Gay Marriage

Someone remarked to me the other day that her daughter would make someone a good wife. Her remark caused me to wonder about the roles of husband and wife in society nowadays. In the past a husband and a wife had a specific role in marriage. I’m not sure these specific roles still exist and if they do perhaps they have become interchangeable. In the past I have defended traditional marriage which prohibits same sex unions but if these roles no longer exist or are now interchangeable then perhaps I should reconsider my position.

Let us assume that marriage has evolved so that the role of husband and wife are to some degree interchangeable. I am perfectly happy to accept such a change. This evolution means a woman can play the role of husband and a man the role of wife. It follows two women can play the roles of husband and wife in a marriage and the same applies to two men. It might then be argued if the state recognises marriage between a man and a woman it should also recognise a marriage between two partners of the same sex and that my defence of traditional marriage was wrong. Perhaps even my defence was due some unconscious prejudice on my part

At this point I must make exactly clear what position I have previously defended. Let us accept that until recently in western world it has been accepted that marriage was the union of one man and one woman. I did not defend the states right to define what marriage means. I accepted that the state has no business in semantics or else we might end up in a state akin to that in George Orwell’s 1984. Nonetheless I did defend the state’s right to encourage and offer support to traditional marriages. My argument went as follows. The state supports children’s education because this helps them flourish and become good citizens. I then argued by analogy if a marriage helps the children of the marriage flourish and hence become good citizens that the state should support marriage. I pointed to evidence that the children of married couples flourish better than those of unmarried couples, see for instance Married and unmarried family breakdown .  I concluded that the state should support traditional marriage.

However even if my argument is accepted it doesn’t mean the state shouldn’t recognise gay marriage. Gay couples don’t want to radically change marriage or destroy traditional marriage they simply want it to become more inclusive. I accept my argument above doesn’t automatically preclude this possibility. Provided of course this inclusion doesn’t harm the relationship between heterosexual married couples with children. Prima facie it would appear there is no moral reason why the state should exclude gay couples from marrying. Nonetheless the above provides no reason why the state should do so. Someone might object that the state should do so for reasons of equality. If it did so straight couples will no longer be able to claim moral superiority over gay couples. In reply I would of course accept that straight couples have no moral superiority over gay couples. Nonetheless my reason why the state should recognise traditional marriage had nothing to do with equality or discrimination it was simply concerned with helping children to flourish. My objector may now question why infertile heterosexual couples should be able to enter into a traditional marriage and gay couples shouldn’t. In reply I would argue the state has no moral reason to promote the marriage of infertile heterosexual couples. It may of course do so for purely pragmatic reasons simply because it is hard to differentiate between couples who don’t want or can’t have children and those who do.

In the light of the above I was perhaps wrong to argue the state should prohibit same sex marriage. However this is not the same as saying the state should support same sex marriage. A government might of course do so purely to project itself as both caring and modern. But these reasons are based purely on the government’s interests and not on the interests of gay people. In my next posting I will consider whether the state has other reasons to justify it supporting gay marriage.

Pornography and the Corrosion of Character

David Cameron the British Prime Minister has declared war on pornography, see telegraph . He believes pornography corrodes childhood. He therefore proposes that every internet user in the UK will be asked whether they wish to receive pornography and that the default position will be they do not. In this posting I will not consider the effectiveness of his proposal or consider it’s implications on our freedom. I agree pornography corrodes but would argue this corrosion is not limited to children. In this posting I will argue that pornography might damage someone’s sense of personhood, that it might mean he is a deficient sort of person and that it always corrodes character.

In a thoughtful piece in the Independent Archie Bland says he is pretty confident that he is able to keep fantasy and reality distinct. I now want to examine this split. Of course we must be able to split fantasy from reality or else we would go round in a dream state. Moreover there is nothing wrong with some fantasies. There is nothing wrong with someone fantasying about what he would do if he won the lottery provided of course such a fantasy did not come to dominate his life. I will now argue not all fantasies are the same. Fantasies such as becoming rich need not harm others even if they became true. In such cases if the split between fantasy and reality becomes blurred or ceases no harm is done. The split between fantasy and reality is not essential. This is not true of much of pornography. In what follows for the sake of simplicity I will assume that men are the main users of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst being aware some women may also use pornography. I will also assume women are the objects of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst again being aware that many other forms exist. Much of pornography portrays women as being dominated or harmed. These forms of pornography would be harmful if the fantasies involved became true. I will accept some forms of pornography in which women or others are not dominated or harmed may not be harmful to third parties. In the rest of this piece pornography will refer to pornography which involves fantasies which imagine dominating or harming others unless stated otherwise. It follows for these forms of pornography any blurring of the split between fantasy and reality might be harmful to others. In this context the maintenance of the split between fantasy and reality is absolutely essential. The maintenance between fantasy and reality may also be essential in another context. There now an increasing use of sexbots. Sex with a robot is a kind of fantasy. If this fantasy involves domination and harm then once again any blurring of the split between this fantasy and reality might be harmful to others.

Bland is confident that he is able to keep fantasy and reality distinct but this might not be true for all men. It appears to follow the use of pornography is dangerous and a case can be made for the state attempting to control pornography in order to limit this danger. Of course it might be argued the state should not do so as any such attempt would limit personal freedom. I will not pursue this argument here as I am mainly concerned with the type of harm pornography causes. It might be objected at this point that men who are already likely to harm women use pornography, rather than pornography causes some men to become more likely to harm women. Personally I am extremely doubtful about my objector’s point. Nonetheless I must accept that whether pornography causes harm to women or men who use pornography harm women is an empirical question which can only be settled by good evidence and not by philosophy. However even if my objector is right I still believe splitting fantasy and reality is damaging to the user of pornography.

