Is Toleration an Outdated Virtue?

It is sometimes argued that toleration is an outdated or incoherent virtue. One reason for given for this is John Horton’s example of a tolerant racist (1). In this posting I will argue his example does not give us any reason why we should not treat toleration as a virtue. In order to make my argument I must make clear what is meant by toleration and outline what is meant by a tolerant racist.

To be tolerant means someone accepting something he believes is bad or wrong and which she has the power to change. Toleration then has three elements. An example of a tolerant racist might be someone who accepts everyone has equal employment rights whilst believing certain racial groups should not have these rights, perhaps because he believes members of these groups are lazy, and has the power to deny members of these groups these rights in some limited circumstances. Such a person could be regarded as a tolerant racist. According to Magali Bessone if we accept the standard definition of toleration, outlined above, then “the more strongly racist a person is, the more virtuous he appears to be” (2). In essence the above means the stronger someone’s racist belief that these groups should not possess these rights then provided he does not act on these beliefs the more tolerant he appears to be. I will now argue this appearance is false because the example of the tolerant racist conflates the moral worth of tolerance with the amount of effort it takes someone to be tolerant.

At this point I want to introduce another example which I will call the reluctant truth teller. Let us assume someone finds it hard to tell the truth. He likes to embellish stories and exaggerate his exploits. Nonetheless this person forces himself to be truthful. Let us compare the reluctant truth teller with someone who finds it natural to be truthful. If we accept the logic of the tolerant racist then it would appear that the reluctant truth teller is morally more virtuous than the person who finds truth telling natural. I could proceed to construct an example of a reluctant just man and this would lead to an identical appearance. In general I would argue accepting the tolerant racist argument means accepting that in general someone who reluctantly accepts some virtue is morally more virtuous than someone who finds being virtuous in the same way natural. I would further argue accepting the tolerant racist argument means accepting the value of someone’s moral virtue depends on the amount of effort he has to make to act virtuously for all the virtues.

Why does acting virtuously have moral value? Several reasons might be advanced. It might for instance help society flourish or it might be aimed at some concept of the good. Whatever gives acting virtuously its moral value it does not seem to directly depend on the amount of effort someone makes. Increased effort aimed at evil ends certainly does not diminish the evil intended. I of course accept that extra effort aimed at achieving some virtuous end may make achieving that end easier but I do not accept this extra effort adds moral value to this end. Accepting the latter means accepting that, a racist who continues to tolerate other races, when he has the power to do otherwise, does not become more tolerant if his racism increases.

At this point someone might point out to me that the above argument depends on toleration being seen as a moral virtue. I accept his point. My objector might now suggest that toleration is a personal virtue in much the same way as courage is. He might further suggest if we accept that toleration is a personal virtue that the problems caused by the tolerant racist resurface. I believe toleration is a moral virtue but I am willing to accept that toleration may also be a personal virtue. However I am unwilling to accept even if toleration is regarded as a personal virtue that a racist, who tolerates other races whilst he has the power not to do so, increases his toleration if his racist beliefs increase. Let us accept that a brave or tolerant person usually flourishes better than he would have done had he not possessed these personal virtues. Let us accept that in general the value of a personal virtue is that it helps its possessor flourish better in life. It follows the value of toleration depends only on how tolerant someone is and not on how much effort it took him to be tolerant. In order to see why the above must be true let us consider an example. Let us consider two tolerant people. Let us also assume it is possible to measure tolerance to some degree, if this is not so the ideas connected to the tolerant racist example make no sense. The first tolerant person is extremely tolerant and toleration comes extremely easily to him. The second is only minimally tolerant and it takes him a great effort to achieve this minimal tolerance. If we allow that effort plays some part in the degree of toleration then it might be possible that both these persons possess the same degree of toleration. However it seems inconceivable provided all other things are equal that the person with only minimal toleration will flourish equally as well as the extremely tolerant person. A racist with only minimal toleration of other races will, all other things being equal, not flourish as well as a more tolerant person.

I have argued that toleration is not an outdated or incoherent virtue. I have argued that toleration helps someone flourish. However toleration not only benefits the tolerant person it benefits those tolerated. Helping others to flourish by toleration might help to some small degree to combat fundamentalism and so benefit society.  

1. John Horton, 1996, Toleration as a virtue, in D Heyd (editor), toleration: an elusive virtue, Princeton University Press, pages 28-43.
2. Magali Bessone, 2013, Will the Real Tolerant Racist Please Stand Up, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(3).