Lying and Autonomy

  

We live in a world surrounded by fake news and lies. According to Terry Pratchett in the Truth “A lie can run round the world before the truth has got its boots on.” However even if lies sometimes spread more easily than the truth, perhaps in part because they are more palatable and we want to believe them, in the long term the truth matters because the truth has persistence which lies don’t. Perhaps the dwindling number of climate change deniers supports the above. Are there any circumstances in which lying is beneficial? Stephen Rainey writing in practicalethics  suggests that some lies “can also be a kindness, when the truth might serve no good”. Let us accept that in most circumstances lying damages both individuals by depriving them of the truth and trust. Nonetheless is Rainey correct when he suggests some lies might be beneficial in some circumstance? For instance might a government be acting beneficently if it lied about the harm done by the coronavirus to prevent panic? The fact that lying hasn’t been eliminated from human culture over time suggests it isn’t harmful in all circumstances. In this posting I want to examine what these circumstances might be. It might be thought that this is merely an interesting rather than important question, however in seeking to answer this question raises a further question about the balance between acting beneficently and respecting autonomy. I will argue that if I lie to someone and even if my lie benefits him that I also fail to respect him by failing to respect his autonomy.

Most people have no problems with defining a lie. The definition I shall adopt here is that of Sam Harris

“To lie is to intentionally mislead others when they expect honest communication.” lying

Lies so defined can explicit when liars intentionally give someone false information. Lies can also be acts of omission when the liar intentionally withholds information others expect him to provide. Perhaps passive aggression can be a form of lying if it involves withholding information. Liars can be practised by individuals, institutions or even governments.

Let us now consider whether it is ever acceptable to lie for beneficent reasons. Because lying is so prevalent our intuitions suggest that it is. Everyday examples seem to confirm our intuitions. For instance the mother who lies to her child by saying she has no money left when her child demands a second ice cream. Someone who lies to his partner about a surprise party. A government which lies to its citizens about the seriousness of some disease outbreak, such as that caused by the coronavirus, in order to prevent mass panic. Nonetheless as Harris points out we need to be extremely cautious about our intuitions. Firstly we must be sure about our motives being really beneficent. Is the mother above really worried about her child becoming obese or simply taking an easy option? Secondly we must be careful not to damage trust. The government above might avert mass panic but in the future its pronouncements on health matters might not be so readily trusted. If a lie cannot be maintained then it is better not to lie at all in order to retain trust. The Chinese government’s attempt to suppress the full extent of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan seems to support the above. However let us accept that there are at least some cases in which we might lie for beneficent reasons in which our motives are clear and we don’t damage trust. For instance it would be perfectly acceptable to lie to a stalker carrying a knife about the whereabouts of his ex-girlfriend.

Let us accept that in certain circumstances we can act beneficently by lying, telling white lies. Let us further accept that in some of these circumstances trust isn’t damaged. In such circumstances is Rainey correct when he suggests that lying might be an act of kindness? It certainly seems that because we are behaving beneficently that our actions might be classed as acts of kindness. However I now want to argue even if our lies serve a beneficent purpose and can be classed as acts of kindness that nonetheless it is almost always wrong to lie. Most pet owners are kind to their pets and act beneficently towards them but most people don’t want to be treated in the same way as pets however kindly. They want to be recognised as the sort of creatures who can make their own decisions. To be autonomous. Autonomous people govern themselves and this requires making decisions that matter to them. To make decisions that matters to someone requires information and lying deprives him of some of that information. It follows if we lie to someone we fail to respect his autonomy. Moreover if someone becomes aware of being lied to this lack of respect is a form of rudeness see the philosophy of rudeness.html or form of contempt. It further follows if we believe it is right to respect someone’s autonomy that we shouldn’t lie. It further follows if a government lies to or intentionally misleads the electorate over some issue such as Brexit that it not only deprives the electorate of some of the information needed to make a good decision it also shows a lack of respect for the electorate and perhaps even democracy itself. This lack of respect is similar to the lack of respect many colonialists showed for native people even if their motives were beneficent.

I now want to consider two objections to accepting the above conclusion. My first argument will be based on respecting autonomous persons and my second on respecting autonomous decisions. Firstly it might be objected that we should give precedence to acting beneficently over respecting autonomy and that sometimes lying is the only effective way to act in someone’s best interests. I now want to present two counter arguments against accepting the above. Let us accept that if we need to lie to someone in order to act in what we believe to be their best interests that there must be a clash between what we believe to be in their best interests and what they perceive to be in their best interests. It would appear that we believe we know better than the agent about what is in his best interests or should be in his best interests. In this situation we might be accused of epistemic arrogance. Secondly I would argue if we accept the above objection we don’t really understand what respect means. We can sometimes act beneficently towards someone but part time respect isn’t respect we can’t respect someone only some of the time. We can of course respect someone’s courage but not her wit. However when we respect her as a person we can’t respect her only some of the time. Part time respect just isn’t respect at all. It follows if we lie to someone in order to act beneficently we are not giving precedence to acting beneficently over respecting autonomy we are in reality failing to respect autonomy at all.

Now let us consider respecting autonomous decisions. Let accept to respect an autonomous decision means to accept it. It might be objected that any difference between respecting someone’s autonomous decisions and acting beneficently towards him is largely illusory. This objection depends on accepting a substantive account of autonomy in which autonomous decisions must concur with some accepted norms, autonomous decisions must be good decisions. Accepting such an account means that if we lie to someone, who is making a bad decision, in order to act beneficently towards him we are still respecting his autonomy. Bad decisions just aren’t autonomous decisions. However I am reluctant to accept a substantive account of autonomy. A substantive account has become more prominent recently largely in order to make respecting autonomy concur better with the doctrine of informed consent. Unfortunately as I have argued elsewhere a substantive account of autonomy puts itself out of business, see autonomy and toleration . If autonomous decisions must be good decisions in accord with some accepted norms then we can just consider good decisions and autonomy becomes a redundant concept. Of course if someone is to make an autonomous decision he mustn’t be misled or coerced but it follows that if autonomy is to remain a meaningful concept that we should adopt a primitive or Millian account. It further follows if autonomous decisions needn’t be good decisions that if we lie to a mature adult in order to protect him from a bad decision that we are failing to respect his autonomy. I would suggest accepting the above has implications for apology. Insincere apology is a form of lying. Perhaps in most circumstance apologising without really mean it is a form of white lying. Nonetheless such apologising just compounds any wrong by showing a lack of any real respect to the one lied to.

I have argued that it is always wrong to lie if this means we fail to respect someone’s autonomy even this is done for beneficent reasons. The question now arises is lying ever acceptable? If the mother of a young child who pesters her to buy another ice cream lies then her lie can be justified. The child isn’t autonomous yet and having two ice creams isn’t in her best interests. However caution is needed if we accept a primitive account of autonomy as I suggested above then slightly older children who are capable of making autonomous decisions and lying to them fails to respect their autonomy. Sam Harris uses an extreme example and asks should we lie even if with “Nazis at the door and Anne Frank is in the attic”. Of course we should lie. We should lie to protect Anne Frank and her autonomy. Lying to someone who is infringing someone else’s autonomy is perfectly acceptable, lying to protect autonomy is lying to respect autonomy.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly we should never lie if this means failing to respect autonomy even if our lies might be in what we consider to be someone’s best interests. Even white lies are wrong. Secondly if autonomy is to remain a meaningful concept we must always give precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. Lastly lying to autonomous agents can never be kind.

