Driverless Cars and Applied Philosophy

Google has developed an autonomous car and major car makers such as Ford and VW are showing an interest in doing the same. It is reported that up to ten million such cars might be on the road by 2020, see businessinsider . I am somewhat doubtful about such a figure but nonetheless autonomous cars are coming and their coming raises some ethical issues. According to Eric Schwitzgebel

“determining how a car will steer in a risky situation is a moral decision, programming the collision-avoiding software of an autonomous vehicle is an act of applied ethics. We should bring the programming choices into the open, for passengers and the public to see and assess”,

see autonomous cars . Clearly autonomous cars needs collision-avoiding software. Intuitively Schwitzgebel seems to be correct when he argues that an ability to address moral concerns should built into this software. For instance autonomous cars might be programmed to not to protect their passengers if by so doing a large number of pedestrians would be harmed. In this posting I want examine three questions. Firstly is Schwitzgebel correct when he argues that an ability to address moral concerns should be built into the software. Secondly is such software actually possible. Lastly if it isn’t possible to design software which can make moral decisions should we nonetheless permit autonomous cars on our roads?

What does Schwitzgebel mean when he says that the software of an autonomous car should be able to address moral concerns? In this posting I will assume he means some rules should be built into a car’s software about what to do in situations which involves some moral considerations. Does a autonomous car need such software? It is by no means certain it does. Consider a driver whose car will collide with either a young pregnant mother or an old man due to unforeseen circumstances. Does she make a decision about what to do based partly on philosophy? I suggest she does not. Of course her emotions might kick in causing her to avoid the pregnant mother. It might then be concluded if drivers don’t, or can’t, make a decision based on philosophy, that there is no reason why autonomous cars should do so. Of course that autonomous cars should be safe as possible for its passengers, other road users and pedestrians. The above leads to two tentative conclusions. Firstly, provided autonomous card are as safe as drivers then there it would seem that there are no ethical reason against their introduction. Provided autonomous cars are as safe as drivers then autonomous cars do no more harm than drivers. Secondly, provided autonomous cars are only slightly safer than drivers then it would appear that there is an ethical reason for their introduction. Autonomous cars do less harm than drivers. Of course issues concerning responsibility remain.

What objections can be raised about accepting the above conclusion? Firstly it might be objected that my example is chosen to mislead and that in other situations, when the circumstances are much clearer, people do in fact make decisions roughly based on applied philosophy. For instance a driver might be faced with the choice of hitting a concrete stanchion and killing himself or running into a queue of schoolchildren waiting at a bus stop might choose to hit the stanchion for moral reasons. I accept that in some extreme circumstances drivers might make a moral decisions. However such a decision might be based on the driver’s emotions rather than the application of applied philosophy. Applying philosophy takes time and time and may not be a viable option in a collision situation. Moreover I would suggest in real life situations this second example is just as misleading as the first. A car crashing into a queue might kill one or two people but it is unlikely to kill a very large number. It seems to me that only a large number of victims might enable a driver to make a clear moral decision quickly. I have argued drivers don’t usually make moral decisions when making collision decisions and rarely if ever do so by applying philosophy. Does this mean autonomous cars do not need a controlling system that takes account of moral considerations? The above seems to suggest that they don’t. However let us assume drivers should take into account moral considerations in collision situations provided this is possible. It follows autonomous cars should have a controlling system that takes account of moral considerations in collision situations provided this is possible. However if this isn't possible and autonomous cars are at least as safe as drivers the inability to make moral decisions shouldn't prevent the introduction of autonomous cars.

Designing systems that enable autonomous cars to make decisions which include moral considerations will be difficult. Perhaps then rather than designing such systems it might be better to make autonomous cars avoid the circumstances in which the need to make moral decisions arises. Cars and pedestrians don’t mix so perhaps it might be safer to limit autonomous cars to motorways and other major roads. Doing so might have the additional benefit that it might prove easier to design autonomous cars to avoid dangerous circumstances in which they might need to make moral decisions rather make moral decisions. Unfortunately such a course of action whilst desirable would seem to be impractical unless the way people use cars changes radically. People want cars to take them home, to work, to go shopping and their children to school. Satisfying these wants means mixing cars and pedestrians. Cars that don’t satisfy these wants would be unwanted. It would appear that even if it is very hard to do that an attempt to program the collision-avoiding software of a autonomous cars to enable them to take in to account moral considerations should be made provided this is possible.

I have argued that Schwitzgebel is correct in his assertion that the collision-avoiding software of a autonomous car should include moral considerations provided this is possible. Let us turn to the second question I posed, is such software possible? I have argued that in an emergency situation in which people have to make moral judgements that they do so quickly based on their emotions. Cars don’t have emotions so it follows the basis of any software system for making moral decisions in autonomous cars will be different from that used by drivers and based on set of rules. What sort of rules? Schwitzgebel argues that the rule of protecting a autonomous car’s occupants at all costs is too simplistic. I would question whether such a rule is indeed a moral rule at all. Might a strictly utilitarian rule of maximising the lives saved in a crash situation be adopted? Schwitzgebel points out such a rule would unfairly disregard personal accountability. For instance what if a drunken pedestrian steps in front of a car? Isn’t he accountable for his actions? If so shouldn’t his accountability be taken into account when assessing the consequences of any decision about the oncoming collision? Could a driver spot that a pedestrian was drunk in an emergency situation? I would suggest he couldn’t. At present a autonomous car’s software certainly couldn’t. It follows any rules used by autonomous cars must be primitive rules which don’t fully represent our own understanding of moral rules. It seems possible that if we are prepared to accept some primitive rules built into a autonomous cars software then it might be possible for such a car’s software to make some primitive moral decisions.

Let us consider my last question. If the rules involving moral decisions which are built into autonomous car’s software must, at least for the present, be rather primitive rules should we permit the use of such cars? I will now argue we should. Firstly I have argued that drivers don’t, or very rarely, make moral decisions in collisions situations. There is no legal requirement that drivers should make such decisions and I see can no reasons as to why a higher standard should be applied to autonomous cars. Indeed autonomous cars might be safer. Drivers can get drunk, tired and speed. Autonomous cars can’t get drunk or tired and their software can control their speed. Let us accept than any moral rules built into the software of a autonomous car must be concerned with its safe use. Let us also accept that being safe involves avoiding harm. Now let us consider a autonomous car with the primitive rule of protecting its occupants at all costs. This car safe for its occupants and avoids harming them. I would suggest we should not permit the use of autonomous cars using such a simple rule. It’s only safe for some. It might appear that the introduction of autonomous cars would only be acceptable if their software makes them safe for the public at large and avoids harming them. Achieving the above would be difficult. However the above might be amended. The introduction of autonomous cars would only be acceptable if their software makes them as safe to the public as driven cars.  I have argued above that drivers only have the time to make very limited moral decisions. It should be possible to create software for autonomous cars which can make the same sorts of moral decisions as drivers do. Indeed it might be harder to create software which recognises roadside features such as pedestrians than moral concerns.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly provided autonomous cars are as safe as drivers then autonomous should be permissible. Secondly provided autonomous cars are only slightly safer than drivers then it would appear that there is an ethical reason for their introduction. However problems with accountability and insurance remain but these problems don’t seem insurmountable.