I suggest the use of pornography by a man damages his relationships with women in general. Firstly the use of pornography may limit his real engagement with women. Perhaps more importantly someone, who may be able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality so he will not harm women, will nonetheless find that this split taints his engagement with women. He sees women both as objects that may be used as he wills and creatures who are essentially the same as himself and limit his will. At this point my objector might suggest there is a distinction between fantasy women who may be used and real women who limit a man’s will and it is possible for someone to completely separate the two in his mind. If this is so my objector might conclude we have no reason to believe a man’s use of pornography will taint his engagement with real women. In theory my objector may be correct but as above I remain extremely doubtful. Moreover in this case there seems to be some evidence to support my doubts. If the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete then there is no reason why a man who uses such pornography should keep it secret. If his partner asks him if he uses such material he has no reason to lie. I would argue he has two reasons to lie. Firstly let assume he is truthful. If he is truthful it seems probable his relationship with his partner will be damaged. His partner is unlikely to believe he can maintain the separation between fantasy and real women in his mind and as a result sees him as someone who sees her as someone who can be used. Secondly the man involved will not be truthful because he feels ashamed. But why should he be ashamed if the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete? I have previously argued there are two types of shame . One type of shame is anxiety about social disqualification as suggested by Velleman, see (1). Another type of shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves. Because pornography is regarded socially as reprehensible it follows a user of pornography may fear social disqualification even if he is able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality. He might also feel shame because deep down he feels this separation is incomplete.

At this point my objector might point out not all pornography is used by heterosexual men, homosexuals also use pornography. Moreover some homosexual pornography portrays others as being used and harmed. He might question whether lesbian pornography portraying women being used and harmed damages the relationships of women who use it with other women. If it does not he might then ask why only pornography used by men which portrays women being used or harmed damages the user’s relationships with women? At the present time I cannot provide a satisfying answer my objector’s question, perhaps someone else can. I would now simply suggest that the use of pornography damages the user’s relationships with others because he/she is likely to lie about his/her use for the reasons outlined above.

I now want to argue the use of pornography damages the user even if it doesn’t damage his relationship with others. A common theme in my postings is that someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. As always in my postings to ‘care about’ means someone identifies with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Frankfurt argues that caring about oneself is essential to being a person and that someone who doesn’t care about himself can’t really be considered as a person

.

“Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be. There could not be a person of no importance to himself.” (2).

Let us accept someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. Frankfurt goes on to argue that ambivalence is a disease of the will,

“the health of the will is to be unified and in this sense wholehearted. A person is volitionally robust when he is wholehearted in his higher order attitudes and inclinations, in his preferences and decisions, and in other movements of the will.” (3).

Now pornography forces someone to maintain a split between fantasy and reality. If someone uses pornography this split threatens the unity of his will and is damaging to his identity. I would further suggest a user of sexbot risks damaging his identity for the same reason.

My objector might raise two objections to the above. Firstly he might argue a user of pornography might not really care about pornography and as a result its use plays no part in forming his identity. It just a something he has a taste for much the same as ice cream. In my last posting I suggested that an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. I further suggested if someone continually buys ice cream that his liking for ice cream plays a part, albeit a small part, in the creation of his identity. So in reply to my objector I would suggest if someone continually uses pornography this use forms part of his identity to some degree. Secondly my objector might accept that a user of pornography cares about its use but argue this use does not damage his identity. He might point out we all compartmentalise our lives and the user of pornography may put his usage into a safe compartment. He might point out Frankfurt believes that the formation of someone’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others (4). He might then argue if someone is able to order the things he cares about by how much he cares about them that his use of pornography need not harm his identity. At this point I must accept that the use of pornography may, at least in theory, not damage the user’s identity as a person provided he is able to fully order the things he cares about. However I believe this would be hard to achieve in practice and for this reason the use of pornography remains dangerous to someone’s identity.

Let us accept that for someone to be a person of any sort he must care about something. But according to Helm such an account of a person is incomplete and for someone to be a person he must have some values (5). I would argue this means he must care about what he cares about. According to Helm such meta-caring about must involve feelings of pride and shame. I believe the simple ability to care about is all that is necessary for someone to be a person. Nonetheless I believe that most people do care what they care about. They care not just about being a person but being a good person and this caring does involve feelings of pride and shame. Let us accept without argument that it is better to be a good person than simply a person who cares about things but has no pride or shame in what he cares about. It follows someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in some way a deficient person.

Let us accept that someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in a deficient kind of person. Let us also return to pornography which portrays women as being used or harmed and consider a man who uses such pornography. Let us assume this man cares what he cares about. It seems to me such a man must wish he didn’t care about pornography. Because by using pornography he is caring about using and harming others. Anyone who cares about what he cares about must have some conception of the good. He must also care about the good. I would suggest any conception of the good must exclude using or harming others for no benefit. I would further suggest this exclusion must include imaginary harm. It follows such a man is likely to feel shame at his use of pornography. This is not the type of shame as anxiety about social disqualification. It is anxiety about harming the things he cares about, in this case his conception of the good. In the light of the above I would suggest that the user of pornography, who cares about what he cares about, sees himself as a deficient person as he fails to be the sort of person he aspires to be. The character he aspires to be is corroded.

1.      David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95.

2.      Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 90.

3.      Frankfurt, page 100.

4.      Frankfurt, 1988, The importance of what we care about, Cambridge University Press, page 91,

5.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship, & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 128.

