Caring, Empathy and Love

Michael Slote argues we must choose between care ethics and traditional liberalism’s ideas of autonomy. He argues liberal Kantian autonomy requires critical vigilance. This he believes would mean someone would have to continually critically assess all his emotions and relationships including those with his parents and children. He further argues this continual critical vigilance would destroy love. Because of this fact he argues we should develop responsive vigilance. Slote quotes William’s example of a man deciding which of two drowning people he should save, when one of these people is his wife, as intuitively suggesting there is something wrong with continual critical assessment. I agree with Slote continual critical assessment destroys love. However I do not agree because of this we must choose care ethics over traditional liberalism.

Slote seems to be arguing that because of problems associated with loving we should adopt a more restricted basis for respecting autonomy.

“I believe that the more restricted of autonomy, and respect for autonomy that care ethics can articulate and defend represent a more ethically adequate picture of what is all about than anything we find in the mainstream tradition of liberal moral and political philosophy.”(1)

I want to raise two objections to the above. Firstly it is no means clear to me that any caring ethic based solely on empathy would give a lower priority to respecting autonomy and secondly not all ideas of liberal autonomy are based on continual critical assessment.

At this point it is useful to define two sorts of care ethics. Firstly there is care ethics in general in which care depends on empathy, sympathy and places emphasis on people’s relationships. I will refer to this as care ethic (G). Secondly a care ethic may be based solely on empathy as advocated by Slote. I will refer to this as care ethic (E). I have argued in a previous posting a care ethic based solely on empathy would seem to value autonomy over beneficence. I will not pursue this point however it is not all obvious why care ethic (E) should give a lower priority to respecting autonomy than traditional liberal approaches to autonomy.

Let it be accepted that care ethic (G) does give a lower priority to respecting autonomy than Kantian approaches to autonomy. However it only follows, one must choose between giving a high priority to respecting autonomy or a lower priority to respecting autonomy whilst placing greater emphasis on caring (G), if the above are the only two possible concepts of autonomy. Slote argues for a caring ethic based on sentimentalism. It is also possible to give an account of autonomy based on what people care about. Furthermore such an account seems able to account for love or even be love based. According to Harrt Frankfurt,

“The will can only be one that incorporates what Kant calls a ‘pure’ will. … Now this pure will is a very peculiar and unlikely place in which to locate an indispensable condition of individual autonomy. After all its purity consists precisely in the fact that it is wholly untouched by any of the personal features that make people distinctive and charecterize their specific identities” (2)

Autonomy according to Frankfurt involves reflection but it is primarily based on what the agent cares about.

“The formation of a person’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others.” (3)

It is important to note Frankfurt’s ideas of “caring about” or love are volitional rather than simple emotions and hence are not identical to Slote’s and other care ethicists ideas of caring. However, subject to above proviso, Frankfurt’s ideas on autonomy can account for love. It seems Frankfurt’s account of autonomy explains why a man can automatically save his wife from drowning, as opposed to a stranger, without any need for critical reflection. It follows Slote is wrong to suggest only a care based ethic account of autonomy can make room for love. It further follows a more restricted concept of autonomy and respect for autonomy are not needed to account for love.

1. Michael Slote, 2007The Ethics of Caring and Empathy, Routledge.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press.)
3. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press.