Different Degrees or Different Types of Rape?

Rape is an offence which can vary greatly in the degree of its seriousness. Unlawful killing is split into two different offences, manslaughter and murder. In this posting I want to examine whether it might also be beneficial to split rape into two different offences or continue to accept a single definition. If we continue with the later course then because the seriousness of the rape can vary greatly this variability might lead to some less serious cases not being prosecuted. Perhaps if we allow for different types of rape these less serious cases might become more likely to be prosecuted. Perhaps also if we define different types of rape it might be clearer to some potential rapists that cases which might be considered as borderline cases under a single definition are indeed forms of rape.

I want to start my examination by considering four examples which are all very different. These differences suggest that our concept of rape is really an umbrella one. These examples highlight the differences involved. The first case was used by Mike LaBossierre.

“They’d now decided — mutually, she thought — just to be friends. When he ended up falling asleep on her bed, she changed into pyjamas and climbed in next to him. Soon, he was putting his arm around her and taking off her clothes. ‘I basically said, “No, I don’t want to have sex with you.” And then he said, “OK, that’s fine” and stopped. . . . And then he started again a few minutes later, taking off my panties, taking off his boxers. I just kind of laid there and didn’t do anything — I had already said no. I was just tired and wanted to go to bed. I let him finish. I pulled my panties back on and went to sleep.” talking philosophy

My second example is that of 78 year old man who had sex with his wife who was suffering from Alzheimer, see Hastings Center  . She didn’t resist his advances but was incapable of giving any form of consent. My third example is of someone who is violently raped by a stranger. My last example is that of a paedophile having sex with an underage child.

Do these examples suggest any ways in which how different types of rape might be defined? Firstly it might be suggested that different types of rape might be differentiated by the amount of violence is involved. If we accept the above suggestion then my first two examples would be considered as a less serious type of rape and my third example a more serious type. Unfortunately my fourth example shows any such a suggestion to be unsound. Consider a paedophile having sex with a child who is neither forced nor unwilling. If we accept that rape can be differentiated by whether violence is involved then this case might be classed as a less serious type of rape. However this seems to be a clear example of extremely serious rape. It follows that different types of rape cannot be differentiated by the use of violence.

Next it might be suggested that different types of rape might be differentiated not simply by the violence involved but by the actual harm inflicted. Let us accept that not all the harm involved in rape need be physical harm. Accepting the above would mean that my example of the paedophile need not be considered as a less serious type of rape. Let us now consider this suggestion using my other examples. In my third example the victim would suffer physical harm and great psychological trauma. However the victims in my first two examples wouldn’t suffer the same degree of harm. The student in my first example suffered no physical harm and only believed she was raped in retrospect and so any psychological trauma would seem to be slight whilst in my second example we are even unable to say if any trauma took place at all. In spite of the above I would be reluctant to accept that different types of rape might be differentiated by the harm involved for two reasons. Firstly theft is not split into different types based on how much the thief steals, theft is theft, and I can see no obvious reason why rape should be different in this respect. Secondly the old man having sex with his demented wife might not be considered as a less serious form of rape but not an example of rape at all.

Lastly might different types of rape might be defined by differences in the refusal of consent. In what follows I will assume that a refusal of consent can not only be verbal but take the form of active resistance to sexual intercourse. According to the Oxford English Dictionary rape is,

“Typically committed by a man, of forcing another person to have sexual intercourse with the offender against their will.”

Let us consider my first and third examples. Let us assume in my third example that the victim fought back and maintained her refusal of consent provided she wasn’t prevented from doing so. In my first example the victim refused to consent but it might be questioned whether her actions maintained that refusal. She wasn’t prevented from maintaining her refusal to consent but didn’t do so. It might be suggested that type one rape should be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent and that whilst undergoing sexual intercourse maintained her refusal or is prevented from doing so. Type two rape might be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent but whilst undergoing sexual intercourse but fails to maintain her refusal whilst remaining capable of doing so. This division of rape into two different types might appear attractive because by allowing these two different types might mean some cases of rape might be prosecuted as type two rapes which wouldn’t have been prosecuted if we retain a unified concept of rape. However these are incomplete definitions because they fail to deal with cases in which the possibility of consent doesn’t exist such as in my second and fourth examples. It might be suggested that this difficultly might be avoided if we define type one rape as one in which the victim is unable to give valid consent or if she is able give consent refuses to so and whilst undergoing sexual intercourse maintains her refusal or is prevented from doing so. Initially his suggestion seems to be an attractive for one for in most cases in which sexual intercourse taking place without the possibility of consent are serious cases. Sex with children or adults unable to give consent due learning difficulties are serious offences. Unfortunately my second example gives us a reason to question adopting this approach provided we accept that the old man having sex with his demented wife was a form of rape. Intuitively it seems wrong to class his rape as the same type of a rape as that of a violent rapist for whilst we might still blame the old man for his actions we can also pity him. We would have no such pity for the violent rapist. Perhaps then we should include cases in which consent is impossible with type two rapes. Type two rape might now be defined as rape defined cases in which the victim is unable give valid consent or if she is able do so refuses to consent and her refusal of consent is not maintained whilst undergoing sexual intercourse when it is possible for her to do so. Unfortunately my fourth example shows the difficulties with adopting this approach. It would seem to be wrong to put a paedophile having activity with a child in the same class of rape as that of someone having activity with a victim who only comes to realise that she has been raped in retrospect. At this point it might be objected that my first example isn’t a less serious type of rape, it isn’t a type of rape at all. Underlying my definition of both types rape is the idea that consent can sometimes be implicit rather than explicit. It might be argued that the student in my first example by not maintaining her refusal of consent was in practice giving implicit consent. Perhaps if the student in question hadn’t initially refused consent then her actions might be construed as giving implicit consent. I would suggest that explicit and implicit consent cannot be mixed up and that an explicit refusal of consent can only be changed by the explicit giving of consent. Explicit consent is stronger than implicit consent. It follows the student was indeed raped. Her failure to maintain her refusal of consent doesn’t show she wasn’t raped but I would suggest it does show her rape was a less serious type of rape than some others. It also illustrates why the idea of type two rape could be a useful concept.

