Ectogenesis means the gestation of a foetus in an
artificial environment outside the mother’s womb. Recent research with
raising premature lambs in gestation bags means there is some possibility that
ectogenesis might be feasible. Let us assume
that ectogenesis becomes possible. It has been suggested that such a
possibility might lead to the end of the debate about the permissibility of
abortion, see bioedge.
In this posting I will argue that whilst the realisation of this possibility
might reframe the debate it will not end it.
One of the classic arguments for the permissibility of
abortion is that of Judith
Jarvis Thompson . Thompson asks us to imagine that someone wakes up
to find herself in bed connected to a famous unconscious violinist suffering
from a fatal kidney disease. Her thought experiment assumes that she is the
only one with the right physiological features to save the violinist. Thompson
assumes she has not consented to being connected to the violinist and that he
will automatically recover in nine months. She suggests that it is morally
permissible for her to demand to be disconnected from the violinist even if
this leads to his premature death. She then argues by analogy that a pregnant
mother has a right to an abortion. A woman has a right to be disconnected from
her unborn child even though this will lead to the child dying. If ectogenesis
becomes a possibility, then Thompson’s argument by analogy fails. In Thompson
example it is not possible to disconnect the person connected to the violinist
without the violinist dying. However, if ectogenesis becomes possible then it
might be feasible for a mother to become disconnected from her unborn child
without the child dying. The child is then gestated/incubated in an artificial
womb.
It might appear that if ectogenesis becomes feasible then
abortion will become unnecessary. Let us reimagine Thompson’s thought
experiment. In this reimagined scenario someone is still connected to the
violinist for nine months in order to save his life and at the end of this time
she is disconnected. Unfortunately, the violinist’s illness has greatly weakened
him meaning he needs care for the next fifteen years. Equally unfortunately
because she are a close relation of the violinist it is suggested that she is
the ideal person to carry out this caring. Someone in this scenario has two
reasons for wanting not to be connected to the violinist. Firstly, she simply
doesn’t want to be connected, secondly she wants be disconnected so she doesn’t
have to care for the violinist later on even if this causes his death.
Let us further reimagine our thought experiment. The
violinist’s doctors come along with some good news, they have discovered some new
treatment which means it is unnecessary for someone to be connected for nine
months. However, the violinist will be greatly weakened and still need care for
the next fifteen years and that because of your close relationship you remain
the best person to provide that care. You now have no reason to cause the
violinist’s death because you wish to be disconnected but you still have some
reason to cause his death because you don’t want to care for him for next
fifteen. This scenario seems analogous to that of a pregnant women wanting an
abortion if ectogenesis becomes feasible. She now has no reason to cause the
foetus’ death because she can be disconnected, she might even never be
connected in the first place, but she does have a reason this death because she
doesn’t want to be a mother. It might be objected that I am not realistically
representing the situation. My objector might suggest that others can care for
the violinist, even if as not as well as a close relative, and that an unwanted
baby can be cared by the state or adopted. I accept her objection. She might
conclude that there is no need for abortion if ectogenesis becomes available
and that the state provides childcare for abandoned children.
The soundness of my objector’s conclusion depends on two
factors. Firstly, exactly how ectogenesis works and secondly the State’s willingness
to finance ectogenesis and the extra childcare involved. Let us consider the
process of ectogenesis. It seems conceivable that one day ectogenesis might be
used by couples who conceive using IVF and that there might be no need for
women to gestate the foetus involved in IVF at all, but these are not the women
seeking abortions. The women seeking abortions are already carrying the foetus
involved. Might the process in removing the foetus from a women’s womb be much
more invasive than a simple abortion? If so might the women involved prefer an
abortion? I will put this question to one side and deal with the importance of
the preferences of a women carrying a foetus later. Let now consider the
State’s obligations. The philosopher Rousseau sent all his five children to the
Paris Foundling Hospital immediately upon birth. It might be argued that
if a great many people acted in the same manner as Rousseau that the cost of
ectogenesis together with that of childrearing might place too great a burden
on the state. I find such an argument unpersuasive and in the era of safe
contraception think it unlikely that the State would find the burden of
financing ectogenesis and extra childcare excessively burdensome.
In spite of the above many people would feel uneasy about
the ease with which Rousseau gave away his children. It might be possible for a
potential mother to have a preference not to have a child and a
preference not to abandon any child she had. Let us assume abortion
ceases to be an option open to women due to ectgenesis and state childrearing. Let
us consider a pregnant woman who would prefer not to be a mother and also
prefer that if she did indeed become a mother not to abandon her child. In the
above scenario she could not have an abortion and would find herself unable
abandon the child she didn’t want. I would find her preference not to abandon
her child commendable for two reasons. First, she displays a caring attitude
towards her child. Secondly she has a sense of personal duty, she believes some
duties shouldn’t be delegated to the state. She might believe she doesn’t have
a duty to cause a child to exist but that if she does cause a child to exist
then she has a duty to rear that child.
It is important to be clear about the relationship between
her two preferences. Her primary preference is not to become a mother. If she
cannot satisfy her primary preference, then she has a secondary preference not
to abandon her child and become a mother. She doesn’t want to be in a position
in which she satisfies her second preference. She has a mega preference that
she should be able to satisfy her first preference rather than her second. Her
position is analogous to that of a soldier. Most soldiers would prefer not go
to war but if they must do so most would prefer to act courageously, they have
a mega preference that there will be no need for them to act courageously in
battle. If we can ask whether we should satisfy her mega preference means that
the possibility of ectogenesis would not end the abortion debate, but merely
reframe it.
Should we try to satisfy her mega preference? It might be
argued that someone’s inability to abandon her child means that at a later
period she might be glad she became a mother. It might then be further argued
because she later affirms having the child she must also affirm the conditions
necessary for that child to exist, she must become glad she was unable to have
an abortion and that as a result we had no reason to satisfy her mega
preference. This situation is analogous to Parfit’s fourteen-year-old girl who
has a child and later in her life her love for that child means she must affirm
her decision to become pregnant at fourteen was a good decision for her. For an
excellent treatment of these issues can be found in Jay Wallace’s ‘The View
from Here’ (1). I would feel uncomfortable in endorsing the fourteen-year-old’s
decision as a good decision and likewise would feel uncomfortable in failing to
endorse someone’s mega preference to have an abortion as a good for her because
she might later come to love her child. I would suggest in cases such as these
result in the feeling of a deep sense of ambivalence and do not give us reason
to regard the fourteen-year-old girl’s decision as a good decision or the
denial of abortion as justified. If we accept the above, then the possibility
of ectogenesis and State childcare doesn’t give us reason to ban abortion. I
don’t believe the idea of souls should play any part in determining the
permissibility of abortion. I do believe it is permissible for a woman have an
abortion before the foetus becomes conscious. However, if science can determine
when consciousness emerges this might change the time at which abortions ceases
to be permissible.
- See chapter 2 of, Jay Wallace, 2013, The View from Here; On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret, Oxford University Press.
