Moral Insanity

In this posting I want to examine the moral implications raised by the behaviour of the Austrian man Josef Fritzl who imprisoned and sexually abused his daughter for 24 years. The idea for this posting is “The stain of moral insanity” by A C Grayling and found in the New Scientist of 17/05/08. Grayling suggests evil simply means a great deal of wrong. Moreover he suggests evil is not a useful term and acts as a full stop on our understanding. It follows he argues describing someone as evil does not capture the moral implications his behaviour. He argues it might be better to regard people such as Fritzl as morally insane rather than simply mad or evil. I will use Grayling’s definition of moral insanity to give two further consistent definitions. I will also briefly examine the implications of these two definitions.

Insanity is not now usually regarded as a medical term. Legally insanity means an agent suffers from a mental disease or defect and does not possess the capacity to appreciate the requirements of the law. Moral insanity is defined by Grayling as follows
“Moral insanity is the refusal to act according to important moral dictates the agent fully understands.”
Grayling’s definition makes no mention of mental illness or defect. It follows Grayling’s concept of moral insanity appears to be unattached to the legal concept. This appearance does not of course mean his concept is not useful in examining the moral implications of the behaviour of people such as Fritzl.

It might be Grayling wants to connect the idea of moral insanity to our intuitive ideas of insanity. Intuitively insanity might be simply said to be acting without any regard for rationality. However it is hard to see how any requirement of rationality, other than understanding what society regards as a moral dictate, is needed by Grayling’s definition. Consider the behaviour of someone like Fritzl with regard to Grayling’s definition. Let it be assumed this person fully understands the moral dictates of society. Let it be further assumed that for someone to act rationally simply means to act in such a way as is likely to satisfy his desires and help him attain his goals. It appears to follow such a person may fully understand these moral dictates but have no reasons, other than prudential reasons, to obey them. Grayling argues the elaborate steps Fritzl took to conceal his behaviour showed he believed what was doing was wrong. It seems reasonable to assume Fritzl was aware society would punish him on account of his actions should these be discovered. It follows it is possible to give a different interpretation of Fritzl’s behaviour. Fritzl had good reasons to conceal his behaviour for his prudential interests. It then follows the steps he took were quite rational based purely on serving these prudential interests. It might then be concluded, provided the two above assumptions are accepted, that Fritzl’s behaviour might be better described as a failure to accept generally accepted moral standards rather than acting irrationally.

However it might be possible to connect rationality with moral insanity if Grayling’s definition is slightly amended. His definition might be amended as follows to give my first definition of moral insanity.

Moral insanity is the refusal to act according to important moral dictates the agent fully accepts.

Prima facie using this definition of moral insanity Fritzl’s actions would be irrational provided he fully accepted these important moral dictates. It is important to be clear about what ‘fully accepts’ means in this definition. Fully accepting something in this amended definition doesn’t simply mean that the agent accepts that some moral dictates are society’s moral dictates but rather that these dictates are his dictates. He identifies himself with these dictates. Moreover if someone identifies himself with a course of action in line with these dictates then rationally he should undertake this action in circumstances in which he is able to do so. Using this amended definition it might be useful to class someone, who acts contrary to moral principles he accepts, as morally insane due to his lack of rationality. However in practice such clear cut circumstances are rare. As a consequence it seems doubtful if my first definition of moral insanity would apply in many cases. Moreover whilst it is possible to check if someone acts logically it would seem to be difficult to assess whether someone’s actions are instrumentally rational. It follows in such cases it might be more useful to question whether the perpetrator is autonomous rather than morally insane.

I suggested above that intuitively insanity might be simply defined as someone acting without regard for rationality. I then assumed an agent acts rationally if he acts in such a way as is likely to satisfy his desires and help him attain his goals. However if this assumption is rejected might it be possible to connect an agent’s refusal to act according to important moral dictates with our intuitive ideas of insanity in a more meaningful way? Let it be assumed the above assumption is incorrect by assuming Kant is correct in believing that morality is based on the rational recognition of universal moral norms. It follows Fritzl is defective because he is unable to correctly apply universal rationality. It further follows Fritzl’s actions might be intuitively considered as insane due to this inability to recognise rational moral norms. It still further follows if morality is based on universal rationality that the idea of moral insanity based on rationality might indeed be a useful concept. However the rational recognition of universal moral norms would seem to be something few, if any, could achieve in practice. It follows that in normal circumstances if we question someone’s ability to act rationally we assess his ability to use practical rationality. Let it be accepted if we question someone like Fritzl’s ability to act rationally we should use the same standard as we use to assess the rationality of others. It can then be concluded if we question someone like Fritzl’s ability to act rationally we should assess his ability to use practical rationality.

I have argued someone like Fritzl and sociopaths in general seem perfectly able to use practical rationality. It follows it would be wrong to class such persons as insane, or morally insane, provided they are capable of using practical rationality. However it still seems to me that the idea of moral insanity might be useful. Legal ideas on insanity mean that an insane person suffers from mental disease or defect and does not possess the capacity to appreciate the requirements of the law. I have argued that sociopaths do not usually have a defect of rationality. However sociopaths may be defective in other ways. Sociopaths may be defective because they lack sympathy and empathy for others. Slote argues actions are morally wrong and contrary to moral obligation, if and only if, they reflect or exhibit or express an absence of a fully developed empathic concern for others on behalf of the agent, see previous postings. Provided Slote’s argument is accepted then someone such as Fritzl and sociopaths in general are morally defective because they are unable to feel empathy for others. It follows the whole idea of morality makes no sense to such persons. It is now possible to give a second definition of moral insanity based on an inability to feel empathy for others.

Someone is morally insane if he acts contrary to accepted moral dictates he understands due to his inability to feel empathic concern for others.

It is important to be aware of two important properties of this definition. Firstly this definition makes no mention of rationality. Secondly this definition differs significantly from the legal definition of insanity. Legally in order to be considered insane someone must not only have some mental defect, in our case no capacity to feel empathy, but also not understand what the law requires. A sociopath might well understand the requirements of the law and have a defect in empathy, but is this defect a mental defect? It follows a sociopath might be considered as morally insane but as legally sane, depending on whether we regard an inability to feel empathy as a mental defect or not.

I will now consider the practical implications of accepting this second definition of moral insanity. Firstly it seems to me if we accept this definition then we have a duty to see the circumstances in which moral insanity arises are minimised. In practice this means trying to foster circumstances in which children grow up to be able to empathise with others. To do this we must address social problems such as struggling single parents, social isolation and poverty. Secondly accepting this definition carries certain dangers. If we regard someone as defective because he is incapable of empathic caring then we might also regard him as different from others in a particularly important way. If I lose a leg I am defective with regard to walking but I am not defective with regard to being essentially human. The same does not seem to be true of a sociopath. Furthermore if morality is in some way based on empathy, the fact a sociopath is defective with regard to empathising, might mean we would find it difficult to include him within our sphere of moral concern. See Slote and empathising with an alien, mentioned in an earlier posting. Returning to Grayling’s concerns the term sociopath might indeed act as a full stop on our understanding. Perhaps if evil is also seen as a full stop on our understanding it would be right to describe sociopaths as evil. The dangers of labelling people as evil are all too well illustrated by considering Nazi Germany. The dangers of seeing people as evil and beyond our moral understanding are real and present a challenge to those of us who see morality as based on empathic caring. In this case all that can be done is to admit sociopaths may indeed be evil, beyond our moral understanding, but we should never the less include them in our moral concerns. After all we may be morally concerned about the environment even if the environment has no moral concerns.