Most people are indifferent to vegetarians and vegans some however dislike them and a few appear to hate vegans. Kristof Dhont and Joachim Stoeber ask “what drives people to lash out at others who choose to eschew eating animals out of compassion?” (1) The anger of these people is mostly directed at vegans but also applies to vegetarians. In the rest of this posting I will use the term veg*ns to refer to both vegans and vegetarians. In what follows I will outline two reasons Dhont and Stoeber give for this anger and then examine whether these reasons can justify anger. I will argue they can’t. In the course of my arguments I will also argue that one reason why some people dislike veg*ns is caused by a feeling of moral distress. Lastly I will suggest that my argument involving moral distress might be applicable in more broadly.
First let us consider what is meant by moral distress.
Moral distress might be defined as the distress someone feels when she knows
the right action to take but is constrained from taking it. Moral distress so
defined differs from moral dilemmas which can also cause distress. A moral
dilemma is when an agent is unable to choose between two moral options. Someone
experiencing moral distress has no doubt about the moral option she should
choose. A soldier ordered by her commander to carry out some order which she
knows is wrong might suffer from moral distress but she isn’t facing a moral
dilemma. In most cases of moral distress the constraining element is externally
imposed. However in what follows I will assume that the constraining element
might also be internally imposed. An agent feels the pull of morality but is
constrained by some of her other non-moral desires. For instance someone might
believe being unfaithful to her partner is wrong but the pleasure of infidelity
constrains her ability to do what she considers to be right thing to do causing
her to suffer from moral distress. In what follows moral distress will refer to
internally imposed moral distress.
Let us now consider hating veg*ns and moral distress. Many
of the statements by those who dislike veg*ns are directed at the veg*ns
personally rather than being focussed on their arguments in favour of veg*nism.
Can this direction be morally justified? According to Dhont and Stoeber some
meat eaters feel that veg*ns, by not eating meat are expressing moral
disapproval of their meat eating. Let us accept that even if most veg*ns
don’t explicitly express such disapproval that their behaviour does so
implicitly. I now want to argue that this disapproval leads to moral distress
and that this distress cannot justify their anger. First let us assume that a
meat eater believes veg*ns disapproval is justified. She feels the pull of
morality but some of her other desires outweigh this moral pull. She has
conflicting desires because she desires to eat meat and act morally and this
conflict causes moral distress. She relieves this distress by expressing anger
with veg*ns. Her anger is directed at veg*ns because they remind her of her
moral inadequacy. However such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. It is
misplaced because it fails address the real cause of his distress, her rejection
of the pull of morality. She is shooting the messenger and avoiding addressing
the message. Her anger is unjustified because she accepts the veg*n case. Secondly
let us assume our meat eater doesn’t accept the veg*n case and believes veg*n’s
disapproval is unjustified. In order to be consistent she must also believe
that the argument used by veg*ns to support not eating meat is flawed. Let us briefly
consider the veg*n argument. The veg*n argument has two premises. First a veg*n
might suggest that it is wrong to cause any creature to suffer against its will
for our pleasure. Secondly she might suggest that meat eaters eat meat for
their own pleasure. However the second premise has not always been true.
Someone living in a hunter gatherer society might have needed to eat meat in
order to survive. Nonetheless in most parts
of the world someone can live a perfectly healthy life without eating meat. It
would seem to be difficult to reject the second premise. Let us accept that in most
places people don’t have to eat meat and eating meat is a lifestyle choice. It
follows that if meat eaters are to reject veg*n’s argument that they must find good
reason to reject the first premise. For instance they might argue that animals
which are reared in good conditions and are slaughtered humanely don’t suffer
against their will. However if a meat eater believes her arguments against the
veg*n one is successful it is hard to see what reason she has to be angry with
veg*ns. We are usually become angry because of some wrong done to us or others
we care about. In the above scenario even if a meat eater believes veg*ns are
misguided about the wrongness of eating meat this gives her no reason to
believe that they wrong her and other meat eaters, he has no reason to feel angry.
