Aspiration

 

People change over time. We become older, bigger and weaker. This posting isn’t concerned with physical changes but changes in what matters to us. We might become a professional sportsperson, a mother or even a priest. These changes often require us to adopt new values and these values help in defining the person we want to be. This posting is concerned with the way in which we acquire these new values. Agnes Callard argues that the way we change our existing values to new ones is by aspiring. In this posting I will firstly outline her idea of aspiration and will then examine an important question what motivates us to aspire.

This examination will be concerned with the choices about values which are connected to character, to the sort of person we are. Some choices are made without reflection, we simply choose the ice cream flavour we prefer. We reflect about other choices. If I want to help my grandchildren flourish I might reflect about how I might assist in this. I use reason to decide which course of action will help me achieve my aim. Now let us assume that I decide to make a major change to the way I live my life. For instance I might decide to become a vegetarian. I can do this for two reasons. I can do so because I believe it is the right thing to do or because I am attracted by the vegetarian lifestyle. If I do so for the first reason then my choice is a result of reflection based on my existing ethical values. It is possible to choose some of our values but I’m not sure that we can choose our ethical values. Let us now assume I make my choice because I’m attracted to the vegetarian lifestyle and that being a vegetarian is not something which I previously valued. In this scenario how do I make my choice? Do I simply decide as I did when choosing an ice cream?  Surely such a big decision shouldn’t be an arbitrary one? Perhaps my choice should be a reflective one based on reason. However a reflective decision is based on our values. If I decide to become a vegetarian then I am changing my values and it might be asked what values I base my decision on. It would seem that I have become dissatisfied with my old values but haven’t yet acquired new ones which could form a basis for my decision. Problems with acquiring new values have lead Agnes Callard to suggest that we acquire these values by aspiration.

What does Callard mean by aspiration? According to Callard,

“The aspirant sees that she does not have the values that she would like to have, and therefore seeks to move herself toward a better valuational condition.” (1)

The aspirant doesn’t decide on better values but tries to move himself towards these values. We usually think of someone as exercising his rational agency if he first considers his values and then decides what to do. Callard wants to reverse this order and say someone when aspiring still exercises his agency by deciding to acquire some different values and throughout the process of acquisition. I’m slightly unhappy about saying an aspirant decides to acquire new values. Aspiration is a process rather a decision perhaps it might be regarded as a smudged decision. Unfortunately there seem to be a problem with how the aspirant comes to aspire to these new values. Perhaps the aspirant glimpses these new values but if this is so what do we mean by glimpse? In the light of this difficulty I will now examine potential alternative means of acquiring new values, perhaps we might not need the idea of aspiration to explain how we acquire new values.

 

Let us accept that values are defined by what we care about. Let us further agree with Harry Frankfurt that what we care about is equivalent to what we love. Love means love in general and not just romantic love. Moreover according to Frankfurt the lover,

“is not free. On the contrary, he is in the very nature of the case captivated by his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice.” (2)

Let us assume that Frankfurt is correct when he asserts that the will of someone is constrained when he comes to acquiring new values. How then might he acquire these values? Perhaps he simply makes an arbitrary choice. I would be reluctant to accept this suggestion for surely acquiring new values which will form a basis for the way someone lives is different from making a choice about flavours of ice cream. It might then be suggested his choice is determined by his character which is linked to his values. This might happen in two ways. First it might be suggested the agent’s choice is determined by his existing character. However if we accept this suggestion it might be questioned whether our agent is really acquiring new values or merely maintaining his existing ones. Secondly it might be suggested that the agent glimpses some character he wants to become. Let us consider Satre’s classic example of someone choosing. He must choose between looking after an ailing mother or joining the French resistance. Did Satre really believe such a choice was completely free? If so we are back to ice cream. Perhaps Satre’s choice was really a choice about what sort of character the agent wanted to become. However the agent hadn’t become that character yet and as yet didn’t have the values of his chosen character. It appears to follow that such a person could best be described as an aspirant. 

It has been suggested above that it is impossible to choose new values based on our current ones. Perhaps our new values emerge from our current ones in some way. This might happen in two ways. Firstly if we seriously reflect on our current values and new values simply emerge. Let us return to our potential vegetarian. Among his current values is not causing unnecessary harm. However he doesn’t value not eating meat. One summer’s day he has time to reflect on his values. He considers causing harm in some detail and comes to believe eating animals harms them. He is well aware that it is unnecessary to eat meat for a healthy diet. He concludes that eating animals causes them unnecessary harm. He becomes a vegetarian and now values not eating meat. It might be suggested that a new value has emerged based on his reflection on his current values. What do we mean by emerged in this scenario? Does it mean he has chosen a new value? I would suggest it doesn’t. The agent has become aware of a value entailed by his current values and becoming aware of a value isn’t the same as choosing a new one. Secondly let us assume that our agent doesn’t reflect very much on his values but that these together with experience of life lead to the emergence of another value. This scenario is similar to the first one. The agent is becoming aware of a value rather than choosing a new one. It appears to follow that it is impossible for somebody to choose new values based on his current ones. Reflection can make us aware of values but it can’t help us choose new ones. Becoming aware of is process but it seems to a different sort of process to the one involved in aspiring. It is of course possible that it is impossible to choose any values by any means because we lack free will. In the light of the above it would seem that provided we can acquire new values and our agency plays some part in this acquisition that Callard’s ideas about aspiration might be helpful in explaining the process.

Unfortunately even if we accept the above a problem remains. Clearly desires can motivate us. According to Frankfurt the things we cares about or love also naturally motivate us. If we don’t act to further what we care about when this is possible then we don’t really care. Let us assume that when we aspire we hope to care about our new beliefs. But new beliefs we have yet to acquire can’t yet motivate. If we aspire to something what motivates us to aspire? Callard suggests that aspiration is a process and that during the course of the process we have a partial grasp of the values we are trying to acquire. Let us agree with Callard that these partially acquired values can motivate us to pursue the acquisition process further. Unfortunately the above problem can be amended. If someone aspires to new values what motivates him to initiate the aspiration process? 

Let us accept that Callard is correct when she suggests that we can’t use our existing values to acquire new values and that we do so by aspiring. However if we do so we must be able to offer an explanation of what initiates the aspiration process. I will now outline two possible explanation. First we aspire because we hope to acquire these new values. What do we mean by hope? Initially someone hoping might described as simply desiring some favoured outcome. Frankfurt points out desires don’t have to have persistence. Hoping seems to have some persistence. Perhaps then if someone hopes means he ‘cares about’ some favoured outcome and ‘caring about’ means that he takes steps to achieve this outcome. Unfortunately a problem remains. Hoping isn’t a mood with no focus. Hoping must be focussed on some specific outcome. If we use hope to explain what motivates us to acquire new values then it cannot be focussed on these new values because we haven’t yet acquired them. Perhaps the above explanation might be modified. Let us accept that one of an aspirants aims is to become a better person. If it is possible to hope to be a better person then this might help to explain what motivates aspiration. It might be objected that the aim of becoming a better person is too vague to be considered as the focus of someone’s hope. Let us now consider a second way in which we might be motivated to aspire. According to John Stuart Mill “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.” Might our dissatisfaction cause us to aspire? Let us also accept that an aspirant is dissatisfied with his current values. It might then be argued that dissatisfaction with his old values rather than these values themselves motivates him to seek new ones. His dissatisfaction motivates him to try and acquire new values. His focus is broad but some of his attempts might allow him glimpse new values which motivates him to aspire further. Aspiration is a process and sometimes as he comes to see these values more clearly he will continue with the process whilst in other cases he might end it.

