Lying and Autonomy

  

We live in a world surrounded by fake news and lies. According to Terry Pratchett in the Truth “A lie can run round the world before the truth has got its boots on.” However even if lies sometimes spread more easily than the truth, perhaps in part because they are more palatable and we want to believe them, in the long term the truth matters because the truth has persistence which lies don’t. Perhaps the dwindling number of climate change deniers supports the above. Are there any circumstances in which lying is beneficial? Stephen Rainey writing in practicalethics  suggests that some lies “can also be a kindness, when the truth might serve no good”. Let us accept that in most circumstances lying damages both individuals by depriving them of the truth and trust. Nonetheless is Rainey correct when he suggests some lies might be beneficial in some circumstance? For instance might a government be acting beneficently if it lied about the harm done by the coronavirus to prevent panic? The fact that lying hasn’t been eliminated from human culture over time suggests it isn’t harmful in all circumstances. In this posting I want to examine what these circumstances might be. It might be thought that this is merely an interesting rather than important question, however in seeking to answer this question raises a further question about the balance between acting beneficently and respecting autonomy. I will argue that if I lie to someone and even if my lie benefits him that I also fail to respect him by failing to respect his autonomy.

Most people have no problems with defining a lie. The definition I shall adopt here is that of Sam Harris

“To lie is to intentionally mislead others when they expect honest communication.” lying

Lies so defined can explicit when liars intentionally give someone false information. Lies can also be acts of omission when the liar intentionally withholds information others expect him to provide. Perhaps passive aggression can be a form of lying if it involves withholding information. Liars can be practised by individuals, institutions or even governments.

Let us now consider whether it is ever acceptable to lie for beneficent reasons. Because lying is so prevalent our intuitions suggest that it is. Everyday examples seem to confirm our intuitions. For instance the mother who lies to her child by saying she has no money left when her child demands a second ice cream. Someone who lies to his partner about a surprise party. A government which lies to its citizens about the seriousness of some disease outbreak, such as that caused by the coronavirus, in order to prevent mass panic. Nonetheless as Harris points out we need to be extremely cautious about our intuitions. Firstly we must be sure about our motives being really beneficent. Is the mother above really worried about her child becoming obese or simply taking an easy option? Secondly we must be careful not to damage trust. The government above might avert mass panic but in the future its pronouncements on health matters might not be so readily trusted. If a lie cannot be maintained then it is better not to lie at all in order to retain trust. The Chinese government’s attempt to suppress the full extent of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan seems to support the above. However let us accept that there are at least some cases in which we might lie for beneficent reasons in which our motives are clear and we don’t damage trust. For instance it would be perfectly acceptable to lie to a stalker carrying a knife about the whereabouts of his ex-girlfriend.

Let us accept that in certain circumstances we can act beneficently by lying, telling white lies. Let us further accept that in some of these circumstances trust isn’t damaged. In such circumstances is Rainey correct when he suggests that lying might be an act of kindness? It certainly seems that because we are behaving beneficently that our actions might be classed as acts of kindness. However I now want to argue even if our lies serve a beneficent purpose and can be classed as acts of kindness that nonetheless it is almost always wrong to lie. Most pet owners are kind to their pets and act beneficently towards them but most people don’t want to be treated in the same way as pets however kindly. They want to be recognised as the sort of creatures who can make their own decisions. To be autonomous. Autonomous people govern themselves and this requires making decisions that matter to them. To make decisions that matters to someone requires information and lying deprives him of some of that information. It follows if we lie to someone we fail to respect his autonomy. Moreover if someone becomes aware of being lied to this lack of respect is a form of rudeness see the philosophy of rudeness.html or form of contempt. It further follows if we believe it is right to respect someone’s autonomy that we shouldn’t lie. It further follows if a government lies to or intentionally misleads the electorate over some issue such as Brexit that it not only deprives the electorate of some of the information needed to make a good decision it also shows a lack of respect for the electorate and perhaps even democracy itself. This lack of respect is similar to the lack of respect many colonialists showed for native people even if their motives were beneficent.

I now want to consider two objections to accepting the above conclusion. My first argument will be based on respecting autonomous persons and my second on respecting autonomous decisions. Firstly it might be objected that we should give precedence to acting beneficently over respecting autonomy and that sometimes lying is the only effective way to act in someone’s best interests. I now want to present two counter arguments against accepting the above. Let us accept that if we need to lie to someone in order to act in what we believe to be their best interests that there must be a clash between what we believe to be in their best interests and what they perceive to be in their best interests. It would appear that we believe we know better than the agent about what is in his best interests or should be in his best interests. In this situation we might be accused of epistemic arrogance. Secondly I would argue if we accept the above objection we don’t really understand what respect means. We can sometimes act beneficently towards someone but part time respect isn’t respect we can’t respect someone only some of the time. We can of course respect someone’s courage but not her wit. However when we respect her as a person we can’t respect her only some of the time. Part time respect just isn’t respect at all. It follows if we lie to someone in order to act beneficently we are not giving precedence to acting beneficently over respecting autonomy we are in reality failing to respect autonomy at all.

Now let us consider respecting autonomous decisions. Let accept to respect an autonomous decision means to accept it. It might be objected that any difference between respecting someone’s autonomous decisions and acting beneficently towards him is largely illusory. This objection depends on accepting a substantive account of autonomy in which autonomous decisions must concur with some accepted norms, autonomous decisions must be good decisions. Accepting such an account means that if we lie to someone, who is making a bad decision, in order to act beneficently towards him we are still respecting his autonomy. Bad decisions just aren’t autonomous decisions. However I am reluctant to accept a substantive account of autonomy. A substantive account has become more prominent recently largely in order to make respecting autonomy concur better with the doctrine of informed consent. Unfortunately as I have argued elsewhere a substantive account of autonomy puts itself out of business, see autonomy and toleration . If autonomous decisions must be good decisions in accord with some accepted norms then we can just consider good decisions and autonomy becomes a redundant concept. Of course if someone is to make an autonomous decision he mustn’t be misled or coerced but it follows that if autonomy is to remain a meaningful concept that we should adopt a primitive or Millian account. It further follows if autonomous decisions needn’t be good decisions that if we lie to a mature adult in order to protect him from a bad decision that we are failing to respect his autonomy. I would suggest accepting the above has implications for apology. Insincere apology is a form of lying. Perhaps in most circumstance apologising without really mean it is a form of white lying. Nonetheless such apologising just compounds any wrong by showing a lack of any real respect to the one lied to.

I have argued that it is always wrong to lie if this means we fail to respect someone’s autonomy even this is done for beneficent reasons. The question now arises is lying ever acceptable? If the mother of a young child who pesters her to buy another ice cream lies then her lie can be justified. The child isn’t autonomous yet and having two ice creams isn’t in her best interests. However caution is needed if we accept a primitive account of autonomy as I suggested above then slightly older children who are capable of making autonomous decisions and lying to them fails to respect their autonomy. Sam Harris uses an extreme example and asks should we lie even if with “Nazis at the door and Anne Frank is in the attic”. Of course we should lie. We should lie to protect Anne Frank and her autonomy. Lying to someone who is infringing someone else’s autonomy is perfectly acceptable, lying to protect autonomy is lying to respect autonomy.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly we should never lie if this means failing to respect autonomy even if our lies might be in what we consider to be someone’s best interests. Even white lies are wrong. Secondly if autonomy is to remain a meaningful concept we must always give precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. Lastly lying to autonomous agents can never be kind.