In the light of the above it seems my initial intention to split rape into two types fails. It fails because of difficulties in accommodating cases in which no consent is involved within either of these two types. When I started writing this posting my intention was to show that rape should be split into two types, the above shows that in philosophy one must always be prepared to change one’s mind. Can anything be salvaged from the above discussion? Perhaps if we want to prosecute an increased number of rape cases then rapes might be split into three types. Category one rape might be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent and whilst undergoing sexual intercourse maintains her refusal of consent or is prevented from maintaining her refusal. Category two rape might be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent but whilst undergoing sexual intercourse fails to maintain her refusal of consent whilst remaining able to do so. Category three rape might defined as any form of sexual intercourse in which the victim is unable to consent. What might be the consequences of adopting these three different types? One consequence might be a greater number of prosecutions for rape. Cases such as the student in my first example might be prosecuted whilst he might not have been prosecuted using the current definition. Splitting rape into three types would have an effect on sentencing. The sentencing of rapists guilty of category one rapes would remain unchanged. The sentencing of rapists guilty of category two rapes might be best dealt with by restorative justice. It might be objected that restorative justice doesn’t deal with the serious of the crime. In response I would point out restorative justice is not easy for the offender. The offender doesn’t simply have something done to him but has to seriously address behaviour, doing so means confronting the sort of person he is and learning to make changes. One of the aims of restorative justice is not just to make the offender feel he has done wrong but also feel the wrongness itself. I would also point out that whilst category two rape isn’t a trivial offence it is a much serious offence than category one and should be considered as such. I have suggested that the severity of sentencing for category one and two rapes should have a fairly tight domain the same isn’t true of category three. A paedophile might attract expect a severe sentence whilst the old man having sex with his demented wife is to be pitied and simply needs to learn his actions were wrong.

What conclusion can be drawn from the above? Clearly splitting rape into three different types is a messy business. However life is sometimes a messy business and this messiness might be a price worth paying if it leads to the prosecution of some cases which might not otherwise be prosecuted and a clearer understanding of what it means to rape someone. Should we do so? I’m not sure

The Logic of Relieving Suffering and Voluntary Euthanasia

Recently a seventeen year old Dutch girl, who had been repeatedly raped as a child and who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, anorexia and depression, starved herself to death. This was widely reported as an example of euthanasia, see BioEdge . Simply starving oneself to death isn’t euthanasia. It was unclear in this case whether her doctors helped to control her suffering. In this posting I want to explore whether doctors who relieve the suffering of a patient who starves himself to death should be regarded as assisting in suicide. In order to make my argument I will first explore what can be considered as the legitimate use of medical skills. Let us start with the premise that the decreasing of someone’s suffering is a legitimate use of medical skills. However accepting this premise is too simplistic. Surgery might actually increase someone’s suffering in the short term and surgery is clearly a legitimate use of medical skills. Let us revise the premise so that decreasing someone’s overall suffering is always a legitimate use of medical skills when this is possible.

Let us now agree that decreasing someone’s suffering is usually a legitimate use of medical skills but is it always so? I now want to examine two arguments suggesting it isn’t. Firstly it might be argued that some people deserve to suffer and that it would be wrong to alleviate their suffering due to dessert. Consider a convicted rapist who became infected with HIV when committing his crime. Let us assume that he is now serving his sentence in relative isolation due to the hideous nature of this crime and as a result is unable to infect others. Would treating him for his HIV would be an illegitimate use of medical skills? What reason could be advanced for illegitimacy of treatment in this case? It might possibly be argued that in this case the rapist deserves to be HIV positive and that as a result treating him for this state should be an illegitimate use of medical skills. This extreme example might concur with many people’s intuitions but seems to run counter to the caring ethos of medicine. I would argue linking the legitimacy of the use of medical skills to dessert is problematic in all circumstances. Accepting that it is illegitimate to treat some people whilst it is legitimate to treat others because of dessert appears to imply that it is legitimate to use medical skills to achieve dessert. The domain in which the employment of legitimate medical skills is extended from simply treating suffering to treating suffering and ensuring just dessert. We might link suffering and dessert together but nonetheless they remain independent conditions. Someone can suffer without deserving to do so and someone may deserve to suffer without actually doing so. If we accept that the legitimate use of medical skills is linked to dessert in addition to suffering then provided a death sentence could be considered as just it would be a legitimate use of medical skills to carry out this sentence. An interesting account of the death penalty and the proper ends of medicine is to be found can Silver (1).

Secondly it might be argued that medical professionals have no duty to alleviate suffering when this is caused by self-harm and the sufferer is fully aware his behaviour is the cause of his suffering. In practice accepting this argument might mean that there is less of a duty to treat conditions when these conditions are caused by alcoholism, obesity and anorexia. Clearly alcoholics, the obese and anorexics suffer even if this suffering is caused by their own behaviour. What reason could be advanced as to why treating them would be regarded as an illegitimate use of medicals skills? One reason might be that because their suffering is self-imposed they can simply stop the suffering by changing their behaviour and there is no need to employ medical skills. I’m doubtful whether the eating habits of anorexics or the obese can simply change their behaviour and alcoholism is an addiction.  However let us assume that someone’s suffering is self-imposed and that can change his behaviour and he will cease to suffer. In this context is the use of medical skills to alleviate his is an illegitimate use? It might be suggested he deserves to suffer because his suffering is self-imposed. However if we accept this suggestion it would re-introduce all the problems of dessert outlined above. Both of the above arguments as to why medical professionals don’t always have a duty to alleviate suffering when this is possible appear to be unsound. It follows that we should accept the premise that the decreasing someone’s overall suffering is always a legitimate use of medical skills when this is possible. It is of course possible that there are other legitimate uses of medical skills, see Cosmetic Surgery, Enhancement and the Aims of Medicine . 

I now want to consider the relationship between the relief of suffering and voluntary euthanasia. In particular I want to focus on the relief of suffering of those people who voluntary stop eating and drinking (VSED). Most people who adopt VSED do so because they have a terminal illness but this isn’t true in all cases as the Dutch girl shows. Let us assume that the relief of someone’s suffering caused by VSED is assisting in voluntary euthanasia. I have argued above that decreasing someone’s overall suffering is always a legitimate use of medical skills. It follows relief of someone’s suffering caused by VSED is a legitimate use of medical skills. It further follows that assisting in voluntary euthanasia is a legitimate use of medical skills. Some might be unhappy to accept these conclusions but being unhappy about these conclusions has nothing to do with the logic of the argument or the validity of the conclusions. 

Lastly let us assume that the relief of someone’s suffering caused by VSED isn’t assisting in voluntary euthanasia. If this is the case then there would seem to be no reason to be unhappy about the deployment of medical skills to alleviate someone’s suffering caused by VSED. However I find hard to see how alleviating someone’s suffering, when this suffering is caused by a desire to die, shouldn't be regarded as a case of physician assisted suicide without using the principle of double effect.

1. Silver D, (2003) Lethal Injection, Autonomy and the proper ends of Medicine, Bioethics 17(2), pp. 205-211.

Redesigning People

In China a scientist has created two gene edited babies using CRISPR-cas9 in order to prevent HIV infection. These babies are usually referred to as designer babies. In this posting I will use the term redesign rather than design because people have already been designed by their genes and this design is shaped by nature and evolution. I will consider whether we should attempt to improve on that design by redesigning people and in what circumstances it would be permissible to do so. If we redesign a kettle we hope the redesigned kettle will be an improvement on the previous one. Intuitively it might be thought if we redesign a person the result will automatically be an improved person. However we must be wary of our intuitions and whilst it might be pointless to redesign a kettle which isn’t an improved kettle the same does not hold for persons. A kettle is designed for a single task persons aren’t. Someone might redesign a person to serve a specific purpose and such a redesigned person needn’t necessarily be an improved person when considered more broadly. Perhaps a person might be redesigned to be a better soldier such a redesigned person need only be a better soldier not a better person. Prior to considering specific wrongs which might arise if we redesign persons I want to consider the different ways in which redesigning might be wrong.