Perhaps then meat eaters hate veg*ns it is because deep down they have a
lingering belief that their arguments for eating meat are contrived and don’t
fully dismiss the pull of the veg*n argument. If meat eaters can’t fully dismiss
the veg*n argument then this causes moral distress. This distress causes anger
which once again is directed at veg*ns because meat eaters remind them of this
distress. However once again such anger is both misplaced unjustified because
it doesn’t address the real cause of meat eaters’ moral distress.
Dhont and Stoeber advance a second reason to explain why
some meat eaters become angry with veg*ns. Some meat eaters might suggest
veg*ns damage society and that this justifies their anger. Their argument contains
two premises and might be summarised as follows. Firstly society is valuable
and it is wrong to damage it. Secondly veg*ns damage society because they
damage social cohesion, collective order and stability. It follows that because
veg*n way of life damages society that it is wrong and meat eaters anger can be
justified. Let us call this argument the social cohesion argument. Let us
accept the second premise. However the early Christian martyrs, Anti-slavery
protesters and Suffragettes all damaged the social cohesion of the societies
they lived in. Some members of these societies did become angry with
Christians, Anti-slavery protesters and Suffragettes. If we are to accept the
social cohesion argument then we must conclude that their anger was justified.
It seems hard to accept such a conclusion. If we accept the second premise of
the social cohesion argument but reject the conclusion then we must reject the
first premise. It is hard to see how this might be done but perhaps the first
premise might be amended as follows. Society is valuable and we shouldn’t
damage the society we live in unless the cause we do so for is just. It follows that if we damage the social
cohesion of the society we live in because it is unjust that far from damaging
society we are improving it. It follows
that our anger with people for damaging social cohesion cannot be justified if
the cause these people are fighting for is a just one. It further follows the
argument about veg*ns damaging social cohesion reverts to our original argument
about whether veg*ism can be justified.
However the above argument might be modified. It might be
argued even if the fact that veg*ns damage social cohesion doesn’t provide a
reason for anger that they also damage the natural order of things and this
might justify their anger. This argument claims that veg*nism is unnatural. This
is a dangerous argument to make for many people in the past might argued that
the patriarchy was part of the natural order. Nonetheless let us accept that it
was natural for our ancestors to eat meat. However if we argue from the above
premise that it is natural to eat meat means veg*nism is wrong then we must
introduce a second premise. We must assume that our nature is permanently fixed.
It is easy to call what is necessary for an animal to survive natural when in
fact it is just necessary at the time. For instance perhaps it is necessary for
hunter gatherers to eat meat in order to survive but meat eating isn’t a
necessity for a modern city dweller. If a meat eater isn’t prepared to accept
this second premise that our nature is permanently fixed then she has no
justification based on our nature to become angry with veg*ns. Once again it
would appear that if a meat becomes angry with veg*ns her anger is due to
internal moral conflict, moral distress. However for the sake of argument let
us assume that our nature is permanently fixed. Nonetheless even if we accept
this unlikely assumption there is still no justification for meat eaters
becoming angry with veg*ns. Veg*ns might be misguided but they don’t harm meat
eaters and so give no cause for anger. Once again if meat eaters become angry
with veg*ns and this would appear to be caused by internal moral conflict,
moral distress.
In conclusion I accept that most meat eaters don’t accept the pull of the veg*n argument and as a result don’t become angry with veg*ns, they simply accept them. However I have argued that some meat eaters who do dislike veg*ns do so, not because they feel they are doing something wrong but because they feel the pull of veg*n arguments at least to some degree. I further argued that this pull together with their desire to eat meat causes them to suffer internal conflict or moral distress. I conclude that such anger is both misplaced and unjustified. I further concluded that hating veg*ns both matters and is wrong. I would suggest that moral distress can lead to hate in even more important areas. Some people seem to dislike BLM activists. I would suggest that sometimes this dislike originates in a similar way to the dislike of veg*ns. Those who dislike BLM activists might feel the moral pull of the BLM cause but resist bowing to it because they are unwilling to make sacrifices to aid the cause. This conflict causes moral distress. In fairness some deprived people have very little to sacrifice. Much the same argument might be applied to some cases of misogyny.
