Hating Vegans and Moral Distress

 

Most people are indifferent to vegetarians and vegans some however dislike them and a few appear to hate vegans. Kristof Dhont and Joachim Stoeber ask “what drives people to lash out at others who choose to eschew eating animals out of compassion?” (1) The anger of these people is mostly directed at vegans but also applies to vegetarians. In the rest of this posting I will use the term veg*ns to refer to both vegans and vegetarians. In what follows I will outline two reasons Dhont and Stoeber give for this anger and then examine whether these reasons can justify anger. I will argue they can’t. In the course of my arguments I will also argue that one reason why some people dislike veg*ns is caused by a feeling of moral distress. Lastly I will suggest that my argument involving moral distress might be applicable in more broadly.

First let us consider what is meant by moral distress. Moral distress might be defined as the distress someone feels when she knows the right action to take but is constrained from taking it. Moral distress so defined differs from moral dilemmas which can also cause distress. A moral dilemma is when an agent is unable to choose between two moral options. Someone experiencing moral distress has no doubt about the moral option she should choose. A soldier ordered by her commander to carry out some order which she knows is wrong might suffer from moral distress but she isn’t facing a moral dilemma. In most cases of moral distress the constraining element is externally imposed. However in what follows I will assume that the constraining element might also be internally imposed. An agent feels the pull of morality but is constrained by some of her other non-moral desires. For instance someone might believe being unfaithful to her partner is wrong but the pleasure of infidelity constrains her ability to do what she considers to be right thing to do causing her to suffer from moral distress. In what follows moral distress will refer to internally imposed moral distress.

Let us now consider hating veg*ns and moral distress. Many of the statements by those who dislike veg*ns are directed at the veg*ns personally rather than being focussed on their arguments in favour of veg*nism. Can this direction be morally justified? According to Dhont and Stoeber some meat eaters feel that veg*ns, by not eating meat are expressing moral disapproval of their meat eating. Let us accept that even if most veg*ns don’t explicitly express such disapproval that their behaviour does so implicitly. I now want to argue that this disapproval leads to moral distress and that this distress cannot justify their anger. First let us assume that a meat eater believes veg*ns disapproval is justified. She feels the pull of morality but some of her other desires outweigh this moral pull. She has conflicting desires because she desires to eat meat and act morally and this conflict causes moral distress. She relieves this distress by expressing anger with veg*ns. Her anger is directed at veg*ns because they remind her of her moral inadequacy. However such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. It is misplaced because it fails address the real cause of his distress, her rejection of the pull of morality. She is shooting the messenger and avoiding addressing the message. Her anger is unjustified because she accepts the veg*n case. Secondly let us assume our meat eater doesn’t accept the veg*n case and believes veg*n’s disapproval is unjustified. In order to be consistent she must also believe that the argument used by veg*ns to support not eating meat is flawed. Let us briefly consider the veg*n argument. The veg*n argument has two premises. First a veg*n might suggest that it is wrong to cause any creature to suffer against its will for our pleasure. Secondly she might suggest that meat eaters eat meat for their own pleasure. However the second premise has not always been true. Someone living in a hunter gatherer society might have needed to eat meat in order to survive.  Nonetheless in most parts of the world someone can live a perfectly healthy life without eating meat. It would seem to be difficult to reject the second premise. Let us accept that in most places people don’t have to eat meat and eating meat is a lifestyle choice. It follows that if meat eaters are to reject veg*n’s argument that they must find good reason to reject the first premise. For instance they might argue that animals which are reared in good conditions and are slaughtered humanely don’t suffer against their will. However if a meat eater believes her arguments against the veg*n one is successful it is hard to see what reason she has to be angry with veg*ns. We are usually become angry because of some wrong done to us or others we care about. In the above scenario even if a meat eater believes veg*ns are misguided about the wrongness of eating meat this gives her no reason to believe that they wrong her and other meat eaters, he has no reason to feel angry. Perhaps then meat eaters hate veg*ns it is because deep down they have a lingering belief that their arguments for eating meat are contrived and don’t fully dismiss the pull of the veg*n argument. If meat eaters can’t fully dismiss the veg*n argument then this causes moral distress. This distress causes anger which once again is directed at veg*ns because meat eaters remind them of this distress. However once again such anger is both misplaced unjustified because it doesn’t address the real cause of meat eaters’ moral distress.

Dhont and Stoeber advance a second reason to explain why some meat eaters become angry with veg*ns. Some meat eaters might suggest veg*ns damage society and that this justifies their anger. Their argument contains two premises and might be summarised as follows. Firstly society is valuable and it is wrong to damage it. Secondly veg*ns damage society because they damage social cohesion, collective order and stability. It follows that because veg*n way of life damages society that it is wrong and meat eaters anger can be justified. Let us call this argument the social cohesion argument. Let us accept the second premise. However the early Christian martyrs, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes all damaged the social cohesion of the societies they lived in. Some members of these societies did become angry with Christians, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes. If we are to accept the social cohesion argument then we must conclude that their anger was justified. It seems hard to accept such a conclusion. If we accept the second premise of the social cohesion argument but reject the conclusion then we must reject the first premise. It is hard to see how this might be done but perhaps the first premise might be amended as follows. Society is valuable and we shouldn’t damage the society we live in unless the cause we do so for is just.  It follows that if we damage the social cohesion of the society we live in because it is unjust that far from damaging society we are improving it.  It follows that our anger with people for damaging social cohesion cannot be justified if the cause these people are fighting for is a just one. It further follows the argument about veg*ns damaging social cohesion reverts to our original argument about whether veg*ism can be justified.

However the above argument might be modified. It might be argued even if the fact that veg*ns damage social cohesion doesn’t provide a reason for anger that they also damage the natural order of things and this might justify their anger. This argument claims that veg*nism is unnatural. This is a dangerous argument to make for many people in the past might argued that the patriarchy was part of the natural order. Nonetheless let us accept that it was natural for our ancestors to eat meat. However if we argue from the above premise that it is natural to eat meat means veg*nism is wrong then we must introduce a second premise. We must assume that our nature is permanently fixed. It is easy to call what is necessary for an animal to survive natural when in fact it is just necessary at the time. For instance perhaps it is necessary for hunter gatherers to eat meat in order to survive but meat eating isn’t a necessity for a modern city dweller. If a meat eater isn’t prepared to accept this second premise that our nature is permanently fixed then she has no justification based on our nature to become angry with veg*ns. Once again it would appear that if a meat becomes angry with veg*ns her anger is due to internal moral conflict, moral distress. However for the sake of argument let us assume that our nature is permanently fixed. Nonetheless even if we accept this unlikely assumption there is still no justification for meat eaters becoming angry with veg*ns. Veg*ns might be misguided but they don’t harm meat eaters and so give no cause for anger. Once again if meat eaters become angry with veg*ns and this would appear to be caused by internal moral conflict, moral distress.

In conclusion I accept that most meat eaters don’t accept the pull of the veg*n argument and as a result don’t become angry with veg*ns, they simply accept them.  However I have argued that some meat eaters who do dislike veg*ns do so, not because they feel they are doing something wrong but because they feel the pull of veg*n arguments at least to some degree. I further argued that this pull together with their desire to eat meat causes them to suffer internal conflict or moral distress. I conclude that such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. I further concluded that hating veg*ns both matters and is wrong. I would suggest that moral distress can lead to hate in even more important areas. Some people seem to dislike BLM activists. I would suggest that sometimes this dislike originates in a similar way to the dislike of veg*ns. Those who dislike BLM activists might feel the moral pull of the BLM cause but resist bowing to it because they are unwilling to make sacrifices to aid the cause. This conflict causes moral distress. In fairness some deprived people have very little to sacrifice. Much the same argument might be applied to some cases of misogyny.

