Forgiveness and Narrative

If someone asks for forgiveness Griswold argues she must take responsibility for her harmful actions (Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press, 2007). He further argues she must also be able to offer some kind of narrative both as to why she acted as she did and as to why she now seeks forgiveness. A narrative must combine two elements; firstly it must contain an accurate account of the events concerned and secondly a personal account of why they happened. In this posting I want to investigate the second element of a narrative. In what follows when I refer to the nature of a narrative I am referring to this second element. Let it be accepted that any act needing forgiveness and any accompanying decision to seek forgiveness are intentional acts. Clearly someone need not seek forgiveness for some harm caused by her when she was suffering from a convulsion. She may of course express regret for her actions but she has nothing to apologise for or seek forgiveness. Prima facie it then might be assumed the nature of a narrative of someone seeking forgiveness should concern intention.

However a moment’s reflection casts some doubt on the above assumption. I will now argue some unintentional harmful acts are inexcusable meaning the nature of a forgiveness narrative cannot be solely concerned with an agent’s intentions. For example some brutal acts may be the unthinking product of someone’s intentional actions aimed at achieving some other end. In this context an unintentional brutal act may cause harm which requires forgiveness. Of course I do not deny brutality may be intentional especially if it is part of some deliberate policy. Let it be accepted brutal acts require forgiveness. It now follows that because some brutal acts are unintentional some unintentional acts require forgiveness. The nature of a narrative offered by someone wishing to be forgiven requires she should offer an explanation as to why she acted as she did. If I am correct in believing that some unintentional acts require forgiveness then the nature of a forgiveness narrative cannot be one based solely on intention. For this reason I suggest the nature of a narrative must be based on the character of the agent seeking forgiveness rather than her intentions. Such a narrative must contain three elements. Firstly it must make clear the agent’s character when she caused the harm, secondly her present character as she seeks forgiveness and lastly some explanation as to why her character has changed.

It might be argued the above only holds in certain contexts and that in other contexts the agent’s intentions offer a basis for a far simpler whilst at the same time a completely adequate account of the nature of a forgiveness narrative. It might then be argued the nature of any narrative offered should not be simply based on the agent seeking forgiveness’s character but rather should be a hybrid concept based mostly on intention and only on character when this is necessary. I will now argue that character alone should form the basis of any forgiveness narrative. I will argue that if we accept the conditions Griswold believes are necessary for paradigmatic forgiveness then a narrative based on character rather than intention seems to be required.

Our intentions don’t leap ready formed into our minds. Out intentions are partly formed by the situations we face. Natural selection would soon eliminate members of any species that did not react appropriately to a specific situation. Experimental philosophy seems to suggest that situation is all important and that our character plays little part in our decisions and hence should play little part in any forgiveness narrative, see for instance Appiah (Experiments in Ethics, Harvard University Press, 2008, chapter 2). A constant theme of this Blog is “caring about” or love. Let it be accepted here without any argument that someone’s ideals are something she “cares about” or loves. Frankfurt argues,
“For a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity.” (Necessity Volition and Love, Cambridge University Press, 1999, page 114)
Such a person, if such a person can possibly exist, is not a candidate for forgiveness. Griswold sets out several conditions an offender must meet for paradigmatic forgiveness. Let us consider an example. Let us assume Sue wants to be forgiven for some offence she has caused. The first condition Griswold thinks Sue must meet is that she must admit she was responsible for the action. Let it be further assumed Sue has no ideals and is amorphous without fixed shape or identity. It follows Sue may well admit she was responsible for the offence one moment but deny it the next. Intuitively Sue does not genuinely meet Griswold’s first condition needed for forgiveness. She might of course be excused blame due to her lack of identity. The above suggests Griswold’s first condition might be slightly reframed so that an offender must consistently admit she was responsible for her action. Consistency in actions requires ideals to act on. It follows someone seeking forgiveness must have ideals. Ideals form character. Nothing I have said about character means the situations we find ourselves in don’t help determine our actions, indeed they do and this fact is important in reminding us of our common humanity. It does however mean that these situations don’t completely determine our actions. Indeed if this was not so we would all act identically in identical situations and this is clearly not the case. I have shown if someone can be forgiven she must have some character however I have yet to show her forgiveness narrative must concern her character.

The fourth condition Griswold believes is necessary for paradigmatic forgiveness is that the offender must be committed to becoming a better person. Someone might try to become a better person by simply avoiding situations similar to that which caused the original offence. Such a tactic may be praiseworthy but a commitment to avoid certain situations seems more like an effort to behave better rather than a genuine commitment to become a better person. Indeed if one accepts the claims of some experimental philosophy, situationist ethics, this might be the only option an agent really has. I however argued above people do indeed have character based on their ideals and I would argue any attempt to become a genuinely better person involves one’s character. It follows the narrative offered as part of forgiveness should refer to character. I believe such a narrative should take the following form. In the past I only cared about X but not Y, I have now changed and I care less about X and now care about Y. Such a narrative contains the three elements I suggested were necessary for any forgiveness narrative based on character. It might be objected someone may believe that she cares about Y but when it she acts she finds she cannot do what caring about Y requires. I accept this may well be true but it is not an argument for replacing character by intention at the heart of a forgiveness narrative. Someone may also fully intend to do y but find she cannot carry out her intention in practice. For these reasons it seems to me any forgiveness narrative should be a character narrative. This character narrative should contain three elements, the agent’s past character, her present character and why her character has changed.

I have argued that paradigmatic forgiveness requires a narrative based on the offender’s character. Does imperfect forgiveness also require such a narrative? Griswold argues if an offender is to be imperfectly forgiven she must at the very least be willing to take some minimal steps to seek forgiveness, this willingness may be in some circumstances be imaginatively reconstructed by the victim (page 115). The question then becomes this. Do the minimal steps any offender must take if she is to be forgiven include a forgiveness narrative based on her character? In my previous posting I argued one of the minimal steps any offender must take for imperfect forgiveness is that she must say sorry. Saying sorry may be imaginatively reconstructed. I further argued if saying sorry is genuine and not simply a case of rhetoric that saying sorry involves a move from excuse to guilt. I still further argued this move from excuse to guilt involves a fundamental change in the way the offender pictures herself. Any fundamental change in the way someone pictures herself involves a change in character. Moreover this change in character can be explained by a narrative. Someone might object even if my argument is accepted it does not automatically follow that such a narrative must play a part in imperfect forgiveness. I disagree; let it be assumed an offender can take the minimal steps needed to seek forgiveness without even the possibility of an imaginatively reconstructed narrative. Let it be further assumed the offender says sorry and behaves in a more moral manner. My objector would seem to be committed to the view that the offender has taken the minimal steps required for imperfect forgiveness. However it seems to be entirely possible that in the above situation the offender has only taken these steps in order to protect her self interests. If this is so I see no reason to forgive the offender. It seems clear to me if someone is to be forgiven it must be possible to give, or at the very least imaginatively reconstruct, a narrative to explain the offender’s change in character. It follows all personal forgiveness, including imperfect forgiveness, requires some sort of character narrative.

