Unconditional Forgiveness

Charles Griswold argues that there are certain conditions attached to the concept of forgiveness and that one cannot truly forgive unless these conditions are satisfied (1). It might be pointed out conditional love is inferior to unconditional love. It might then be argued by analogy in response to Griswold that conditional forgiveness is inferior to unconditional forgiveness. In response to this argument, suggested by Garrard and McNaughton (2) Griswold counter argues that for a victim just to give unconditional forgiveness means she lacks self-respect. He points out that intuitively if someone who has been wronged when the offender exhibits no remorse or indeed continues in the offence holds no resentment then the injured party has no self-respect.

I find Griswold’s argument persuasive and believe that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness does indeed mean the forgiver, the offended person, lacks self-respect. However, I want to pursue a slightly different but related argument. In this posting I want to argue that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness means the offended person has too much respect for herself, she is over proud. Let it be accepted that all forgiveness whether unconditional or not means letting go of resentment. Intuitively this appears to be true for it seems hard to believe I have forgiven someone if I still bear resentment towards that person. For the sake of argument let us assume Sue has been morally harmed by John and that she has unconditionally forgiven him. In this context because Sue’s forgiveness is unconditional it is possible that John might remain quite happy with the fact that he has morally harmed Sue and would be fully prepared to do so again. Also in this context, because all forgiveness means letting go of resentment, Sue holds no resentment towards John.

Let us question Sue’s motives in unconditionally forgiving John. It seems to me Sue’s motives for forgiving John have nothing actually to do with John. Perhaps Sue believes that the act of forgiving is morally good. Whatever Sue’s reasons are she is committed to acting morally and she believes John is acting immorally. It follows even if she does not explicitly believe that she is better morally than John she must at least implicitly hold this view. What way might Sue believe she is better morally than John? Firstly it might be possible that Sue believes she is worthy of more moral consideration than John. Such a view runs counter to one of the basic tenets of accepted morality, namely all moral agents are worthy of equal consideration. It follows because Sue sees herself as a moral person this possibility must be rejected. The second possibility is that Sue believes she is better at acting morally than John.

Let us accept this second possibility and agree that Sue sees herself as a morally good person. Morally good people must consider all moral agents and not just a select few. I now want to argue that by unconditionally forgiving John and unconditionally letting go of her resentment Sue does not genuinely consider his moral needs. I will argue that by withdrawing her resentment Sue is removing something that might help John become a better person. Resentment, moral anger, about the way we are being treated is a protest. This protest may play a part in asserting our self-respect (3), but it also is signal to the offender that he is causing moral harm. It seems to me that by unconditionally forgiving John Sue is denying John this signal which might help him become a better person. The above suggests Sue is only considering herself morally and disregarding the moral needs of John. Sue certainly acts as if John does not deserve the same moral consideration as she does and hence runs counter to one of the basic tenets of accepted morality. However, I accept it is possible Sue acts from purely altruistic motives and believes that by forgiving John she benefits him even if in actual fact she does not. However, I would question her motives. She chooses a course of action most others would not, most people feel resentment. Moreover she too easily presumes she knows what is best morally for John. It might be suggested her presumption is based on an excess of moral pride. In the light of the above it would seem justifiable to conclude that Sue was wrong to unconditionally forgive John.

It might be countered to my conclusion is unsound. It might be pointed out that unconditional forgiveness seems to set an excellent example to others outweighing the reasons I have given for unconditional forgiveness being unsound. I will very briefly present two counter arguments to show this is not so. Firstly, I would argue the recognition of others as moral agents is even more fundamental to morality than any possible demonstration of moral excellence. Without this basic recognition no system of morality can even get started. In my example it seems to me Sue may be acting in a way she believes is best for John but none the less by so doing she is failing to recognise him as a fully moral agent. Secondly a decision to unconditionally forgive seems to lack an affective element. I would suggesr that any meaningful moral decision must at least be partly based on empathic concern, see (4). Sue’s decision to unconditionally forgive John is not even partly based on empathic concern. To conclude let us accept that unconditional forgiveness is preferable to no forgiveness. However the above suggest that conditional forgiveness is preferable to unconditional forgiveness for two reasons. Firstly unconditional forgiveness does not truly consider the moral needs of the offender and secondly the forgiver seems to exhibit an unjustified pride in his forgiveness.

1. Charles Griswold, 2007, Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press.
2. Garrard & McNaughton, 2003, In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104.
3.  Griswold, page 65.
4. Michael Slote, The ethics of Caring and Empathy, Routledge, 2007, page 31.