Tuesday 8 November 2016

Nussbaum, Transitional Anger and Unconditional Forgiveness




Charles Griswold argues that forgiveness is a kind of transaction and as a result there are certain conditions attached to the transaction which mean that one cannot truly forgive without fulfilling these conditions (1). In response it might be pointed out that conditional love is inferior to unconditional love. It might then be argued by analogy that conditional forgiveness, transactional forgiveness, is inferior to unconditional forgiveness. In this posting I will argue this doesn’t hold and that transactional forgiveness is morally more desirable than unconditional forgiveness because of the message it sends to the offender.

Martha Nussbaum rejects the idea of transactional forgiveness as suggested by Griswold and goes further by arguing that there are also problems with unconditional forgiveness. The problem with all sorts of forgiveness according to Nussbaum is that it is essentially backward looking and attached ideas of payback. She argues rather than forgiving we should engage with offenders in a spirit of active love (2). In response to such arguments Griswold suggests that for a victim just to give unconditional forgiveness means she lacks self-respect and that others will also fail to respect her. Intuitively if someone who has been wronged and the offender exhibits no remorse or indeed continues offending, holds no resentment, then the victim lacks self-respect. Intuitively it also seems morally wrong, not just hard, for someone who has been sexually assaulted to unconditionally forgive her assailant.

In this posting I don’t want to examine a lack of respect. Instead I want examine two different objections to unconditional forgiveness. First, I will argue that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness means the victim far from having too little self-respect, means she actually has too much and is over proud. Secondly I will argue unconditional forgiveness by the victim harms the offender. Let it be accepted that all forgiveness whether unconditional or transactional means letting go of resentment. Intuitively this appears to be true for it seems impossible to believe a victim truly forgives her transgressor if she still bears resentment towards him. For the sake of argument let us assume Sue has been morally harmed by John and that she has unconditionally forgiven him. In this context because Sue’s forgiveness is unconditional it is possible that John might remain quite happy with the fact that he has morally harmed Sue and would be fully prepared to do so again.

Let us examine Sue’s motives in unconditionally forgiving John. According to Nussbaum sometimes,

“the person who purports to forgive unconditionally may assume the moral high ground in a superior and condescending way.” (3)

If we accept Nussbaum view, then it is possible that Sue’s underlying motive in unconditionally forgiving John is to feel good in a superior way. Sue’s motive displays a certain moral arrogance. Such a motive does not justify unconditional forgiveness. However, let us assume that Sue’s motive is not to feel superior but simply a desire to act in a moral manner.
Let us examine the above assumption. I now want to present two arguments why even in this context Sue’s unconditional forgiveness might be flawed. Both arguments will be based on Sue’s focus. Firstly, I will argue that by unconditionally forgiving John to satisfy her desire to act in moral manner Sue might still be exhibiting an excessive moral pride. Before proceeding I must make it clear I am not attacking limited moral pride, moreover I believe that some limited moral pride is a good thing. How then can Sue exhibit excessive moral pride by unconditionally forgiving John? It seems possible to me that Sue’s motives for forgiving John might have nothing actually to do with John. Let us assume Sue’s unconditional forgiveness is due to her focus on acting morally and isn’t a case of moral grandstanding. Her focus might be flawed if it focusses exclusively on Sue’s behaviour because her focus is too narrow. If Sue focusses exclusively on her own behaviour, focusses on herself, then she seems to be exhibiting excessive pride. Nussbaum for instance might argue such a limited focus is unhealthy because it contains a narcissistic element. It follows that if underlying Sue’s unconditional forgiveness is an excessive pride that her motive for this forgiveness is flawed, indeed it might be argued that by excessive cherishing of herself she damages herself. However, it does not automatically follow that her unconditional forgiveness of John cannot be justified by other reasons just because Sue’s motivation is flawed.

Let us assume Sue’s motive for her unconditional forgiveness is simply focussed on acting morally and has nothing to do with excessive pride. This brings us to the second of my two arguments. I want to argue that whilst Sue’s simple desire to act morally is admirable the way she enacts this desire is flawed. I will base my argument once again on Sue’s narrow focus. In order to act in a true moral way people must consider all moral agents and not just a select few, a particular morality is a partial morality. Any non-partial system of morality must include those who harm us. I would suggest that Sue’s narrow focus on unconditionally forgiving John means she fails to genuinely consider his moral needs. Sue is only considering herself morally and disregarding the moral needs of John. By withdrawing her resentment Sue is withdrawing something that might help John become a better person. Resentment at wrongdoing is not simply something the victim feels; resentment also sends a signal to the offender that he is causing moral harm. It seems to me that by unconditionally forgiving John Sue is denying John this signal which might help him become a better person. Agnes Callard makes a similar argument with respect to revenge when she argues that “revenge is how we hold one another morally responsible” (4). It follows Sue’s unconditional forgiveness of John whilst admirable in some ways is nonetheless flawed because she ignores John’s moral needs or is mistaken about what will help John become a better person.