Forgiving Polanski

Recently Roman Polanski was arrested in Switzerland on a warrant from the USA for a rape committed in 1978. In this posting I want to use this case to examine some ideas connected to forgiveness. Before doing so I want to make clear that there is a clear separation between justice and forgiveness. If this was not so it would seem possible for someone to criminally assault me, causing me great harm, to escape justice provided I forgave him. Justice cannot be a private matter. The victim of Polanski, Samantha Geimer, says she has forgiven him but this does not mean he should not face justice. I agree with Grayling who argues we should prosecute Polanski because “We prosecute and punish in order to maintain our determination not to countenance such crimes” (see http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6852996.ece). The fact we cannot countenance some crimes does not mean we cannot forgive the offender. The central question I want to examine in this posting is whether Polanski has met the conditions needed for forgiveness by Geimer. I will argue he has not.

Charles Griswold in (Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press, 2007) sets out the conditions needed for paradigmatic forgiveness. In these conditions Griswold outlines the following three conditions an offender must meet in order to qualify for forgiveness.
“The first of these reasons consists in the wrong-doers demonstration that she no longer wishes to stand by herself as the author of these wrongs …. Second she must repudiate her deeds (by acknowledging their wrongness) …. Third, the wrong-doer must experience and express regret at having caused that particular injury to that particular person” (pages 49, 50).
As far as I can see Polanski has not satisfied any of the above conditions. The fact that the rape happened a long time ago or because of the circumstances prevailing in Hollywood at that time doesn’t mean he wasn’t the rapist or that he doesn’t need to repudiate his action by acknowledging the wrongness of that particular rape. Polanski has also never expressed regret for having raped Geimer. It might of course be argued these paradigmatic conditions set too high a standard and that a non-paradigmatic form of forgiveness should be applied. Griswold himself argues for such a position in chapter three of his book. It might then be questioned whether Polanski meets the conditions needed for non-paradigmatic or imperfect forgiveness. Griswold argues imperfect forgiveness must meet a certain threshold and that anything failing to meet this threshold is not an example of forgiveness. One of his three conditions needed for any sort of forgiveness is that,
“the willingness – whether in fact, or imaginatively reconstructed by the victim … - of the offender to take minimal steps to qualify for forgiveness” (page 115).
Intuitively it would seem to be difficult to class some actions as forgiveness if the offender shows no remorse. I will return to this point later in my posting. However for the moment I am going to assume Griswold view is correct and move on to examine one of the minimal steps an offender must take if he is to be forgiven.

The third condition outlined above for paradigmatic forgiveness is that the offender must experience and express regret at having caused that particular injury. Basically the offender must say sorry to the victim. It is not enough for the offender just to feel sorry. I now want to argue this third condition of paradigmatic forgiveness also a threshold condition for imperfect forgiveness. Mary Warnock commenting in the Observer of 26/04/09 on the release of Ronnie Biggs from prison makes the following comment.
“But apologising is an act that may bear no more relation to contrition than "yours sincerely" bears to meaning what you say when you regretfully decline an invitation”.
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/apr/26/observer-panel-ronnie-biggs) If Warnock is correct then saying sorry is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. Let us agree with Warnock that signing something “yours sincerely” has little connection to sincerity. But it seems far from clear to me that “saying sorry” is a mere formality and has little connection to contrition. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that “saying sorry” is indeed a mere formality. However if “saying sorry” is a mere formality it seems hard to understand why Biggs and others find it hard to so do. Such cases strongly suggest that “saying sorry” is not a mere formality bereft of all real meaning. It might be objected more people apologise now than in the past. I will merely comment that often such apologies are made by individuals on behalf of an organisation like a church, a company or political party and are not instances of someone “saying sorry” for some personal action. It still seems to me that “saying sorry” for some personal act is not a mere formality.

I believe “saying sorry” is not easy because it usually involves making a move from excuse to guilt. The move from excuse to guilt involves a fundamental change in the way the offender pictures himself. It is possible someone like Polanski might excuse his conduct by believing it was just the way people like him behaved in the hedonistic Hollywood of the seventies. If such a person says sorry he not only admits his guilt and by doing so also lets go of his excuse, he becomes a simply a rapist. Let it be accepted if an offender cannot “say sorry” that he must to some degree excuse his conduct. It seems to me if an offender excuses his conduct he has no reason to take the minimal steps needed to qualify for forgiveness. It follows that “saying sorry” is not a mere formality but a necessary condition for even imperfect forgiveness. Indeed if I am correct to connect “saying sorry” with guilt then Griswold’s second condition for paradigmatic forgiveness becomes a threshold condition needed for imperfect forgiveness. It might then be concluded all forgiveness requires firstly that the offender must repudiate his deeds by acknowledging their wrongness and secondly express remorse. Accepting my conclusion implies that because Polanski has failed to meet both of these conditions Geimer cannot forgive him.

It might be pointed out the implications of my conclusion appear to be objectionable. Why should someone like Geimer, who has done no wrong and has been wronged, not be able to forgive the offender in order to leave the offence behind her and move on with the rest of her life? She might adopt the attitude of “I’m not going the let the bastard spoil my life”. I have great sympathy with this position and believe such an attitude together with moving on is commendable. However when doing philosophy, as opposed to pop psychology, we must be accurate with words we use. It would be a mistake simply to equate “moving on” with forgiveness. It seems quite feasible to “move on” by forgetting but forgiving is certainly not the same as forgetting. A victim might possibly forget by taking drugs or possibly even more bizarrely by committing suicide! Moreover the purpose of “moving on” and forgiveness are not the same. The purpose of “moving on” and getting on with the rest of her life is solely to benefit the victim. This is not so with forgiveness. The purpose of forgiveness is to benefit both the victim and offender. For these reasons I believe if an offender, such as Polanski, fails to express any genuine remorse it is impossible for a victim, such as Geimer, to genuinely forgive him. Such a victim can of course “move on” and put the offences committed against behind her.

Unconditional Forgiveness

Charles Griswold argues that there are certain conditions attached to the concept of forgiveness and that one cannot truly forgive unless these conditions are satisfied (1). It might be pointed out conditional love is inferior to unconditional love. It might then be argued by analogy in response to Griswold that conditional forgiveness is inferior to unconditional forgiveness. In response to this argument, suggested by Garrard and McNaughton (2) Griswold counter argues that for a victim just to give unconditional forgiveness means she lacks self-respect. He points out that intuitively if someone who has been wronged when the offender exhibits no remorse or indeed continues in the offence holds no resentment then the injured party has no self-respect.

I find Griswold’s argument persuasive and believe that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness does indeed mean the forgiver, the offended person, lacks self-respect. However, I want to pursue a slightly different but related argument. In this posting I want to argue that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness means the offended person has too much respect for herself, she is over proud. Let it be accepted that all forgiveness whether unconditional or not means letting go of resentment. Intuitively this appears to be true for it seems hard to believe I have forgiven someone if I still bear resentment towards that person. For the sake of argument let us assume Sue has been morally harmed by John and that she has unconditionally forgiven him. In this context because Sue’s forgiveness is unconditional it is possible that John might remain quite happy with the fact that he has morally harmed Sue and would be fully prepared to do so again. Also in this context, because all forgiveness means letting go of resentment, Sue holds no resentment towards John.