Redesigning persons might be wrong in three circumstances. Firstly we aren’t competent to redesign persons. Persons unlike kettles are highly complex and perhaps we just don’t have the expertise to carry out such redesign. If we accept the above then it would be unacceptable to redesign persons unfortunately in these circumstances we should be open to the rather unpalatable option that others such as aliens or even some advanced AI might be able to redesign us even if we can't do so. Secondly it might be suggested that whilst we don’t have the expertise to redesign persons now that we might acquire such expertise in the future. If we accept this option then whilst it would be unacceptable to redesign persons now it might become acceptable in the future and it would be sensible to debate the consequences of doing so now. Lastly it might be suggested that the act of redesign must always damage the redesigned person. Danaher explores two objections raised by Jurgen Habermas to redesigning persons in which the act of redesign damages the designee. Habermas argues redesigning a person would of necessity damage her because it would compromise her autonomy and status of equality. I will now consider the specific ways in which redesigning persons might be damaging. Firstly I will briefly consider how redesigning persons might cause damage to both persons and society by creating inequality. Secondly I will consider how redesigning a person might damage that person by compromising her autonomy.

Let us accept that Kant was right to insist that treating someone simply as a means and not an end in herself is morally wrong. It follows that if we accept that creating someone to serve our ends is equivalent to using someone to serve our ends then redesigning a person to serve the ends of another is wrong. It also follows that if someone redesigns another to serve her ends that there is a lack of equality between the designer and the designee. The choice of available ends to the designer and the designee are unequal. However why should we want to redesign a person to serve our needs? It seems probable that if our technology becomes advanced enough to redesign persons that it would also become advanced enough to design robots which aren’t, as yet, persons to serve the same needs. In this situation if we want an improved soldier, a robotic soldier would seem to be a better option than a redesigned person. Personhood would be an unnecessary extravagance and might even make the soldier less effective. The same seems true of most servants with one possible exception. Currently there is some interest in sex robots (1). However is sex with a robot genuine intercourse? I have argued that sex isn’t simply friction and as a result sex with a robot is really only an enhanced form of masturbation sex with robots . It is possible that in this situation someone might want to redesign a person to serve her sexual desires. It follows that it is conceivable that in some limited circumstances someone might want to redesign a person to serve her own ends. Such redesigning creates a person designed for the ends of another making her less equal. It follows redesigning someone to serve the ends of another is morally wrong because it creates inequalities between persons. Now let us consider whether redesigning someone in order to benefit that person might also create inequalities in society. Any society which contains both enhanced and unenhanced persons is likely to be an unequal one. It follows that we might have reason not redesign persons based on the potential damage it might do to society. How strong these reasons are will depend on the cost and availability of redesign. It is possible that redesigning persons won’t damage society. I now want to consider other reasons why redesigning persons might be wrong.

In what follows it will be accepted that to design a person in order to serve the needs of another is wrong. It will also be accepted that redesigning persons might be wrong if it creates unacceptable inequalities in society. It will also be assumed that if we redesign someone that we do so in order to benefit her. If we redesign someone in order to benefit her then this redesign is a form of enhancement. I now want examine whether redesigning someone in order to enhance her might damage her personally? Let us start our examination by considering a specific example. Some potential mothers suffer from mitochondrial disease and these mothers will normally have babies who will suffer from the same disease. Using IVF an egg taken from such a mother might be fertilised. The nucleus of this egg is then transferred to an egg with its nucleus removed which has been donated by another woman from which the nucleus has been removed creating a three parent baby. This is a clear case of redesign and it is hard to see in this case how being designed damages the designee. It also seems to answer one of the questions raised above as to whether we can effectively redesign someone, the answer is that we can at least in some cases. If we accept the above then redesigning persons is both possible and doesn’t always damage the persons involved. However are there some circumstances in which designing a person damages the designed person?

Let us recall we have excluded cases in which we redesign someone in order to serve the purposes of another and are only considering redesign in circumstances in which the redesign is intended to benefit the redesigned person. Such a redesign is a form of enhancement. Let us first consider the possibility that we can enhance only one capability and leave the rest of the designed persons capabilities unchanged. Perhaps someone might be redesigned to be stronger or have a better memory. Human beings are animals and it is hard to see from the viewpoint of an animal how such enhancement might damage the animal involved. Being stronger or remembering the hiding places of predators should give any animal an evolutionary advantage. Let us accept that enhancing a single instrumental capability whilst leaving the rest of some designed person’s capabilities unchanged doesn’t damage her physically. Much the same reasoning can be applied to enhancing several capabilities provided the remaining capabilities are unchanged. However human beings aren’t simply animals they are potential persons. Does the fact that some capacity or capacities have been chosen by another for enhancement damage her as a person? I now want to consider whether the redesigning of a person in order to enhance her damages her autonomy.

Let us return to my example in which we redesign someone to be stronger. How can being stronger damage someone’s autonomy even if this choice was made for her by another? It might be suggested that by making someone stronger we are enhancing her capacity for athletic prowess. It might then be further suggested that by enhancing her athletic prowess she becomes more likely to choose an athletic career and as a result we have limited her choices and compromised her autonomy. The same argument could be applied to redesigning someone in order to enhance other skills such as an improved memory. It might be suggested that such redesign is analogous to parents who encourage a child’s athletic prowess and that they too damage her ability to choose and as a result compromise her autonomy. In practice we accept parents who encourage their children’s athletic prowess.  After all what can be wrong with encouraging prowess in something which is beneficial? It might then be further argued that if we are prepared to accept encouraging parents who encourage athletic prowess that we should be prepared to accept parents who seek to increase this prowess by redesign. It seems to me that this argument is unsound because the analogy is not a close one as children can reject parental encouragement but they can’t reject redesign.

I have suggested that parents who encourage their children to excel in some activity don’t damage their children’s autonomy because their children can reject their parent’s choices whilst parents who redesign their children to excel in some activity might do so because their children can’t reject the enhancement. I would be unhappy to accept this suggestion for two reasons. Firstly I accept that whilst most parents who encourage their children to excel don’t damage their children’s autonomy some might. Parenting is about guidance and some parents try to direct rather than guide their children, such parents do some harm to their children’s autonomy, see parenting and excessive guidance . Secondly my objector is suggesting that the enhancement of certain capacities of someone makes it more likely that she will choose some option and that this increased probability damages her autonomy. I accept that enhancing someone’s capacity might make her more inclined to make certain choices but I want to argue this doesn’t damage her autonomy in all circumstances. Let us return to my example of parents who enhance their child so that she has greater strength. These parents have no specific life plan for their child in mind and only want their child to be stronger. Let us assume that the child decides to become a gymnast. Let us accept that her increased strength makes it both easier and more probable that she will choose this option. Does the fact that some option has been made both easier to choose and more probable to be chosen by someone due to her enhancement by others mean that her autonomy has been damaged? I would suggest that in these circumstances it doesn’t. In these circumstances our potential gymnast hasn’t been coerced and it is difficult to see how her greater strength could possibly alter her capabilities to make an autonomous choice. Making it easier for someone to choose some option isn’t the same as making her choose that option. It follows redesigning a child so she has greater strength doesn’t damage her autonomy. I would now suggest that the same argument could be applied to all her instrumental capacities including cognitive abilities such as an improved memory or quicker reasoning. The fact that someone else has chosen which capacities to enhance seems irrelevant in these circumstances as far as enhanced person’s autonomy is concerned. Accepting the above leads a the conclusion that redesigning someone so that she has certain enhanced instrumental cognitive or physical capacities which were chosen by others and these capacities make it more likely that she will choose a particular option doesn’t damage her autonomy in circumstance in which this redesign doesn’t affect her remaining capacities and should be permissible. If this wasn’t so then any educational establishment which offered a bursary to a student, which might make it more likely she would pursue an academic career could be said to be damaging her autonomy.