As we age it seems that we become less concerned with becoming better persons and aspiring and this offers some evidence to support the two explanations offered above. We become more content with our existing values and seek to maintain them rather than acquiring new ones. However many will be unconvinced that the desire to be a better person could initiate the aspiring process. Indeed I am not totally convinced myself. Perhaps then we should reconsider whether it is possible to acquire new values from our existing ones. Perhaps sometimes new experience in conjunction with our existing values might allow us to glimpse new values. Glimpsing these new values doesn’t mean that they are strictly entailed by our existing ones. For instance we might glimpse these new values by the use of analogy. Analogies are never perfect so new values might be suggested by our old values rather than strictly entailed by them. Moreover once we accept these suggested new values and reflect further on them then we might have to change or modify our previous existing values. In in science we are used to the idea of a paradigm shift. Newton’s laws allowed Einstein to develop relativity but once relativity became accepted Newton’s laws had to be modified slightly. Is a paradigm shift in values possible? If so it might be possible to acquire new values which are suggested by our old ones.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion?  Firstly it is at least conceivable that our old values might suggest new ones by analogy and that if we acquire these new values we will be required to amend our old ones.  Secondly we can acquire new values by aspiring. It seems possible that the acquisition process is initiated by a desire to be a better person.

1. Callard, Agnes. Aspiration. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition, Location 192.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1999 Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 135.

What do we mean by Evil?

Few people seem to actively enjoy doing evil acts yet evil seems to be widespread. In this posting I will examine what we mean by evil in order to explain this discrepancy. Evil is a word we use all the time, for instance terrorists and serial killers are often said to be evil. However if saying something or someone is evil is to be useful, to be more than condemnation, then we must be clear what we are talking about. In this posting I will attempt to define a useful definition of evil and I will argue that being evil isn’t a matter of degree, how bad we are, but is concerns with how we are motivated. I will draw a definition between someone who is actively evil and someone who is passively evil, This will lead me to conclude that someone needn’t commit any evil acts or even have a disposition to do so in order to be regarded as evil. Such a position might be regarded as an extreme one by some.

Evil is connected to harm. I will now introduce definitions of an evil act and evil person as suggested by Luke Russell. Russell defines an evil act as follows,

“An action is evil if and only if it is a wrong that is extremely harmful for at least one individual victim, where the wrongdoer is fully culpable for the harm in its extremity, or it is an action that is appropriately connected to an actual or possible extreme harm of this kind and the agent is fully culpable for that action” (1)

Russell defines an evil person as,

“You are an evil person if and only if you are strongly disposed to perform evil action and this disposition is now so firmly fixed that you ought to be treated as a write off.” (2)

These are thoughtful definitions and are a useful starting point for our examination. However accepting these definitions makes it is difficult to account for Hannah Arendt’s “banality of evil”. Moreover intuitively whether an act, however bad, is regarded as evil seems dependent on the definition of an evil person.

I now want to suggest a different account of evil. Sometimes an evil person is contrasted with a virtuous person. Very roughly speaking a virtuous person has a disposition to mostly do good. It might then be suggested that an evil person mirrors this and is someone who has a disposition to do evil. If we accept that an evil action is one which causes great harm for which the agent is culpable then we are accepting a definition akin to that of Russell. I now want to propose a different account of evil. According to David Hume

 “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”.

Perhaps such a person might be regarded rational, which I wouldn’t, but we would certainly regard her as evil. The above suggests that instead of having a disposition to do evil an evil person is simply someone who lacks any disposition to do good when she is capable of doing so even and when doing so would prevent extreme harm. Evil acts don’t require evil intentions but a lack of motivation to do the good. However such a definition is incomplete because using it someone who feels no moral pull because she is incapable of understanding any moral requirements would be regarded as evil. Surely we shouldn’t regard someone who is severely cognitively impaired as evil. Someone who causes great harm but cannot understand any moral requirements not to cause that harm is no more responsible for this harm than the harm caused by an earthquake. I would suggest that an evil action cannot be understood without reference to an agent understanding that the society she lives in has moral requirements even if she doesn’t feel the pull of these requirements. Moreover she must understand what these requirements entail. It is important to be clear that by the inability to feel any moral pull isn’t the same as the inability to understand moral requirements. It follows that if someone is to be regarded as evil that she must be capable of understanding some moral requirements. An evil person might be defined by the following two conditions.

An evil person is someone who lacks any disposition to do good when she is capable of doing so even when doing so would prevent extreme harm.

An evil person is someone who is capable of understanding moral requirements even if she feels no moral pull.

If we accept this definition then it is possible to define an evil action.

An evil action is an extremely harmful act which an evil person enacts or permits to be enacted.

Accepting these definitions means that we need to be able to understand what it means to be an evil person before we can classify some act as evil. It also means that someone need not be actively evil and she can be passively evil. It is possible to differentiate between active and passive evil. Lastly it means that hatred need play no part in evildoing.

This definition is similar to that of Simon Baron Cohen. Baron Cohen wants to redefine evil as the erosion of empathy. (3) This definition refers to evil acts rather than evil persons because whilst autistic people lack empathy to some degree this lack doesn't make them evil. Indeed many high functioning autistic people are attracted by rules and strongly feel the pull of morality. This pull could be due to ‘caring about’ as the defined by Harry Frankfurt or due to emotions unconnected to empathy. The above definition is slightly different from that of Baron Cohen and might be characterised by the inability or the erosion of the ability to feel the pull of morality rather than empathy.

Let us now examine some of the consequences of accepting the above definitions. According to Arendt Adolf Eichmann was an ordinary, rather bland, bureaucrat who was neither perverted nor sadistic, but ‘terrifyingly normal. His motive according to Arendt motive was simply to advance his career in the Nazi bureaucracy. According to Arendt’s account of Eichmann he didn’t enjoy his evil deeds and didn’t have a strong disposition to perform evil actions. It follows that we must reject either Russell’s definition of an evil person or Arendt’s account of Eichmann. Is the definition of an evil person outlined above more compatible with Arendt’s account of the banality of evil? If we accept this definition then an evil person doesn’t have to like to be attracted to evil she merely has to have no motivation not to do evil, she is passively evil. Perhaps Eichmann didn’t enjoy sending Jews to extermination camps but he had no motivation not to do so. It follows that Eichmann fulfilled the first condition of an evil person. I would further suggest that Eichmann must have understood that killing millions of people contravened moral standards. Someone might object to the above and suggest that the Nazis had introduced new moral standards. She might then suggest that the situation Eichmann found himself was responsible for his evil acts rather Eichmann himself. In response I would suggest the secrecy of the final solution suggests that the Eichmann was well aware that he was breaking moral standards and that even if the situation helped determine his actions that he felt no unease at doing so. This failure to feel any moral unease made him an evil man. Much of the above could be applicable in the case of Harold Shipman the British serial killer who murdered around 250 victims. Except for one case Shipman had no motive for murder and appeared to take no pleasure in his actions. However I would suggest the above definition isn’t completely compatible with Arendt’s views. Arendt suggested Eichmann was an ordinary, rather bland, bureaucrat I would suggest that someone who lacks any motivation to prevent harm when she is capable of doing so isn’t normal. Perhaps Eichmann was a bland bureaucrat but he wasn’t ordinary, wasn’t orfinary.

A second consequence of accepting the above definition is that someone might be an evil person but never actually do any evil acts, an evil person might never be an evildoer. This consequence accords well with Nicolas Bommarito’s idea of inner virtue and vice. Such a thought seems to run counter to our intuitions. However it seems possible that someone might have a generous disposition but that she has never been generous because she lives in an extremely deprived circumstances. Let us recall that an evil act must be an extremely harmful one. It seems possible then that someone might live in circumstances in which the opportunity for doing extremely harmful actions doesn’t exist. In such circumstances someone might not be an evildoer but would remain an evil person if she had a disposition to do evil even if she never acted on it. However my definition is more radical than this, Someone can be an evil person even if she never acts evilly or doesn’t have any disposition to act evilly provided she doesn’t have any disposition to do good when she is capable of doing so in order to prevent extreme harm. According to David Hume “all that is necessary for evil to flourish is that good men do nothing” but if we accept the above Hume’s ‘good men’ are actually passively evil. Consider someone who sees a frail person fall in the street and struggle to get up and has no motivation to help him then she should be regarded as an evil rather than simply heartless. Omissions can point out evil. Perhaps if Eichmann had been born in different times he would have been an ordinary bland, bureaucrat who did no evil but nonetheless he would have remained an evil person.