1. https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/vegan-resistance

Raw Anger

 

Let us agree that uncontrollable anger is bad for us because it harms us and damages our relationships. Young children often exhibit uncontrollable anger but as they grow up they learn to control it. Uncontrollable anger might be acceptable in toddlers and their parents might even find it amusing but it isn’t acceptable in teenagers and adults. Controlling our anger matters. Agnes Callard points out that when philosophers argue about how we should control our anger they are often talking about refining our raw anger by losing certain elements of our original raw anger rather than simply controlling it. (1) Some limit our anger to indignation or resentment whilst others such as Martha Nussbaum suggest that we should transmute our anger into searching for a way to right the original wrong. Callard argues in doing so they lose the raw feeling of anger. In this posting I want to consider whether our raw feeling of anger matters and whether we have reasons to completely refine our raw anger provided of course this is possible.

What does Callard mean by the dark feeling of raw anger? When we become angry we undergo certain physiological changes. For instance our heartrate increases. Many of these feelings could also apply to rage but it is important not to confuse anger with rage. We can rage against events or animals but it seems our anger is always directed at persons. Whilst our anger is directed at persons it is focussed on some moral wrong. Moral wrong in this context might simply mean a failure in moral concern by others who fail to respect or consider us. Because our feelings are focussed on some wrong these feelings involve a sense of grievance and a desire for revenge. It would be impossible to feel anger without at least some sense of grievance but some can people can feel aggrieved without feeling angry. It follows a sense of grievance is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for anger. Revenge seems more central to our idea of anger and is also a necessary but not a sufficient condition for raw anger. Some authors such as Nussbaum use the term payback instead of revenge but this seems to be yet another attempt to refine anger.  For this reason I will continue to use the term revenge when referring to raw anger. In this posting raw anger will be defined as a combination of physiological changes which we interpret negatively together with a sense of grievance against the offender and a desire for revenge.

Let us now consider Callard’s example of someone who robs us making us angry. After our initial angry reaction should we refine it and seek to rectify the situation? It might be suggested that if the situation doesn’t change that we have no reason to do so. However let us assume that after some time the offender makes a sincere apology and recompenses us for our losses. In this situation should we let our raw anger go? Callard presents two arguments to show that we still have reasons to retain our raw anger. The first is her argument for grudges. According to Callard,

“Once we have reason to be angry we have reason to be angry forever” (2)

If we had reason for a grievance that reason remains even if the offender apologises his apology doesn’t remove the reason for our grievance. Of course a sincere apology might give us reason to attach less importance to our grievance and alter our behaviour but according to Callard it doesn’t eradicate the grievance. The example of rape seems to support Callard’s position. Even if the rapist sincerely apologises and vows never to do so again and the victim forgives the rapist her sense of grievance might remain and would remain and seem to be fully justified. Callard’s second argument is the argument for revenge. According to Callard,

“The Argument for Revenge is simply that revenge is how we hold one another morally responsible” (3)

We do so according to Callard by,

“you make my wronging of you into a general principle and then “educate” me by imposing it on me.” (4)

This argument might be roughly summarised as follows. A harms B. It follows that A believes it is good for him to harm B. If he thought it bad for him he wouldn’t do so. B makes A’s behaviour into a norm. B harms A and B learns harming others is bad. Of course the possibility of revenge might simply deter someone from wrongdoing but revenge can also teach an offender that his actions are wrong. Let us accept Callard’s two arguments for retaining our raw anger.

However even if we accept that we have some reasons to retain our raw anger this doesn’t automatically mean we should do so. We might have even stronger reasons to refine our anger. A permanently angry society would be a violent one. Let us first consider our desire for revenge. We are no longer a tribal society so it might be suggested that we should let go of our desire for revenge in order to create a less violent society. Two objections might be raised to this suggestion. Firstly it might be objected that if we do so that we damage both our self-respect and the respect others have for us. We might be seen by others and ourselves as pushovers. This would occur if we simply repressed or lost all anger. However if we refine rather than simply lose our anger we might retain our respect. According to Nussbaum if we shift our focus from how we feel to the cause of our anger our focus also shifts to a set of projects aimed at improving both society and the offender. (5) If we refine our anger by losing our desire for revenge then we aren’t acting passively, shouldn’t be seen as pushovers and the objection fails. Secondly it might be objected that if we refine our anger by losing our desire for revenge that we deprive the offender of some benefit. Callard argues that if we give up our desire for revenge that we would be failing to hold someone as morally responsible and failing to educate him as to what is morally required. In response I would suggest that our desire for revenge is mostly a desire to educate the offender that we aren’t pushovers, to teach him a lesson in moral behaviour. Nonetheless let us agree with Callard that our desire for revenge also holds someone as responsible for his actions and educates him to some degree about what is required morally by society. In a tribal society we might well have good reason to pursue revenge. However we don’t live in a tribal society and any educational benefits of revenge might be achieved by other means. For instance it is perfectly possible to withhold trust without feeling any need for revenge. Altering someone’s status within society by the withdrawal of trust might educate an offender about what is morally required. It follows even if revenge might deliver some benefits that these benefits might be more effectively by other means and that the possible benefits delivered by revenge do not give us reason not to refine our raw anger.

According to Callard the holding of a grievance or grudge is an essential element of anger. I have argued above that the withdrawal of trust might achieve much the same benefits as revenge. Let us accept that if we lose our desire for revenge but retain our sense of grievance that we have refined our anger to some degree. However some would argue that we should go further in refining our anger by also letting go of our sense of grievances. Let us accept that Callard is correct in her assertion that once we have a grievance that we have reason for our grievance forever. It follows it might be impossible to refine our anger further. In the real world it would be very difficult for someone who has been raped to give up her sense of grievance even if she can give up her desire for revenge. According to Nussbaum traditional anger can transmute into transitional anger,

“quickly puts itself out of business, in that even the residual focus on punishing the offender is soon seen as part of a set of projects for improving both offenders and society.” (6)

If we accept Callard is correct then raw anger cannot be totally refined. Nonetheless it might be possible to move on. Even if the rape victim cannot let go of her grievance she can take part in a set of projects for improving both the offender and society, she can move on by moderating her behaviour whilst retaining her sense of grievance. Our behaviour isn’t determined by a single reason but by a set of reasons. Individual reasons within this set are weighted, some are more important than others. We can retain a reason to act whilst the weight given to this reason is changed by additions to the set of our reasons. If the rapist genuinely apologises and seeks to reform the rape victim might give less weight to her grievance whilst still retaining it.

In the above it has been assumed above that Callard is correct when she argues that if a victim has a reason for a grievance that she has that reason forever. I now want to argue that if a victim has a reason for a grievance that she doesn’t always have this reason forever. Callard assumes that that a victim has a grievance because of some past event and that she has reason for this grievance forever because the past cannot be changed. Of course the past cannot be changed but a grievance isn’t simply concerned with some past event but must of necessity be directed at someone. To make this clearer let us return to our rape example. Let us assume that the rapist is an adult but has the mental age of a five year old. In this situation the victim has been wronged but would she be justified in holding a grievance with the offender? I would suggest she won’t. It would seem that whether someone can have a grievance with some offender depends on the internal make-up of the offender.  I have argued elsewhere that emotions serve as alarms by maintaining our focus on some potential danger.  A grievance maintains our focus on the fact that someone might harm us. If we accept the above then a victim may have a reason to maintain a grievance with an offender because it alerts her to danger but that if the offender changes the danger might cease and she loses her reason to maintain her grievance. Let us once again return to our rape victim. Let us assume that the victim has been violently raped and that her grievance alerts her to the dangers posed by the offender. Let us now assume at some later date the offender has a severe stroke which leaves him in a vegetative state. In this new situation the victim might still be unhappy and hurt but she has lost her reason to hold onto her grievance with the offender because it maintains her focus on danger. It follows that Callard isn’t correct when she argues that all victims who have a reason for a grievance have those reasons forever. All victims have been wronged forever but not all victims have reasons to hold onto their grievances forever.