I have argued that conditional is superior to unconditional forgiveness however it might be argued by some that my conclusion is unsound. They might point out that unconditional forgiveness seems to set an excellent example of how to love others and this reason for supporting unconditional forgiveness outweighs the reasons against I have advanced above. In response I would argue the recognition of others as moral agents is even of even more fundamental importance to morality than any possible demonstration of love. Without this basic recognition no system of morality can even get started. In my example it seems to me if Sue unconditionally forgives John then she is acting in a way she believes is best for John and by so doing she is failing to recognise him as a fully moral agent.

Does accepting that unconditional forgiveness might be harmful mean we must accept the type of transactional forgiveness favoured by Griswold? Nussbaum sets out the long list conditions necessary for Griswold’s conditions for transactional forgiveness to take place (5). She argues that going through such a process is a humiliating one smacking of payback, I am inclined to agree. Griswold’s transactional forgiveness makes sense if we accept a traditional view of anger which includes payback. However, Nussbaum argues ideas of anger involving payback doesn’t make sense. Once we see traditional anger doesn’t make sense we can transmute it into action according to Nussbaum. Traditional anger,

“quickly puts itself out of business, in that even the residual focus on punishing the offender is soon seen as part of a set of projects for improving both offenders and society.” (6)

I am again inclined to agree with Nussbaum that anger should be transmuted into something useful. I am inclined to agree because I believe like Michael Brady that emotions, including anger, act in a way analogous to alarms focussing our attention on the need to do something (7). Alarms are meant to be attended to, an unattended car alarm is annoying, unattended anger can be damaging. However, even if unattended anger is harmful this doesn’t mean anger is harmful. Unattended alarms are annoying but alarms are useful. Unattended anger may be harmful but anger is useful, anger draws attention on the need to do something. According to Nussbaum anger should “focuses on future welfare from the start. Saying ‘Something should be done about this”. (8) If we accept that anger should be attended to, be transmuted, then it seems to me Griswold’s transactional idea of forgiveness is in trouble because the transactions involve payback which seem to me to be related to un-transmuted anger.

If we forgive someone and we do not adopt Griswold’s ideas on transactional forgiveness are we forced somewhat reluctantly to conclude that our forgiveness should be unconditional? I don’t believe it does. What does it mean to forgive? If we define forgiveness as simply as relinquishing anger and its associated desire for revenge, then a commitment to transitional anger also means commitment to unconditional forgiveness. It means even if John remains quite happy with the fact that he has morally harmed Sue and remains prepared to do so again that if Sue translates her anger that she forgives him unconditionally. However, forgiving someone might mean also be defined as the normalisation of relations between the forgiver and the forgiven. Translating anger in this context doesn’t simply mean moving on. Transitional anger means looking to the future, moving on. Transitional anger also means looking back to the past, past wrongdoing cannot be ignored after all it is the reason why we must look to the future. This approach doesn’t of necessity involve a formal transactional process involving payback. It does however mean that certain minimum conditions not involving payback must be met. Relations cannot be normalised if a wrongdoer disputes the facts or wrongness of his action. In this situation victims are entitled to protect themselves by withholding trust. Trust is an essential part of normal human relations if someone is always wary of another their relationship cannot said to be a normal one. Protecting oneself doesn’t need involving payback. It follows forgiveness requires that the wrongdoer must accept responsibility for the act and acknowledge its wrongness for normal relations to be met. It further follows if someone accepts transitional anger that his acceptance does not commit her to unconditional forgiveness which might harm the wrongdoing.

1.    Charles Griswold, 2007, Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press.
2.    Martha Nussbaum, 2016, Anger and Forgiveness, Oxford University Press, Chapter 3.
3.    Nussbaum, chapter 3.
4.    Agnes Callard, 2020, On Anger, Boston Review Forum, page 15
5.    List of Griswold’s conditions as outlined by Nussbaum.
·       Acknowledge she was the responsible agent.
·       Repudiate her deed (by acknowledging it. Express regret to the injured at having caused this particular injury to her
·        Commit to becoming a better short of person who does not commit injury and show this commitment through deeds as well as words.
·       Show how she understands from the injured person’s perspective the damage done by the injury. Offer a narrative of accounting for how she came to do the wrong, how the wrongdoing does not express the totality of the person and how she became worthy of approbation.
·       Acknowledge she was the responsible agent. Repudiate her deed (by acknowledging its wrongness) and herself as the cause.
·       Express regret to the injured at having caused this particular injury to her.
·       Commit to becoming a better short of person who does not commit injury and show this commitment through deeds as well as words. 
·       Show how she understands from the injured person’s perspective the damage done by the injury. Offer a narrative of accounting for how she came to do the wrong, how the wrongdoing does not express the totality of the person and how she became worthy of approbation.
 
6.    MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 2015, Transitional Anger. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 51.
7.    Michael S. Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press
8.    MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 2015, Transitional Anger. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 54.


1

No comments:

Historic wrongdoing, Slavery, Compensation and Apology

      Recently the Trevelyan family says it is apologising for its ancestor’s role in slavery in the Caribbean, see The Observer .King Ch...