According to the definition of evil we have adopted an evil person feels no moral pull but must understand moral requirements. This leads to the third consequence of accepting the above definition. Someone can only be regarded as evil in reference to the moral standards they lived in. Moral standards aren’t changed easily which I have suggested is one reason for the Nazi’s secrecy about the Holocaust. Nonetheless moral standards do change over longer periods of time. Let us consider slavery. Slavery is a great wrong today and in our time anyone who kept a slave would be regarded as an evil person. Let us now consider the Bristol slave trader Edward Colston. Let us accept that he was a racist but was he also an evil person? If he felt the moral pull and understood the moral requirements of his time then perhaps he wasn’t. The question then becomes was slave trading morally acceptable in his times. This is no means clear. Let us move on to consider an easy case, let us consider Aristotle. Let us assume that Aristotle kept slaves if our assumption is correct was he an evil person? If he felt the moral pull and understood the moral requirements of his times then he wasn’t. I would suggest that keeping slaves was morally acceptable in ancient Greece. In the light of the above it would seem that we should judge people as evil or not according to how they responded to the moral requirements of their time.

The fourth consequence of accepting the above definition means that even if a good person can act badly that she cannot act evilly. Evil acts are defined as extremely harmful actions performed by evil persons. Accepting the above seems to run counter to our intuitions and appears to give us a strong reason to reject the above account of evil. In Bernard Shaw's St Joan a soldier is let out of hell for one day because he does a good thing by giving Joan a straw cross. An evil person does a good thing.  Surely if evil people can do good things then good people can do evil things. The Milligram experiment shows good people can do very bad things but is doing very bad things the same as acting evilly? Before answering this question we must provide a rough definition of what we mean by a good person. In what follows a good person will simply be defined as someone who has a disposition to do good in most situations For the sake of argument let us assume that a good person can act evilly. What reasons can be advanced for a good person acting evilly? Firstly a good person might have a failure in cognition and fail to see that she is acting evilly. Secondly her disposition to do mostly good might be overwhelmed by other forces allowing her to act evilly. Let consider the first of these explanations. Perhaps a good person feels the pull of morality in general way but fails to fully understand what a particular moral norm requires of her. For instance someone might understand the moral norm not to be cruel to others but fail to include animals among those others. Let us assume she is cruel to animals. Let us accept she acts badly but it would seem hard to describe her actions as evil. More generally it would seem hard to describe someone’s action as evil when she fails to fully understand the moral implications of the action. If this wasn’t true then it would be possible to describe the actions of someone who is severely cognitively impaired as evil. Such a description seems to run counter to our intuitions. It follows that a good person cannot act evilly because of a failure in cognition.

Let us now consider the second explanation of how a good person can act evilly. It might argued that a good person can act evilly if her moral sentiments are overwhelmed by other forces. For instance a soldier’s moral sentiments might be overwhelmed by rage at some atrocity and she in turn commits a further atrocity. According to Seneca rage is a form of madness. If so when someone’s disposition to do good is overwhelmed by rage she is cognitively disabled and we are able to use the first explanation above to show she isn’t acting evilly. However let us assume that whilst someone’s disposition to do good is completely overwhelmed that she remains aware she is acting badly. Can someone who can do no other said to be responsible for her actions? Can some act be regarded as evil if the agent cannot be held to be responsible for her actions? If the answers to these two questions are both negative then good people can act badly but it would be wrong to describe those whose disposition to do good are over whelmed by other forces as acting evilly. Such a conclusion might have satisfied Socrates. Perhaps whilst good person can act badly she can’t act evilly.

The fifth consequence of accepting the above means we might question whether terrorists are really evildoers. Terrorists should rightly be regarded as cruel and callous but should they also be regarded as evil? Terrorists have some sort of moral code even if we might regard it as a warped one. If being evil depends on a complete lack of any moral pull then it follows that terrorists aren’t evil. Such a conclusion might not be totally unwelcome for perhaps terrorists might be reformed by changing their moral concepts even if this change is extremely difficult bring about, such a change might not be possible with evildoers such as Eichmann.

The sixth consequence of accepting the above definitions means we can’t label any organisation as evil. This seems counterintuitive. We can’t label the Nazi party or a terrorist organisations as evil even if they foster evil. Dictators and party members may be evil but the party can’t be evil for to be evil some creature must be capable of understanding moral requirements.  Organisations can’t understand moral requirements and so can’t be evil.

Definitions should increase our understanding or be useful. Does the above definition do either of these? Firstly the fact that an evildoer doesn’t feel any moral pull doesn’t excuse her evil actions. If someone knowingly does evil and could have acted otherwise then she can be held accountable for her actions. However if the cause of evil is a failure to feel any moral pull then this might be regarded as a mitigating factor. Secondly one way to combat evil might be to look at how people fail to acquire a sense of moral pull. Children naturally acquire some feeling of morality from their parents and society. Perhaps extremely deprived or abusive childhoods erode a child’s ability to acquire moral sentiments. Good parenting and education might help children acquire these sentiments. Unfortunately some people might not acquire these sentiments for physical reasons. Perhaps a low level of these sentiments might be boosted by pharmacological means. In ‘unfit for the Future’ Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that there is a need for moral enhancement in order to counter the existential dangers. (4) Perhaps more limited targeted pharmacological enhancement might be used to prevent some people from becoming evil, see psychopaths and moral enhancement. Lastly the society we should try to make our society one which decreases the likelihood of evil manifesting itself. I suggested above that whilst Eichmann might have remained an evil man but that in a better society that his evil might not have manifested itself.

1. Luke Russell, 2020 Being Evil, Oxford University Press, page 87
2. Russell, page 114
3. Simon Baron-Cohen, 2011, Zero Degrees of Empathy, Allen Lane, page 4.
4. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.

Against Tact

 Intuitively tact seems to be a virtue. I try to be tactful but recently have questioned whether I should continue to do so. Corina Stan argues that tact isn’t a social luxury and that it becomes imperative in the age we live in, see aeon . Let us agree with Stan that live in difficult times and that without too much reflection tact appears to be a virtue.  However if we reflect on the nature of tact it doesn’t seem so obvious that it really is a virtue. Often tact involves a lack of candour and candour is essential for respect. In this posting. I will attempt to convince myself and others that tact isn’t a virtue.

Before attempting to question as to whether tact is a virtue we should acknowledge that some people can't be tactful. Autistic people are concerned with the truth and tact seems to involve concealing the truth. What we mean by tact? Let us agree that acting tactfully requires paying close attention to the situation and the feelings of others. If this is all that is required for someone to act tactfully then a psychopath could be tactful. A psychopath might pay close attention to the situation and the feelings of others for his own purposes. Let us accept that if tact is to be regarded as a virtue that a psychopath acting to serve his own ends cannot be said to be acting tactfully. In the rest of this posting I will only be concerned with tact when the reason a tactful person pays close attention to the situation and the feelings of others is that he cares about them for their own sake.

Before proceeding I now want to introduce an example which I will use in the rest of this posting. Any definition of tact must be able to account for this example. Consider someone who is overweight and says to a friend “do you think I’m fat”. Intuitively the tactful response would be to say no. The tactful thing to do would be to lie. By saying no we are paying attention to the feelings of the overweight person because we care about him, but do we respect him?

The Cambridge dictionary defines tact as “the ability to say or do the right thing without making anyone unhappy or angry”. Can this definition account for our example of tact. I would suggest it can’t. Clearly if we told the overweight person he wasn’t fat we wouldn’t be making him unhappy or angry but would we be doing the right thing? Provided doing the right thing only means not making someone unhappy or angry then we are. However if we accept this then we have no need to include doing the right thing in our definition. It follows doing the right thing involves more than simply not making someone unhappy or angry. In the above example we tell a lie. Can lying be doing the right thing? The answer to this question depends on what we mean by doing the right thing. More generally if doing the right thing means doing the right thing morally then we would severely restrict the domain in which we can act tactfully. We would exclude many minor situations in which tact seems appropriate such as saying nothing about parking infringements. Perhaps then doing the right thing in the definition of tact means helping or allowing someone to flourish. In most cases helping someone to flourish displays empathy and is a good thing to do. Let us recall that the tact we are concerned with is tact which requires ‘caring about’ the person we are treating tactfully. Unfortunately the above raises two questions. First can we really help someone to flourish by contravening moral norms? If we can’t then doing the right thing requires doing the right thing morally. Secondly let us return to our example if I tell the overweight person that he isn’t fat and I’m not annoying or upsetting him but it might be questioned whether I’m really helping him to flourish? Perhaps telling him that he is indeed overweight might encourage him to diet and flourish better in the future. If we accept this definition then we must be able to do the right thing whilst at the same time not make someone unhappy or angry. This is a big ask and perhaps we should search for a slightly different definition.  