How do we differentiate between those victims who have reason to maintain their grievances and those who don’t? I have argued above the focus of our anger is on some wrong but that it is directed at the offender. I have further argued that if the offender changes in some radical way that we sometimes have reason to lose a grievance. Lastly I argued that the reason we have to maintain a grievance against an offender because it focusses on our need for caution in our dealings with him. It follows if the offender changes so that we no longer have to be so cautious in dealing with him that we lose our reason for our grievance. In my above example because the rapist has a stroke and poses no further threat to the victim she loses her reason to maintain her sense of grievance. In the above example it is clear that the offender has changed but in more general cases how do we know the offender has changed and that as a result we have lost our reason for maintaining our grievance with him? Perhaps if the offender makes a sincere apology and takes steps to repair the damage done then we should try to lose our sense of grievance. However if the offender doesn’t change we have reason to maintain our grievance and shouldn’t unconditionally forgive him.

 

1. Agnes Callard, 2020, On Anger, Boston Review Forum, page 15.
2. Callard, page 18
3. Callard, page 18
4. Callard , page 19
5. Martha Nussbaum, 2015, Transitional Anger. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 51.
6. Nussbaum, page 51

Games, Sport and Drugs

In this posting I want to examine the links between games, sport and performance enhancing drugs. Hopefully this examination will shed some light on interesting questions. Is sport always a game? Playing football clearly is playing a game but is the same true of someone competing in athletics? I will argue all sport is a game. Play matters to children as it helps them learn. Does play matter to adult or is it just a trivial pursuit? I will argue that playing games matters to adults. I will further argue sport matters because playing games matters. What reasons can be advanced for not taking performance enhancing drugs when playing sport? I will argue that taking performance enhancing drugs erodes the value of sport. Before beginning my examination I will try to define what is meant by a game and sport.

What do we mean by a game? Games vary greatly. Snakes and ladders, Grand Theft Auto and football are all games but they are all very different. Wittgenstein argued that it is impossible to define a game. (1) In what follows I will use the definition of Bernad Suits adopted by John Danaher. (2) According to Danaher a game must have a goal, some rules and a certain attitude. The goal of a game is some outcome that is intelligible apart from the game. Achieving checkmate or scoring more goals that the opposition by full time would be goals of a game. The rules of a game are constitutive rules, they help define the game by defining the ways in which the goal of the game can be reached. These rules can be regarded as artificial obstacles to achieving the goal. For instance a player must take his turn and go up ladders and down snakes. A goal is only scored if the ball is kicked or headed into the net. Lastly for some activity to count as a game the player or players must commit to accepting the rules of the game in order to make the game possible. This commitment is a commitment not to cheat. For instance handling the ball into the net would not be playing football. This is a very broad definition of games and might include lots of activities we wouldn’t normally consider as games such as knitting. Danaher points out that if some billionaire decided to build himself a house which he could easily obtain by other means that he would be playing a game. The objective is the finished house. The rule is build it himself, an artificial obstacle. The attitude is to do so only by himself. It follows games need not be competitive. In spite of the broadness of this definition I will adopt it in what follows.

Is engaging in sport playing a game? We talk about playing a game and we often talk about playing sport which suggests that it is. Certainly some sports are games such as football but are all sports games? I now want to argue that all sports are games. I will further argue that sports might be defined as a subset of games in general involving competition. However chess is a competitive game and isn’t usually thought of as a sport. Sport might then be better defined as a subset of games involving physical competition. It might be objected that athletes running in a race aren’t playing a game. However if we accept Danaher’s definition of a game they are. An athlete’s objective is to win the race, he must do so by running round the course and not cheat by taking a shortcut. Let us accept that sport is a subset of games which involve physical competition. Accepting the above means that we can explain the difference between elite runners and fun runners running a marathon. Elite runners are competing and fun runners who aren’t. Elite runners are engaging in sport whilst fun runners are simply playing a game. Accepting the above also means that athletes training for sport aren’t engaging in sport but preparing for sport.

Does playing games have any value? It might be suggested that playing some games is a trivial pursuit of little value. However I now want to argue that playing difficult games is valuable. According to Danaher,

“Games will be arenas in which human autonomy and agency can be nurtured and developed. They will provide opportunities for humans to think, plan, and decide; to cultivate moral virtues such as courage, generosity, and fair play; and to display ingenuity and creativity. This is not an unusual or alien idea. People have long argued that the value of sports, for example, lies in their capacity to develop such attributes and provide outlets for human agency to flourish.” (3)

If we accept Danaher’s position then participation in sport matters because sport is a game and games enable players to exhibit and develop character by fostering certain virtues, I have argued this previously, see wooler.scottus . It might be objected that whilst some game playing is connected to character that it is ridiculous to say that this is true of all games. My objector might point out that playing ‘snakes and ladders’ doesn’t help develop character. He might give as a reason that the goal of the game in this case is just too trivial. He might then proceed to argue that any goal in any game is trivial because we place artificial obstacles, the rules, in our way of achieving it. In response to my objector I would accept that for adults the playing of ‘snakes and ladders’ is indeed a trivial pursuit. However few, if any, games of ‘snakes and ladders’ are played purely between adults. ‘Snakes and ladders’ is usually played by a group of adults and children. ‘Snakes and ladders’ helps teach children not to cheat, the virtue of honesty. The virtue of honesty fosters the development of good character. The goal when playing ‘snakes and ladders’ is to reach the finish first but I would suggest when playing ‘snakes and ladders’ we have two other goals in mind. First simply to have a bit of fun, another trivial pursuit. Secondly to teach children not to cheat a non-trivial pursuit connected to the development of character. These goals could be seen as a mixture of instrumental and intrinsic goals. All goals capture our attention and I will follow Bennett Helm in regarding then as the focus and sub focus of our attention (4). Perhaps when playing ‘snakes and ladders’ the sub focus is on reaching the finish first whilst the focus is on teaching children to play games fairly. It might appear that knocking a white ball into a hole is a trivial pursuit but if it helps develop character it isn’t. Knocking the ball into the hole is the sub focus of the game whilst developing good character is the focus.

Let us accept that games are valuable because they foster character. I now want to argue that games are valuable for another reason. I will now argue some games are valuable because they give us a sense of achievement. Achievement isn’t simply about winning it is about how we win. An achievement consists of a product and a process by which the product is attained. I will only consider the process here. According to Gwen Bradford there are two essential elements to any achievement (5). For something to be an achievement it must be difficult and the agent must cause it competently. I will only consider difficulty here. If something is difficult to do then we have to make an effort which engages our will. Let us accept that a life in which someone exercises his will is a better one than one in which he simply exists or spends his time daydreaming. It follows that because some games are concerned with achievement which is difficult that these games have value because they foster the will. Of course not all games can give us a sense of achievement. Winning at ‘snakes and ladders’ isn’t difficult and requires little effort. However many games are difficult and this is true of sport which by definition used above require physical effort.