I have argued that any enhancement in circumstances which only enhances some of someone’s instrumental capacities whilst leaving her remaining capacities unchanged doesn’t damage her autonomy and that such a redesign should be permissible. However it is possible to enhance someone’s non-instrumental capacities. I now want to consider whether enhancing these capacities might damage someone’s autonomy. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that there is a need for widespread moral enhancement in order to counter the existential dangers which our modern world poses (2). Perhaps in order to counter these dangers we should redesign persons so that they have an increased capacity for empathy.  Would such a redesign damage someone’s capacity for autonomy? It might be argued that if we increase someone’s capacity for empathy that this increased capacity would lead to an increased desire to help others which in turn might lead to a decrease in her ability to fully exercise her cognitive abilities. Her increased empathy overwhelms her ability to make autonomous decisions to some degree. If we accept the above then enhancing someone’s capacity for empathy might damage her capacity to make autonomous decisions. What is important in these circumstances is not simply that someone has chosen which capacity to enhance but that by choosing she has altered the relationship between the enhanced person’s capacities to choose or damaged one of them. If we accept the above then it might be concluded that if enhancing some of someone’s capacities alters her remaining capacities to choose or damages them then this enhancement damages her autonomy and this redesign should be impermissible.

Whether we should accept the above conclusion depends on the account of autonomy employed. There are many different accounts of autonomy and I will only consider two accounts here because most other accounts fall somewhere between these accounts for our purposes here even if the details differ. First an autonomous decision might be regarded as a good decision based on what the agent cares about together with some widely accepted norms. If we accept this account then if someone’s enhanced capacity for empathy compromises her ability to accept certain norms then her autonomy is damaged. If we accept this account of autonomy then we might limit any damage to someone’s autonomy by employing a dual enhancement that enhances both empathy and cognition which might lead to increased empathy across a wider domain, see widespread moral enhancement. Secondly an autonomous decision might be regarded as simply as one which accords with what an agent cares about. Clearly if we accept this account and redesign someone in order to increase her empathy we won’t damage her autonomy. I have argued elsewhere that we should adopt this second primitive account of autonomy because if we don’t autonomous decisions simply become good decisions and that we have no need for a separate account of autonomy. If we accept this second account of autonomy then we have no reason based on damaging someone’s autonomy not to enhance her capacity for empathy even if her enhanced empathy overwhelms some of her cognitive capabilities. However in these circumstances doing so would still damage her as a person. Persons have some capacity for reasoning and if we overwhelm this capacity we damage the person involved.

I have summarised the main conclusions which can be drawn from the above below.

·       It should be unacceptable to redesign a person to serve the needs of another.

·       Redesigning persons might create unwarranted inequalities in society. Whether these inequalities mean redesign should be impermissible will depend on the cost and availability of the redesign.

·       Redesigning persons in order to enhance one or more of their capacities whilst leaving the remaining capacities the same does not compromise their capacity for autonomy and should be permissible. Making some option easier to choose is not the same as damaging someone’s capacity to make autonomous decisions.

·       Redesigning persons in order to enhance one or more of their capacities when this enhancement means altering the relationship between her capacities involved in decision making might damage her as a person even if it doesn’t damage her capacity to make autonomous decisions and should be impermissible.

1. Danaher, Mcarthur, and Migotti, 2017 Robot Sex: Social and Ethical Implications, MIT Press
2. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.

A right to anaesthesia, a right to physician euthanasia?

In an editorial in Anaesthesia Julian Savulescu and Janet Radcliffe‐Richards suggest that many people who are against the deliberate killing of terminally ill patients who wish to die should have no objection to what is known as terminal sedation, bringing about unconsciousness for terminally ill patients until their natural death, see Anaesthesia . I agree with Savulescu and Radcliffe‐Richards that most people would accept that sedation for terminally ill patients is not wrong when death is imminent. In France in 2016 a law came into effect granting terminally ill patients the right to anaesthesia until death. Sinmyee et al go further and argue that a right to anaesthesia should be available to all patients who choose to end their life by starvation or dehydration, see Sinmyee . Would most people accept that sedation for terminally ill patients is not wrong when death is inevitable but not imminent? Perhaps a patient has a prognosis that he has only six months to live. Secondly would most people accept that sedation for terminally ill patients is not wrong when used to relieve suffering which they cause themselves by a refusal to eat or to drink? I’m not sure what most people would find acceptable in either of these scenarios. In this posting I will firstly briefly summarise the argument why it isn’t morally wrong to sedate terminally ill patients even if their current suffering is due caused by a refusal to eat or drink. I will then consider what implications accepting this argument has for accepting physician assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.

Let us accept that any competent person has right to refuse to take food and water. It might be objected that in some cases the person in question is unlikely to be competent due to eating disorders such as anorexia. However clearly this objection doesn’t carry much weight when considering terminally ill patients. Let us also accept that relieving pain is a legitimate end of medicine even when this lessens a patient’s life span. Let us still further accept that relieving pain remains a legitimate end of medicine even when this pain is due to self-harm. We treat drug users for their addiction. Lastly let us accept that if pain cannot be controlled by any other means that it can be controlled by deep sedation. It appears to follow that deeply sedating a patient suffering from a terminal illness, even if his immediate suffering is caused by his refusal to eat or drink, is a legitimate end of medicine. It follows that in these circumstances deep sedation would not be morally wrong.

Let us now consider how permanent deep sedation differs from death. For a dead person conscious life is over. Conscious life is also over anyone who will be deeply sedated until he dies. Of course for someone who is deeply sedated some important unconscious physiological processes such as breathing will continue. The same is not true of the dead. But do these unconscious physiological processes matter if someone will never resume consciousness or take part in life again? If they do matter who do they matter to? These unconscious physiological processes certainly don’t matter to the sedated person. If they doesn’t matter to the person involved why should they matter morally to others? It would appear to follow that there is no significant moral difference between being dead and being deeply sedated until death. If this is so is there any moral difference between a doctor deeply sedating someone until he dies and helping him die a good death if he requests help to do so? If dying and being deeply sedated until death are equivalent for moral concerns then we should be prepared to conclude that if we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death that we should be prepared to accept physician assisted suicide PAS.