The Oxford dictionary defines tact as “the ability to deal with difficult or embarrassing situations carefully and without doing or saying anything that will annoy or upset other people.” This definition drops the need to do the right thing. Can this second definition account for our example of tact. Clearly if we tell an overweight person that he isn’t fat it would appear we won’t upset or annoy him. In these circumstances this definition permits us to lie. Let us adopt this definition and accept that it permits the telling of white lies. It follows that accepting this definition means someone acting tactfully must be prepared to act in a less than fully candid manner.

I now want to examine whether acting tactfully can be virtuous when doing so involve a lack of candour. For the purposes of this posting acting virtuously will be roughly defined as acting in a manner which usually produces good consequences. I will now present four arguments which attempt to show that because acting tactfully involves a loss of candour that tact should not be regarded as a virtue. Firstly according to Amy Olberding any well-mannered, polite, discourse must involve respect, consideration and toleration. (1) Acting respectfully seems to be incompatible with a lack of candour including the telling of white lies. It follows that if we value both acting politely and acting tactfully we must decide which is the most valuable. Which is the most valuable might depend on the situation involved. However we are social animals and I would suggest we can decide in which situations it would be best to act tactfully and in which to act politely. It follows that tact might be regarded as a situationist virtue unlike justice which is always a virtue. Tact might be a virtue in some situations and not in others. Secondly let us consider our motives for acting tactfully. It might be argued that we sometimes act tactfully from mixed motives. Sometimes we act tactfully partly to benefit ourselves. For instance we might act tactfully simply because we are lazy and just want to bring any discussion to an end. Or perhaps by acting tactfully we are virtue signalling. If others are present we might be preening ourselves in front of them or if others aren't present patting ourselves on the back. However even if our motives aren’t all good ones this doesn’t mean our behaviour can’t have good consequences for others. It follows even if our motives for acting tactfully are mixed that tact might still be regarded as a virtue. Thirdly I want to consider whether acting tactfully has good long term consequences. Does telling an overweight person that he isn’t fat have good consequences in the long term? Clearly telling him that he isn’t fat won’t upset or annoy him has good short term consequences. However if we politely told him that he was indeed fat this might be better in the long term. Perhaps our white lie might assist in giving him a false impression of himself which is damaging in the long term. Accepting the above means that whilst being tactful isn’t always a virtue it can still be a situationst virtue.

I have presented three arguments to show tact isn’t a virtue. None of these arguments should prevent us from regarding tact as acting virtuously in some situations. Tact can be a situationist virtue. I will now argue that if tact involves a lack of candour it isn’t a virtue in any situation. My argument will again be based on a lack of respect. Of course being less than candid with someone doesn’t automatically mean that we aren’t concerned with and don’t care about him. Perhaps in some situations our lack of candour might be seen as an act of kindness. But acting kindly towards someone isn’t the same as respecting him. Colonialists can act kindly towards subject peoples, patriarchs kindly towards women and pet owners towards their pets but this kindness doesn’t involve respect. Even loving needn’t involve respect. I have previously argued that most people don’t want to be treated like as subjected people never mind as pets, they want to be recognised as the sort of creatures who can make their own decisions, see Lying and autonomy . Let us accept that respect matters to people. It might be objected that even if we accept the above it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t act tactfully. My objector might argue we can respect someone for his physical strength but not for his wisdom. He might then suggest that we can act tactfully towards someone some of the time and still respect him the rest of the time. He might conclude that acting tactfully is compatible with part time respect. In response I would suggest that the idea of part time respect is nonsensical. In my objectors example he respected someone’s strength but this respect isn’t part time, she doesn’t believe that he is strong some of the time and is weak the rest of the time. Let us accept that it is impossible to respect someone part time. In spite of the above it might be suggested that acting tactfully can be more important than acting respectfully. If we fail to be candid with people by telling them white lies in order to prevent them becoming annoyed or unhappy. We are failing to respect them as persons and are treating them as children. If people values not being annoyed or unhappy more than being respected then acting tactfully can be regarded as acting virtuously. However if people value not being treated as children more than being annoyed or made unhappy then tact isn’t a virtue in any situation.

In response to the above it might be suggested that not all cases of acting tactfully involve a lack of candour. In might be further suggested that acting tactfully in such a way should be regarded as acting virtuously. However if we accept these suggestions is there any difference between acting tactfully and acting politely? If there isn’t does tact remain a useful concept? Perhaps instead of being tactful we should simply be polite and candid. I have previously argued that politeness matters, see the philosophy of rudeness. 

What are the implications of the above? Should we stop trying to be tactful and accept that tact isn't a virtue? Tonight I complemented someone on the taste of her chutney which was unexceptional. In the light of the above ir might appear I was wrong to do so. It has been assumed in the above that the sole purpose of language is truthful communication. Robin Dunbar argues that another purpose of language is to bond ourselves with others. If Dunbar is correct then perhaps tact plays an essential part in this bonding and I was right to complement someone about her chutney. Perhaps Corina Stan is correct when she argues that tact isn’t a social luxury but an imperative in the age we live in. Maybe the above only means we should approach tact with caution and regard it as a situationist virtue as suggested above. I am somewhat reluctant to accept this conclusion. I have argued tact involves a lack of candour and this involves a lack of respect. Bonding requires solidarity but can we truly bond with someone we don’t fully respect? If we can’t then being tactful might actually damage bonding However not all cases of acting tactfully involve bonding. For instance doctors often act tactfully towards patients and should be careful because even if being tactful is a caring thing to do it still involves a lack of respect. Lastly we shouldn’t confuse tact with toleration. I have based my case against tact on respect, respect for someone’s autonomy. Respect for someone’s autonomy means we sometimes have to accept what we regard as bad choices. However respect for autonomy doesn’t mean we have to respect these actual choices or say we do so provided this is done politely. Perhaps then tact isn’t really a virtue in any situation and instead of trying to be tactful we should be polite but candid.

1. Amy Olberding, 2019, The Wrongness of Rudeness, Oxford University Press, page 28
2. Robin Dunbar, 2021, FRIENS, Little Bown, chapter 9

Hating Vegans and Moral Distress

 

Most people are indifferent to vegetarians and vegans some however dislike them and a few appear to hate vegans. Kristof Dhont and Joachim Stoeber ask “what drives people to lash out at others who choose to eschew eating animals out of compassion?” (1) The anger of these people is mostly directed at vegans but also applies to vegetarians. In the rest of this posting I will use the term veg*ns to refer to both vegans and vegetarians. In what follows I will outline two reasons Dhont and Stoeber give for this anger and then examine whether these reasons can justify anger. I will argue they can’t. In the course of my arguments I will also argue that one reason why some people dislike veg*ns is caused by a feeling of moral distress. Lastly I will suggest that my argument involving moral distress might be applicable in more broadly.

First let us consider what is meant by moral distress. Moral distress might be defined as the distress someone feels when she knows the right action to take but is constrained from taking it. Moral distress so defined differs from moral dilemmas which can also cause distress. A moral dilemma is when an agent is unable to choose between two moral options. Someone experiencing moral distress has no doubt about the moral option she should choose. A soldier ordered by her commander to carry out some order which she knows is wrong might suffer from moral distress but she isn’t facing a moral dilemma. In most cases of moral distress the constraining element is externally imposed. However in what follows I will assume that the constraining element might also be internally imposed. An agent feels the pull of morality but is constrained by some of her other non-moral desires. For instance someone might believe being unfaithful to her partner is wrong but the pleasure of infidelity constrains her ability to do what she considers to be right thing to do causing her to suffer from moral distress. In what follows moral distress will refer to internally imposed moral distress.