It might be objected that sports differs from games in general by having a different focus. For instance it might be suggested that professional sport shows that the focus of sport isn’t on character. The focus of professional sport is on earning a living, doing a job, rather than on character. My objector seems to agree with me that the focus of sport isn’t simply on winning and that winning is a sub focus, but disagree with me about the real focus. The fact that we place artificial obstacles, the rules, in the way of winning seems to support the above. Let us consider the focus of professional footballers. I am prepared to agree with my objector that their focus is on earning a living but the focus of the players isn’t of necessity the focus of the game itself. I am also prepared to accept that a main focus of players in any game is on winning but would argue that this isn't the focus of the game. It might be objected that players can have a focus games can't. In response I would suggest that the focus of games is on what we find valuable about them, the reason we play them. Let us accept the rules of any game place restrictions on what players can do. If we accept that these rules aren’t purposeless then we must ask the question what is their purpose? This purpose could be to protect the players from something or to enable them to do something.  For instance the rules in football might protect the players from injury. However it is hard to see what the rules in athletics protect the athletes from. Moreover the rules in football extend far beyond those needed for player protection. Perhaps the purpose of the rules is to enable athletes in some way.

If we accept the above what might the rules of the game enable players to do? I will now argue that the rules of a game enable the players gain a sense of achievement and develop certain virtues both of which are valuable. Let us consider achievement first. The rules of a game place artificial obstacles in our way of obtaining the goal of the game. It follows the rules of the game make obtaining this goal difficult to some degree. It has been argued above that doing something difficult gives us a sense of achievement. It follows that the rules of the game help give us a sense of achievement. The rules of the game don’t help or hinder professional footballers from making a living but they can give them a sense of achievement. Let us now consider virtue. The rules of a game enable athletes to demonstrate of develop certain qualities. These qualities can be physical or mental qualities. For instance it might be argued that the rules of football might enable a footballer to develop and demonstrate his ability to head the ball. However it might be argued that the rules of a game don’t help a player in developing or demonstrating his physical skills. All obstacles make something harder to do and it difficult to see how making something harder to do can assist players to demonstrating or develop their physical skills. Do the rules of football assist a player develop her heading skills, surely a player can develop these skills in the absence of rules? Do the rules, artificial obstacles, assist athletes develop mental traits? Our intuitions suggest that the answer should be yes. We naturally talk about athletes exhibiting determination, patience, courage and not letting their heads drop. These traits seem to be a form of resilience. If we accept that sport fosters these traits then because these traits are connected to good character sport helps develop character. It might be objected that I am presenting a completely unrealistic outdated Corinthian ideal of sport. In response I would point out that sport isn’t just about winning it is about winning fairly. Someone can win something without being fair. Life is full of winners and losers and isn’t fair. Acting fairly seems to be totally unconnected to winning, consider winning a war. If we accept that fairness is an essential element of sport then we must ask the question why? I argued above that the rules of a game don’t enable players to develop or demonstrate their physical skills. I now want to argue that the same applies to fairness. The simple fact a game is fair doesn’t affect the players athletic abilities. The fact that a game is fair allows players to develop and demonstrate certain beneficial mental qualities or virtues. It follows that the rules of a game foster certain virtues in those who play it. It further follows what is valuable about games is also what is valuable about sport.

Let us accept that sport is valuable because it fosters a sense of achievement and encourages certain virtues. What implications does our acceptance have for the taking of performance enhancing drugs? These drugs are endemic in some sports such as professional cycling. Perhaps if these drugs were tested and found to be safe the rules of some sports could be amended to permit their use. According to Julian Savulescu,

 “performance enhancement is not against the spirit of cycling; it is the spirit cycling” he goes on to suggest that “we should focus on monitoring the athletes’ health rather than on losing a war on doping”, see Practical Ethics.

In response it might be argued that if performance enhancing drugs were only available to some athletes the fairness element of sport would disappear. However let us assume that these drugs are safe, cheap and available to all. In these circumstances it might be suggested that the fairness element of sport isn’t damaged because enhancing drugs are available to all. However in these circumstances can athletes still gain a sense of achievement, develop and display their character? Let us accept than sport encourages courage, fortitude, resilience and patience. If performance enhancing drugs are introduced into sport then perhaps the exercise of these qualities becomes easier. If the exercise of these qualities becomes too easy then sport no longer helps in the development of character. Moreover even if the introduction of these drugs doesn’t damage the development of these qualities it remains hard to see how their introduction benefits sport. If these drugs don’t benefit one athlete more than another it is hard to see why any athlete would want to take them. However if they benefit some athletes at the expense of others they damage the fairness of sport. They shift the focus of sport from character development to winning. Lastly I have argued that sport fosters character by fostering the will due to achievement. However if the scale of someone’s achievement depends on the degree of difficulty involved and this difficulty is decreased by the use of drugs then his achievement is diminished.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly sport is a game. Secondly games are valuable. The value can be trivial in some cases but all games have value. Thirdly performance enhancing drugs decrease the value of sport. Lastly Danaher has argued the AI and increasing automation will lead to widespread loss of jobs which will further lead to a loss of meaning. In these circumstances Danaher further argues playing games can bring some value into our lives (6). Perhaps he is right, I’m not sure. I have argued elsewhere that increasing automation might make sport more important for many people in the future wooler.scottus . Lastly if game playing might bring more meaning into the lives of who lose their jobs due to automation might game playing also bring more meaning into the lives of the elderly who give up their jobs when they retire. Perhaps old age is a time for games  rather than being on holiday.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 65.
2. Danaher John, 2019, Automation and Utopia, Harvard University, page 231
3. Danaher, page 234
4. Bennett Helm, 2010 Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press
5. Gwen Bradford, 2015, Achievement, Oxford University Press
6. Danaher, chapter 7.

Coronavirus Passports

  

The Covid-19 pandemic lockdown has caused great damage to the way people lead their lives and the economy. It is in the interests of both society and individuals to lift the lockdown. One way this might be done would be by the issuing of covid-19 immunity passports. According to Olivia Kates the path to reopening public life should be set by expert health officials, with close attention to justice and equity, and at no point on that path should anyone be stopped and asked, “Show me your passport”, see Hastings Center . In this posting I want to argue that the introduction of covid-19 passports would be fair in certain circumstances should be accepted.

What conditions would need to be satisfied before we could consider the introduction of covid-19 immunity passports? Firstly if a fully tested vaccine became available which offered a high degree of protection and that those vaccinated couldn’t pass on the virus to others. If this condition is meet then it would be feasible to introduce a covid-19 passport. Secondly if it is ascertained that those who have had covid-19 have develop antibodies which protect them from reinfection for a reasonable period of time. In addition a test must have been developed which can tell whether someone has acquired these antibodies. If either of these conditions can be meet then it would also be feasible to introduce a covid-19 passport for a limited period dependent on how long the immunity lasts. 

What reasons can be advanced for the introduction of these passports? Firstly it should allow passport holders greater freedom to go to the places they want because they won’t pass the virus on to others and won’t become a burden on our health services. Secondly if the number of passport holders was large enough this might help revive society and the economy quicker without risking another peak of infections. In certain settings social distancing isn’t feasible. For instance when eating out or going to the theatre or attending large sporting events. If during the pandemic only passport holders were able go to restaurants, to attend the theatre or large sporting events then perhaps these place could benefit. Lastly let us assume that an effective vaccine becomes widely available. In these circumstances the extreme pressure on society and the economy might lead some to propose mandatory vaccination. In these circumstances covid-19 passports might relieve this pressure whilst causing less damage to personal autonomy. In light of the above reasons exist for the introduction of covid-19 passports.

Let us assume that an effect vaccine becomes available. Let us also assume that the vaccine will be made available to all. In these circumstances would we still have reasons to introduce corona virus passports? I will now argue that we have two reasons to introduce passports. Firstly any vaccination will take time. The introduction of passports might enable restaurants, sporting venues and theatres to reopen earlier than would be possible otherwise. Such earlier reopening would benefit the institutions involved and permit greater freedom to passport holders. Secondly some people such as anti-vaxxers might not want to become vaccinated and passports would offer an incentive to do so. It would appear that even with the advent of an effective corona virus vaccine that we still have reasons for a temporary introduction of passports. What reasons can be advanced for their non-introduction?