More Autonomy

In Melbourne Australia Harry Kakavas lost $20.5 million to a casino. He sued the casino arguing it should have known he was a pathological gambler and as a result not taken his money. He lost his case in the Australian High Court. The Court ruled that Kakavas did not show that he suffered from a disability, special to him, which was exploited by the casino. What sort of disability is relevant in such a case? It would seem in this particular case that Kakavas did not have the ability to make meaningful decisions, decisions which were in his own interests, whilst gambling. Gambling affected his autonomy. The Kakavas case raises questions about the nature and extent of autonomous decisions. In this posting I will examine both of these questions. I addition I will consider when we have a duty to intervene when someone makes a non-autonomous decision; provided of course we have the power to do so as the casino involved with Kakavas did,

Which of the decisions we make are autonomous? It might be thought that these decisions must be important decisions which we make only after careful consideration. A patient giving informed consent might be seen a paradigmatic example of such an autonomous decision. If this is so someone making a decision without appropriate reflection might be said to be making a non-autonomous decision. It might then be argued we can safely ignore her decision because it does not represent her ‘real self’, see Berlin (1). It is not a decision she would have made if he had more adequately reflected on it. I would suggest such an attitude is one of moral arrogance.

I now want to argue almost all of the decisions we make are autonomous. A common theme throughout all my postings is that someone’s autonomy depends on what she ‘cares about’. Caring about in this context means not merely wanting something; it means someone’s identity, her ‘real self’, is dependent on what she cares about. Moreover I have argued in previous postings what someone ‘cares about’ is defined by what she is satisfied with. Satisfaction in this context simply means no resistance to a decision, no restlessness with that decision (2). There is no desire to change the decision. It is important here to be clear satisfaction with a decision does not equate with being happy about a decision. As I have argued before someone with a terminal illness may decide to commit suicide and be completely satisfied with her decision but nonetheless her satisfaction does not imply she is happy about it. Accepting the above means if someone is satisfied with some decision and has no inclination to change her decision that her decision is an autonomous one. I would suggest that people are satisfied, as defined above, with almost all of their decisions. The above leads to the tentative conclusion that almost all of the decisions we make are autonomous.

At this point an objector might be prepared to accept that for a decision to be autonomous it must be based on what we care about. However she might be unwilling to concede that it naturally follows that almost all of our decisions are autonomous. My objector might argue we can only know what we care about after adequate reflection. She might then further argue that because most of our decisions are non-reflective that most of our decisions are non-autonomous. If my objector’s argument is to carry any weight then she must accept one of two options. Firstly someone may make an autonomous decision based on what she cares about and be dissatisfied with her decision. Or secondly she must accept that being satisfied with a decision is a necessary condition for that decision to be an autonomous decision based on what the agent cares about but argue it is not a sufficient condition. Let us examine the first option. An agent can make an autonomous decision and be dissatisfied with it. I accept an agent can make an autonomous decision she’s not happy with, see above, but I can’t accept she can make an autonomous decision she’s not satisfied with. Let us accept satisfaction with a decision does not simply mean the agent has some smug feeling but means she has no resistance to her decision, no restlessness to change it. It follows if an agent is dissatisfied with a decision that she either resists the decision or seeks to change it. She is ambivalent about her decision. I don’t accept that any decision someone is ambivalent about and seeks to change can be an autonomous decision. It follows an agent cannot make an autonomous decision she is dissatisfied with.

Let us consider my objectors second option that being satisfied with a decision is a necessary condition for that decision to be an autonomous one based on what the agent cares about but that it is not a sufficient one. My objector might suggest that for a decision to be an autonomous one not only must the agent be satisfied with it but that she must have reflected on it. This suggestion would mean most decisions we make are non-autonomous. Of course for many of the decisions we make this doesn’t matter. No one is really concerned whether someone’s decision to have an ice cream is an autonomous one or not. However let us consider a family on a summer’s day sitting on the bank of a fast flowing river eating ice cream. Let us assume one of the children falls into the river and without any thought the mother jumps in and saves the child. Was this a non-autonomous decision? I would argue it was an autonomous decision. Indeed the mother might feel hurt if someone suggested afterwards her actions were mindless. She might say she minded very much, she loved her child, and that she couldn’t act any other way, reflection was pointless. The above suggests for a decision to be autonomous all that matters is that the agent cares about it. It suggests that caring about a decision is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for that decision to be autonomous in conditions in which the agent has been neither coerced nor deceived. Of course sometimes an agent may have to reflect on what he cares about but it is caring about rather than reflection that guarantees a decision is autonomous. Indeed it might be argued the fact that an agent feels a need to reflect on a decision make the autonomy of the decision less certain.

My objector might accept that for a decision to be an autonomous one the agent must care about her decision but suggest we don’t really care about many of our decisions. For instance she might point out my decision to buy an ice cream on a sudden whim is not based on what I really care about in the way we have been using the term. We only care about important decisions and only these decisions can be autonomous or non autonomous, mere whims don’t count. I believe this might be the position Frankfurt would adopt, see (3). I however would adopt a slightly different position. I would suggest an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. If my suggestion is accepted then most of the decisions we make, including my whim to buy ice cream, would be autonomous. At this point my objector might point out my suggestion seems to weaken the connection between autonomy and personal identity. Frankfurt argues our identity is linked to what we care about.

“Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the indispensably activity through which provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. Regardless of whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things possesses for us an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in making us the distinctive kind of creatures that we are.” (4).