It might be objected that deep sedation involves no suffering whilst helping a patient to die might do so. However even if we accept this objection the above question might be reframed. Is there any moral difference between a doctor deeply sedating someone until he dies and deeply sedating someone prior to carry out his previously expressed wishes for voluntary euthanasia? If there isn’t any difference then we should be prepared to conclude that if we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death that we should be prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia, which might require prior sedation, when requested by a terminally ill patient.

I now want to examine two major objections to the above conclusion. Firstly it might be objected that the above argument depends on the concept of a person and that when considering deep sedation and voluntary euthanasia we should consider human beings instead. My objector might argue that that matters is not whether a person continues to exist bur whether a human being continues to exist. What does it mean for a human being to continue existing? Is someone who will never regain consciousness but for whom unconscious physiological processes such as breathing continue still a human being? My objector might conclude the answer is obvious and is affirmative. However if we consider the concept of brain death commonly used in transplant medicine the answer is not obvious. Someone is brain dead if he has a permanent absence of cerebral and brainstem functions, however mechanical ventilators and other advanced critical care services can maintain unconscious physiological processes such as breathing for some time. Whether someone who is brain dead remains a human being is far from obvious for we can use his organs for transplant subject to consent. Why does brain death matter? It matters not simply because of a loss of cerebral and brainstem functions but because the implications of these losses. These losses lead to a permanent loss of consciousness. If the above is accepted then substituting human for persons doesn’t affect my original argument.

I now want to consider a second objection to my argument that if we are prepared to accept deep sedation of the terminally ill patients until death that we should also be prepared to voluntary euthanasia for such patients. It might be objected that I have slipped too easily from considering PAS to considering voluntary euthanasia and that the two aren’t equivalent. PAS is self-administered whilst voluntary euthanasia is carried out by a physician. I made this move because it has been suggested that PAS might involve suffering by the terminally ill patient. As a philosopher I am unable to say much about whether PAS might involve suffering. However I can say something about the possible scenarios. Firstly if PAS doesn’t necessarily involve suffering then my original conclusion stands. Next let us assume that PAS involves some limited suffering. In this scenario it might be questioned whether a terminally ill patient needs to be fully anaesthetised for PAS to take place? Perhaps a patient’s pain might be alleviated without affecting his cognitive abilities allowing him to carry out PAS. Once again my original conclusion stands. Lastly let us assume that PAS involves suffering that cannot be fully alleviated without full anaesthesia. In this scenario PAS isn’t possible with full pain relief. In this scenario the question changes and becomes, if we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death then why shouldn’t we be prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia?

In order to answer the above question I want to consider two further scenarios. In both scenarios I will assume the patient is fully competent. In the first I will assume that the patient is capable of initiating the start of his anaesthesia before his physician takes over and delivers a fatal dose. In this scenario why is the patient initiating his own anaesthesia? I would suggest he isn’t only initiating a form of pain relief. He is only initiating pain relief in order to die. In this scenario the patient’s actions resemble those of a patient undergoing PAS.  However the two are not identical. In PAS the physician only supplies the means and need not be present at the time of death whilst in the above scenario the physician must not only be present but also deliver the lethal dose. Let us accept that the physician’s presence or lack of it is not relevant morally. However we must ask ourselves whether the fact that the physician supplies the means of dying differs in a morally significant way from the physician applying the lethal dose. It might be suggested that this a case in which we could use the principle of double effect to explain the difference. I would be reluctant to accept this suggestion. When supplying the means to die the physician involved in PAS has the intention of allowing the patient to kill himself, it isn’t a foreseen consequence of something else. The physician’s intention is the same whether he is involved in PAS or voluntary euthanasia as described in the above scenario. It seems provided the patient involved is able to initiate his own anaesthesia that there is no morally significant difference between voluntary euthanasia in these circumstances and PAS. Let us now consider a second scenario in which the patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia. I would suggest that there are no morally significant differences between a physician carrying out voluntary euthanasia on a terminally ill patient in this scenario and a physician suppling him with the means to carry out PAS provided the degree of voluntariness is the same in both cases. However is the degree of voluntariness the same in both cases? In the case of PAS the patient’s intentions seem to be clear because he initiates the dying process. If a patient can initiate his own anaesthesia I have argued he is initiating his death and once again his intentions seem clear cut. However if a patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia his intentions aren’t quite so clear cut. Perhaps this situation can be remedied by a rigorous consent process and a clear last directive. None the less differences remain between this scenario and the one in which the patient initiates his own anaesthesia and for this reason I would be reluctant to conclude that the scenario in which the patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia is equivalent to PAS. The above suggests some consequences for the process of deep sedation. Let us accept that the deep sedation of terminally ill patients who are unable to initiate their own sedation and voluntary are equivalent. It follows if we aren’t prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia we shouldn’t be prepared to accept deep sedation if the patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia.

In this posting I have argued that the deep sedation of terminally ill patients should be morally acceptable. I further argued such sedation was a legitimate use of medical skills. I have also assumed that most people would find such sedation acceptable and less contentious than either PAS or voluntary euthanasia. If most people find PA and voluntary euthanasia unacceptable and deep sedation is a legitimate use of medical skills then such sedation should be an option for the terminally ill. I then examined the moral implications of accepting deep sedation. The main implications of this acceptance are summarised below.

1. If we are prepared to accept deep sedation for terminally ill patients until death then we should be prepared to accept PAS when this process does not involve suffering.
2. If we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death and PAS involves some suffering then we should accept PAS provided that this suffering can be controlled without anaesthesia.
3. If we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death and a patient is able to initiate his own anaesthesia then in these circumstances we should be prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia.
4. If we are not prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia then we should not be prepared to accept deep sedation until death when a patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia.

Assisted Suicide and a Life not Worth Living

Writing in theconversation  Lidia Ripamonti asks if assisted dying became legalised who should decide if a life is worth living. She is assuming that assisted dying would become available to those who have a life not worth living. It might be argued because of dangers of pressure being put on disabled people, the aged and those suffering from mental illness that any such decision should not be solely up to the patient. If not the patient who else can say her life isn’t worth living? Her medical team, her priest or a bioethics committee? Others telling a patient she has a life worth living when she has already decided her life is not worth living seems to be unacceptably arrogant. In philosophy how we frame a question is especially important if we want to draw meaningful conclusions. In this posting I will frame the above question slightly differently. I will then argue that in certain situations we should simply accept the patient’s decision.