Let us question Sue’s motives in unconditionally forgiving John. It seems to me Sue’s motives for forgiving John have nothing actually to do with John. Perhaps Sue believes that the act of forgiving is morally good. Whatever Sue’s reasons are she is committed to acting morally and she believes John is acting immorally. It follows even if she does not explicitly believe that she is better morally than John she must at least implicitly hold this view. What way might Sue believe she is better morally than John? Firstly it might be possible that Sue believes she is worthy of more moral consideration than John. Such a view runs counter to one of the basic tenets of accepted morality, namely all moral agents are worthy of equal consideration. It follows because Sue sees herself as a moral person this possibility must be rejected. The second possibility is that Sue believes she is better at acting morally than John.

Let us accept this second possibility and agree that Sue sees herself as a morally good person. Morally good people must consider all moral agents and not just a select few. I now want to argue that by unconditionally forgiving John and unconditionally letting go of her resentment Sue does not genuinely consider his moral needs. I will argue that by withdrawing her resentment Sue is removing something that might help John become a better person. Resentment, moral anger, about the way we are being treated is a protest. This protest may play a part in asserting our self-respect (3), but it also is signal to the offender that he is causing moral harm. It seems to me that by unconditionally forgiving John Sue is denying John this signal which might help him become a better person. The above suggests Sue is only considering herself morally and disregarding the moral needs of John. Sue certainly acts as if John does not deserve the same moral consideration as she does and hence runs counter to one of the basic tenets of accepted morality. However, I accept it is possible Sue acts from purely altruistic motives and believes that by forgiving John she benefits him even if in actual fact she does not. However, I would question her motives. She chooses a course of action most others would not, most people feel resentment. Moreover she too easily presumes she knows what is best morally for John. It might be suggested her presumption is based on an excess of moral pride. In the light of the above it would seem justifiable to conclude that Sue was wrong to unconditionally forgive John.

It might be countered to my conclusion is unsound. It might be pointed out that unconditional forgiveness seems to set an excellent example to others outweighing the reasons I have given for unconditional forgiveness being unsound. I will very briefly present two counter arguments to show this is not so. Firstly, I would argue the recognition of others as moral agents is even more fundamental to morality than any possible demonstration of moral excellence. Without this basic recognition no system of morality can even get started. In my example it seems to me Sue may be acting in a way she believes is best for John but none the less by so doing she is failing to recognise him as a fully moral agent. Secondly a decision to unconditionally forgive seems to lack an affective element. I would suggesr that any meaningful moral decision must at least be partly based on empathic concern, see (4). Sue’s decision to unconditionally forgive John is not even partly based on empathic concern. To conclude let us accept that unconditional forgiveness is preferable to no forgiveness. However the above suggest that conditional forgiveness is preferable to unconditional forgiveness for two reasons. Firstly unconditional forgiveness does not truly consider the moral needs of the offender and secondly the forgiver seems to exhibit an unjustified pride in his forgiveness.

1. Charles Griswold, 2007, Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press.
2. Garrard & McNaughton, 2003, In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104.
3.  Griswold, page 65.
4. Michael Slote, The ethics of Caring and Empathy, Routledge, 2007, page 31.

Pornography

Sex sells or so it would seem. In the western world we have developed a large porn industry as demonstrated by the BBC television documentary ‘Hardcore profits’ broadcast on 08/09/09 and 15/09/09. In this posting I want to specifically consider the harm pornography does to the consumers of pornography. I will not consider the harms done to those involved in making pornography. I believe these harms to be considerable even if it is possible, at least in theory, to have an unexploited pornographer involved in the trade merely to support her family. I will also not discuss the legality of the pornography. I will accept people have a right to make and consume pornography subject to suitable safeguards for minors. My attitude to the legality of pornography is analogous to my attitude to smoking. I am a non smoker who believes smoking, like pornography, is harmful. Nevertheless I am prepared to defend the freedom of smokers to smoke in their own homes and outside areas. It might be objected smoking whilst harmful to the individual does not damage society whilst pornography does. I will merely comment even if pornography does damage society to some degree, which I accept, its prohibition would damage our free society to a far greater degree.

Before I consider the harm pornography does to its consumers I must first define pornography. This task is not as simple as it might appear for whilst most people would easily recognise an example of pornography few could easily define it. Intuitively pornography might be defined as sexually explicit material designed to give sexual arousal to those who view, read or listen to it. The trouble with this definition is that there seems to nothing wrong with either sexual explicitness or arousal. A medical text book might be sexually explicit whilst a man may become aroused by simply watching his partner undress. This suggests that what is wrong with pornography is not that it simply causes arousal but rather the way it causes this arousal. For this reason I am going to initially adopt the definition of pornography given by Caroline West in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/pornography-censorship. She defines pornography as sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in its consumers which is bad in a certain way. Some might disagree with this definition pointing out it is already value laden before any discussion of why pornography is bad, see Wendy McElroy’s ‘A Woman’s Right to Pornography’ chapter two is available at www.wendymcelroy.com/xxx/, nevertheless I intend to use West’s definition. In my discussion of pornography I will consider the nature of pornography to be mainly heterosexual and its consumers male even though I accept pornography may be homosexual in nature and used by some women, see link above.

In what way is pornography bad for its consumers? It certainly isn’t bad because of the way its effects on someone’s physical health like smoking. The viewing of pornography and possible subsequent masturbation does not cause blindness and insanity as some Victorians believed. In what follows I will argue what is bad about pornography is not the way it affects someone’s physical or mental health but rather the way it affects his character. I will present three arguments in an attempt to show pornography damages someone’s character. Firstly I will argue pornography damages his natural disposition to feel empathy. Secondly I will argue pornography in some way splits his character and lastly that it damages this character.

I believe that normal human beings have a natural disposition to feel empathy. I further believe this disposition enhances our character. It might then be argued if the use of pornography damages this natural disposition then it also damages our character. Does the use of pornography damage someone’s disposition to feel empathy? The use of pornography certainly means the user uses others instrumentally but this fact alone does not mean his disposition to feel empathy is damaged. For instance he may catch a bus and normally be completely indifferent to the bus driver without any damage being done to his disposition to feel empathy. I see no obvious reason why the way someone uses explicit sexual material must automatically damage this disposition. I see no reason why readers of the Sun who avidly scan page three cannot express as much empathy as anyone else. However I do feel the nature of some explicit sexual material can damage a person’s disposition to feel empathy. The above suggests that the badness in West’s definition lies not in the way the explicit material is used but rather the way people are portrayed in this material. The badness lies in the way the explicit material portrays others as being exploited. Moreover it seems to me this portrayal of exploitation is not an incidental part of but an essential element of sexual arousal. In the light of the above West’s definition might be amended as follows, pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in its consumers in an exploitative way. In practice this portrayal of exploitation for the most part involves those being portrayed in being powerless or humiliated. West’s definition might then be further amended as follows. Pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in its consumers by portraying others as powerless or humiliated in some way. It seems probable to me that pornography, so defined, will damage the consumer of such material’s disposition to feel empathy. I have assumed above that a disposition to feel empathy is part of someone’s good character it follows that any damage done to this disposition will also damage his character.