Let us now consider hating veg*ns and moral distress. Many of the statements by those who dislike veg*ns are directed at the veg*ns personally rather than being focussed on their arguments in favour of veg*nism. Can this direction be morally justified? According to Dhont and Stoeber some meat eaters feel that veg*ns, by not eating meat are expressing moral disapproval of their meat eating. Let us accept that even if most veg*ns don’t explicitly express such disapproval that their behaviour does so implicitly. I now want to argue that this disapproval leads to moral distress and that this distress cannot justify their anger. First let us assume that a meat eater believes veg*ns disapproval is justified. She feels the pull of morality but some of her other desires outweigh this moral pull. She has conflicting desires because she desires to eat meat and act morally and this conflict causes moral distress. She relieves this distress by expressing anger with veg*ns. Her anger is directed at veg*ns because they remind her of her moral inadequacy. However such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. It is misplaced because it fails address the real cause of his distress, her rejection of the pull of morality. She is shooting the messenger and avoiding addressing the message. Her anger is unjustified because she accepts the veg*n case. Secondly let us assume our meat eater doesn’t accept the veg*n case and believes veg*n’s disapproval is unjustified. In order to be consistent she must also believe that the argument used by veg*ns to support not eating meat is flawed. Let us briefly consider the veg*n argument. The veg*n argument has two premises. First a veg*n might suggest that it is wrong to cause any creature to suffer against its will for our pleasure. Secondly she might suggest that meat eaters eat meat for their own pleasure. However the second premise has not always been true. Someone living in a hunter gatherer society might have needed to eat meat in order to survive.  Nonetheless in most parts of the world someone can live a perfectly healthy life without eating meat. It would seem to be difficult to reject the second premise. Let us accept that in most places people don’t have to eat meat and eating meat is a lifestyle choice. It follows that if meat eaters are to reject veg*n’s argument that they must find good reason to reject the first premise. For instance they might argue that animals which are reared in good conditions and are slaughtered humanely don’t suffer against their will. However if a meat eater believes her arguments against the veg*n one is successful it is hard to see what reason she has to be angry with veg*ns. We are usually become angry because of some wrong done to us or others we care about. In the above scenario even if a meat eater believes veg*ns are misguided about the wrongness of eating meat this gives her no reason to believe that they wrong her and other meat eaters, he has no reason to feel angry. Perhaps then meat eaters hate veg*ns it is because deep down they have a lingering belief that their arguments for eating meat are contrived and don’t fully dismiss the pull of the veg*n argument. If meat eaters can’t fully dismiss the veg*n argument then this causes moral distress. This distress causes anger which once again is directed at veg*ns because meat eaters remind them of this distress. However once again such anger is both misplaced unjustified because it doesn’t address the real cause of meat eaters’ moral distress.

Dhont and Stoeber advance a second reason to explain why some meat eaters become angry with veg*ns. Some meat eaters might suggest veg*ns damage society and that this justifies their anger. Their argument contains two premises and might be summarised as follows. Firstly society is valuable and it is wrong to damage it. Secondly veg*ns damage society because they damage social cohesion, collective order and stability. It follows that because veg*n way of life damages society that it is wrong and meat eaters anger can be justified. Let us call this argument the social cohesion argument. Let us accept the second premise. However the early Christian martyrs, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes all damaged the social cohesion of the societies they lived in. Some members of these societies did become angry with Christians, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes. If we are to accept the social cohesion argument then we must conclude that their anger was justified. It seems hard to accept such a conclusion. If we accept the second premise of the social cohesion argument but reject the conclusion then we must reject the first premise. It is hard to see how this might be done but perhaps the first premise might be amended as follows. Society is valuable and we shouldn’t damage the society we live in unless the cause we do so for is just.  It follows that if we damage the social cohesion of the society we live in because it is unjust that far from damaging society we are improving it.  It follows that our anger with people for damaging social cohesion cannot be justified if the cause these people are fighting for is a just one. It further follows the argument about veg*ns damaging social cohesion reverts to our original argument about whether veg*ism can be justified.

However the above argument might be modified. It might be argued even if the fact that veg*ns damage social cohesion doesn’t provide a reason for anger that they also damage the natural order of things and this might justify their anger. This argument claims that veg*nism is unnatural. This is a dangerous argument to make for many people in the past might argued that the patriarchy was part of the natural order. Nonetheless let us accept that it was natural for our ancestors to eat meat. However if we argue from the above premise that it is natural to eat meat means veg*nism is wrong then we must introduce a second premise. We must assume that our nature is permanently fixed. It is easy to call what is necessary for an animal to survive natural when in fact it is just necessary at the time. For instance perhaps it is necessary for hunter gatherers to eat meat in order to survive but meat eating isn’t a necessity for a modern city dweller. If a meat eater isn’t prepared to accept this second premise that our nature is permanently fixed then she has no justification based on our nature to become angry with veg*ns. Once again it would appear that if a meat becomes angry with veg*ns her anger is due to internal moral conflict, moral distress. However for the sake of argument let us assume that our nature is permanently fixed. Nonetheless even if we accept this unlikely assumption there is still no justification for meat eaters becoming angry with veg*ns. Veg*ns might be misguided but they don’t harm meat eaters and so give no cause for anger. Once again if meat eaters become angry with veg*ns and this would appear to be caused by internal moral conflict, moral distress.

In conclusion I accept that most meat eaters don’t accept the pull of the veg*n argument and as a result don’t become angry with veg*ns, they simply accept them.  However I have argued that some meat eaters who do dislike veg*ns do so, not because they feel they are doing something wrong but because they feel the pull of veg*n arguments at least to some degree. I further argued that this pull together with their desire to eat meat causes them to suffer internal conflict or moral distress. I conclude that such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. I further concluded that hating veg*ns both matters and is wrong. I would suggest that moral distress can lead to hate in even more important areas. Some people seem to dislike BLM activists. I would suggest that sometimes this dislike originates in a similar way to the dislike of veg*ns. Those who dislike BLM activists might feel the moral pull of the BLM cause but resist bowing to it because they are unwilling to make sacrifices to aid the cause. This conflict causes moral distress. In fairness some deprived people have very little to sacrifice. Much the same argument might be applied to some cases of misogyny.

1. https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/vegan-resistance

Raw Anger

 

Let us agree that uncontrollable anger is bad for us because it harms us and damages our relationships. Young children often exhibit uncontrollable anger but as they grow up they learn to control it. Uncontrollable anger might be acceptable in toddlers and their parents might even find it amusing but it isn’t acceptable in teenagers and adults. Controlling our anger matters. Agnes Callard points out that when philosophers argue about how we should control our anger they are often talking about refining our raw anger by losing certain elements of our original raw anger rather than simply controlling it. (1) Some limit our anger to indignation or resentment whilst others such as Martha Nussbaum suggest that we should transmute our anger into searching for a way to right the original wrong. Callard argues in doing so they lose the raw feeling of anger. In this posting I want to consider whether our raw feeling of anger matters and whether we have reasons to completely refine our raw anger provided of course this is possible.

What does Callard mean by the dark feeling of raw anger? When we become angry we undergo certain physiological changes. For instance our heartrate increases. Many of these feelings could also apply to rage but it is important not to confuse anger with rage. We can rage against events or animals but it seems our anger is always directed at persons. Whilst our anger is directed at persons it is focussed on some moral wrong. Moral wrong in this context might simply mean a failure in moral concern by others who fail to respect or consider us. Because our feelings are focussed on some wrong these feelings involve a sense of grievance and a desire for revenge. It would be impossible to feel anger without at least some sense of grievance but some can people can feel aggrieved without feeling angry. It follows a sense of grievance is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for anger. Revenge seems more central to our idea of anger and is also a necessary but not a sufficient condition for raw anger. Some authors such as Nussbaum use the term payback instead of revenge but this seems to be yet another attempt to refine anger.  For this reason I will continue to use the term revenge when referring to raw anger. In this posting raw anger will be defined as a combination of physiological changes which we interpret negatively together with a sense of grievance against the offender and a desire for revenge.

