Hating Vegans and Moral Distress

 

Most people are indifferent to vegetarians and vegans some however dislike them and a few appear to hate vegans. Kristof Dhont and Joachim Stoeber ask “what drives people to lash out at others who choose to eschew eating animals out of compassion?” (1) The anger of these people is mostly directed at vegans but also applies to vegetarians. In the rest of this posting I will use the term veg*ns to refer to both vegans and vegetarians. In what follows I will outline two reasons Dhont and Stoeber give for this anger and then examine whether these reasons can justify anger. I will argue they can’t. In the course of my arguments I will also argue that one reason why some people dislike veg*ns is caused by a feeling of moral distress. Lastly I will suggest that my argument involving moral distress might be applicable in more broadly.

First let us consider what is meant by moral distress. Moral distress might be defined as the distress someone feels when she knows the right action to take but is constrained from taking it. Moral distress so defined differs from moral dilemmas which can also cause distress. A moral dilemma is when an agent is unable to choose between two moral options. Someone experiencing moral distress has no doubt about the moral option she should choose. A soldier ordered by her commander to carry out some order which she knows is wrong might suffer from moral distress but she isn’t facing a moral dilemma. In most cases of moral distress the constraining element is externally imposed. However in what follows I will assume that the constraining element might also be internally imposed. An agent feels the pull of morality but is constrained by some of her other non-moral desires. For instance someone might believe being unfaithful to her partner is wrong but the pleasure of infidelity constrains her ability to do what she considers to be right thing to do causing her to suffer from moral distress. In what follows moral distress will refer to internally imposed moral distress.

Let us now consider hating veg*ns and moral distress. Many of the statements by those who dislike veg*ns are directed at the veg*ns personally rather than being focussed on their arguments in favour of veg*nism. Can this direction be morally justified? According to Dhont and Stoeber some meat eaters feel that veg*ns, by not eating meat are expressing moral disapproval of their meat eating. Let us accept that even if most veg*ns don’t explicitly express such disapproval that their behaviour does so implicitly. I now want to argue that this disapproval leads to moral distress and that this distress cannot justify their anger. First let us assume that a meat eater believes veg*ns disapproval is justified. She feels the pull of morality but some of her other desires outweigh this moral pull. She has conflicting desires because she desires to eat meat and act morally and this conflict causes moral distress. She relieves this distress by expressing anger with veg*ns. Her anger is directed at veg*ns because they remind her of her moral inadequacy. However such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. It is misplaced because it fails address the real cause of his distress, her rejection of the pull of morality. She is shooting the messenger and avoiding addressing the message. Her anger is unjustified because she accepts the veg*n case. Secondly let us assume our meat eater doesn’t accept the veg*n case and believes veg*n’s disapproval is unjustified. In order to be consistent she must also believe that the argument used by veg*ns to support not eating meat is flawed. Let us briefly consider the veg*n argument. The veg*n argument has two premises. First a veg*n might suggest that it is wrong to cause any creature to suffer against its will for our pleasure. Secondly she might suggest that meat eaters eat meat for their own pleasure. However the second premise has not always been true. Someone living in a hunter gatherer society might have needed to eat meat in order to survive.  Nonetheless in most parts of the world someone can live a perfectly healthy life without eating meat. It would seem to be difficult to reject the second premise. Let us accept that in most places people don’t have to eat meat and eating meat is a lifestyle choice. It follows that if meat eaters are to reject veg*n’s argument that they must find good reason to reject the first premise. For instance they might argue that animals which are reared in good conditions and are slaughtered humanely don’t suffer against their will. However if a meat eater believes her arguments against the veg*n one is successful it is hard to see what reason she has to be angry with veg*ns. We are usually become angry because of some wrong done to us or others we care about. In the above scenario even if a meat eater believes veg*ns are misguided about the wrongness of eating meat this gives her no reason to believe that they wrong her and other meat eaters, he has no reason to feel angry. Perhaps then meat eaters hate veg*ns it is because deep down they have a lingering belief that their arguments for eating meat are contrived and don’t fully dismiss the pull of the veg*n argument. If meat eaters can’t fully dismiss the veg*n argument then this causes moral distress. This distress causes anger which once again is directed at veg*ns because meat eaters remind them of this distress. However once again such anger is both misplaced unjustified because it doesn’t address the real cause of meat eaters’ moral distress.

