Unintentional Fathers

Should unwilling fathers be forced to maintain their children? The answer is no according to Laurie Shrage. She bases her argument on the facts that an unwilling father has not consented to have a child and does not have the power to have the foetus aborted or the child given up for abortion. In what follows I will make a distinction between unwilling and unintentional fathers. I will argue that whilst most unintentional should be forced to maintain their children some should not.

To start with I want differentiate between two classes of unwilling fathers. There are unwilling fathers who intended to have a child and those who did not. An example of the former would be someone who intentionally fathers a child simply because he loves his partner even though he would rather not be a father. Initially such a father might well support his child simply because he loves his partner. However if his love fades so may his support. It would appear that any unwilling father who intentionally fathers a child, and has made an autonomous choice to do so, can be held responsible for his actions and should help maintain his child. It is possible that a very small subset of the class of intentional fathers may not have made an autonomous decision to become a father. I will not consider these fathers in this posting. In the rest of this posting I will only be concerned with unwilling fathers who father a child unintentionally.

Let us consider a driver speeding recklessly. Let us assume this driver mounts the pavement and harms a pedestrian due to his reckless speeding. The driver did not intend to harm the pedestrian but nonetheless he would be held responsible for his actions and hence liable to pay damages. Now let us consider a man who does not intend becoming a father but nonetheless engages in unprotected sex. Let us assume as a result he becomes a father. It might then be argued by analogy he ought to be liable to pay some maintenance towards his child. It might at this point be objected that my analogy is an inaccurate one. My objector might point out that in the case of the unintentional father the mother has the freedom to abort or have the child adopted, a freedom the father does not have. This point is made by Shrage. Let us revise the case of our speeding driver. Let us now assume that when he mounted the pavement a bystander could have pushed the victim out of the way. Let us assume he did not. It seems to me that in this revised case the reckless driver should still be held responsible for his actions and hence liable to pay damages. Moreover it seems this revised case of the reckless driver is much more analogous to that of an unintended father. Prima facie it might be concluded that all unintentional father should be required to help maintain their children.

It has been suggested to me by Owen Schaefer that the above analogy may fail because simply causing a child to exist does not harm that child. In response I would adopt a position similar to that of Lindsey Porter (1). Porter points out that a biological parent is someone who causes a new person to exist. She then points out children are vulnerable. She proceeds to argue that because a biological parent is responsible for a child’s vulnerability he/she should take steps to remedy this situation. Now of course causing someone to be vulnerable is not exactly the same as directly harming her unless one accepts omissions can have the same moral import as actions. Nonetheless making vulnerable and harming are closely related. Consider a parent who fails to ensure his/her child receives her measles MMR jab. Such a parent makes his/her child vulnerable to catching measles. I will assume such a jab is completely safe and that parents should be aware of this fact. I would suggest in this situation such a parent fails in his/her parental obligation. If my suggestion is accepted then does such a parent fail in this obligation because he/she makes the child vulnerable to measles or does he/she only fail in this obligation if the child actually catches measles and is harmed as a result? I would be reluctant to accept the latter conclusion. If my reluctance is justified in this case then making a child vulnerable is morally equivalent to harming that child. It follows if making a child vulnerable is analogous to creating a vulnerable child that creating a vulnerable child and taking no steps to remedy this vulnerability is morally equivalent to harming that child and this supports my prima facie conclusion above.

I have argued that causing a vulnerable child to exist places a prima facie duty on a parent to support that child. This duty is only a prima facie one and some parents such as a 14 year old mother might well be exempt. However as Schaefer points out accepting this appears to imply gamete donors and fertility doctors would be subject to the same duty. Such an implication is counter intuitive. I have previously argued this implication is unsound and will repeat the argument here.  Let us consider two sisters Ann and Carol. Ann is married but is incapable of carrying a child because she has had a hysterectomy followed by chemotherapy due to cancer. Prior to her treatment some of Ann’s eggs were saved. Carol has two children of her own but nonetheless offers to act as a surrogate mother for Ann. Carol successfully undergoes IVF using her sister’s eggs together with Ann’s partner’s sperm and produces a child. Let us assume Carol will never undertake surrogacy again or have any other children. Clearly Carol played a necessary part in causing Ann’s child to exist. Does it follow that in this situation Carol has any obligation with Ann to assume parental duties? I argued it does not. Ann wanted a child. Having a child of her own was of intrinsic value to her. Carol only acted instrumentally to serve Ann’s wants.  Carol may have played a necessary part in the creation of the child but she would not have done so without Ann’s need. Ann and Carol caused the child to exist in different ways. Ann’s need was the original cause of the child. Carol served this original cause instrumentally. I would suggest only those people who cause a child to exist, by being the original cause of that child, have a prima facie duty to support that child. I further suggest unintentional fathers are among these people. It might appear that people who cause a child to exist by acting instrumentally to fulfil someone else’s need for a child do not have such a duty. It follows that gamete donors, IVF specialists and surrogate mothers do not have a prima facie duty to support any children they help to come into existence.

However the above appearance is too simplistic. It is not always true that someone acting purely instrumentally to serve someone else’s ends has no duties connected to these ends. If this were not so a Nazi who participated in the Holocaust and was following orders should not have been held responsible for his actions. I would suggest anyone acting instrumentally to serve someone else’s ends has a duty to satisfy himself those ends cause no harm. If he is able to satisfy himself his actions to serve the ends of another will cause no harm then he has no further duties connected to these ends. This duty of course applies to IVF specialists and surrogate mothers who have a duty to satisfy themselves that any children born with their help will be well cared for. An IVF specialist who helped a 16 year old become a single parent might not be satisfying this duty; Carol in the above example would. It also seems to follow from the above that any unwilling father who intentionally fathers a child because he loves his partner and believes his partner can support the child on her own does not have a duty maintain his child.

I will now argue not all unintentional fathers have a duty to support their children. I will argue that if an unintentional father is deceived then he does not have a duty to help maintain his child. Let us return to our speeding driver. This driver does not intend to cause harm but he is aware, or should be aware, that his speeding may cause harm and as a result is liable for any harm he causes. Most unintentional fathers engaging in unprotected sex are, or should be aware, that they may father children and as a result should be liable to maintain their children. However some unintentional fathers may be deceived. Perhaps they are lied to about contraception. Such fathers may have been unaware that they might become fathers and this ignorance was not due to any fault on their behalf. I would suggest such fathers do not have a duty to maintain their children.

1. Lindsey Porter, Adoption is Not Abortion-Lite, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(1), 2012.