Let us now consider Callard’s example of someone who robs us making us angry. After our initial angry reaction should we refine it and seek to rectify the situation? It might be suggested that if the situation doesn’t change that we have no reason to do so. However let us assume that after some time the offender makes a sincere apology and recompenses us for our losses. In this situation should we let our raw anger go? Callard presents two arguments to show that we still have reasons to retain our raw anger. The first is her argument for grudges. According to Callard,

“Once we have reason to be angry we have reason to be angry forever” (2)

If we had reason for a grievance that reason remains even if the offender apologises his apology doesn’t remove the reason for our grievance. Of course a sincere apology might give us reason to attach less importance to our grievance and alter our behaviour but according to Callard it doesn’t eradicate the grievance. The example of rape seems to support Callard’s position. Even if the rapist sincerely apologises and vows never to do so again and the victim forgives the rapist her sense of grievance might remain and would remain and seem to be fully justified. Callard’s second argument is the argument for revenge. According to Callard,

“The Argument for Revenge is simply that revenge is how we hold one another morally responsible” (3)

We do so according to Callard by,

“you make my wronging of you into a general principle and then “educate” me by imposing it on me.” (4)

This argument might be roughly summarised as follows. A harms B. It follows that A believes it is good for him to harm B. If he thought it bad for him he wouldn’t do so. B makes A’s behaviour into a norm. B harms A and B learns harming others is bad. Of course the possibility of revenge might simply deter someone from wrongdoing but revenge can also teach an offender that his actions are wrong. Let us accept Callard’s two arguments for retaining our raw anger.

However even if we accept that we have some reasons to retain our raw anger this doesn’t automatically mean we should do so. We might have even stronger reasons to refine our anger. A permanently angry society would be a violent one. Let us first consider our desire for revenge. We are no longer a tribal society so it might be suggested that we should let go of our desire for revenge in order to create a less violent society. Two objections might be raised to this suggestion. Firstly it might be objected that if we do so that we damage both our self-respect and the respect others have for us. We might be seen by others and ourselves as pushovers. This would occur if we simply repressed or lost all anger. However if we refine rather than simply lose our anger we might retain our respect. According to Nussbaum if we shift our focus from how we feel to the cause of our anger our focus also shifts to a set of projects aimed at improving both society and the offender. (5) If we refine our anger by losing our desire for revenge then we aren’t acting passively, shouldn’t be seen as pushovers and the objection fails. Secondly it might be objected that if we refine our anger by losing our desire for revenge that we deprive the offender of some benefit. Callard argues that if we give up our desire for revenge that we would be failing to hold someone as morally responsible and failing to educate him as to what is morally required. In response I would suggest that our desire for revenge is mostly a desire to educate the offender that we aren’t pushovers, to teach him a lesson in moral behaviour. Nonetheless let us agree with Callard that our desire for revenge also holds someone as responsible for his actions and educates him to some degree about what is required morally by society. In a tribal society we might well have good reason to pursue revenge. However we don’t live in a tribal society and any educational benefits of revenge might be achieved by other means. For instance it is perfectly possible to withhold trust without feeling any need for revenge. Altering someone’s status within society by the withdrawal of trust might educate an offender about what is morally required. It follows even if revenge might deliver some benefits that these benefits might be more effectively by other means and that the possible benefits delivered by revenge do not give us reason not to refine our raw anger.

According to Callard the holding of a grievance or grudge is an essential element of anger. I have argued above that the withdrawal of trust might achieve much the same benefits as revenge. Let us accept that if we lose our desire for revenge but retain our sense of grievance that we have refined our anger to some degree. However some would argue that we should go further in refining our anger by also letting go of our sense of grievances. Let us accept that Callard is correct in her assertion that once we have a grievance that we have reason for our grievance forever. It follows it might be impossible to refine our anger further. In the real world it would be very difficult for someone who has been raped to give up her sense of grievance even if she can give up her desire for revenge. According to Nussbaum traditional anger can transmute into transitional anger,

“quickly puts itself out of business, in that even the residual focus on punishing the offender is soon seen as part of a set of projects for improving both offenders and society.” (6)

If we accept Callard is correct then raw anger cannot be totally refined. Nonetheless it might be possible to move on. Even if the rape victim cannot let go of her grievance she can take part in a set of projects for improving both the offender and society, she can move on by moderating her behaviour whilst retaining her sense of grievance. Our behaviour isn’t determined by a single reason but by a set of reasons. Individual reasons within this set are weighted, some are more important than others. We can retain a reason to act whilst the weight given to this reason is changed by additions to the set of our reasons. If the rapist genuinely apologises and seeks to reform the rape victim might give less weight to her grievance whilst still retaining it.

In the above it has been assumed above that Callard is correct when she argues that if a victim has a reason for a grievance that she has that reason forever. I now want to argue that if a victim has a reason for a grievance that she doesn’t always have this reason forever. Callard assumes that that a victim has a grievance because of some past event and that she has reason for this grievance forever because the past cannot be changed. Of course the past cannot be changed but a grievance isn’t simply concerned with some past event but must of necessity be directed at someone. To make this clearer let us return to our rape example. Let us assume that the rapist is an adult but has the mental age of a five year old. In this situation the victim has been wronged but would she be justified in holding a grievance with the offender? I would suggest she won’t. It would seem that whether someone can have a grievance with some offender depends on the internal make-up of the offender.  I have argued elsewhere that emotions serve as alarms by maintaining our focus on some potential danger.  A grievance maintains our focus on the fact that someone might harm us. If we accept the above then a victim may have a reason to maintain a grievance with an offender because it alerts her to danger but that if the offender changes the danger might cease and she loses her reason to maintain her grievance. Let us once again return to our rape victim. Let us assume that the victim has been violently raped and that her grievance alerts her to the dangers posed by the offender. Let us now assume at some later date the offender has a severe stroke which leaves him in a vegetative state. In this new situation the victim might still be unhappy and hurt but she has lost her reason to hold onto her grievance with the offender because it maintains her focus on danger. It follows that Callard isn’t correct when she argues that all victims who have a reason for a grievance have those reasons forever. All victims have been wronged forever but not all victims have reasons to hold onto their grievances forever.

How do we differentiate between those victims who have reason to maintain their grievances and those who don’t? I have argued above the focus of our anger is on some wrong but that it is directed at the offender. I have further argued that if the offender changes in some radical way that we sometimes have reason to lose a grievance. Lastly I argued that the reason we have to maintain a grievance against an offender because it focusses on our need for caution in our dealings with him. It follows if the offender changes so that we no longer have to be so cautious in dealing with him that we lose our reason for our grievance. In my above example because the rapist has a stroke and poses no further threat to the victim she loses her reason to maintain her sense of grievance. In the above example it is clear that the offender has changed but in more general cases how do we know the offender has changed and that as a result we have lost our reason for maintaining our grievance with him? Perhaps if the offender makes a sincere apology and takes steps to repair the damage done then we should try to lose our sense of grievance. However if the offender doesn’t change we have reason to maintain our grievance and shouldn’t unconditionally forgive him.

 

1. Agnes Callard, 2020, On Anger, Boston Review Forum, page 15.
2. Callard, page 18
3. Callard, page 18
4. Callard , page 19
5. Martha Nussbaum, 2015, Transitional Anger. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 51.
6. Nussbaum, page 51

Games, Sport and Drugs

In this posting I want to examine the links between games, sport and performance enhancing drugs. Hopefully this examination will shed some light on interesting questions. Is sport always a game? Playing football clearly is playing a game but is the same true of someone competing in athletics? I will argue all sport is a game. Play matters to children as it helps them learn. Does play matter to adult or is it just a trivial pursuit? I will argue that playing games matters to adults. I will further argue sport matters because playing games matters. What reasons can be advanced for not taking performance enhancing drugs when playing sport? I will argue that taking performance enhancing drugs erodes the value of sport. Before beginning my examination I will try to define what is meant by a game and sport.

What do we mean by a game? Games vary greatly. Snakes and ladders, Grand Theft Auto and football are all games but they are all very different. Wittgenstein argued that it is impossible to define a game. (1) In what follows I will use the definition of Bernad Suits adopted by John Danaher. (2) According to Danaher a game must have a goal, some rules and a certain attitude. The goal of a game is some outcome that is intelligible apart from the game. Achieving checkmate or scoring more goals that the opposition by full time would be goals of a game. The rules of a game are constitutive rules, they help define the game by defining the ways in which the goal of the game can be reached. These rules can be regarded as artificial obstacles to achieving the goal. For instance a player must take his turn and go up ladders and down snakes. A goal is only scored if the ball is kicked or headed into the net. Lastly for some activity to count as a game the player or players must commit to accepting the rules of the game in order to make the game possible. This commitment is a commitment not to cheat. For instance handling the ball into the net would not be playing football. This is a very broad definition of games and might include lots of activities we wouldn’t normally consider as games such as knitting. Danaher points out that if some billionaire decided to build himself a house which he could easily obtain by other means that he would be playing a game. The objective is the finished house. The rule is build it himself, an artificial obstacle. The attitude is to do so only by himself. It follows games need not be competitive. In spite of the broadness of this definition I will adopt it in what follows.

