insufficient to maintain social cohesion. If people become bored and little matters to them then social cohesion might become eroded. Boredom in this situation wouldn’t be a minor matter but of major concern both to individuals and society. One way of dealing with this concern might be to refocus the way people work. Perhaps people should focus on working at rather than working for. Such a refocussing would accord better with stoic ideals. Someone’s ability to work at something is less dependent on her having a job. Nonetheless such a refocussing of the way we work is not straightforward as many people would need to be helped to change their focus from working for to working at. I have suggested in a previous posting that such a refocussing might be helped by a refocussing of our education system, see work, automation and happiness . The focus of education might be broadened from simply preparing people for work to helping them to lead a good life. Such a shift might be aided by placing greater emphasis on the humanities. Once again such a change in emphasis would accord better with stoic ideals. It might be objected that I am adopting a somewhat elitist attitude. I accept this objection and offer two suggestions to combat such elitism. First, the focus of education might be broadened still further to enabling some people learn a craft. Crafts sometimes allow the craftsperson to enter a flow state giving her life some meaning. Secondly in ancient Greece the elite lead a life of leisure in which sport and the gymnasium were important. Perhaps sport participation should play a greater part in any society which finds its cohesion damaged by automation. I have suggested above that a professional footballer might be regarded as a worker if we accept the above definition an amateur footballer might be said to work at his game. Like UBI such participation would be expensive but these costs might be partly offset by health benefits.
- Tim Dunlop, Why the future is workless, New South Publishing.
Tuesday, 16 August 2016
Sport, Motivational Enhancement and Authenticity
Heather Dyke writing in the conversation examines why
doping in sport is wrong. In a previous posting I have argued that doping in
sport is wrong for three main reasons, see sport performance and enhancing drugs
. Firstly, I believe there should be a difference between sport and simple
spectacle and that the use performance enhancing drugs by sportspersons erodes
this difference. Secondly I argued that permitting performance enhancing drugs
simply moves the goalposts. If we don’t permit the use of all drugs, including
dangerous ones, we will still have to test whether any drugs used are permitted
ones. Lastly I argued what we admire about sport is linked to the determination
and effort required by sportspersons and that the use of performance enhancing
drugs weakens this link. Determination and effort are linked to motivation, to
character. I have previously argued that it would not be wrong to enhance our
motivation, see effectiveness enhancement . It
would appear that I hold two conflicting positions with regard to doping in
sport. In this posting I want to examine this conflict.
Let me start my examination by making it clear the sort of
doping I am opposed to. I believe any drug which enhances an athlete’s body
damages sport for the three reasons outlined above. If some mediocre athlete
could transform himself into an Olympic champion in a matter of weeks by taking
some drug which vastly physically enhanced him would we really admire him? I
would suggest we would not because we feel sporting excellence should require
some effort. Now let us consider a second mediocre athlete who transforms
himself into an Olympic champion over by taking some drug which enhances his
motivation over a number of years. By transforming his motivation, he trains
more determinedly and makes greater effort when training. This second athlete
raises three interesting questions. Firstly, is there any real difference in a
sporting context between an athlete taking a drug to enhance himself physically
and enhance himself mentally? Secondly would we admire such an athlete? Lastly
is the enhancement of someone’s motivation compatible with the ethos of sport?
I will now attempt to answer each of the above a questions
in turn. Is there any real difference in a sporting context between an athlete
taking a drug to enhance himself physically and enhance himself mentally?
Clearly there is a difference in this case because an athlete who enhances
himself physically with the use of drugs need make no effort to achieve his
enhancement whilst a second athlete who physically enhances herself by mentally
enhancing her motivation must still train hard. Does this difference matter?
The answer this additional question is connected to our second original
question. What do we admire about sportspeople? I would suggest we admire their
dedication to the effort required for their sport, we admire their motivation
for sport, we admire part of their character. Of course it follows we need not
admire all of a sportsperson’s character. Let us accept that we admire a
sportsperson’s motivation, effort and dedication. The question now would admire
his motivation, effort and dedication if these were artificially enhanced?
It might be argued that if we obtain certain goods easily
without any real determination that in so doing we devalue determination in
general. Let us assume it is possible to artificially enhance our motivation by
making us more determined. Let us accept that if an athlete enhances himself
physically by the use of drugs, gene therapy or blood doping that he devalues
the importance of motivation. Does the same apply if he enhances his motivation
artificially? I would suggest it does not. There is an important difference
between the enhancement of effectiveness and the enhancement of
motivation. Enhancing our effectiveness devalues our motivation
whilst it is hard to see how enhancing our motivation could possibly devalue
motivation. Accepting the above means it might be possible to
admire an athlete who artificially enhances his motivation whilst at the same
time failing to admire an athlete who simply enhances himself physically.
At this point someone might object that whilst accepting
someone who enhances his motivation does not devalue his motivation that
nonetheless he devalues himself as a person. He does so by making himself less
authentic. My objector might then argue someone shouldn’t enhance his motivation
because being authentic is something we value. In response I would point out
the things which make us authentic aren’t fixed from birth, babies aren’t
authentic. People seek to change themselves by enhancing themselves by training
or learning. I can see of no reason why people changing themselves by these
means will render themselves inauthentic. I would suggest someone’s authenticity
depends on him seeking goals he identifies with rather than the means he
chooses to seek these goals. Someone’s authenticity is determined by
what he loves or cares about. I would further suggest that a truly
authentic person must always choose those means which are most effective in
promoting the goals he identifies herself with. It follows if these
means include enhancing his motivation that this enhancement isn’t inauthentic.
Indeed, it appears that if someone doesn’t use the most effective means to
promote those goals he identifies with that his authenticity is weakened.
Sometimes those most effective means might include motivational enhancement and
it follows someone does not use motivational enhancement that his
authenticity is weakened
What conclusions can be drawn from the above. Firstly,
physical enhancement by artificial means devalues sport. Secondly motivational enhancement by
artificial means does not seem to conflict with the ethos of sport provided it
is accepted this ethos is connected to the sportsperson’s character. I accept
some people might be reluctant to accept this second conclusion and might
believe I am wrong to separate so completely the goals someone identifies with
and the means he uses to achieves his goals.
Friday, 3 August 2012
Olympic Ideals and Winning
- Earl Spurgin 2012 Hey, How did I become a Role
Model? Privacy and the Extent of Role Model-Obligations. Journal of Applied Philosophy,
29(2)
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