First it might be argued that covid-19 passports would lead to a divided society, those who have passports and those who don’t. It might then be argued a divided society is a bad society. A divided society need not be a bad society unless this division is unfair. If the purpose of covid-19 passports only benefits passports holders then it might be argued that non-passport holders are being treated unfairly because they are being denied the benefits available to passport holders. Clearly passport holders might benefit from their passports by being able to engage more fully in society. For instance they may work where social distancing is impossible, travel more widely and attend the theatre. However even if passports enable the holders to enjoy these benefits they don’t deny these benefits to non-passport holders. If everyone during the pandemic wasn’t able to work where social distancing was impossible, travel widely and attend the theatre then these jobs would cease, widespread travel would be impossible and theatres would remain closed. Driving licences benefit those who hold them by allowing them to drive on public roads but such licences, passports, don’t seem to be unfair on those who don’t hold them. Fairness isn’t simply about benefitting people equally it is about benefitting people equally when this is possible. I would suggest the above would hold even if supplies of vaccine are limited provided these supplies are allocated fairly. If supplies are limited are fairly allocated then passports could benefit those who are vaccinated but limited supplies mean others couldn’t benefit so the question of fairness doesn’t arise.

The above argument is based on the premise that a divided society is a bad society only when it is an unfair society. Some might reject this premise. They might argue that a divided society creates envy, jealousy and anger and these unhealthy emotions lead to an unhealthy society. Those who don’t have passports become envious and jealous of those who do. Let us accept that we should do our best to mitigate these emotions this isn’t the same as eliminating the cause of these emotions. Let us also accept that it is wrong to disable someone to benefit others. The introduction of covid-19 passports would enable some people to avail themselves of some benefits. I would suggest that preventing someone from enabling himself is a form of disablement and hence wrong. For instance denying someone education which would enable him to better himself would be a kind of disablement. I would further suggest that a divided society is a better society than any society which considers disabling some of its members. 

It might be objected that my argument is flawed. It is flawed because my suggestion that, preventing someone from enabling himself is a form of disablement, is too simplistic. My objector might then suggest that enabling is a form of enhancement. I am prepared to accept his objection. I accept that there is a difference between someone enhancing himself and being enhanced. There is a difference between someone having the capacity to enhance oneself and being enhanced by being given the capacity to enhance oneself. For instance there is a difference between someone enhancing himself by learning and being enhanced by pharmacological means. In one case the capacity to enhance oneself is already present, in the other it is introduced. With these differences in mind I accept, for the purposes of this argument, that preventing someone from being enabled by being given additional capacities isn’t a form of disablement. However I would still suggest that preventing someone from exercising some capacity which he already possesses is a form of disablement. I would further suggest that banning covid-19 passports which would enable some people to avail themselves of some benefits falls into the latter group and as a result is a form of disablement. Accepting the above means even if the introduction of covid-19 passports leads to a more divided society this doesn’t mean it would be wrong to do so.

I have argued that it would be morally permissible to introduce covid-19 passports in two scenarios. However this is an applied philosophy blog and the question must be asked would their issue be useful. Issuing such passports would only be useful if it both opened up society whilst at the same time controlling the infection. Let us accept that the issue of civid-19 passports would open up society. However would their issue be effective in preventing another peak in infection? Their effectiveness might be undermined by two factors, the presence of fakes and a lack of proper scrutiny. I would argue the problem of fakes is unlikely to undermine the passports effectiveness. After all fake driving licences and normal passports exist but these don’t cause major difficulties. Perhaps the introduction of some government approved app might reduce this risk. The problem of a lack of scrutiny is more difficult. Scrutiny in workplaces shouldn’t be difficult but the same wouldn’t be true of the entrances to theatres and sporting events. At such events time pressure might lead to a lack of proper scrutiny. However once again the introduction of an effective app might reduce this danger.

Locking Down the Elderly

Julian Savulescu and James Cameron argue that a policy which locked down the elderly whilst allowing greater freedom to younger people during the covid-19 pandemic wouldn’t be ageist, see practical ethics . The purpose of such a policy would be to protect health services from being overwhelmed. They further argue if such a policy isn’t ageist that it isn’t wrong. In this posting I will accept their argument but suggest that an alternative policy would be preferable. Before proceeding I must make it clear that I am over seventy and one of the elderly however I hope this doesn’t affect the validity of my argument. In the rest of this posting I will use the term ‘older persons’ rather than elderly as this better reflects that the elderly remain persons.

Before making my argument I will briefly outline that of Savulescu and Cameron. They base their argument on Aristotle’s principle of equality. This requires that we treat like cases alike, unless there is a morally relevant difference. They use two examples to illustrate the principle. Firstly if men were allowed to vote and women weren’t this would be sexist and wrong because differences in sex don’t make any difference to the capacity to vote. Secondly government investment in screening women for breast cancer whilst not doing the same for men who sometimes also develop breast cancer isn’t sexist or wrong because men are far less likely to develop this cancer. Let us turn to Savulescu and Cameron’s argument that it wouldn’t be ageist to lockdown older persons whilst allowing younger people greater freedom. They point out that because the cost of the lockdown is massive it is desirable to lift the lockdown. Unfortunately lifting the lockdown might result in health services being overwhelmed. They further point that older persons are much more likely to require health services due to covid-19 than younger ones. They proceed to argue that because that older persons are much more likely to require health care that it wouldn’t be ageist or wrong to require older persons to remain lockdown whilst lifting the lockdown for others due to Aristotle’s principle of equality. When considering the need for health services due to covid-19 outbreak there is a significant difference between older persons and others. It follows that it wouldn’t be ageist to follow a policy which discriminates against older persons in this way.

Let us accept that the above is a perfectly good argument. However it would appear that BAME people are dying at twice the rate of others in the UK. If we accept Savulescu and Cameron’s argument about lockdown for the elderly then the same argument could be applied to BAME people. If it isn’t ageist to lockdown older persons then it shouldn’t be racist to lockdown BAME people. Most would be uneasy about accepting such a conclusion. Let us now consider a different policy which achieves the same ends and which might alleviate our unease. Let us assume that older persons are warned prior the lockdown being lifted, that if this leads to an increase in covid-19 cases which threaten to overwhelm the health services, that they might receive a lower standard of care compared to others. This lower standard is justified because of the disproportionate burden they place on these services. This policy means that older persons might be denied places in ICU and just receive palliative care. Older persons would face a choice of whether to self-isolate or not in order to protect themselves. Let us further assume that the lockdown is lifted and this leads to an increase in covid-19 cases which threaten to overwhelm the health services and as a result older persons start receiving a lower standard of care. Should this policy be regarded as ageist? Let us consider Aristotle’s principle of equality in this scenario. Clearly older persons are treated differently to others but are there any reasons which might justify this difference? I would suggest that there are two reasons which might justify treating older people differently. Firstly older persons are much less likely to survive treatment in ICU. Secondly if treatment in ICU has to be rationed then saving a younger patients at the expense of the elderly means saving patients who will usually live longer and can be justified by utilitarian principles. It would appear that if we accept Aristotle’s principle of equality then a policy which discriminates against older persons in this way wouldn’t be ageist.

I’m self-isolating and believe it is sensible for most older persons to remain in lockdown even if the lockdown were to be partially lifted. I have outlined two policies to protect our health services from becoming overwhelmed in both of which it wouldn’t be ageist to discriminate against older persons. Let us assume that each of these policies would be equally effective in preventing the health from being overwhelmed. Which of these policies should we choose if we accept that it isn’t a question of whether to discriminate but rather when to discriminate.