It might be pointed out in reply to my above conclusion that there is no empirical evidence that the consumption of pornography, explicit sexual material in which others are portrayed as powerless or humiliated, is linked to sexual violence. I am prepared to accept this point but I would merely point out a lack of empathy need not be connected to sexual violence. Someone whose capacity to feel empathy is damaged may be aloof, cold or indifferent to others and these traits are undesirable parts of his character even if they not of necessity linked to sexual violence. However it might also be pointed out I have offered no evidence for my belief connecting the consumption of pornography to the damage done to someone’s capacity to feel empathy. However there is compelling indirect evidence to support this connection. The evidence I offer is based on psychological research which shows the situation someone finds himself in affects his capacity to act beneficently. In 1972 Isen and Levin showed if someone dropped his papers outside a phone booth in a shopping mall he was more likely to be helped by a phone user who had just found a dime in the booth than by a user who had not (The Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 1972). Isen and Levin’s experiment clearly shows the situations which we find ourselves in affect our capacity for beneficence. It seems clear if someone reacts beneficently in such an experiment his decision to help is not based on his rationality. It further seems clear that in such a situation his capacity for empathy is enhanced leading him to react beneficently. It follows the situations we find ourselves in can positively affect our natural capacity for empathy.

In the light of the above I will now argue that a consumer of pornography is placing himself in a situation which will negatively affect his natural disposition for empathy. Sometimes we are in a situation in which we view or read about people who are powerless or humiliated such as famine victims. These people naturally arouse our empathy. However this situation is not the same as the one a consumer of pornography finds himself in. This consumer is purposely placing himself in a situation in which others appear to be purposely harmed by being portrayed as powerless or humiliated. It follows in pornographic situations the consumer must curb his natural empathy. If this was not so it would seem he could enjoy humiliating or degrading sexual acts and still feel empathy for the participants in these acts. It seems highly improbable to me that anyone placing himself in a situation in which he curbs his natural capacity for empathy will not negatively affect this capacity in related situations. These other situations may be related by either time or similar circumstances. It follows if a consumer of pornography purposely limits his capacity for empathy in some situations and as a result damages his capacity for empathy in some related situations that such a consumer will also inevitably damage his character.

I will now attempt to argue pornography in some way splits the personality of the user and that this split is detrimental to his character. I have defined pornography as sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers by portraying others as powerless or humiliated. If men sometimes purposely view women as powerless and in humiliating positions and at other times have to deal with women in more normal situations then it might be argued that the different attitudes in different situations in some ways splits their personality. Of course some more radical feminists might argue it is in all men’s nature to see women powerless and humiliated and that their actual relationships with women are merely coated by some thin veneer of civilisation. It might be thought because I have argued pornography of necessity involves seeing others as powerless and humiliated that I would have some sympathy for such a position. I do not because I believe culture and civilisation contribute to an essential part of our nature and are not merely some thin veneer. I accept that the use of pornography does split the personality of the user. However I believe any evidence that this split damages someone’s character is weak for many people seem able to split their lives into different compartments and provided these compartments don’t overlap this causes no splits in character. It seems to me some people’s character, for example that of Oskar Schindler, seem resilient to splits in their personality. For the above reason I reject the above attempted argument.

My third argument concerning the harm pornography does to a consumer concerns the way that it damages his pride and hence his character. For the moment I am going to assume without any argument that anyone who uses pornography cannot be proud of this fact and that his use damages his pride in himself. Accepting this assumption means I need only to show pride is part of someone’s good character in order to show the use of pornography damages his character. In essence I have to show pride is a virtue. The problem with doing this is that not all pride seems virtuous. For instance the pride of overweight football fans in their team’s athletic success hardly seems to count as a virtue, see (Solomon, 2007, True to our Feelings, Oxford, page 100). Moreover historically Christianity has regarded pride as vice. It seems clear not all pride is virtuous. However I think it is possible to show that a certain kind of pride is both virtuous and an essential part of a good character. In order to do so I will consider gay pride. What are the essentials of gay pride? To me gay pride essentially seems to consist of a rational evaluation that you are homosexual together with being satisfied with your sexuality. Two objections might be raised to the above. Firstly it might be objected that gay pride requires no evaluation by someone that he is a homosexual. Secondly it might be argued what is really important is not someone’s satisfaction with the fact that he is gay but his acceptance of it. My response to the first objection is to point out we often deceive ourselves as to our true nature and because of this I believe a rational evaluation of someone’s sexuality forms an essential element of gay pride. My response to the second objection is to point out someone might accept his homosexuality and be deeply unhappy about it. Such a person is not proud of his sexuality. It follows satisfaction with one’s sexuality appears to be an essential element of gay pride, connecting pride and satisfaction is not new see (Hume, (1978, originally 1739-40) A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, page 297). In the light of my discussion of gay pride I suggest pride is indeed a virtue when it is regarded as a rational evaluation of oneself together with being satisfied with oneself.

However if pride is to be regarded as a virtue more needs to be said about being satisfied with oneself. Firstly pride in oneself requires that one must satisfied with a reasonably accurate picture of oneself hence the need for rational evaluation. Secondly satisfaction does not mean some smug emotive feeling about oneself. In previous postings I have frequently used Harry Frankfurt’s definition of satisfaction in connection with ‘caring about’ or love. Having pride in oneself must of necessity involve caring about oneself and for this reason I will again use his definition. According to Frankfurt satisfaction entails an absence of restlessness to change one’s condition. A satisfied person is willing to change his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about any change (see Necessity, Volition, and Love, 1999, Cambridge University Press, page 103). It might be objected that satisfaction so defined merely means acceptance. However this is not so for as I have pointed out above someone may find himself in a situation he dislikes but accepts. Someone for example may accept he will continue to use pornography but be dissatisfied with this situation. In such a situation the person involved does have active interest in bringing about a change in his situation when change is a possibility. It seems provided pride is regarded as a rational evaluation of oneself together with being satisfied with oneself, using Frankfurt’s definition of satisfaction, that pride can be regarded as a genuine virtue. I assumed above without any argument that anyone who uses pornography cannot be proud of this fact using Frankfurt’s definition of satisfaction I am now in a position to provide a reason to back this assumption. It seems inconceivable to me that any consumer of pornography should feel absolutely no restlessness about this consumption. If it is accepted that pride in oneself is a genuine virtue and that the consumption of pornography damages this pride then it follows that the consumption of pornography damages the consumer’s character.

In conclusion I believe I have shown that the consumption of pornography damages the character of those who consume it. It is important to note I use the word damage rather than destroy. The consumption of pornography makes someone less good than he might possibly be. However it is still possible for someone who consumes pornography to possess a good, if damaged, character. His Character is damaged in two ways. Firstly his consumption of pornography erodes his natural disposition to feel empathy and secondly reduces his ability to feel pride in himself.