Dhont and Stoeber advance a second reason to explain why some meat eaters become angry with veg*ns. Some meat eaters might suggest veg*ns damage society and that this justifies their anger. Their argument contains two premises and might be summarised as follows. Firstly society is valuable and it is wrong to damage it. Secondly veg*ns damage society because they damage social cohesion, collective order and stability. It follows that because veg*n way of life damages society that it is wrong and meat eaters anger can be justified. Let us call this argument the social cohesion argument. Let us accept the second premise. However the early Christian martyrs, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes all damaged the social cohesion of the societies they lived in. Some members of these societies did become angry with Christians, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes. If we are to accept the social cohesion argument then we must conclude that their anger was justified. It seems hard to accept such a conclusion. If we accept the second premise of the social cohesion argument but reject the conclusion then we must reject the first premise. It is hard to see how this might be done but perhaps the first premise might be amended as follows. Society is valuable and we shouldn’t damage the society we live in unless the cause we do so for is just.  It follows that if we damage the social cohesion of the society we live in because it is unjust that far from damaging society we are improving it.  It follows that our anger with people for damaging social cohesion cannot be justified if the cause these people are fighting for is a just one. It further follows the argument about veg*ns damaging social cohesion reverts to our original argument about whether veg*ism can be justified.

However the above argument might be modified. It might be argued even if the fact that veg*ns damage social cohesion doesn’t provide a reason for anger that they also damage the natural order of things and this might justify their anger. This argument claims that veg*nism is unnatural. This is a dangerous argument to make for many people in the past might argued that the patriarchy was part of the natural order. Nonetheless let us accept that it was natural for our ancestors to eat meat. However if we argue from the above premise that it is natural to eat meat means veg*nism is wrong then we must introduce a second premise. We must assume that our nature is permanently fixed. It is easy to call what is necessary for an animal to survive natural when in fact it is just necessary at the time. For instance perhaps it is necessary for hunter gatherers to eat meat in order to survive but meat eating isn’t a necessity for a modern city dweller. If a meat eater isn’t prepared to accept this second premise that our nature is permanently fixed then she has no justification based on our nature to become angry with veg*ns. Once again it would appear that if a meat becomes angry with veg*ns her anger is due to internal moral conflict, moral distress. However for the sake of argument let us assume that our nature is permanently fixed. Nonetheless even if we accept this unlikely assumption there is still no justification for meat eaters becoming angry with veg*ns. Veg*ns might be misguided but they don’t harm meat eaters and so give no cause for anger. Once again if meat eaters become angry with veg*ns and this would appear to be caused by internal moral conflict, moral distress.

In conclusion I accept that most meat eaters don’t accept the pull of the veg*n argument and as a result don’t become angry with veg*ns, they simply accept them.  However I have argued that some meat eaters who do dislike veg*ns do so, not because they feel they are doing something wrong but because they feel the pull of veg*n arguments at least to some degree. I further argued that this pull together with their desire to eat meat causes them to suffer internal conflict or moral distress. I conclude that such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. I further concluded that hating veg*ns both matters and is wrong. I would suggest that moral distress can lead to hate in even more important areas. Some people seem to dislike BLM activists. I would suggest that sometimes this dislike originates in a similar way to the dislike of veg*ns. Those who dislike BLM activists might feel the moral pull of the BLM cause but resist bowing to it because they are unwilling to make sacrifices to aid the cause. This conflict causes moral distress. In fairness some deprived people have very little to sacrifice. Much the same argument might be applied to some cases of misogyny.

1. https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/vegan-resistance