I agree our identity is connected to what we care about. It might appear that because identity and autonomy are connected that autonomous decisions must be decisions we care about. I believe appearance is unjustified. I have suggested above that autonomous decisions are connected to what we care about, our identity, by being decisions which are not discordant with what we care about, our identity. Of course when making most decisions we don’t reflect about our identity. Nonetheless I would suggest our identity is always present even if only in the background. I would further suggest this presence gives continuity and coherence to our lives. If autonomous decisions are any decisions which are not discordant with what we care about then not all autonomous decisions play an equal part in defining our identity. Indeed some like my decision to have an ice cream may play no part. Nonetheless if I continually buy ice cream I may be said to be someone who likes ice cream and this plays a small part of my identity. In the light of the above it appears an agent caring about her decision is not necessary for her decision to be an autonomous one. Moreover someone’s being satisfied with her decision is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the decision to be an autonomous one in circumstances in which she has not been deceived or coerced.

I have argued that most of the decisions we make are autonomous decisions. In addition I believe we should always accept an autonomous decision even if this decision harms the decision maker provided of course the decision does not harm others. I believe we must give precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. It seems to me someone’s identity is tied to her autonomy, tied to what she finds appropriate, what satisfies her. If we fail to respect someone’s autonomy we fail to respect her. Let us consider an example. Personally I detest is smoking. Moreover smoking harms smokers. Let us assume I one of my friends is a smoker who on hearing I am going to a shop asks me to buy her some cigarettes. As I am going to the shop anyway I will not be inconvenienced if I buy her cigarettes. Let us also assume she is completely satisfied with her decision, she will not smoke in my presence or that of other non-smoker and that she fully understands the dangers of smoking and is not deceiving herself. Let us further assume I refuse to buy her cigarettes because I believe these will harm her. I am helping her to prevent harming herself by not respecting her autonomous request even though satisfying her request would not inconvenience me. I am giving priority to acting beneficently over respecting her autonomy. I would suggest in this example I am merely paying lip service to respecting her as a person. Perhaps I might console myself that I am respecting her real self, but this real self is really an ideal self created by me. In this example I believe I could justly be accused of some sort of arrogance.

If we accept we should respect autonomy over acting beneficently and most decisions we make are autonomous in the sense used above then we have to accept a large number of decisions which are unwise or even foolhardy. Kakavas’ decision to gamble in the casino was certainly an unwise one but was it also a non-autonomous one? If it was an autonomous one then the casino should respect his decision however unwise it was. In theory it seems there might be completely satisfied gamblers. However in practice most gamblers feel guilty about their gambling and have some resistance to their compulsion to gamble. It follows most gamblers’ decisions to gamble are non-autonomous decisions. It seems probable that Kakavas’ decision to gamble was a non-autonomous one. It follows the casino could not justify, allowing Kakavas to continue gambling, on respect for his autonomy.

In normal life we generally accept peoples’ decisions, even if many of these are not autonomous decisions, provided we have no reason to suspect that these decisions will harm the decision maker. Kakavas’ gambling clearly harmed him. How could a casino possibly justify allowing Kakavas to gamble if his gambling was both non-autonomous and harmed him? One possible justification concerns the nature of the harm involved. Kakavas’ gambling harmed him financially but it might have done only limited harm to his capacity to make autonomous decisions. Kakavas’ capacity to make autonomous decisions was impaired whilst gambling but perhaps it remained unimpaired at other times. He could have made an autonomous decision not to go to the casino in much the same way a recovering alcoholic makes a decision not to go to a bar. The casino might argue even if Kakavas was harmed it was respecting his autonomous decision to go gambling and it was justified in respecting this decision because respecting autonomy should take precedence over acting beneficently. I would accept the above argument. However I would be some what sceptical about a gamblers ability to make a decision she knows will make her feel guilty without any resistance to her decision.

Unintentional Fathers

Should unwilling fathers be forced to maintain their children? The answer is no according to Laurie Shrage. She bases her argument on the facts that an unwilling father has not consented to have a child and does not have the power to have the foetus aborted or the child given up for abortion. In what follows I will make a distinction between unwilling and unintentional fathers. I will argue that whilst most unintentional should be forced to maintain their children some should not.

To start with I want differentiate between two classes of unwilling fathers. There are unwilling fathers who intended to have a child and those who did not. An example of the former would be someone who intentionally fathers a child simply because he loves his partner even though he would rather not be a father. Initially such a father might well support his child simply because he loves his partner. However if his love fades so may his support. It would appear that any unwilling father who intentionally fathers a child, and has made an autonomous choice to do so, can be held responsible for his actions and should help maintain his child. It is possible that a very small subset of the class of intentional fathers may not have made an autonomous decision to become a father. I will not consider these fathers in this posting. In the rest of this posting I will only be concerned with unwilling fathers who father a child unintentionally.

Let us consider a driver speeding recklessly. Let us assume this driver mounts the pavement and harms a pedestrian due to his reckless speeding. The driver did not intend to harm the pedestrian but nonetheless he would be held responsible for his actions and hence liable to pay damages. Now let us consider a man who does not intend becoming a father but nonetheless engages in unprotected sex. Let us assume as a result he becomes a father. It might then be argued by analogy he ought to be liable to pay some maintenance towards his child. It might at this point be objected that my analogy is an inaccurate one. My objector might point out that in the case of the unintentional father the mother has the freedom to abort or have the child adopted, a freedom the father does not have. This point is made by Shrage. Let us revise the case of our speeding driver. Let us now assume that when he mounted the pavement a bystander could have pushed the victim out of the way. Let us assume he did not. It seems to me that in this revised case the reckless driver should still be held responsible for his actions and hence liable to pay damages. Moreover it seems this revised case of the reckless driver is much more analogous to that of an unintended father. Prima facie it might be concluded that all unintentional father should be required to help maintain their children.