Is engaging in sport playing a game? We talk about playing a game and we often talk about playing sport which suggests that it is. Certainly some sports are games such as football but are all sports games? I now want to argue that all sports are games. I will further argue that sports might be defined as a subset of games in general involving competition. However chess is a competitive game and isn’t usually thought of as a sport. Sport might then be better defined as a subset of games involving physical competition. It might be objected that athletes running in a race aren’t playing a game. However if we accept Danaher’s definition of a game they are. An athlete’s objective is to win the race, he must do so by running round the course and not cheat by taking a shortcut. Let us accept that sport is a subset of games which involve physical competition. Accepting the above means that we can explain the difference between elite runners and fun runners running a marathon. Elite runners are competing and fun runners who aren’t. Elite runners are engaging in sport whilst fun runners are simply playing a game. Accepting the above also means that athletes training for sport aren’t engaging in sport but preparing for sport.

Does playing games have any value? It might be suggested that playing some games is a trivial pursuit of little value. However I now want to argue that playing difficult games is valuable. According to Danaher,

“Games will be arenas in which human autonomy and agency can be nurtured and developed. They will provide opportunities for humans to think, plan, and decide; to cultivate moral virtues such as courage, generosity, and fair play; and to display ingenuity and creativity. This is not an unusual or alien idea. People have long argued that the value of sports, for example, lies in their capacity to develop such attributes and provide outlets for human agency to flourish.” (3)

If we accept Danaher’s position then participation in sport matters because sport is a game and games enable players to exhibit and develop character by fostering certain virtues, I have argued this previously, see wooler.scottus . It might be objected that whilst some game playing is connected to character that it is ridiculous to say that this is true of all games. My objector might point out that playing ‘snakes and ladders’ doesn’t help develop character. He might give as a reason that the goal of the game in this case is just too trivial. He might then proceed to argue that any goal in any game is trivial because we place artificial obstacles, the rules, in our way of achieving it. In response to my objector I would accept that for adults the playing of ‘snakes and ladders’ is indeed a trivial pursuit. However few, if any, games of ‘snakes and ladders’ are played purely between adults. ‘Snakes and ladders’ is usually played by a group of adults and children. ‘Snakes and ladders’ helps teach children not to cheat, the virtue of honesty. The virtue of honesty fosters the development of good character. The goal when playing ‘snakes and ladders’ is to reach the finish first but I would suggest when playing ‘snakes and ladders’ we have two other goals in mind. First simply to have a bit of fun, another trivial pursuit. Secondly to teach children not to cheat a non-trivial pursuit connected to the development of character. These goals could be seen as a mixture of instrumental and intrinsic goals. All goals capture our attention and I will follow Bennett Helm in regarding then as the focus and sub focus of our attention (4). Perhaps when playing ‘snakes and ladders’ the sub focus is on reaching the finish first whilst the focus is on teaching children to play games fairly. It might appear that knocking a white ball into a hole is a trivial pursuit but if it helps develop character it isn’t. Knocking the ball into the hole is the sub focus of the game whilst developing good character is the focus.

Let us accept that games are valuable because they foster character. I now want to argue that games are valuable for another reason. I will now argue some games are valuable because they give us a sense of achievement. Achievement isn’t simply about winning it is about how we win. An achievement consists of a product and a process by which the product is attained. I will only consider the process here. According to Gwen Bradford there are two essential elements to any achievement (5). For something to be an achievement it must be difficult and the agent must cause it competently. I will only consider difficulty here. If something is difficult to do then we have to make an effort which engages our will. Let us accept that a life in which someone exercises his will is a better one than one in which he simply exists or spends his time daydreaming. It follows that because some games are concerned with achievement which is difficult that these games have value because they foster the will. Of course not all games can give us a sense of achievement. Winning at ‘snakes and ladders’ isn’t difficult and requires little effort. However many games are difficult and this is true of sport which by definition used above require physical effort.

It might be objected that sports differs from games in general by having a different focus. For instance it might be suggested that professional sport shows that the focus of sport isn’t on character. The focus of professional sport is on earning a living, doing a job, rather than on character. My objector seems to agree with me that the focus of sport isn’t simply on winning and that winning is a sub focus, but disagree with me about the real focus. The fact that we place artificial obstacles, the rules, in the way of winning seems to support the above. Let us consider the focus of professional footballers. I am prepared to agree with my objector that their focus is on earning a living but the focus of the players isn’t of necessity the focus of the game itself. I am also prepared to accept that a main focus of players in any game is on winning but would argue that this isn't the focus of the game. It might be objected that players can have a focus games can't. In response I would suggest that the focus of games is on what we find valuable about them, the reason we play them. Let us accept the rules of any game place restrictions on what players can do. If we accept that these rules aren’t purposeless then we must ask the question what is their purpose? This purpose could be to protect the players from something or to enable them to do something.  For instance the rules in football might protect the players from injury. However it is hard to see what the rules in athletics protect the athletes from. Moreover the rules in football extend far beyond those needed for player protection. Perhaps the purpose of the rules is to enable athletes in some way.

If we accept the above what might the rules of the game enable players to do? I will now argue that the rules of a game enable the players gain a sense of achievement and develop certain virtues both of which are valuable. Let us consider achievement first. The rules of a game place artificial obstacles in our way of obtaining the goal of the game. It follows the rules of the game make obtaining this goal difficult to some degree. It has been argued above that doing something difficult gives us a sense of achievement. It follows that the rules of the game help give us a sense of achievement. The rules of the game don’t help or hinder professional footballers from making a living but they can give them a sense of achievement. Let us now consider virtue. The rules of a game enable athletes to demonstrate of develop certain qualities. These qualities can be physical or mental qualities. For instance it might be argued that the rules of football might enable a footballer to develop and demonstrate his ability to head the ball. However it might be argued that the rules of a game don’t help a player in developing or demonstrating his physical skills. All obstacles make something harder to do and it difficult to see how making something harder to do can assist players to demonstrating or develop their physical skills. Do the rules of football assist a player develop her heading skills, surely a player can develop these skills in the absence of rules? Do the rules, artificial obstacles, assist athletes develop mental traits? Our intuitions suggest that the answer should be yes. We naturally talk about athletes exhibiting determination, patience, courage and not letting their heads drop. These traits seem to be a form of resilience. If we accept that sport fosters these traits then because these traits are connected to good character sport helps develop character. It might be objected that I am presenting a completely unrealistic outdated Corinthian ideal of sport. In response I would point out that sport isn’t just about winning it is about winning fairly. Someone can win something without being fair. Life is full of winners and losers and isn’t fair. Acting fairly seems to be totally unconnected to winning, consider winning a war. If we accept that fairness is an essential element of sport then we must ask the question why? I argued above that the rules of a game don’t enable players to develop or demonstrate their physical skills. I now want to argue that the same applies to fairness. The simple fact a game is fair doesn’t affect the players athletic abilities. The fact that a game is fair allows players to develop and demonstrate certain beneficial mental qualities or virtues. It follows that the rules of a game foster certain virtues in those who play it. It further follows what is valuable about games is also what is valuable about sport.

Let us accept that sport is valuable because it fosters a sense of achievement and encourages certain virtues. What implications does our acceptance have for the taking of performance enhancing drugs? These drugs are endemic in some sports such as professional cycling. Perhaps if these drugs were tested and found to be safe the rules of some sports could be amended to permit their use. According to Julian Savulescu,

 “performance enhancement is not against the spirit of cycling; it is the spirit cycling” he goes on to suggest that “we should focus on monitoring the athletes’ health rather than on losing a war on doping”, see Practical Ethics.