Let us accept that we have good reasons why we should adopt the first policy as proposed by Savulescu and Cameron. It might be argued that following such policy would protect older persons better than the second. It might be pointed out that if the second policy was adopted that older persons would have to protect themselves. In response it might be pointed out if the first policy is introduced that older persons would still have to protect themselves by remaining compliant. Nonetheless let us accept that we have good reason to adopt the first policy. However it is important to note that the reason to prefer the first policy over the second has nothing to do with protecting our health services from being overwhelmed, both policies do this adequately, the reason for preferring the first policy is to do with caring for older persons. If we choose the first policy then we are also acting beneficently.

Do we have any reasons to choose the second policy instead?  I would suggest that we have two. Firstly adopting the second policy might be more effective as it might be difficult to ensure that older persons remained in long term lockdown under the first policy. I won’t consider this reason further here. Secondly it might be argued that preferring the second policy protects autonomy better. Adopting the first policy serves the interests of all by protecting the health services but it doesn’t respect the autonomy of older individuals. It might then be argued that if the second policy adequately protects health services and respects autonomy that we have reason to prefer this policy. Two objections might be raised to the above argument. Firstly it might be objected that the first policy does respect autonomy. Secondly it might be objected that in times of extreme crisis such as this we should give preference to acting beneficently over respecting autonomy. I will now consider both objections.

What it means to respect autonomy depends on the concept of autonomy used. It might be suggested that an autonomous decision is one that is rationally made to concur with the agent’s best interests and is freely made. If we accept a substantive account of autonomy then these best interests include generally accepted interests such as safety and good health. If we accept a substantive account of autonomy then it might be argued that adopting the first policy is compatible with respecting the autonomy of older persons. Older people, if given the choice, would make an autonomous decision to remain in lockdown because it is in their best interests to stay safe and protect their health. I myself would make such a choice. However let us consider an elderly widow who lives alone and who is suffering from terminal cancer. Let us assume that she is still able to visit her family. If the first policy was adopted she would have to remain in lockdown whilst the rest of her family were free to socialise. I would suggest that if such a person could make an autonomous decision whether to remain in lockdown or not she would choose to socialise with her family. When she considers her best interests she might prioritise family life over staying safely in lockdown. It follows that in this case adopting the first policy wouldn’t respect her autonomy. It might be objected that I have used an extreme example and that we should still prefer the first policy.  I am prepared to accept that I have used an extreme example to illustrate my point but I still want to argue that if we prefer the first policy that we fail to respect the autonomy of older persons. Older persons in general have less future time to look forward to than younger people and many might make an autonomous decision, if they were able to do so, to prioritise family life over staying safe.

Let us accept that if we prefer the first policy then we must be prepared to accept either that acting beneficently is more important than respecting autonomy or that we can respect autonomy whilst acting beneficently. If we accept the second option then we must also accept a substantive account of autonomy. I have argued elsewhere that if we accept a substantive account of autonomy that autonomous decisions must be good decisions, see wooler.scottus . An autonomous decision cannot be a bad decision, it must concur with what is generally accepted to be in the maker’s best interests. However if autonomous decisions must be good decisions then the entire idea of autonomous decision making becomes redundant. We just need to consider good decisions. It follows that if we accept that autonomy is to remain a meaningful concept that we must be prepared to accept a content neutral account. It further follows that if we don’t accept that acting beneficently should be given priority over respecting autonomy that we should prefer the second policy.

However it might be argued that in times like these that acting beneficently is more important than respecting autonomy. Two objections might be raised to the above. Firstly if we prefer the first policy are we really acting beneficently towards older persons? An older person might well believe that leading a social life is in her best interests rather than remaining safe for her last few years. If we disagree we might be accused of epistemic arrogance. Secondly if we give precedence to acting beneficently we are taking acting beneficently to mean ‘caring for’ rather than ‘caring about’. People don’t want to be ‘cared for’ in much the same way as pets are they want to be ‘cared about’ as persons and this means taking their interests into account. It follows if we want to act truly beneficently that we should prefer the second policy.

Inner Virtue and Private Racist Thoughts

 

In this posting I want to consider Nicolas Bommarito’s idea of inner moral virtue. In doing so I want to examine whether our purely private thoughts matter morally. For instance someone might have private evil thoughts but never express or act on them. In order to make the idea of inner moral virtue clear I will combine my examination with considering whether someone’s purely private racist’s thoughts are wrong and if so why. The thoughts I will be considering will be purely private conscious thoughts which the thinker endorses to some degree rather than simply some unconscious bias.it might be thought that the question of private inner thoughts is interesting but of little importance. However is someone who has private evil thoughts evil even if he never expresses or acts on them perhaps because hr fears punishment? If not do we have to accept that we can force people to be good and that morality doesn’t have an inner component.

Let us start our investigation by considering Galen Strawson’s idea of weather watchers (1). Bommarito describes these as follows,

iant stone monoliths, they are living creatures with mental lives much like our own—own—they have thoughts, memories, desires, emotions, sensations, and even fantasies and dreams. These creatures care very deeply about the weather; they are filled with joy when it is sunny out and melancholy when it rains or snows. Because of their physiology, they are completely incapable of any behavioral action……However, none of their rich mental lives are externally observable and, because of the kind of creatures they are, they are unable to perform overt actions of any kind….. They will even lack the associated intentions.” (2)

It might be objected that the idea of weather watchers is of little moral relevance because they are pure fantasy. However there are human beings who share many of the characteristics of weather watchers, those suffering from locked in syndrome. Someone with locked in syndrome may be happy when he has visitors, unhappy when he hasn’t and dream about having visitors when he is alone in the night. Clearly the mental life of someone with locked in syndrome matters to him but does his purely mental life have any moral relevance

Traditionally moral virtue is linked to character and some someone can be said to be virtuous if he has a disposition or attitudes which cause him to act morally most of the time. Clearly a weather watcher cannot be virtuous in this traditional sense because traditionally being virtuous is connected to action. However Bommarito argues that an inability to act does not preclude someone from having inner moral virtue linked to character. What does Bommarito mean by an inner moral virtue or vice? He argues that whilst weather watchers are incapable of virtue in the traditional sense that nonetheless they are capable of some sort of inner virtue or vice. A Weather Watcher who took pleasure in knowing that another of his kind was experiencing pleasure in the warm sun might be said to be expressing inner virtue. However schadenfreude shows such a definition is too simplistic. Someone might takes pleasure in another’s suffering. If someone else takes pleasure in the pleasure of the person enjoying schadenfreude then he cannot be regarded as being virtuous. Bommarito sees virtuous states as mental manifestations of an underlying moral concern. This definition could be seen as one part of the more traditional definition outlined above which sees someone as virtuous provided he has dispositions or attitudes which cause him to act morally most of the time, his dispositions can be seen as mental manifestations of an underlying moral concern. Accepting such a definition makes inner virtue a possibility. If a weather watcher takes pleasure in another watcher’s pleasure in the warm sun then he is being virtuous provided his pleasure is a manifestation of caring, of moral concern for the other. Similarly someone with locked in syndrome is being virtuous if he takes pleasure when his nurse hums happily to herself, his pleasure is a manifestation of concern for her wellbeing. It might be objected that these examples aren’t really manifestations of moral concern because they are concerned with happiness and someone’s happiness isn’t a moral concern. Two responses are possible to this objection. First someone’s happiness is connected to his wellbeing and someone’s wellbeing is a moral concern. Secondly inner virtue might be defined as manifestations of an underlying caring about someone’s wellbeing rather than moral concern. In the rest of this posting I will adopt this amended definition.