It has been suggested to me by Owen Schaefer that the above analogy may fail because simply causing a child to exist does not harm that child. In response I would adopt a position similar to that of Lindsey Porter (1). Porter points out that a biological parent is someone who causes a new person to exist. She then points out children are vulnerable. She proceeds to argue that because a biological parent is responsible for a child’s vulnerability he/she should take steps to remedy this situation. Now of course causing someone to be vulnerable is not exactly the same as directly harming her unless one accepts omissions can have the same moral import as actions. Nonetheless making vulnerable and harming are closely related. Consider a parent who fails to ensure his/her child receives her measles MMR jab. Such a parent makes his/her child vulnerable to catching measles. I will assume such a jab is completely safe and that parents should be aware of this fact. I would suggest in this situation such a parent fails in his/her parental obligation. If my suggestion is accepted then does such a parent fail in this obligation because he/she makes the child vulnerable to measles or does he/she only fail in this obligation if the child actually catches measles and is harmed as a result? I would be reluctant to accept the latter conclusion. If my reluctance is justified in this case then making a child vulnerable is morally equivalent to harming that child. It follows if making a child vulnerable is analogous to creating a vulnerable child that creating a vulnerable child and taking no steps to remedy this vulnerability is morally equivalent to harming that child and this supports my prima facie conclusion above.

I have argued that causing a vulnerable child to exist places a prima facie duty on a parent to support that child. This duty is only a prima facie one and some parents such as a 14 year old mother might well be exempt. However as Schaefer points out accepting this appears to imply gamete donors and fertility doctors would be subject to the same duty. Such an implication is counter intuitive. I have previously argued this implication is unsound and will repeat the argument here.  Let us consider two sisters Ann and Carol. Ann is married but is incapable of carrying a child because she has had a hysterectomy followed by chemotherapy due to cancer. Prior to her treatment some of Ann’s eggs were saved. Carol has two children of her own but nonetheless offers to act as a surrogate mother for Ann. Carol successfully undergoes IVF using her sister’s eggs together with Ann’s partner’s sperm and produces a child. Let us assume Carol will never undertake surrogacy again or have any other children. Clearly Carol played a necessary part in causing Ann’s child to exist. Does it follow that in this situation Carol has any obligation with Ann to assume parental duties? I argued it does not. Ann wanted a child. Having a child of her own was of intrinsic value to her. Carol only acted instrumentally to serve Ann’s wants.  Carol may have played a necessary part in the creation of the child but she would not have done so without Ann’s need. Ann and Carol caused the child to exist in different ways. Ann’s need was the original cause of the child. Carol served this original cause instrumentally. I would suggest only those people who cause a child to exist, by being the original cause of that child, have a prima facie duty to support that child. I further suggest unintentional fathers are among these people. It might appear that people who cause a child to exist by acting instrumentally to fulfil someone else’s need for a child do not have such a duty. It follows that gamete donors, IVF specialists and surrogate mothers do not have a prima facie duty to support any children they help to come into existence.

However the above appearance is too simplistic. It is not always true that someone acting purely instrumentally to serve someone else’s ends has no duties connected to these ends. If this were not so a Nazi who participated in the Holocaust and was following orders should not have been held responsible for his actions. I would suggest anyone acting instrumentally to serve someone else’s ends has a duty to satisfy himself those ends cause no harm. If he is able to satisfy himself his actions to serve the ends of another will cause no harm then he has no further duties connected to these ends. This duty of course applies to IVF specialists and surrogate mothers who have a duty to satisfy themselves that any children born with their help will be well cared for. An IVF specialist who helped a 16 year old become a single parent might not be satisfying this duty; Carol in the above example would. It also seems to follow from the above that any unwilling father who intentionally fathers a child because he loves his partner and believes his partner can support the child on her own does not have a duty maintain his child.

I will now argue not all unintentional fathers have a duty to support their children. I will argue that if an unintentional father is deceived then he does not have a duty to help maintain his child. Let us return to our speeding driver. This driver does not intend to cause harm but he is aware, or should be aware, that his speeding may cause harm and as a result is liable for any harm he causes. Most unintentional fathers engaging in unprotected sex are, or should be aware, that they may father children and as a result should be liable to maintain their children. However some unintentional fathers may be deceived. Perhaps they are lied to about contraception. Such fathers may have been unaware that they might become fathers and this ignorance was not due to any fault on their behalf. I would suggest such fathers do not have a duty to maintain their children.

1. Lindsey Porter, Adoption is Not Abortion-Lite, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(1), 2012.

Moral Arrogance and not Understanding the Holocaust

I have just been reading a particularly interesting posting by Michael Hauskeller concerning Primo Levi’s attitude to the Holocaust. Levi’s attitude is summed up by Hauskeller as follows,

“Perhaps one cannot, what is more one must not, understand what happened, because to understand is almost to justify. Let me explain: ‘understanding’ a proposal or human behaviour means to ‘contain’ it, contain its author, put oneself in his place, identify with him.” (1)

Hauskeller is inclined to concur with Levi and claims that whilst we must know what causes evil, such as the Holocaust, we should not try to understand it. In this posting I will investigate Hauskeller’s claim. I will conclude that if we fail to attempt to understand the Holocaust we can be accused of moral arrogance. I will then suggest such arrogance is dangerous.

Hauskeller supports his claim as follows.

“Understanding is more intimate, it bridges the reflective distance between the subject and the object of understanding. By “understanding” the Holocaust we would acknowledge it as a real human possibility, as something that is understandable for humans to do. But it is important to reject this possibility, to preserve an image of the human that positively excludes it.”