Why love is not just a disposition to feel empathy

In my last two postings I have argued the love of inanimate objects may not be same as the love of persons and that loving someone might simply be a disposition to feel empathy for beloved. However I will now present two examples which appear contradict my previous view. My first example is of a mother’s love of her baby and my second is self-love. I will firstly consider a mother’s love and attempt to show this love is incompatible with love being regarded as a disposition to feel empathy and I will then repeat the exercise with self-love.

Empathy is defined by the Cambridge Online Dictionary as follows; empathy is the ability to share someone else's feelings or experiences by imagining what it would be like to be in their situation. Let it be assumed that loving someone simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for her. It follows if a mother loves her baby she is able to share her baby’s feelings or experiences. I accept a mother may share her child’s feelings or experiences but it seems inconceivable to me that a mother could share her baby’s feelings or experiences. A baby’s experiences just aren’t available to others. Moreover it would seem to be impossible for a mother to share her baby’s feelings by imagining what it would be like to be a baby. She might of course be able to imagine what it would be like for her to be a baby but this is by no means the same thing as imagining what it is like to be a baby. It follows if we accept the premise that love is simply a disposition to feel empathy it follows that mothers are unable to love their babies. Mothers clearly do love their babies. It follows the above conclusion is false and we must reject the premise it is based on.

Are there any counter arguments which would enable us to accept the above premise and also accept that mothers love their babies? If empathy is defined as above it seems to me the answer is clearly no. However let us consider a real case in order to clarify our concept of empathy. In 2007 the Washington Post reported that a colonel in the US army called off a test using a land mine sweeping robot because it continued sweeping after losing several of its legs. The colonel declared the test was inhumane. What might be the reasons behind the colonel’s decision? His decision was clearly not based on pure rationality. It follows the colonel’s decision was at least in part emotionally based. People have a tendency to anthropomorphise in such situations. It seems likely this was happening in this case, the colonel was treating the robot as if it was something like a human being. It further seems to me the colonel was doing so because he attributed feelings or emotions to the robot. The colonel felt sympathy for the robot. I believe feeling sympathy is connected to some degree with feeling empathy. Sympathy is defined by the Cambridge Online Dictionary as; an expression of understanding and care for someone else's suffering. It seems to me one cannot possibly understand someone else’s suffering unless one has some ability to share that person’s feelings or experiences. Admittedly this sharing does not need to be very precise. For instance a child may share a sense of unease with his mother who has lost her partner. The mother feels uneasy but it would be more accurate to say she feels grief. I believe for sympathy to take place between persons there must be some basic sharing of feelings, or at the very least moods, between the persons involved. I believe understanding how someone feels must involve emotion. I cannot use pure logic to understand someone’s grief. Moreover the emotion involved must be an appropriate emotion. It makes no sense to say I understand someone’s grief if the only emotion I feel is happiness. Accepting the above means sympathy of necessity involves some basic form of empathy. Accepting the above also means the colonel felt some basic or primitive form of empathy for the robot. Clearly this scenario is nonsensical. However it might be suggested this difficultly might be overcome if a primitive form of empathy was defined as the ability to experience what you believe to be someone or something else's feelings or experiences by imagining what it would be like to be in their situation. It might then be argued that whilst a mother cannot feel full blown empathy for her baby she may nonetheless feel some primitive form of empathy based on what she believes her baby feels. And her disposition to feel this primitive empathy can form a basis of her love for her baby.

The question I now wish to address is whether the primitive form of empathy defined above really is a form of empathy? Does this primitive form of empathy even exist? It seems clear to me the concept of empathy can be stretched and that the feeling of empathy is to some extent a matter of degree. For instance I may have the ability to share some of someone else's feelings or experiences but not others. This is probably particularly true of the sharing of some feelings and experiences between men and women. However is describing, the ability to experience what you believe to be someone or something else's feelings or experiences as empathy, stretching the concept of empathy too far? Let it be accepted that the feeling of empathy depends on our ability to experience emotions as well as place ourselves in someone else’s situation. The connection between the emotion and the situation cannot be purely arbitrary. I believe empathy should not be regarded as the feeling of any emotion but the feeling of an appropriate emotion. The feeling of a shared emotion is an appropriate emotion. It follows the feeling of a believed shared emotion is not an appropriate emotion and for this reason, the ability to share what you believe to be someone or something else's feelings or experiences, is not a genuine form of empathy. Let us accept that mothers do love their babies. Let us also accept that mothers cannot feel or have a disposition to feel empathy for their babies. It follows that loving someone cannot simply be a disposition to feel empathy for the beloved.

It might be pointed out in response to the above that loving friends, partners and children differs from loving babies. It might then be suggested that loving someone other than babies means loving persons. Young babies might be regarded as human beings and potential persons rather than actual persons. It might then be further suggested that loving a person simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for her. Accepting these suggestions would not mean we don’t love babies, for clearly we do, but rather that we love babies in a different way to the way we love persons. I would be reluctant to accept to this suggestion. For they imply either we love babies in the same way as we love cities, landscapes or a particular piece of music. Or that we love babies in a completely different way to the way we love both inanimate things and the way we love persons.

My second example of why it is hard to accept that loving, someone is simply a disposition to feel empathy, is connected to self-love. Let it be accepted that I cannot feel empathy for myself. It follows if loving someone simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for that person that self-love is impossible. Intuitively we can love ourselves. If our intuitions are correct we must reject the premise that loving someone simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for her.

Let it be accepted the two examples I have used show that I was wrong to argue that loving someone might simply be a disposition to feel empathy for the beloved in a previous posting. However the idea of self-love is interesting and I now wish to examine self-love further in order to try and better understand the nature of love. Some people believe that the self-love is not at all bad even if it runs counter to accepted morality. They might use Nietzsche to justify this belief. However I would argue such a belief is based on a false view about the nature of love. This false view seems to connect loving purely with satisfying our desires. Nietzsche would have approved of the strong satisfying their desires. However let us consider a mother who desires chips, cocaine, cigarettes and large quantities of alcohol. Let it be assumed she neglects her child and indulges in all of the above. If loving one-self is purely a matter of satisfying one’s desires then clearly this mother loves herself. It might be objected my example only shows that self-love based on the rather basic desires, I introduced in my example, is not genuine self-love. My objector might then be suggest that the satisfaction of noble desires is a form of self-love. Once again Nietzsche might well have approved of this objection seeing the desire for power rather than gluttony as a form of self-love. My reply to this objection is simple. I do not deny love can be connected to our desires. Indeed I believe love must be connected to our desires. I do however believe love cannot be only connected to our desires. If love can be based on noble but not base desires then there must be some way, of differentiating between noble and base desires. Furthermore any way of differentiating between noble and base desires cannot itself be a desire. Returning to my example I would suggest that the mother in question not only neglects her child but that she also neglects herself. I would further argue anyone who neglects herself does not genuinely love herself. My reason being I believe loving is linked to caring about and it follows loving oneself involves caring about oneself.

