Ectogenesis and the Abortion Debate

Ectogenesis means the gestation of a foetus in an artificial environment outside the mother’s womb. Recent research with raising premature lambs in gestation bags means there is some possibility that ectogenesis might be feasible. Let us assume that ectogenesis becomes possible. It has been suggested that such a possibility might lead to the end of the debate about the permissibility of abortion, see bioedge. In this posting I will argue that whilst the realisation of this possibility might reframe the debate it will not end it.

One of the classic arguments for the permissibility of abortion is that of Judith Jarvis Thompson . Thompson asks us to imagine that someone wakes up to find herself in bed connected to a famous unconscious violinist suffering from a fatal kidney disease. Her thought experiment assumes that she is the only one with the right physiological features to save the violinist. Thompson assumes she has not consented to being connected to the violinist and that he will automatically recover in nine months. She suggests that it is morally permissible for her to demand to be disconnected from the violinist even if this leads to his premature death. She then argues by analogy that a pregnant mother has a right to an abortion. A woman has a right to be disconnected from her unborn child even though this will lead to the child dying. If ectogenesis becomes a possibility, then Thompson’s argument by analogy fails. In Thompson example it is not possible to disconnect the person connected to the violinist without the violinist dying. However, if ectogenesis becomes possible then it might be feasible for a mother to become disconnected from her unborn child without the child dying. The child is then gestated/incubated in an artificial womb.

It might appear that if ectogenesis becomes feasible then abortion will become unnecessary. Let us reimagine Thompson’s thought experiment. In this reimagined scenario someone is still connected to the violinist for nine months in order to save his life and at the end of this time she is disconnected. Unfortunately, the violinist’s illness has greatly weakened him meaning he needs care for the next fifteen years. Equally unfortunately because she are a close relation of the violinist it is suggested that she is the ideal person to carry out this caring. Someone in this scenario has two reasons for wanting not to be connected to the violinist. Firstly, she simply doesn’t want to be connected, secondly she wants be disconnected so she doesn’t have to care for the violinist later on even if this causes his death.

Let us further reimagine our thought experiment. The violinist’s doctors come along with some good news, they have discovered some new treatment which means it is unnecessary for someone to be connected for nine months. However, the violinist will be greatly weakened and still need care for the next fifteen years and that because of your close relationship you remain the best person to provide that care. You now have no reason to cause the violinist’s death because you wish to be disconnected but you still have some reason to cause his death because you don’t want to care for him for next fifteen. This scenario seems analogous to that of a pregnant women wanting an abortion if ectogenesis becomes feasible. She now has no reason to cause the foetus’ death because she can be disconnected, she might even never be connected in the first place, but she does have a reason this death because she doesn’t want to be a mother. It might be objected that I am not realistically representing the situation. My objector might suggest that others can care for the violinist, even if as not as well as a close relative, and that an unwanted baby can be cared by the state or adopted. I accept her objection. She might conclude that there is no need for abortion if ectogenesis becomes available and that the state provides childcare for abandoned children.

The soundness of my objector’s conclusion depends on two factors. Firstly, exactly how ectogenesis works and secondly the State’s willingness to finance ectogenesis and the extra childcare involved. Let us consider the process of ectogenesis. It seems conceivable that one day ectogenesis might be used by couples who conceive using IVF and that there might be no need for women to gestate the foetus involved in IVF at all, but these are not the women seeking abortions. The women seeking abortions are already carrying the foetus involved. Might the process in removing the foetus from a women’s womb be much more invasive than a simple abortion? If so might the women involved prefer an abortion? I will put this question to one side and deal with the importance of the preferences of a women carrying a foetus later. Let now consider the State’s obligations. The philosopher Rousseau sent all his five children to the Paris Foundling Hospital immediately upon birth. It might be argued that if a great many people acted in the same manner as Rousseau that the cost of ectogenesis together with that of childrearing might place too great a burden on the state. I find such an argument unpersuasive and in the era of safe contraception think it unlikely that the State would find the burden of financing ectogenesis and extra childcare excessively burdensome.

In spite of the above many people would feel uneasy about the ease with which Rousseau gave away his children. It might be possible for a potential mother to have a preference not to have a child and a preference not to abandon any child she had. Let us assume abortion ceases to be an option open to women due to ectgenesis and state childrearing. Let us consider a pregnant woman who would prefer not to be a mother and also prefer that if she did indeed become a mother not to abandon her child. In the above scenario she could not have an abortion and would find herself unable abandon the child she didn’t want. I would find her preference not to abandon her child commendable for two reasons. First, she displays a caring attitude towards her child. Secondly she has a sense of personal duty, she believes some duties shouldn’t be delegated to the state. She might believe she doesn’t have a duty to cause a child to exist but that if she does cause a child to exist then she has a duty to rear that child.

It is important to be clear about the relationship between her two preferences. Her primary preference is not to become a mother. If she cannot satisfy her primary preference, then she has a secondary preference not to abandon her child and become a mother. She doesn’t want to be in a position in which she satisfies her second preference. She has a mega preference that she should be able to satisfy her first preference rather than her second. Her position is analogous to that of a soldier. Most soldiers would prefer not go to war but if they must do so most would prefer to act courageously, they have a mega preference that there will be no need for them to act courageously in battle. If we can ask whether we should satisfy her mega preference means that the possibility of ectogenesis would not end the abortion debate, but merely reframe it.

Should we try to satisfy her mega preference? It might be argued that someone’s inability to abandon her child means that at a later period she might be glad she became a mother. It might then be further argued because she later affirms having the child she must also affirm the conditions necessary for that child to exist, she must become glad she was unable to have an abortion and that as a result we had no reason to satisfy her mega preference. This situation is analogous to Parfit’s fourteen-year-old girl who has a child and later in her life her love for that child means she must affirm her decision to become pregnant at fourteen was a good decision for her. For an excellent treatment of these issues can be found in Jay Wallace’s ‘The View from Here’ (1). I would feel uncomfortable in endorsing the fourteen-year-old’s decision as a good decision and likewise would feel uncomfortable in failing to endorse someone’s mega preference to have an abortion as a good for her because she might later come to love her child. I would suggest in cases such as these result in the feeling of a deep sense of ambivalence and do not give us reason to regard the fourteen-year-old girl’s decision as a good decision or the denial of abortion as justified. If we accept the above, then the possibility of ectogenesis and State childcare doesn’t give us reason to ban abortion. I don’t believe the idea of souls should play any part in determining the permissibility of abortion. I do believe it is permissible for a woman have an abortion before the foetus becomes conscious. However, if science can determine when consciousness emerges this might change the time at which abortions ceases to be permissible.

1. See chapter 2 of, Jay Wallace, 2013, The View from Here; On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret, Oxford University Press.