If we simply accept the framing of Ripamonti’s question then it is possible to conclude that there may be dangers for the disabled, the aged and the mentally ill if assisted suicide became permissible. I now want to suggest that her question might be better framed Perhaps the question might be framed as follows. If assisted dying is legalised, who gets to decide if someone’s life contains unbearable suffering rather than her experiencing a life which isn’t worth living? It might be argued that if the permissibility of assisted dying is based on unbearable suffering that disabled people and those suffering from mental illness would be better protected because they can live enjoyable worthwhile lives. It might be suggested that others, such as a patient’s medical team, might be able to give an objective answer as to whether the patient is suffering unbearably. Unfortunately it seems impossible to give an objective answer as to whether someone’s suffering is unbearable. One person might find some suffering bearable whilst similar suffering would be unbearable to someone else. Whether suffering is unbearable is a subjective question. Others telling a patient that she doesn’t have unbearable suffering when she has already decided her suffering is unbearable seems to be unacceptably arrogant. It might be suggested that this difficultly might be addressed by replacing unbearable suffering in our amended question by unbearable pain. Perhaps we can measure pain objectively. I’m doubtful whether this might be possible but let us assume for the sake of argument that pain can be measured objectively. However even if this was possible it doesn’t help solve our problem. What matters to some is not the degree of pain alone or how long it will persist but someone’s reaction to it. As with suffering someone might find a pain bearable whilst someone else might find the same degree of pain unbearable. It appears to follow if we don’t want to be accused of arrogance that we cannot replace a ‘life not worth living’ with either ‘unbearable suffering’ or ‘unbearable pain’ in an attempt to reframe Ripamonti’s question.

Ripamonti is concerned that letting the patient solely decide if she has an unbearable life endangers the disabled, the aged and the mentally ill if assisted suicide became available. I accept that Ripamonti is correct provided assisted dying became available across a broad domain. I will now argue that in a restricted domain her concern seem much less pressing. No one is suggesting assisted suicide should be available to anyone who finds her life not worth living. Medicine is concerned with illness not social problems. Let us assume that assisted suicide should only be available to terminally ill patients capable of making a competent decision. If we strictly restrict the domain of patients who could avail themselves of assisted suicide in this way the disabled, the aged and the mentally ill would appear to have little to fear from the legalisation of assisted suicide. Unfortunately this restricted domain appears not to be restricted enough, some terminal diseases may kill someone but can take a long time to do so. For instance Stephen Hawking was diagnosed with motor neurone disease MND in 1963 but lived a highly productive life until his death in 2018. Perhaps then the domain of patients who should be limited to those who are autonomous with a terminal illness and who are expected to live less than six months. Accepting such a domain should protect those suffering from Alzheimers, the disabled, the aged and those suffering from mental illnesses.

However accepting this strict domain causes additional problems which are not easy to resolve. If the domain is restricted to autonomous persons then this restriction protects those suffering from Alzheimers. We don’t, or can’t fully understand what it means to suffer from Alzheimers. But does it always protect children? Consider two patients suffering from terminal cancer both of whom suffer identical pain and find their lives not worth living. Let us assume that assisted suicide becomes permissible but is restricted by the above domain. Let us also assume that the first patient is an adult and as a result is able to end her suffering using assisted suicide. Let next assume that the second patient is a child who because of her suffering also wishes to relieve her suffering by ending her life. Children are not usually considered to be fully autonomous and we have restricted the domain of patients who can avail themselves of assisted suicide to those who are fully autonomous. It might be questioned whether we are really protecting the child. We certainly aren’t protecting her from pain and suffering.

I have argued that autonomous adults with a terminal illness with a prognosis that they will live less than six months and who believe that their life isn’t worth living should have a right to assisted suicide. However because I argued that assisted dying should only be available to autonomous patients creates difficulties and doesn’t protect some patients from pain and suffering. What sort of responses might be made to these difficulties? One response might simply be that I am wrong and that the decision as to whether a patient’s life is not worth living should not be solely up to the patient. Accepting this response would mean Ripamonti’s question becomes pertinent again, who should decide. However I would be reluctant to accept this response because of the reason given above. If someone who is expected to live less than six months believes her life isn’t worth living then it might be asked what pertinent reasons could have others advance to say her life is worth living? Of course others might advance other reasons pertinent to the impermissibility of assisted suicide but these reasons are not pertinent as to whether someone’s life is worth living. It would appear that the decision as to whether a patient’s life is not worth should be solely up to the patient. A second response might be to drop the requirement that the terminally ill patient must be autonomous. Of course how a decision is made to request assisted suicide matters. If such a decision needn’t be an autonomous decision should be replaced by a good decision, I have argued elsewhere that autonomous decisions need not always be good decisions wooler.scottus . Let us accept that a good decision is not simply some decisions regarded as a good decision by the decision maker. Others must also be able to regard the decision as a good decision. However if we accept the above the following might occur. The patient might make a decision that her life is not worth living which she believes is a good decision whilst others believe her decision is a bad one and not in her interests. Once again we might question whether the reasons others give for her life being worth living are pertinent. If others cannot give such reasons then there replacing an autonomous decision by a good decision becomes meaningless. I have argued that if assisted suicide became permissible that initially it should only be made available to autonomous adults with a terminal illness and a prognosis that they will live less than six months and who believe that their life isn’t worth living. I have further argued that who decides if a life isn’t worth living is the person living that life.

What can we learn from the above except that applied philosophy is a messy business? Can any practical conclusions be drawn from the above discussion? First I would argue that the discussion shows how a question is framed matters. Secondly a tight restriction on the domain of people who can avail themselves of assisted suicide gives rise to difficult questions. Such a restricted domain would protect the disabled from exploitation whilst enabling those disabled who meet the criteria to avail themselves of assisted suicide. However such a tightly restricted domain would not protect other vulnerable patients from suffering such as children and those suffering from dementia. None the less I would argue that it is better to protect a limited number of people from suffering than none. Perhaps more work might enable us to extend this tightly restricted domain to others but extreme caution would be needed.

The Philosopher's Dog

 

 A philosopher has a pet dog, does he do anything wrong? According to Gary Francione he does because a morally just world would have no pets, no aquaria and no zoos. Francione opposes pet ownership, zoos and aquaria because such things violate the fundamental rights of animals. In this posting I will only be concerned with pets and I will argue that Francione’s view is mistaken in cases involving some kinds of animals. I will next argue that the keeping of some pets can sometimes be mutually beneficial. Lastly in the light of these benefits I will consider the sort of animals it is permissible and possibly beneficial to keep as pets.

 I won’t consider a virtue ethics approach to the keeping pets because whilst virtue ethics might have something to say about how we ought to treat pets it has little to say about the permissibility of keeping pets. Neither will I consider a consequentialist approach. It might be objected problems of hungry people and environmental harm means we shouldn’t keep pets for consequentialist reasons. In what follows I will assume that either these reasons can be overcome or balanced by the benefits of keeping pets. In what follows I will examine three objections to pet keeping based on animal rights. First, a right to be free. Secondly, a right not to considered as property. And lastly, a right not to be kept in a dependent state.

 Pets unlike wild animals are confined to our home or to its immediate surroundings. It follows pets are restricted by their keepers from roaming freely. It has been argued that the inability to roam freely causes pets distress and that this distress means pet keeping is wrong. However, we don’t allow young children and infants to roam freely. Many five or six-year old children would like at times to roam freely and feel frustrated when their parents prevent from doing so. Frustration is a form of distress. Nobody suggests we shouldn’t have children because we curtail their freedom to roam might cause distress. It might be argued by analogy that the same is true of pets. It might be objected that this analogy doesn’t hold because once children become adults they can decide where they want to go whilst the same doesn’t apply to pets. In response to this objection I would point out that children develop skills which means they can enjoy their freedom. Feral dogs are free from restrictions but unlike adult humans they don’t appear to have the skills to enjoy this freedom. Pet dogs appear to flourish better than feral dogs. What is true for dogs need not of course apply to all animals. Some animals we keep as pets might be happier and flourish better if they were free to roam. However accepting the above means that there is at least one kind of animal which is not damaged if its freedom to roam is curtailed. It follows the argument against keeping of at least some kinds of animals as pets based on restrictions to their freedom fails.