I accept Harry Frankfurt is correct when he states that love is a form of ‘caring about’ and that love concerns the will rather than being a simple emotion. Love has persistence and desires and emotions however noble need not. This persistence was the main reason for my suggestion that love might be defined as a disposition to feel an emotion. It in order to better understand the nature of love we must understand the nature of caring about. What then does caring about consist of? Frankfurt argues a lover is benefited when her beloved flourishes and this means accepting the interests of her beloved as her own (1). Let it be accepted ‘caring about’ ourselves is the same as ‘caring about’ others. It follows if we ‘care about’ ourselves we must be concerned with our flourishing and our interests.

Let us accept that if I love someone that I must be concerned with my beloved’s flourishing and furthering her interests. It seems to me this concern must contain two important elements. Firstly this concern cannot be a passive concern but must involve action. If my beloved needs help and I fail to help for no good reason then it must be questioned whether my love is genuine. Secondly this concern must involve some reflection. If I am genuinely concerned with someone’s flourishing and interests I must concerned with how my actions will promote this flourishing and these interests. It follows loving defined as ‘caring about’ someone must involve our cognitive powers. Accepting that love involves cognition does not of course imply that love does not also involve the emotions. Personally I would argue love must involve the emotions. I pointed out in my posting ‘love revisited’ some philosophers would argue emotions are intentional and as a result must have a cognitive element. If this is correct then love might be regarded as an emotion which includes a cognitive element. However I myself am doubtful as to whether emotions contain a cognitive element. Emotions might of course act as alarms calling for reflection by our cognitive elements, see Brady (2). Our emotions might alert us to consider the needs of our beloved. It seems to me that any meaningful actions, including loving ones, must depend on both a cognitive and affective element for without any affective element we have no reason to act.

I have argued loving someone must include a reflective element. This conclusion seems at odds with some parts of Frankfurt’s concept of love. Frankfurt argues a lover,

“is not free. On the contrary, he is in the very nature of the case captivated by his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice. (3)

Clearly reflection serves no useful purpose if someone’s will is rigorously constrained. Am I wrong to argue love involves reflection or is it possible to reconcile these two views? Frankfurt’s defines loving in terms of what a lover cares about. He also defines autonomous decisions as decisions the agent cares about. Cuypers believes Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy and hence his concept of love is a hybrid concept. He believes this hybrid as a combination of voluntaristic and non-voluntaristic components. He argues that the harmonious agreement between a person’s second-order volitions and his first order desires defines the voluntaristic component. He then further argues that the non-voluntaristic component consists of what the agent cares about (2). I have some sympathy for Cuypers view. However I believe these two views might be better reconciled by differentiating between the way someone loves a beloved and comes to love a beloved.

I believe the way we love someone involves reflection. We must consider the interests of our beloved. The way we come to love someone might not. The way we come to love someone is constrained. It seems ridiculous to me to say I choose to love Jennifer, Newcastle United or philosophy. Do the emotions play any part in the way I come to love someone? Frankfurt would argue not. According to him the emotions have no persistence whilst love does. Indeed it might argued that he believes what defines coming to love someone is a lack of emotion. A lover might be defined as a satisfied person, perhaps willing to change her beloved, but also one who has no active interest in bringing about such a change. Intuitively however coming to love someone does involve emotion. If I come to some love someone I identify with her and as a result I become vulnerable to any harm that befalls her and become distressed as a result. It might be suggested coming to love someone means coming to have a disposition to feel empathy for her. However my example of the love between a mother and her baby seems to make this concept of coming to love difficult to accept. For this reason it might be suggested that coming to love someone simply means coming to be pleased when she is pleased and distressed when she is distressed. It might be objected that accepting this suggestion seems to conflate coming to love and actual loving. In response I would argue that someone cannot come to love someone without actually loving her. Loving someone of necessity must involve some emotion, if I love someone and she becomes distressed I must also become distressed. It follows coming to love does involve the emotions.

However I can feel distress for a lot of people I hardly know. For instance I may feel distress at seeing the distress of famine victims on TV, victims I don’t really know. It follows if my suggestion is accepted that I love these famine victims. It might then be pointed out this love seems counter to our intuitions of love. I am however prepared to argue that I do in fact love these victims to some degree. The degree to which I love my wife, children, friends and neighbours varies greatly. I see no reason why I should not feel at least some slight degree love for these famine victims. Indeed it might be a natural default position for most people to feel some degree of love for others. Optimistically considering the last century one of the defining characteristics of persons might be a natural tendency to love. People lacking this tendency such as sociopaths might be seen as damaged persons.

There is one final question I wish to address in this posting; does coming to love come to involve our rational faculties in any way? Clearly we may choose who we wish to marry but not who we love. Prima facie if it is accepted that our love is constrained it might be concluded our rational faculties play no part in our coming to love. I will argue such a prima facie conclusion is unjustified. What is meant by our will being constrained when we come to love? It certainly doesn’t mean our will is constrained by others. It means we cannot choose whom we come to love, our will is constrained by forces which are part of us, we like Luther can do no other. However these constraining forces are our constraining forces and hence our will seem likely to shaped by our perceptions of the world. These perceptions include our beliefs. Our rational faculties shape these beliefs. My perceptions of a situation surely partly determine the emotions I feel as I pointed in my posting love revisited. In this posting I pointed out if I am fearful, because I perceive a tiger approaching me, my perception is the cause of my fear. Moreover part of my perception must include the concept that tigers are dangerous. It might now be argued our perception of someone, which includes cognitive elements, frames our coming to love that person and reason indirectly affects our choice of a beloved.

1.  Harry Frankfurt, 2006,Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, page 41.
2. Michael Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.
3. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity Volition and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 135.
4. Stefaan Cuypers, 2000, In Defence of Hierarchy, , Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30(2).

Love and Wholeheartedness

In my previous posting I presented two arguments. Firstly I argued loving persons is not the same as loving inanimate things such as cities, music or philosophical musings. Secondly I argued the love of persons might be best defined by someone having a disposition to feel empathy. In this posting I want to consider how this definition of love concurs with some of Harry Frankfurt’s ideas on love. Frankfurt believes love is both involuntary and must be persistent. In my previous posting I argued the above definition of love is compatible with both of these ideas. I will not repeat those arguments here. Frankfurt also believes a lover must be wholehearted. In this posting the question I want to examine is this. If love is a disposition to feel empathy must the lover be wholehearted? I will argue she does not.

Before proceeding I must make clear what Frankfurt means by wholeheartedness. He believes wholeheartedness requires that a lover must be able to love some things more than she loves others. He also believes wholeheartedness means a lover must in some sense be satisfied with the things she loves. This satisfaction is not some smug satisfaction but is defined by Frankfurt as follows,
“What satisfaction does entail is an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change” (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 103,).
A wholehearted person is contrasted to an ambivalent person. Such a person he believes is a wanton because she is torn in different directions and suffers from volitional division according to Frankfurt. Indeed it is argued by Cuypers that such a person is threatened by disintegration and personality disorder (2000, Autonomy, beyond voluntarism, In Defence of Hierarchy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30(2), page 236).