What are the consequences of accepting the above definition for our intuitive ideas concerning virtue? Firstly if we accept the idea of inner virtue then someone can be virtuous without acting. Someone with locked in syndrome who is incapable of action can still be virtuous.  However caution is needed here. In the above definition I intentionally replaced Borramito’s ‘concern’ by ‘caring about’. I did so to exclude someone, who is supposedly concerned about another’s wellbeing and is capable of acting to promote this wellbeing but nonetheless fails to do so from being regarded as virtuous. For instance a parent who is always expressing concern for his children’s wellbeing but fails to attend parent’s evenings, sporting and other events which matter to his children without a genuine excuse. Someone cannot be said to care about the wellbeing of others if he takes no steps to promote their wellbeing when he is able to do so. Secondly it might be pointed out that inner virtue, the manifestation of an underlying caring about someone’s wellbeing, is usually manifested by pleasure and that pleasure is involuntary. It then might be argued that accepting the above definition makes it hard to praise the virtuous and blame the vicious. It might then be concluded that inner virtue isn’t a real virtue because acting virtuously is usually regarded as praiseworthy. We can’t be praised or blamed for things which are beyond our control. Two objections can be raised to this argument. Firstly is more conventionally defined virtue always praiseworthy? Consider a child from an affluent home with good loving parents who grows up to be virtuous because of his background and parental encouragement. Is his virtue praiseworthy? Perhaps we should regard virtue as something to be appreciated rather than praised. We might say someone has a better character than someone else even if he isn’t responsible for his better character and doesn’t deserve to be praised for it. Secondly we might question how we acquire our sense of pleasure. A baby just gets pleasure from certain things but do we acquire all our pleasures in the same way? Do we have any input into our acquisition of some pleasures? For instance if we enjoy classical music did we simply come to enjoy it or does our will play some part in its acquisition? Do we have any control over the maintenance of pleasures? For instance if classical music pleases us we can maintain this pleasure by going to concerts. Do we have higher pleasures based our lower pleasures? Being pleased or displeased about what pleases us. If we have some limited control of some of the pleasures we acquire then perhaps inner virtue and vice should attract some praise and blame. Accepting either of the above arguments would mean inner virtue doesn’t differ significantly from our more accepted ideas of virtue when it comes to praise and blame.

  now want to examine the broader consequences of accepting the idea of inner virtue. I will do so by considering inner virtue in conjunction with private racist thoughts. Racism is wrong but do someone’s unexpressed private racist thoughts do any harm and if so why? Clearly someone with locked in syndrome can have racist thoughts. Equally clearly these thoughts cannot be seen as manifestations of an underlying caring about someone’s wellbeing and if we accept that inner virtue is possible then these thoughts cannot be regarded as virtuous. Indeed I argue that such thoughts show a complete disregard for someone’s wellbeing and might be regarded as vicious. I now want to consider two questions. Firstly do the racist thoughts of someone with locked in syndrome do any harm? Secondly do purely private racist thoughts of someone who can act in the world do any harm?

If someone with locked in syndrome has racist thoughts then he harms no one else because he is incapable of action. It might then be argued that because his thoughts don’t harm others that these thoughts really don’t matter. However would we say that the alcoholism of a private alcoholic who drinks alone and doesn’t harms others doesn’t matter? I would suggest we wouldn’t. His alcoholism matters even if no one else becomes aware of it because he harms himself. It might be objected at this point that the analogy I’m trying to make is a false one because the alcoholic harms his physiological health whilst a racist with locked in syndrome doesn’t. In response I now want to argue that even if a racist with locked in syndrome doesn’t harm his physiological health that nonetheless his racist thoughts harm him by damaging his character. How might a private racist thoughts damage character? My argument will be based on two premises. My first premise is that caring about the welfare of others is a necessary condition for having a good character. Someone who is indifferent to the good of others might have some prudential virtues and be said to have a strong character but it cannot be said he has a good character. It might be objected that someone can have a good character and not care about the welfare of others. For instance he might believe in retributory justice and that some people deserve to suffer. In order to accommodate this objection I will amend the above premise slightly. This amended first premise holds that someone cannot be said to have a good character if he fails to care about the undeserved suffering of others. My second premise is that everyone cares about having a good character. It might be objected that my second premise is an extremely over optimistic one. Nonetheless I wish to defend it. It might now be objected that sadism shows my second premise to be unsound because a sadist clearly doesn’t care about having a good character. In response I would suggest even if a sadist happily enjoys inflicting pain on others and accepts his nature that nonetheless he still believes it would be better not to be a sadist. No one aspires to be a sadist. A sadist values having a good character even if he doesn’t value it enough to change his ways. Let us accept my second premise that everyone cares, at least to some degree, about having a good character. It follows that someone with locked in syndrome who has racist thoughts also cares about having a good character at least to some degree. If he has racist thoughts then these thoughts manifest a lack of caring for the underserved suffering of people of other races. It follows that his racist thoughts damages him, even if they don’t damage anyone else, by splitting his character even if this splitting is of no moral concern. Racist thoughts and the caring about character conflict. However even if we don’t accept my second premise I would still argue that someone who doesn’t care about having a good character damages his character. His character is damaged by a lack of aspiration to be a better person.

I now want to consider more practical matters. Does someone who doesn’t have locked in syndrome but has purely private racist thoughts do any real harm. Clearly as I have argued above he damages himself but are these private thoughts of any moral concern provided that he doesn’t harm others? Clearly a smoker damages his health but his smoking shouldn’t be of concern to others if he is an adult and smokes in a field. It might then be argued by analogy that if someone has private racist thoughts that these thoughts shouldn’t be of concern to others. It might then be concluded that someone could still act virtuously even if he has vicious private racist thoughts. What does it mean to act virtuously?  A behaviourist account of virtue might suggest that someone acts virtuously provided he acts in accordance with moral norms. If we accept such an account then someone could act virtuously if his motive was purely to signal virtue or even if his actions were the result of luck. If we aren’t prepared to accept that actions based on virtue signalling or due to luck are truly virtuous ones then we can’t accept a behaviourist account of virtue. Virtue isn’t a shallow concept but has roots. These roots lie in someone’s disposition to act virtuously most of the time. These dispositions are a result of, or form part of someone’s character. It follows that acting virtuously is rooted in character. We have defined inner virtue above as a manifestation of an underlying caring about someone’s wellbeing. Let us accept that what we care about is linked to our character. It follows that acting virtuously and inner virtue are connected by character. I now want to argue that having private racist thoughts harms someone by damaging his ability to act virtuously. Let us assume that someone wants to act virtuously. I have argued above that if someone wants to act virtuously that he must care about other people unless his motive is purely to virtue signal in which case his actions aren’t virtuous. Let us also assume that he has private racist thoughts. These thoughts manifest a lack of concern for someone’s wellbeing. It follows that his character is divided. This division matters because his purely private racist thoughts make it harder for him to act virtuously. Even if someone’s purely private thoughts are never made explicit they leak out into the world by making behaving virtuously harder. This division matters for another reason. A racist might have purely private racist thoughts which he never expresses but these thoughts might leak out into the world by the way he acts, for instance in the way he votes. It follows purely private racist thoughts should be of moral concern. However accepting the above doesn’t make virtuous action completely impossible. For instance someone might care about being slim and enjoy eating junk food. His divided desires makes it harder for him to diet but not impossible.

 What conclusions can be drawn from the above? I have argued that our purely private thoughts matter. They matter because some of them are connected to inner virtue. Inner virtue is connected to acting virtuously because it is linked to character which in turn is determined by the things we care about. If the things we care about form a consistent set then it is easier to act virtuously. However it is harder to act virtuously if the things we care about form an inconsistent set and we are unable to rank our priorities. Acting virtuous isn’t just a matter of luck, it has roots which are connected to inner virtue. If morality has no roots then mimicking morality is the same as acting morally. Lastly if we are capable of acting in the world our inner virtues or vices are of moral concern because they leak out into the world by making it easier or more difficult it to act virtuously.

