Anders Herlitz
asks whether revenge is an unjust necessity, see practical
ethics . In his posting he suggests we have an innate desire to punish
wrongdoers. In the light of this suggestion he further suggests that
institutionalised punishment plays two distinct roles in our society. Firstly
it is a means of justice. Secondly it rids us of innate urges. In this posting I want to consider
these innate urges.
Firstly is there
anything wrong with our urges to punish, hurt, humiliate and harass wrongdoers?
It seems to me in the presence of wrongdoing these strong urges are not only
not wrong but necessary to combat the wrongdoing. For instance Hugh
Thompson’s anger at the My Lai massacre was
both right and necessary to stop the massacre, see Hugh
Thompson . Why then are these strong urges harmful in some situations? I am
attracted to Michael
Brady’s ideas on emotions (1). Brady argues that emotions are somewhat
analogous to alarms. Emotions draw our attention to the things that are
important to us. They do this in two ways. Firstly emotions capture our
attention and secondly point it in a certain direction. Alarms are calls for
action. Hugh Thompson’s
anger prompted him to act to stop the massacre; prompted him to act justly.
Unanswered alarms are annoying and unanswered emotions, emotions that don’t lead
to action, are harmful. It follows if we don’t act in response to our
natural urges to punish, hurt, humiliate and harass wrongdoers that we are
further harmed.
Herlitz suggests one function of punishment is to rid ourselves of these harmful
emotions. However it might be objected that we could lose these emotions in a
different way, we might forgive wrongdoers. What does it mean to forgive? I
would suggest forgiveness is neither simply forgetting nor should we forgive unconditionally.
We forget some wrong when we go to sleep but this forgetting is certainly not
forgiving. Let us accept society depends on trust and that without trust no
sort of meaningful society is possible. I would suggest that if we forgive wrongdoers
unconditionally that we pay scant respect to that trust. It follows if we are
to forgive a wrongdoer certain conditions must be met.
What are
the conditions which must be met if someone is to forgive some wrongdoer for
the harm he has inflicted on a victim? I would suggest the wrongdoer must first
undertake the following actions based on Charles Griswold (2).
- He must admit he was
responsible for the action
- He must admit the deed was
wrong.
- He must express regret, feeling
regret is inadequate.
- He must commit to becoming a
better person.
- He must listen to and
understand the victim’s point of view.
- He must be able to offer some
sort of narrative as to why he did what he did.
If the
wrongdoer undertakes these actions then the victim should respond by,
- Forswearing revenge.
- Moderating or eliminating his
resentment.
- Express his forgiveness to the
wrongdoer.
Let us
assume that some offence takes and the victim forgives the wrongdoer as
outlined above. It seems probable that this forgiveness will usually moderate
the victim’s urges to hurt, humiliate and harass the wrongdoer. I believe
forgiveness can be best achieved by restorative justice, see Restorative Justice Council. I further believe the domain of
restorative justice should be expanded.
However forgiveness
does not punish the wrongdoer; does not alleviate all our innate desires. The
question now arises should we punish those offenders who take part in
restorative justice and pose no threat of re-offending? Punishing such offenders would address our natural
urge for revenge, but should we try to move on from this urge? I will now
argue, admittedly somewhat tentatively, that we should not. Let us accept that
forgiveness without apology is impossible. Apologising for some wrong she
committed forces an offender to split from her former self to some degree. Such
splitting is harmful in the short term. It might be objected that in the long
term such splitting is beneficial. In response I will simply point out that in
the long term a prison sentence might benefit an offender but that it is still
a form of punishment. It follows that for any wrongdoing for which
an apology is justified that some minimal form of punishment must also be
justified. In some cases this minimal punishment might prove to be
adequate. However in other cases greater punishment might well be justified. If
adequate punishment is regarded as a form of revenge then some revenge is not an
unjust necessity.
1. Michael Brady, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University
Press, 2013.
2. Charles Griswold, Forgiveness, Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
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