Frankfurt’s concept of satisfaction is central to his ideas concerning wholeheartedness and ambivalence. For this reason prior to my examination as to, whether regarding love as a disposition to feel empathy is compatible with wholeheartedness, I must first examine what is meant by satisfaction. Prior to doing this it must be clear that when I talk of love I am only talking about the love of persons. I believe love is not a simple unified concept as I argued in my previous posting. It follows when examining satisfaction in connection with wholeheartedness I am only talking about being satisfied with those we love rather than the things we love. Moreover by love I do not simply mean erotic love of one’s partner but include the love of children, friends, colleagues and even acquaintances. Love so defined seems to reflect real life in which we love different people to varying degrees. It seems clear someone may be completely satisfied with loving each of her beloveds but still be dissatisfied to some degree with the way she loves her beloveds. Wholeheartedness according to Frankfurt means a lover must be able to come to love some things more than she loves others. It follows satisfaction in regard to wholeheartedness means a lover is able to eliminate any conflict between loving her beloveds by ranking how much she loves each of them. Ranking of course does not mean the lover must be able attach weights to her various beloveds but only that she is satisfied she loves one more than another.

I am now in a position to address the question as to whether if love is a disposition to feel empathy a lover must be wholehearted. Clearly a lover can have a disposition to feel empathy for John and at the same time have a disposition to feel empathy for Jane. The question I am addressing is whether such a lover can have both these dispositions whilst being unable to say with certainty whether she loves John or Jane the most. If the lover’s life is highly compartmentalised and she actually feels empathy for John or Jane in different compartments of her life it seems possible that she can love both John and Jane without ever having to say with certainty which of the two she loves the most. However love is not easily compartmentalised and in most cases a lover may have to decide which of her beloveds she love the most. I have argued wholeheartedness requires that a lover in such situation must be able to make a decision she is satisfied with based on her ability to rank the things she loves. Let it be assumed a lover feels empathic concern for John and Jane at the same time. Let be further assumed she can only act on one these concerns and makes a decision she is not wholly satisfied with. I can see no reason why these two assumptions are incompatible in practice. It follows if love is simply a disposition to feel empathy a lover need not be wholehearted. Such a conclusion seems to concur with our intuitive ideas of love as is shown by considering the following example. Let it be assumed Samantha is married and has a child she loves called Jane in addition she loves John. Let it be further assumed Sam wishes to leave her husband to live with John but doing so will cause some damage to her beloved Jane. It is easy to imagine in this situation that regardless of whether Sam leaves her husband, because of her love of John, or remains in a loveless marriage, because of her love for Jane, she will have some regrets and be dissatisfied to some degree.

I will now briefly examine two of the implications of accepting my conclusion. Accepting the above means a lover may be satisfied with her beloved or beloveds but still not be be completely satisfied as a lover because she is unable to rank the things she loves. It is important to be clear what I mean by rank the things she loves. The ability to rank the things a lover loves does not mean she must be able reflect on or even make a conscious decision about this ranking. It only means a lover can choose between the various things she loves without any hint of dissatisfaction with her decision. If it is accepted that love is simply a disposition to feel empathy then a lover may well be dissatisfied with some of her decisions. It follows all the things a lover loves need not be united in any meaningful way and she is not wholehearted. Frankfurt believes if lover is not wholehearted she is ambivalent. Moreover ambivalence is a disease of the will. Both Cuypers and Frankfurt believe the ambivalent person cannot make meaningful decisions concerning love. Indeed Cuypers implies that an ambivalent lover is threatened by disintegration and personality disorder, see above. I see no reason to accept such an implication. In practice it seems there is no unity between all of a lover’s loves as we often consider a lover as torn between two loves. Further in practice it seems in most cases that even if a lover is ambivalent about some of her loves she is still able to choose between these loves. Moreover by doing so she is not usually threatened by either the disintegration of her character or personality disorder. In my example let it be assumed Sam arbitrarily decides to stay with her husband, because she loves Jane, and let it be further assumed that this choice does not work out as well as she envisioned. It is quite plausible to believe in this situation Sam will abide by her decision and not be threatened by personality disorder even if she has long lasting regrets.

Frankfurt links the ability to love, to care about, to autonomy. It seems to me Frankfurt holds a lover is necessarily an autonomous person. This follows because a lover must be wholehearted and be able to rank the things she loves and hence has the ability to make an un-ambivalent decision with which she is completely satisfied. Frankfurt contrasts an autonomous person, a lover who cares about something, with a wanton who has no means of making meaningful decisions (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 106). I have argued a lover is simply someone with a disposition to feel empathy and that a lover need not be wholehearted. If my argument is accepted it implies a lover is not of necessity an autonomous person. Nonetheless I believe Frankfurt is right to associate love with autonomy because it seems obvious if someone doesn’t care about x she cannot make an autonomous decision concerning x. I also believe Frankfurt is correct in arguing that someone making an autonomous decision must be in some sense wholehearted. If love is simply a disposition to feel empathy it follows loving, caring about, x is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to make an autonomous decision concerning x. In the light of the above I want to revisit my example. Sam was torn between her love for John and Jane. Sam loved both John and Jane but her love was not wholehearted. In the light of the above Sam could not make an autonomous decision as to whether she should leave her husband for John. Nevertheless as I pointed out above I see no reason why we should regard Sam as non-autonomous or a wanton person. The above suggests that when we consider autonomy we should be concerned with autonomous decisions rather than autonomous persons. It further suggests that when we consider wholeheartedness we should only consider whether someone is wholehearted with respect to the things she loves or cares about which are relevant to the actual decision she is making. We should not be too concerned whether she is totally wholehearted where totally wholehearted means she must be wholehearted in relation to all the things she loves or cares about. Indeed in practice it would seem to be impossible ever to be sure someone was totally wholehearted.

Love Revisited

Love or ‘caring about’ is a constant theme of this blog. In previous postings I have discussed love in relation to keeping dogs, dissident IRA republican killers and arranged marriages. In this posting I want to examine the nature of love rather than any of its affects. It was suggested to me by Ian Law of Birmingham University in discussion that love is simply an emotion. In this examination I want firstly to discuss whether Ian was correct and secondly what this discussion tells us about emotions.

Before discussing the nature of love it must be clear what is meant by love. I consider love to be ‘caring about something’ as defined by Frankfurt.
“A person who cares about something is, as it were invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced” (1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 84).
The question I now wish to address is whether equating love with such ‘caring about’ is compatible with love being regarded as an emotion? Frankfurt would argue it is not,
“That a person cares about something or that he loves something has less to do with how things make him feel, or his opinions about them, than the more or less stable motivational structures that shape his preferences and guide his conduct” (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 129).
Why does Frankfurt believe love is not an emotion? Because he believes love must have some persistence and he also believes emotions do not have persistence. It seems clear that love cannot be turned off and on like a tap. It is also clear that emotions unlike love can quickly change. For this reason I accept love cannot be simply regarded as an emotion. Accepting the above of course does not mean love is unconnected to the emotions. Indeed I will now argue love must of necessity be connected to the emotions. I will argue love might be seen as a persistent emotion, a disposition to have an emotion or a sentiment.