 A pet is sometimes considered as someone’s property and it might be argued that owning an animal is wrong. This argument is really two different arguments. First it might be argued that someone can do whatever he likes with his own property and that he shouldn’t be able to do anything he likes to any pets he keeps. This argument is clearly false. Someone can only do whatever he likes with certain forms of property. Someone may do whatever he likes with his table and chairs. Pets even if they are property are not the kind of things someone can do whatever he likes with. Pets are living things and because of this the law prevents pet owners from mistreating their pets. Secondly it might be argued the simple fact of being owned damages pets? Certainly if one person owns another being owned damages the second person. This damage is due to a lack of freedom. In response to such an argument I would point out most pets are not persons. One possible exception would be a great ape and accepting the above would mean that keeping a great ape as a pet should be impermissible. Secondly as I have argued above for some sort of pets a loss of freedom doesn’t of necessity cause harm. It appears to follow even if pets are in some way owned this ownership doesn’t give us a reason not to keep some kinds of animals as pets.

 Lastly let us consider the dependency argument. If some creature is dependent on another this dependence means it is in a vulnerable position. Let us assume that it is wrong to place some creature in a vulnerable position. It follows we shouldn’t place any creature in a vulnerable position and that because pets are kept in a vulnerable position that it is wrong to keep pets. I believe the above argument is unsound. The premise that is it is wrong to place any creature in a vulnerable position is false. Pets exist and for most pets to be allowed to roam at will this would increase their vulnerability. The above argument might be refined by replacing the above premise with a related one. Let us assume that it is wrong to create some creature which will be vulnerable in life. Accepting the above would mean we might keep our existing pets but it would be wrong to permit the creation of any more. Once again I find the refined argument unconvincing because I believe the revised premise is also false. Human beings are vulnerable. I believe that we do have a duty not to bring into existence any being we think would not find its life worth living. I believe that this duty cannot be extended into a duty not to bring into existence some creature which will have a life worth living but is vulnerable in some way. It would appear that the dependency argument does not give us reason to keep some kind of pets provided that our lifestyle permits us to attend to their needs.

 I have argued that there are no reasons why we shouldn’t keep some types of animals as pets. I now want to argue that there are some good reasons for some people to keep some types of pets. Someone might keep a pet to showcase a lifestyle. Macho man keeps a big strong dog to demonstrate the sort of person he is. For such people pets have much the same status as their jewellery. I don’t believe keeping a pet to showcase a lifestyle is a good reason to keep a pet. Indeed I would suggest that this is a poor reason to keep pets because if someone wants to showcase the sort of person he is he should demonstrate this by his actions rather than his possessions. In spite of the above it should be permissible for such people to keep pets provided that they look after them well.

 One concern of moral philosophy is human flourishing. I now want to outline four empirical reasons why keeping pets might help some people to flourish. Firstly there seems to be a connection between keeping a pet with both physiological and psychological health, see the psychologist . Secondly keeping a pet might be useful in counteracting loneliness among some people, especially the aged. For instance walking a dog besides being beneficial to health increases the possibility of social interaction. Moreover even if someone is unable to exercise a dog keeping some sorts of pet might create a bond which could be useful in counteracting loneliness. Thirdly keeping a pet might be useful in a child’s development and help him to flourish for three reasons. Firstly children who actively care for pets, such as regularly walking a dog, might be more likely to develop a notion of responsibility. Secondly a more developed notion of responsibility might also foster a ‘caring for’ attitude. Thirdly there is some evidence that interaction with a pet might benefit some autistic people by reducing anxiety, see how animals can help autistic children . Verbal communication with a pet is a one way process. Lastly I would suggest that underlying all these reasons is a basic human need to love and be loved. This love of course isn’t romantic love but a very basic need to care about something. Indeed I would further suggest a failure to care much about anything is a failure to be fully human, someone who doesn’t care acts robotically or like a zombie. Caring about, or loving, makes us human and in some cases the keeping of a pet might help foster this caring about. Much more speculatively it might even be suggested that terrorists are unlikely to keep pets or have kept pets as children. Maybe loving a cause tends to exclude someone from loving a pet and vice versa.Perhaps this somewhat bizarre suggestion could be tested empirically.

 Let us accept that it is permissible, perhaps sometimes even desirable, for someone to keep a pet. However does this apply to all animals or only to a subset of animals? What sort of animal it would be morally permissible to keep as a pet? I argued above it is permissible to restrict the freedom of certain animals such as dogs. Dogs, cats and perhaps a few other animals such as horses have adapted their way of life so they can still flourish when restricted by humans. Most wild animals would not cope well if their freedom was restricted and it would be wrong to keep such animals as pets. Let us accept that it is only morally permissible to keep as pets animals that can still flourish when restricted by humans. I now want to consider a slightly different question. What sort of animal might benefit someone if kept as a pet? I have argued above that our need to love and be loved gives us a reason to keep pets. What does accepting the above tell us about the sort of animals we should keep as pets? Let us examine our need to be loved first. Intuitively a dog can love someone whilst a fish can’t. Why is this so? I would suggest the reason is evolution has changed some animals so they can adapt to our lifestyle. Someone merely feeds fish and cleans their tank because fish haven’t adapted to our lifestyle. The same isn’t true of dogs. If we accept the above, then the type of pets we have reason to keep for the benefits they give us is limited. We have reason to keep dogs, possibly cats or even ponies but not many other kinds of animals. We definitely don’t have reason to keep snakes or fish based on our need to be loved. However, we don’t simply have a need to be loved we also have a need to love, to care about something. Is it possible to love a snake or a fish? I will now argue it isn’t. I would argue if we love something we must be capable of benefiting what we love. By love I mean ‘caring about’ and not simply ‘caring for’. Of course ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’ are connected and there is a spectrum between these two forms of caring. However, if I care about something I am benefitted when what I care about is benefitted and harmed when what I care about is harmed. The same is not true for ‘caring for’ something. I can benefit a fish by feeding but not feel benefited myself. Let us consider benefits in more detail. If someone plays with a dog and a ball he is happy because his dog is happy, much the same applies to someone stroking a purring cat. However, someone might know what harms a fish or snake but he has little or no idea about what makes these creatures are happy. She doesn’t know what benefits these creatures besides ‘caring for’ their basic needs. Someone might care for such creatures but he can’t ‘care about’, love them. It follows someone’s need to ‘care about’ love cannot be satisfied by keeping animals like fish and snakes as pets and that this need to love cannot used as a reason to justify keeping them as pets.

 In conclusion it seems that it is perfectly permissible for a philosopher to keep a dog as a pet. It might also be desirable in some cases for some people to keep a pet, especially children. However the sort of animals it is permissible to keep as pets is limited to those animals who have been shaped by evolution to fit our lifestyles.