1. Strawson, Galen. 1994. Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. Bommarito, Nicolas. 2017. Inner Virtue (Oxford Moral Theory) (pp. 13-14). Oxford University Press.

Afterthought, It night be objected to the above that any moral system concerned with character is too complicated and that any practical morality should solely be concerned with actions. Intuitively this objection seems sound but can character and actions be easily separate?

Stoicism, Covid-19 and Fortitude

The pandemic caused by the covid-19 virus raises many ethical concerns. In this posting I won’t consider these concerns directly but instead examine the sort of attitude that we should cultivate in the face of the pandemic. Of course the attitude adopted has some ethical implications. In particular I want to examine whether we should cultivate a stoical attitude. At the outset I would make it plain whilst I have a lot of sympathy for some stoic ideas I am at best only a partial stoic. The virus causes health problems for many and for a few death. At present there is no effective treatment available or vaccine available to treat covid-19. An excellent simple explanation of the effects of covid-19 and some of the ethical implications is provided by Massimo Pigliucci in Medium .

Why should we adopt a stoical attitude to the coronavirus outbreak? A stoic might argue that should adopt such an attitude because fear prevents us from thinking rationally and as a result also prevents us from living as well as we might in the face of the outbreak. A stoic tries to rule herself by reason rather than her emotions. To stoics many emotions are illogical. Anger is pointless because anger can’t change the past and fear of the inevitable is also pointless because someone's fate cannot be changed. Let us accept that being fearful means being in an unpleasant state. It follows if a stoic becomes infected by the virus that she should accept this and only concern herself with the things she can change because her fear serves no useful purpose and is harmful. The things she can change include her attitude to the difficulties she faces and anything she can do to mitigate these difficulties. A stoical attitude similar to acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) in which the client is encouraged to accept her state and commit to changing that which can be changed. The situation is slightly different in the case of a stoic who hasn’t already become infected by the virus. Of course she must accept the fact that she might become infected and not deceive herself by thinking that this is unlikely to happen to her. In this situation is her fear also pointless and should she seek to eliminate it? To say someone might become infected by covid-19 is really to say that there is a probability that she will become infected. Someone might change the probability of contracting cancer by giving up smoking. Similarly someone might change the probability of becoming infected by covid-19 by measures such as effective handwashing, social distancing or self-isolation. If someone becomes paralysed by fear which stops her from taking these measures then she should seek to eliminate her fear. However it might be argued that if fear sometimes helps someone to take these sensible measures then fear is useful and she shouldn’t eliminate it. Fear of lung cancer might help someone give up smoking more effectively than reason alone. Perhaps fear might act as a catalyst. In response a stoic might argue if we eliminate fear rationality alone can give us reason to take these measures.

Let us accept that the stoic is correct in her assertion that being afraid of the inevitable is both harmful and serves no useful purpose. A perfectly rational being shouldn’t fear the inevitable. She might of course consider how she would react to it.  However human beings aren’t perfectly rational creatures. Because of this it might be suggested that a stoic should cultivate courage in order to control her fear. Perhaps, but I will argue that it would be better to cultivate fortitude in response to covid-19 outbreak. Both courage and fortitude are concerned with strength of character. This strength is the ability to face up to dangerous and in some cases difficult situations without becom ing paralysed by fear. However the two aren’t identical. For instance courage is useful to people like soldiers, mountaineers and whistle blowers. Courage is concerned with our actions and is proactive. Fortitude is useful to people facing illness or financial ruin. Fortitude helps people face misfortune and is a reactive rather than a proactive attitude. Someone may also be courageous intermittently but someone can’t be said to have fortitude intermittently. It follows that fortitude is more closely linked to character than courage. How does fortitude help people facing misfortune? If certainly doesn’t simply mean accepting our fate. Exhibiting fatalism isn’t expressing fortitude. Simply accepting our fate is completely compatible with abandoning our values and giving in to sapping self-pity which destroys character. Fortitude is connected to character by helping us hold on to those things we can hold on to and is important in maintaining character. Fortitude helps us to maintain our values, things we can control, and in doing so helps us to maintain value in life. A father who struggles to maintain his family after becoming redundant rather than becoming apathetic would be an example of fortitude. Similarly a mother who continues to care for her family as best she can after becoming infected by covid-19 requires fortitude. Fortitude requires that we keep calm and carry on. Fortitude requires patience and patience might be particularly useful when coming out of lockdown. Easing lockdown too quickly would be imprudent. Fortitude is has similarities to grit a term used by the authentic happiness movement. Grit is described as the tendency to sustain interest in and effort toward very long-standing goals and is often connected to self-control, see authentichappiness.sas.upenn .

Let us accept that fortitude is a useful virtue to cultivate in the face of the coronavirus pandemic. Roughly speaking a stoic seeks to accept the things she can’t change and only concerns herself with the things she can such as her attitude to external events. A stoic seeks to limit her vulnerability. A stoical attitude like one based on fortitude is a reactive attitude rather than proactive one. Moreover I have argued that fortitude is connected to character and we talk of a stoic character. It might appear that a stoic should be able to cultivate the virtue of fortitude with some ease.

However it is important to be clear that even if a stoical person shares some things in common with a fortitudinous person that the two aren’t identical. Central to stoic ideas is accepting our those things we can't change and by doing so limiting our vulnerability. However it is important to be clear accepting our fate isn't the same as as accepting our vulnerability. The stoic ideal is a sage who is impervious to the emotions. This isn’t true of fortitude. A fortitudinous person might see herself as vulnerable but her main drive isn’t to limit to her vulnerability but to accept it whilst moving on. Fortitude is essentially forward looking in helping us maintain our values. It might be objected to the above that stoicism is also forward looking in that a stoic seeks to remain virtuous. I am prepared to accept my objectors point to a certain degree. However I would suggest that whilst a fortitudinous person might look forward to some future event with hope a stoic seeks to avoid hope because by hoping she increases her vulnerability. A stoic seeks to adopt a purely rational approach to future events based on realistic probabilities rather than hopeful ones. However it might be questioned whether a stoic can even value probabilistic outcomes. For a stoic difficulties in assigning values to probabilistic outcomes arise because if she tries to do so she would have to care about some outcomes more than others making herself vulnerable to less favoured outcomes. If we accept that to ‘care about’ is a primitive form of love then a stoic’s reluctance to assign values to probabilistic outcomes damages her capacity to love. Of course Panglossian optimism is harmful but the capacity to hope realistically is needed for the capacity to love and is part of what makes us human, see what do we mean by hope . During the course of the coronavirus pandemic it is inevitable that some of us will feel grief. However to a stoic such as Seneca we should battle grief even if we can’t totally eliminate it. However even for a stoic battling grief is hard. On the death of his brother Cato the younger was overcome by grief and spared no expense on his funeral. I would suggest that when confronted by grief we should seek to control rather than battle it. If we fight or seek to eliminate our grief we are seeking to make ourselves less vulnerable. Unfortunately we become less vulnerable by caring less about the deceased whereby damaging our capacity to love, see grief . Adopting a purely rational attitude, if that is even possible for human beings, damages our capacity to love, to be truly human.

In conclusion I have argued that facing the dangers posed by the covid-19 with fortitude is preferable to facing them stoically. I also suggested that fortitude is connected to character and for that reason is neither quickly nor easily obtained. It follows that if someone doesn’t already possess fortitude it might benefit him to act stoically in the face of the outbreak. However acting stoically is also not easy and carries some dangers outlined above. Some acting stoically must be careful not to become too hard hearted as this will damage his humanity.