Stoics and Hope

 For many of us our hopes play an important part in our lives, try imagining a life without any hope. In this posting I want to examine four questions connected to hope.  First exactly what do we mean by hope?  Secondly why is hope valuable? Thirdly can a stoic hope? Intuitively I will suggest that hoping goes against stoic principles. I will then question whether the stoic idea of preferred indifferents might mean that I am mistaken. Lastly I will examine whether the idea of preferred indifferents is a meaningful one.

I will now outline a definition of hope. Intuitively someone hopes for some outcome if she desires that outcome even though this outcome is uncertain. In what follows I will make use of some of the ideas of Adrienne Martin (1). However Marin doesn’t believe hope can be accounted for by desire, in this posting I will argue that it can be provided that we understand desires correctly. Our intuitive definition seems to be an inadequate one, for instance does someone really hope for some outcome if she expects it? Does a spouse hope for a birthday present from a loving partner or simply expect it? With this in mind we might define hope as follows. 

Hoe 1.  Someone hopes for some outcome when she desires this outcome which has a low probability of being actualised. 

Unfortunately as pointed out by Martin such a desire might give rise to both hope and despair. Let us accept that emotions capture and focus our attention. If we accept this then then perhaps Martin is mistaken in believing our desires can’t account for hope. Using Martin’s example, let us consider two patients with advanced cancer who are offered a new treatment with a low probability of success. Each patient faces the same facts but the focus of each will determine whether they hope or despair. One might despairs because she focusses on probable bad outcome and the other hopes because he focusses on the low probability of a good outcome. This is a good point to make it clear how hope differs from simply wishing or being unrealistically optimistic. Hoping always involves being roughly aware of the probabilities. If someone simply wishes for some outcome then she pays no attention to the probabilities in much the same way as a bullshitter pays no attention to the truth. It might be suggested that whilst Panglossian optimism is harmful that realistic optimism can be beneficial by combatting passivity, see Tiberuus and Realistic Optimism sm . I won’t pursue this suggestion here.

 Let us now define hope as follows.

 ope 2.  If someone hopes then her desires focusses her attention mainly on some positive outcome which has a low probability of being actualises whilst being aware of the true probabilities.

However this definition seems to lack something. Hope doesn’t suddenly materialise out of a vacuum.  A pragmatic person who has never built up her hopes about anything in the past is unlikely to suddenly start hoping for some specific outcome. Hoping seems connected to being a hopeful person. The above definition might be refined as follows.

Hope 3,  If someone hopes then her desires focusses her attention mainly on some positive outcome which has a low probability of being actualises whilst being aware of the true probabilities and this desire is based on her character. .

Hope, like optimism, combats passivity. Some might argue all emotions combat passivity and that despair is mood rather than a genuine emotion. I won’t pursue this thought here. The hopeful person undertakes some sort of action, even if this is merely imagining a better future, whilst the despairing person simply does nothing. Why is combatting passivity valuable? Combatting passivity involves exercising the will and I will now argue that the exercise of the will has essentialist or intrinsic value for human beings.

How might exercising our will be valuable? The approach I will follow is based on that of Gwen Bradford (2). She introduces the idea of an essentialist value. If some capacity is essential to human beings then according to Bradford the exercise of this capacity is of value to human beings. One such capacity is the exercise of the will. It is tempting to equate essentialist value with intrinsic value. If we accept Bradford’s position then hope has essentialist value because it involves exercising the will.

Let us now consider why stoics believe hoping is harmful. Hope as I have defined it above is an emotion, it is possible to define hope in terms of ‘caring about’ or love, see What do we mean by Hope?  . I won’t pursue this further here. Let us accept that hope is an emotion. Stoics believe that we should avoid all emotions as far as possible because emotions harm us by making us vulnerable. But even if we accept that emotions harm us by making us vulnerable this alone doesn’t mean that we should avoid them. For instance a doctor might recommend surgery because it benefits a patient in the long term even if it harms her in the short term. It follows even if emotion harm us that this harm might be outweighed by some benefits. A stoic must be committed to one of two options. Either that emotions have no real value and don’t benefit us in any way or that any benefit emotions confer on us is always outweighed by the harm causes by making us vulnerable. It is difficult to accept the first option for almost everyone has some emotions and it seems unlikely that these would have evolved without benefiting us in some way. Most stoics seem to accept that emotions have some value because they accept the idea of preferred indifferents. For instance they accept that it is better to be happy rather than unhappy even if we shouldn’t pursue happiness. It would seem that most stoics must believe that the value of any emotion is always outweighed by the vulnerability it causes, but why?

Perhaps they believe this because they believe that we are essentially rational creatures rather than emotional ones. What reason might they give for this belief? They might suggest that having a will is essential to being a human being. Let us accept this. However a stoic must also believe that we only express our will through our rationality and that we simply experience emotions. A stoic seems committed to the idea that emotions serve no purpose. Unfortunately for their argument it seems highly unlikely that emotions evolved to serve no purpose. It follows that if emotions serve some purpose then they aren’t totally irrational. For instance in some circumstances it can make sense to be angry because anger might focus someone’s attention on righting a wrong. It follows that even if we accept that we are essentially rational creatures that we don’t have reason to ignore our emotions. Emotions are connected to our rationality. Indeed it might be argued that a failure to attend to our emotions is itself irrational. At this point a stoic might modify her argument and suggest that not only are human beings rational but that they are also free to some degree. A stoic holds this view because she believes that even if we aren’t free to choose our fate we are always free to choose our attitude towards it. She might then argue even if emotions are rational that they deny our freedom by making us slaves to our passions. I would reject such an argument. I accept that we might become a slave to my age but my anger can be controlled and modified. For instance we might choose to retain our anger if an apology isn’t forthcoming and dismiss it if one is. It follows that we aren’t just slaves to our passions and that by controlling the emotions appropriate to us in different situations we shape ourselves. Human beings aren’t robots which act solely rationally without reference to emotions. Acting like a robot denies our nature. If we accept the above then stoics are mistaken in denying the importance of the emotions. Emotions, including hope, matter because they are part of our essential nature.

At this point a stoic might suggest that my treatment of emotions is too simple. She might further suggest that I should differentiate between experiencing an emotion and desiring one. She might move on to suggest that of course stoics prefer experience being happy but that they shouldn’t desire being happy. They believe that the pursuit of happiness makes us vulnerable and usually makes us unhappy and as a result we should remain indifferent to pursuing it. This is a very rough outline of the stoic idea of preferred indifferents. In response I would question whether it is possible to simply experience an emotion. If someone is in an affective state and this state creates no desire, either to avoid or maintain it, then I would suggest that she is experiencing a mood rather than an emotion. I would suggest that whilst there might be a grey area between emotions and moods that we can usually differentiate between the two. We can simply experience a mood because it serves no purpose, the same isn’t true of emotions. I argued above that it can be rational to experience some emotion which means emotions have some purpose. It follows that if an emotion serve some purpose that it is either illogical or impossible to remain indifferent towards them and simply experience them. It further follows that the idea of preferred indifferents makes no sense because it is impossible simply to experience an emotion.

In conclusion it appears to me that stoicism has a distorted notion of the emotions and that this distorted notion leads them to downplay emotions such as love and hope which have essentialist value to human beings. It might be concluded that stoicism hinders someone from living up to her full potential.

1.   Martin, Adrienne. 2014, How We Hope: A Moral Psychology, Princeton University Press.

2.   Gwen Bradford, 2015, Achievement, Oxford University Press