The Holocaust was a great evil and perhaps we could attempt only to know what caused it in order to prevent a similar event ever happening again. Perhaps we could also attempt to regard people like Hitler and Stalin as not really human. My response to such attempts is twofold. Firstly the holocaust was not committed by Hitler and a few of his cronies alone. The holocaust was an evil and it was made possible by a great number of people doing evil. Were all such people animals, sub human or even untermensch in Nazi terminology? Secondly what does it mean to know what caused the Holocaust? Does it simply mean to know what conditions preceded it? Does it exclude trying to understand the thinking of its perpetrators? If it does then I would suggest our knowledge is dangerously limited. I would further suggest if our knowledge of what caused the holocaust is not to be dangerously limited then we must try to understand the human beings who carried it out as well as those who planned it.

Levi says the hatred that caused the Holocaust is not in us; it is outside man, it is a poison fruit sprung from the deadly trunk of Fascism. He goes on to say no normal human being will ever be able to identify with Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Eichmann, and others. The implication of the above is such people are not normal human beings. Perhaps Levi is correct and such people are not normal human beings. But nonetheless they are human beings, even if defective ones, and as such share many of the characteristics of normal human beings. Moreover all of so called normal human beings share some of the harmful characteristics of such people, if to a much lesser degree. We all can be cruel, even if it is only the occasional uncalled for cutting remark. I would suggest if we differentiate ourselves completely from such people we might justly be accused of moral arrogance. The reasons for this differentiation are understandable. But nonetheless this arrogance is extremely dangerous. It leads us to the conclusion we have no need to understand such people. But such arrogance also means we fail to fully understand and hence control the harmful characteristics we share with such people. In attempting to preserve a certain image of what it is to be human we fail to adequately understand ourselves.

1.      Primo Levi; 2000; If This Is a Man, and The Truce; Everyman; introduction.

The Reporting of Suicide

The topic in this posting is the reporting of suicide. My starting point is a posting in bio edge . A leading Australian newspaper recently ran some articles chronicling Beverly Broadbent’s decision to commit suicide, see The Age. It appears at the time Beverly was relatively healthy. I will not consider whether Beverly was right to commit suicide here. However at this point I must make it clear I believe some people have the right to commit suicide and in the right circumstances may justify their decision if they do so. The post’s author clearly believes the journalist involved, Julia Medew, acted in an irresponsible way. He points out,

“A journalist is first of all a human being. Didn’t Medew have a moral obligation to dissuade a relatively healthy woman from committing suicide?”

However even if Medew ought to have attempted to dissuade Beverly this does not mean she ought not to have reported the suicide. In this posting I will argue the reporting of suicide is necessary for a better understanding of suicide.

What is wrong with Medew’s story? It might be objected that either the story should not have been reported in the way it was or it should not have been reported at all. I will deal with the latter objection first. An objector might argue such stories should not be reported due to the harm they cause. She might point to evidence that suggests the reporting of suicide leads to copy cat attempts, see for instance Gould, Jamieson and Romer . Because of the harm these copy cat suicides cause she might conclude suicide should simply not be reported at all. In reply I could point out much the same argument could be applied to school massacres and terrorist bombings. Prima facie it would be inconsistent to report these and not report suicides. Moreover it would seem to be absurd not to report events such as the Boston bombings for fear of contagion so why should Medew not report on Beverly’s suicide. My objector might respond that my analogy is flawed. She might point out the Boston bombings are a major story that cannot be ignored whilst Beverly’s suicide was a minor one and as a result could be. In reply I accept that Beverly’s particular suicide was not a major story but suicide in general is an important concern to society. If this were not so why should the World Health Organisation offer guidelines to journalists ?

However let us assume that my objector is correct and that in practice it is impossible to ignore terrorist bombings, such as those in Boston, whilst suicides can safely be ignored. Now provided she believes suicides should not be reported, due to the danger of copy cat cases, does this mean she also believes terrorist bombings should not be reported provided this was possible, as the same dangers of copycat attacks seem to apply. Perhaps the only reason why we ought not to attempt to ban the reporting of terrorist bombings is that we cannot. I will now argue that for terrorism such censorship is wrong even if this is possible. The Provisional IRA carried out a program of terror in Northern Ireland during the troubles. Both the British and Irish governments attempted censorship in the reporting of the troubles. However in Ed Moloney’s view,

“Censorship probably extended the life of the Troubles by as much as a third and that people died unnecessarily because of it. I say this because what censorship did was prevent the media from explaining events fully. One result was that public and government understanding was less than it should have been”, see Irish Censorship .

At this point my objector might point out that the reporting of terrorist bombings is not the same as journalists talking to Sinn Fein. In response I would point out a failure to report on Sinn Fein lead to a lack of understanding. I would then argue failing to fully report terrorist bombings might lead both the public and governments failing to grasp the full importance of these events. I would then suggest this diminished importance would lead to diminished understanding. If we fail to grasp the full importance of something we are less likely to reflect on it fully. Suicide is a problem for society and it is the biggest killer of young men in the UK, see The Guardian . If society is to understand and tackle this problem then it must be aware of the importance of the problem. I would suggest a failure to debate suicide, in an order to obtain a more adequate understanding of its causes, merely perpetuates suicide at its present levels. I would further suggest even if press coverage of suicide increases the cases of copy cat suicide in the short term that in the long term a more adequate understanding of the causes of suicide will lead to a decrease in the suicide rate. If this is so then the harm caused by copy cat suicides due to the reporting of suicide should be more than counterbalanced by a long term drop in the suicide rate.