If a lover identifies himself with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to the losses and susceptible to the benefits of love then love can be a motivation to act. Indeed if a lover can act to protect or benefit his beloved and fails to do so for no good reason it might be questioned whether he is a genuine lover. Love appears to be a matter of the will. Hume famously argued reason is the slave of the passions, the emotions in current parlance, and that reason alone gives us no motivation to act. It would appear to follow if we accept that reason alone gives us no reason to act and that love is a motivation for action then love must be an emotion. However I have accepted above that because love requires persistence and emotions are not necessarily persistent love is not simply an emotion. There are two ways this impasse might be avoided. Firstly it might be argued that love is connected to someone’s will. It might then be further argued that someone’s will is simply a stable motivational structure independent of both reason and emotion. This I believe would be Frankfurt’s position. Adopting such a position seems to me to be unnecessary and makes the will an unexplainable entity. For this reason I believe the second way of avoiding this impasse is preferable, this way assumes love is not simply an emotion but that it is connected to the emotions in some way.

How can love be connected to the emotions? I have suggested that love might be seen as a persistent emotion, a disposition to have some emotion or a sentiment. In what follows I will consider having a sentiment as being the same as having a disposition to feel some emotion. Accepting the above raises two questions. Firstly what exactly is an emotion; are emotions purely physical sensations or are emotions in some way intentional? Secondly if love is a persistent emotion or a disposition to have an emotion what is the actual emotion involved? There is a continuing philosophical debate as to whether emotions contain a cognitive element or are purely physiological states. Philosophers such as Nussbaum and Solomon would argue emotions are intentional and as a result must have a cognitive element. Others such as Prinz, would argue emotions are simply physiological states (2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford). People don’t just love randomly. It appears to follow love is intentional in some way. Prima facie it might then be suggested that any emotion underlying love must also be intentional. I believe this suggestion is doubtful. Clearly some emotions such as disgust are non intentional and are simply physiological states. It might then be pointed out not all emotions are the same and that some emotions may be intentional and include a cognitive element. However when assigning a cognitive element to an emotion we must be sure we should assign this element to the actual emotion rather than to the cause of the emotion. If for instance I eat too many strawberries this might cause me to have a stomach ache, a purely physiological state. Similarly if I am fearful, because I perceive a tiger approaching me, my perception is the cause of my fear. Moreover I see no reason why my fear must include the concept that tigers are dangerous. In light of the above I will assume there is no reason why all emotions, including persistent ones, should not be regarded as purely physiological states. It follows if love is intentional, as I believe it is, then I was wrong to argue with Law that love might be regarded as a persistent emotion. I now believe love might be better regarded as a disposition to feel some particular emotion. A disposition to feel a particular emotion partially causes this emotion. Further a disposition to feel an emotion may be based on certain beliefs and as a result this disposition might well contain a cognitive element even if the actual emotion does not.

If love is not an emotion, persistent or otherwise, but rather a disposition to feel a particular emotion then the question as to which of the emotions is involved must be addressed. I suggested above if a lover can act to protect or benefit his beloved and he fails to do so it might be questioned whether he is a genuine lover. Accepting the above means neither lust nor sympathy can be the emotion underlying love. The lustful feel no need to benefit the objects of their lust. Sympathy involves understanding the suffering of others. However it is possible to act sympathetically without addressing the desires of others, see Nichols. (2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford, pages 38, 39). Hence a sympathetic person may be unable to truly benefit the object of his sympathy. An empathic person both understands and feels the desires of the object of his empathy. It follows an empathic person will act to protect or benefit the object of his empathy. For this reason I suggest love would be best defined as a disposition to feel empathy.

I now wish to address three problems associated with adopting this definition of love. Firstly it might be argued that by defining love as a disposition to feel empathy we fail to accommodate one of our intuitive ideas of personal love. Love it might be argued is often limited, personal and private whilst empathy appears to have a much larger writ. Empathy does however have the property that it diminishes with distance. This distance might involve physical distance, time or just degree of acquaintance. For instance I may feel some empathy for protestors being crushed in Iran but I felt far greater empathy for my wife when she was admitted to hospital. This property of distance seems to allow us to account for the intuitive idea of love as personal whilst at the same time accepting the definition of love as a disposition to feel empathy. For instance it makes sense to say we can love the residents of our home town in an impersonal way whilst at the same time loving our children in a personal way to a far greater degree.

Secondly it might be argued accepting the above definition means we cannot learn to love. Some recent research suggests that mirror neurones play a central part in our ability to feel empathy. If this is so then it might be argued the ability to feel empathy, to love, depends on the physical structure of our brains rather than our brain states. It seems likely we can alter our brain states by learning. However it seems unlikely we can alter the physical structure of our brains to any great degree by learning. I have used the word unlikely above because we can alter to some degree the physical structure of our body by exercise and training. Accepting the above means it is unlikely we can learn to love. Autism might be advanced as an additional reason why if the definition of love, as a disposition to feel empathy, is accepted we cannot learn to love. In using the example of autism I am not necessarily connecting autism to mirror neurones or arguing autistic children cannot feel some form of sympathy. I am however arguing those suffering from autism cannot feel true empathy for others. Some parents of autistic children might argue their children can feel love and as a result would reject this definition of love. I would merely note it is possible that these parents’ empathy for their children may project non-existent love onto them. It might be argued good parents want their children to learn to love but if this definition is accepted learning to love is impossible for the two reasons outlined above. My starting point in this posting was Frankfurt’s definition of love. Frankfurt himself argues love is not a matter of choice and this seems to support the above argument, see (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, page 135). However if the above definition of love is accepted does it really matter if we cannot learn to love? I would argue it does not. I would argue that under normal circumstances our natural capacity to love develops. I would further argue that in practice parents do not teach their children to love but rather that most parents create the circumstances in which their children’s natural capacity for love develops. I would further suggest that those parents who do not or are unable to create these circumstances should be helped to do so, see my posting of 30/03/09 concerning dissident IRA killers.

The third problem with defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is that the definition seems to be an inadequate definition. People don’t just love people. We can love cities, pieces of music and nature for instance. We are however unable to feel empathy for cities, pieces of music or nature. There seem to be two strategies for dealing with the inadequacy of this definition. Firstly it might be denied that we actually love these inanimate things. For instance can we actually love a city which has lost all its inhabitants forever? Perhaps when we love a city we do feel empathy but this is not empathy for a city devoid of its inhabitants but rather for these inhabitants. I find such a strategy unconvincing because it would be hard to apply to nature. Perhaps it might be better argued we feel empathy for life in general. However I still find this amended strategy unconvincing. Secondly it might be argued defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is an incomplete definition; the reason being that the concept of love is not a simple concept but rather a hybrid concept. The love of animate and inanimate objects is not the same. If this is accepted then defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is a definition limited to the love of animate objects.