In response it might be argued that if performance enhancing drugs were only available to some athletes the fairness element of sport would disappear. However let us assume that these drugs are safe, cheap and available to all. In these circumstances it might be suggested that the fairness element of sport isn’t damaged because enhancing drugs are available to all. However in these circumstances can athletes still gain a sense of achievement, develop and display their character? Let us accept than sport encourages courage, fortitude, resilience and patience. If performance enhancing drugs are introduced into sport then perhaps the exercise of these qualities becomes easier. If the exercise of these qualities becomes too easy then sport no longer helps in the development of character. Moreover even if the introduction of these drugs doesn’t damage the development of these qualities it remains hard to see how their introduction benefits sport. If these drugs don’t benefit one athlete more than another it is hard to see why any athlete would want to take them. However if they benefit some athletes at the expense of others they damage the fairness of sport. They shift the focus of sport from character development to winning. Lastly I have argued that sport fosters character by fostering the will due to achievement. However if the scale of someone’s achievement depends on the degree of difficulty involved and this difficulty is decreased by the use of drugs then his achievement is diminished.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly sport is a game. Secondly games are valuable. The value can be trivial in some cases but all games have value. Thirdly performance enhancing drugs decrease the value of sport. Lastly Danaher has argued the AI and increasing automation will lead to widespread loss of jobs which will further lead to a loss of meaning. In these circumstances Danaher further argues playing games can bring some value into our lives (6). Perhaps he is right, I’m not sure. I have argued elsewhere that increasing automation might make sport more important for many people in the future wooler.scottus . Lastly if game playing might bring more meaning into the lives of who lose their jobs due to automation might game playing also bring more meaning into the lives of the elderly who give up their jobs when they retire. Perhaps old age is a time for games  rather than being on holiday.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 65.
2. Danaher John, 2019, Automation and Utopia, Harvard University, page 231
3. Danaher, page 234
4. Bennett Helm, 2010 Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press
5. Gwen Bradford, 2015, Achievement, Oxford University Press
6. Danaher, chapter 7.

Coronavirus Passports

  

The Covid-19 pandemic lockdown has caused great damage to the way people lead their lives and the economy. It is in the interests of both society and individuals to lift the lockdown. One way this might be done would be by the issuing of covid-19 immunity passports. According to Olivia Kates the path to reopening public life should be set by expert health officials, with close attention to justice and equity, and at no point on that path should anyone be stopped and asked, “Show me your passport”, see Hastings Center . In this posting I want to argue that the introduction of covid-19 passports would be fair in certain circumstances should be accepted.

What conditions would need to be satisfied before we could consider the introduction of covid-19 immunity passports? Firstly if a fully tested vaccine became available which offered a high degree of protection and that those vaccinated couldn’t pass on the virus to others. If this condition is meet then it would be feasible to introduce a covid-19 passport. Secondly if it is ascertained that those who have had covid-19 have develop antibodies which protect them from reinfection for a reasonable period of time. In addition a test must have been developed which can tell whether someone has acquired these antibodies. If either of these conditions can be meet then it would also be feasible to introduce a covid-19 passport for a limited period dependent on how long the immunity lasts. 

What reasons can be advanced for the introduction of these passports? Firstly it should allow passport holders greater freedom to go to the places they want because they won’t pass the virus on to others and won’t become a burden on our health services. Secondly if the number of passport holders was large enough this might help revive society and the economy quicker without risking another peak of infections. In certain settings social distancing isn’t feasible. For instance when eating out or going to the theatre or attending large sporting events. If during the pandemic only passport holders were able go to restaurants, to attend the theatre or large sporting events then perhaps these place could benefit. Lastly let us assume that an effective vaccine becomes widely available. In these circumstances the extreme pressure on society and the economy might lead some to propose mandatory vaccination. In these circumstances covid-19 passports might relieve this pressure whilst causing less damage to personal autonomy. In light of the above reasons exist for the introduction of covid-19 passports.

Let us assume that an effect vaccine becomes available. Let us also assume that the vaccine will be made available to all. In these circumstances would we still have reasons to introduce corona virus passports? I will now argue that we have two reasons to introduce passports. Firstly any vaccination will take time. The introduction of passports might enable restaurants, sporting venues and theatres to reopen earlier than would be possible otherwise. Such earlier reopening would benefit the institutions involved and permit greater freedom to passport holders. Secondly some people such as anti-vaxxers might not want to become vaccinated and passports would offer an incentive to do so. It would appear that even with the advent of an effective corona virus vaccine that we still have reasons for a temporary introduction of passports. What reasons can be advanced for their non-introduction?

First it might be argued that covid-19 passports would lead to a divided society, those who have passports and those who don’t. It might then be argued a divided society is a bad society. A divided society need not be a bad society unless this division is unfair. If the purpose of covid-19 passports only benefits passports holders then it might be argued that non-passport holders are being treated unfairly because they are being denied the benefits available to passport holders. Clearly passport holders might benefit from their passports by being able to engage more fully in society. For instance they may work where social distancing is impossible, travel more widely and attend the theatre. However even if passports enable the holders to enjoy these benefits they don’t deny these benefits to non-passport holders. If everyone during the pandemic wasn’t able to work where social distancing was impossible, travel widely and attend the theatre then these jobs would cease, widespread travel would be impossible and theatres would remain closed. Driving licences benefit those who hold them by allowing them to drive on public roads but such licences, passports, don’t seem to be unfair on those who don’t hold them. Fairness isn’t simply about benefitting people equally it is about benefitting people equally when this is possible. I would suggest the above would hold even if supplies of vaccine are limited provided these supplies are allocated fairly. If supplies are limited are fairly allocated then passports could benefit those who are vaccinated but limited supplies mean others couldn’t benefit so the question of fairness doesn’t arise.

The above argument is based on the premise that a divided society is a bad society only when it is an unfair society. Some might reject this premise. They might argue that a divided society creates envy, jealousy and anger and these unhealthy emotions lead to an unhealthy society. Those who don’t have passports become envious and jealous of those who do. Let us accept that we should do our best to mitigate these emotions this isn’t the same as eliminating the cause of these emotions. Let us also accept that it is wrong to disable someone to benefit others. The introduction of covid-19 passports would enable some people to avail themselves of some benefits. I would suggest that preventing someone from enabling himself is a form of disablement and hence wrong. For instance denying someone education which would enable him to better himself would be a kind of disablement. I would further suggest that a divided society is a better society than any society which considers disabling some of its members. 

It might be objected that my argument is flawed. It is flawed because my suggestion that, preventing someone from enabling himself is a form of disablement, is too simplistic. My objector might then suggest that enabling is a form of enhancement. I am prepared to accept his objection. I accept that there is a difference between someone enhancing himself and being enhanced. There is a difference between someone having the capacity to enhance oneself and being enhanced by being given the capacity to enhance oneself. For instance there is a difference between someone enhancing himself by learning and being enhanced by pharmacological means. In one case the capacity to enhance oneself is already present, in the other it is introduced. With these differences in mind I accept, for the purposes of this argument, that preventing someone from being enabled by being given additional capacities isn’t a form of disablement. However I would still suggest that preventing someone from exercising some capacity which he already possesses is a form of disablement. I would further suggest that banning covid-19 passports which would enable some people to avail themselves of some benefits falls into the latter group and as a result is a form of disablement. Accepting the above means even if the introduction of covid-19 passports leads to a more divided society this doesn’t mean it would be wrong to do so.

I have argued that it would be morally permissible to introduce covid-19 passports in two scenarios. However this is an applied philosophy blog and the question must be asked would their issue be useful. Issuing such passports would only be useful if it both opened up society whilst at the same time controlling the infection. Let us accept that the issue of civid-19 passports would open up society. However would their issue be effective in preventing another peak in infection? Their effectiveness might be undermined by two factors, the presence of fakes and a lack of proper scrutiny. I would argue the problem of fakes is unlikely to undermine the passports effectiveness. After all fake driving licences and normal passports exist but these don’t cause major difficulties. Perhaps the introduction of some government approved app might reduce this risk. The problem of a lack of scrutiny is more difficult. Scrutiny in workplaces shouldn’t be difficult but the same wouldn’t be true of the entrances to theatres and sporting events. At such events time pressure might lead to a lack of proper scrutiny. However once again the introduction of an effective app might reduce this danger.