Thursday, 28 November 2019

Civil Discourse


We live in a fractious age in which people are often rude to those who hold views opposed to their own. Indeed on some social platforms such as Twitter it would seem that being rude is necessary in order to be noticed. In this posting I don’t want to consider the nature or the causes of rudeness. In the philosophy of rudeness I argued that whilst rudeness isn’t immoral that nonetheless it damages discourse and as a result is on the road to immorality. In this posting I want to consider ways in which discourse can be improved with those who hold views which are radically opposed to our own. I will consider how we should talk to our opponents. This isn’t an easy task for as Amy Olberding points out people often enjoy being rude to one another for by being rude they escape from the constraints of politeness. They excuse their escape by believing that they are being true to themselves, being authentic. She suggests such excuses are usually poor excuses and almost all rudeness is unjustified. Moreover if rudeness is ever justified then we should feel regret when doing so rather than smug satisfaction. Olberding also points out that sometimes people are unaware that they are being rude. She advocates that in order to improve civility and reduce rudeness we should respect our opponents by adopting a well-mannered approach. In doing so she is echoing the ancient Chinese philosophy of Confucius and Mengzi. Let us agree with Olberding that being well mannered is a pre-condition for engaging in any meaningful discourse which questions some the views of our opponents. According to Olberding any well-mannered discourse must be pro social and involve respect, consideration and toleration. Perhaps if rudeness damages meaningful discourse civility fosters it. However even if the tone of our discourse is polite what we talk about matters. Even if our arguments are good ones telling people why they are wrong and why we are right is unlikely to be effective. In this posting my arguments will not be primarily about the tone of what we talk to our opponents about but the methods we employ when discussing the issues involved. I will suggest three ways which might make a discourse more meaningful. Firstly I will argue that we should simply and politely explain our own views together with our reasons for holding them. I will then counter argue that such an approach is unlikely to succeed in changing many minds. Secondly I will argue that in certain cases we should simply ask our opponents to confirm their views which we find objectionable, “do you really mean that”. Lastly I will argue that we should politely but firmly press our opponents about what justifies their views. My comments are meant to apply to face to face conversations and those on social media.

Let us briefly examine the first approach. We might try to convince our opponents that our values are sensible values and that the force of our politely expressed arguments will challenge them into changing their own views. We hope that the force of our argument alone will bring about change and that we shouldn’t challenge or directly attempt to discredit our opponents’ views. The hope being that good arguments win out in the long term. For instance, we might challenge opponents of gay marriage by pointing out that gay people have the same rights as other people in most areas of life and suggest that these rights ought to be extended to marriage. We might then hope that the logic of our argument will mean the opponents of gay marriage change their minds. Such a suggestion seems to be hopelessly naive and I am unconvinced that such an approach would be either right or successful. We may be polite to our opponents but we aren’t really trying to improve discourse, indeed it might be questioned whether we are really attempting any sort of meaningful discourse at all because we aren’t paying any attention to the views of our opponents. It might be suggested that we are really doing is preaching and that we aren’t being particularly polite to our opponents by ignoring their views. I would suggest what we wrong our opponents because by not considering their views we fail to respect them as persons. Moreover such an approach is unlikely to be successful because even if we supply good arguments supporting our views we aren’t giving our opponents any reasons to reject their own views. If someone has no reason to reject her current views then she is unlikely to do so. Good arguments don’t alone change minds they must be shown to be better arguments.

A second approach which we might adopt in any discourse questioning the views of our opponents we find objectionable would be simply to ask them to confirm these views, “do you really mean that”. Perhaps we should repeat their views in our own words to ensure clarity. This approach at least has the merit of being directed at their views which our first approach didn’t do. Such an approach seems to morally justifiable because we are being respectful, considerate and tolerant towards our opponents. Unfortunately such an approach seems unlikely to be successful in changing the views of people who are strongly committed to their views. Nonetheless sometimes people express views which reflect underlying unconscious biases. These biases can sometimes come out inadvertently in sexist or racist remarks. If we simply ask the agent “do you really mean that” then this might combat some more mild biases by doing two things. Firstly we are asking the agent to examine her views. If the these views are unconscious views which conflict with her more reflective ones then our question might lead her to reflect more fully on her views by bringing them into focus. Secondly we are expressing our disapproval in a polite manner. If we accept that one form of shame is fear of social disapproval then if the agent feels some shame this might once again cause her to question her views.

However simply asking our opponents to confirm their views which we find objectionable is unlikely to make the majority of them seriously question these views. How then might we more effectively question these views in a polite non-confrontational manner? One approach might be to adopt the position of Socrates and politely ask our opponents why they hold these views, to ask for justification, rather than telling them directly why these views are wrong. Perhaps this approach might be used in conjunction  with the one outlined above of asking out our opponents whether they really mean that. One benefit of such a composite approach is that we are talking with our opponents rather than preaching to them. If someone is asked to provide an explanation in order to help us understand some of her views then the explanation she provides must also offer some sort of justification which she believes supports her views. It might be thought such questioning is a simple task but such a thought would be premature. Our task isn’t simply to listen impatiently and then move on to our own agenda. Out task is to understand our opponent’s views and understanding requires paying attention and listening to her justification with a certain degree of humility. Such a discourse is likely to be a slow one because after listening we must only think of our response after listening. Once again our approach seems to be morally justifiable because it treats our opponents with respect, consideration and toleration. Returning to my example of gay marriage an opponent of gay marriage might justify her views by explaining to us that the purpose of marriage is to provide a safe environment for the creation and rearing of children. We must listen carefully and understand that her opposition to gay marriage is based on a particular view about the purpose of marriage. We might then ask her how this purpose justifies marriage for couples whose children have grown up or are childless. However I would suggest that such an approach is unlikely to change the minds of those who hold strongly held views for three reasons. Firstly the confirmation bias means those such as fervent Brexiteers or Trump supporters instead of changing their minds will seek alternative justifications for their views. Secondly someone’s strongly held views help make someone who she is, help in defining her, and relinquishing them involves a loss of pride. Nonetheless our questioning might help to erode some of our opponent’s most extreme views which would be a useful thing to do. Lastly some people have strongly held views which seem to be based on faith and don’t require justification. This last group is particularly hard to engage in civil discourse because there appears to be no place for the discourse to start. Some might argue that because this approach is unlikely to change many minds that we should adopt a much more aggressive approach towards our opponents in the hope of at least changing a few minds. Perhaps, instead of simply asking our opponents to justify their views, we should robustly tell them why we think these views are unjustifiable. Unfortunately such an approach means we end up simply “talking at” or preaching to our opponents rather than talking with them. Once again such an approach seems to be wrong because we fail to respect our opponents. Moreover the confirmation bias makes it unlikely that it will be successful in changing many minds. However a more strident approach might help convince those who are yet to form a settled view.


What are the consequences of adopting the above approach? One consequence of accepting the above is that we must be prepared to provide justifications for our own views when asked to do so. Moreover, if the justifications we provide seems on reflection to be inadequate ones then we must be prepared to exchange our defective views for more defensible ones. Secondly because we mustn’t simply listen to the justifications of our opponents views but try to understand them then if we find these justifications convincing we must be prepared to accept their views or at the very least amend our own.

  1. Amy Olberding, 2019, The Wrongness of Rudeness, Oxford University Press



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