I have argued it was not wrong for Medew to report on Beverly’s suicide. This brings us back to the first reason for the possible wrongness of her reporting, perhaps she was not wrong to report Beverly’s suicide but she did so in the wrong way. A report usually involves, what happened, the details of how it happened and why it happened. I have argued above if something that happens is not fully reported then we can fail to grasp how important that something is. This failure can lead to an inadequate understanding of the problem. Nonetheless it seems to me the mechanics of how someone commits suicide is not usually necessary to the understanding suicide and hence should not usually be reported. However if we are to understand the reasons for suicide we must understand an individual’s reasons for committing suicide and these should be reported. I would suggest the reporting of these reasons should not be emotive. There should be a separation of news and comment and comment need not be emotive free. If we understand the reasons why someone wishes to or actually commits suicide we might be in a better position to deal with the underlying causes of these reasons. Let us consider the case of the Verbessem brothers mentioned in my previous posting. I accept it is possible that the reporting of the brother’s case might lead to an increase in the number of the deaf blind wanting euthanasia in Belgium. However reporting the reasons why the brothers wanted to die might also lead to more or better centres for the deaf-blind. It follows reporting the brother’s case might well lead to an increase of options available to the deaf-blind, which in turn might lead to a reduction in the number of deaf-blind people seeking to end their lives.

So far I have argued that someone’s suicide should be reported and the reasons for her suicide should also be reported. However it would be a mistake to think all individuals who commit suicide can give reasons for doing so. Some individuals might commit suicide simply because they have a lack of reasons to go on living. Harry Frankfurt would class such persons as wantons (1). I have previously suggested such a person suffers from the unbearable lightness of simply being, see riots and the unbearable lightness of simply being. A wanton is someone moved by mere impulse and inclination and someone to whom nothing much matters. Such a person may well be prone to commit suicide. They may also be prone to becoming terrorists and other violence, see self respect and love. The reporting of suicides could well lead to such persons committing copy cat suicides. Moreover in such cases the reporting of suicides will not lead to any long term decrease in suicide committed by such people. Such people give us reason not to report suicide, or at least to do so in a very limited way.

In the above I have argued that, when someone has a reason to commit suicide, the reporting of her suicide and her attendant reasons, even if it leads to some copy cat suicides, is in the long term beneficial. However I have also suggested that for a certain class of suicidal persons such reporting is harmful. Should then suicide be fully reported? On balance I believe it should, I am however open to persuasion and comments are most welcome.

1. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 106.

Assisted Suicide and the Verbessem Brothers

Belgian twins, Eddie and Marc Verbessem, were euthanized at Brussels University Hospital last December. The brothers had been deaf since birth and had been recently diagnosed with a genetic form of glaucoma that would leave them blind. William Pearce comments that this case appears to mean the following holds in Belgian,

“Death is a logical and reasonable option if a person will become deaf-blind. By logical extension there are some disabilities that are a fate worse than death. One does not need to be terminally ill to be euthanized”, see Hastings Center Bioethics Forum .

In this posting I will argue even if death is a reasonable option it does not mean some disabilities that are worse than death. I will then examine if death is a reasonable option when, if ever, it is permissible to help someone die.

Pearce seems to believe that all voluntary euthanasia is wrong. In the rest of this posting I will assume voluntary euthanasia is roughly equivalent to assisted suicide and only use the latter term. There are of course some differences between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide but don’t I believe these differences significantly affect my arguments. Pearce suggests two reasons for the wrongness of assisted suicide. Firstly he points to research in Oregon where assisted suicide is legal which shows most people who chose to end their lives this way did so because of the loss of autonomy or dignity rather than unbearable pain. The implication of the above is he seems to believe loss of autonomy or dignity is not a good enough reason to justify assisted suicide. I agree loss of autonomy is not a reason that can be used to justify assisted suicide. However it is important to be clear what losing autonomy means. Losing the ability to participate in activities that made someone’s life enjoyable or a loss of her dignity is not the same as losing her autonomy. Losing autonomy means someone losing the ability to make decisions based on what she cares about. Secondly Pearce seems to believe that many of the conditions given as reasons for permitting assisted suicide can be alleviated and hence are not reasons that can be justified. For instance in the Verbessem case he points to the lack of skill centres devoted to the deaf blind. In response I would suggest one cannot say someone ought to do something on the basis of something that ought to be. The Verbessem brothers had to decide what to do on the basis of the circumstances that actually prevailed, not on the circumstances that ought to have prevailed. I of course accept it is possible a reason that is now used to justify assisted suicide may cease to be a reason if and when circumstances change.

It might be suggested that the Verbessem brother’s case implies that living with certain disabilities is worse than dying but this is not so. Clearly some people who are deaf-blind want to continue living and do not see this disability as a fate worse than death. Equally clearly some people would like to live as long as possible regardless of any disability or any disease they may be suffering from. It follows that any condition however bad or painful cannot be the sole reason to justify assisted suicide. What matters is someone’s attitude to her condition. For instance someone suffering from painful terminal cancer might just wish to die whilst someone else suffering from the same cancer might wish to continue living, perhaps for religious reasons. It would appear to follow what matters is someone’s attitude to her condition caused by disease or disability. It further follows assisted suicide is really being justified by someone’s preferences. However because, we do not have a reason simply to satisfy all of someone’s preferences, satisfying her preferences cannot be used to justify assisted suicide. It still further follows that Pearce is correct and neither loss of autonomy nor any condition, however awful someone suffers from, can be used to justify assisted suicide.

It seems to be if we can justify suicide that we should be able to justify assisted suicide. Clearly we have the capacity for rational agency. Joseph Raz argues we also have a duty to respect the exercise of this capacity by others within certain bounds because we value this capacity. Moreover he believes this exercise includes the option to determine when and how to end one’s life and that others may help us implement this option (1). I now want to consider two objections to Raz’s position. Firstly someone might object that euthanasia is not part of a rational person living her life. Raz might reply a rational person might nonetheless value she has the option to end her life, if it became meaningless and full of pain, whilst living her life. He might point out if someone values a right and the exercise of this right does not significantly harm others that we should respect her right. This could be classed as Mill’s position.

I now want to examine what is meant by significant harm in more detail. Firstly the fact that someone is offended, simply by another’s decision to commit assisted suicide, is not a great enough harm for her to fail to respect the other’s decision. The fact that someone is offended by another’s political views should not mean she fails to respect the other’s capacity to express these views. Nonetheless there are certain harms that would sometimes make the exercise of assisted suicide wrong. For instance it would seem wrong for a mother with dependent children to be able to be assisted to commit suicide. Or an aged parent who enjoys life but in spite of this enjoyment chooses to end her life solely to ensure her estate passes to her children rather than being dissipated on her care. However such examples don’t show assisted suicide is always wrong. They merely show, as Raz suggests, there are bounds as to when assisted suicide is permissible.

Should assisted suicide always be impermissible because of the harm it may inflict? In what follows I will argue assisted suicide should only be impermissible in specific cases due to specific harm relevant to the case in question. Let us accept that a complete ban on assisted suicide would prevent harming people such as those in the above examples. However I would suggest a complete ban on assisted suicide would also harm other people. For instance if someone who is terminally ill and in great pain, has no relatives, wishes to commit assisted suicide is prevented from doing so she is harmed. She is harmed not by the failure of society to permit others to help release her from the pain, someone else might well want to continue living even with the same degree of pain. She is harmed in two ways. Firstly she is harmed because society prevents her attaining something she values. Secondly and more importantly in my view she is harmed by the failure of society to recognise her as an agent. In this case she values something, which harms no specific person, but is nonetheless prevented from seeking what she values. It follows a complete ban on assisted suicide would harm some people. It further follows some assisted suicide is permissible.

The above suggests if all assisted suicide is impermissible some people would be harmed and if all assisted suicide is permissible others would be harmed. How is society to decide on which cases are permissible and which are not? I would suggest this decision should firstly be based on harm to others. I would further suggest this harm must be to those who depend on the person who wishes to commit assisted suicide, basically family members. However not all harms to family members make assisted suicide impermissible. Consider an aged woman, suffering from a painful terminal condition, who only has weeks to live. She wants to be assisted to commit suicide. In addition she is also a much loved mother and her adult children do not want her to commit suicide. However her children are not dependent on her any more and even if they will be harmed by her death I would suggest such harm is not so great to make her assisted suicide is impermissible.

Let us assume it is permissible for an autonomous person to commit suicide. If suicide is permissible for an autonomous person why should it be impermissible for someone to aid her to do so in some cases? In order to answer this question I will first consider what means to make an autonomous decision. An autonomous decision is not simply a rational decision. The rationality of a decision depends on how well it achieves the agent’s goals. In this blog I take a position similar to that of Harry Frankfurt. Autonomous decisions are decisions based on what an agent ‘cares about’. Caring about and autonomy are central to being a person.

“Can something to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all. Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be” (2).

However sometimes someone may not be fully aware of what she cares about. She might make a decision based on what she believes she cares about but when she comes to implement her decision finds she cannot. Sometimes what someone cares about is shown more by her actions rather than her decisions. Accepting the above provides a reason as to why even if it is permissible for someone to commit suicide it is sometimes impermissible for others to aid her do so. Someone may make a decision to commit suicide but be unable to implement her decision. Accepting the above suggests if assisted suicide is ever permissible it is only permissible if someone makes an autonomous decision to commit suicide and is unable to implement her decision by herself. It further suggests if voluntary euthanasia is ever permissible it must be so only under the above conditions,

Does the greater certainty that someone’s actions are autonomous compared to her decisions mean we can never justify assisted suicide even for someone who makes, what we believe to be autonomous decision to commit suicide, but lacks the capabilities to implement her decision by herself. I accept that the conditions in which assisted suicide might be permissible are far ideal. Nonetheless even if these conditions are far from ideal I believe assisted suicide is permissible if someone makes a decision to commit suicide and is unable to implement her decision. My belief is based on centrality of autonomy to our lives, of seeing ourselves as capable of determining our own future. I would assume anyone who believes we should not permit assisted suicide does so for beneficent reasons. She believes in acting beneficently has priority over respecting autonomy, at least in this scenario. Some proponents of assisted suicide argue that, because we would not let animal suffer as we do some persons in some cases, we should permit assisted suicide. I have argued above that suffering alone does not provide a basis to justify assisted suicide. Nevertheless in much the same way I would suggest those who place greater emphasis on acting beneficently over respecting autonomy see persons in much the same way as they see animals. They fail to see, or only pay lip service to seeing, others as creatures who can determine their own future, see respecting autonomy and a flourishing society .

Accepting the above has three important practical consequences. Firstly, because our certainty about autonomous decisions is less than our certainty about autonomous actions, we must be extremely careful about assessing autonomous decisions. Unfortunately if autonomy is essentially a matter of someone’s will rather than her rationality this is far from easy to do. I have previously suggested this involves assessing someone’s satisfaction with her decision, see valid consent . Secondly it seems to me Brussels University Hospital can justify offering the Verbessem brothers assisted suicide. Provided the Verbessem brothers had made an autonomous decision to commit suicide which they could not implement. I am assuming in the above that anyone who is both blind and deaf would have difficulty in committing suicide. I do not deny that had there been more skills centres for the death blind might available to the brothers that they might have made a different decision. Unfortunately as I have argued above they had to make their decision in the light of circumstances in their case. Lastly and perhaps even more controversially assisted suicide might be offered to a broader domain of people than just the terminally ill. I have suggested myself that assisted suicide might be permissible for prisoners serving life sentences, see prisoners serving life sentences .

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1. Joseph Raz, 2013, Death in Our Life, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(1).
2. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press. Page 90.