Gay Marriage 2

It might be suggested that the state has other reasons to promote marriage rather than just that of helping children flourish and I was wrong to concentrate on this sole reason in previous postings when I argued against gay marriage. It might be further suggested what gay couples want equality with heterosexual couples. However equality must be justified equality, for instance children don’t have equality with adults when it comes to voting. Nonetheless it seems reasonable to suggest what gay couples want is equal access to the benefits of marriage.

What then are the benefits of marriage? Firstly married couples offer each other mutual support. Secondly traditional marriage is meant to guarantee sexual exclusiveness. This exclusiveness is often more of an expectation than guarantee is practice. Thirdly marriage gives the partners in the marriage certain property rights and guarantees these rights after the death of one of the partners. Lastly a marriage helps in the rearing of children. It would appear there are four main reasons why people marry. As I have previously suggested only the last reason is a good reason why the state should support traditional marriage, it might appear my objector is justified in claiming my basis for the state supporting traditional marriage is at the best highly selective and at the worst prejudiced towards gay couples.

At this point I must make clear my previous position. I argued the state should recognise traditional marriage only because it helps children to flourish. I did not argue the state should recognise traditional marriage because of the additional benefits outlined above. Someone might raise two objections to the above. Firstly she might suggest that state should recognise traditional marriage because of these additional benefits. Secondly she might point out even if the purpose of the state in recognising traditional marriage is only to help children to flourish that a consequence of this recognition is that these benefits become available to married couples. She might then proceed to argue if the state prohibits gay couples from marrying these benefits are made unavailable to gay couples and as a result is guilty of unfair discrimination.

In response to my objector I would suggest the first two benefits of marriage as outlined above are questionable. Firstly is the mutual support a couple offers each other really enhanced because they are married? I would argue the best form of mutual support depends on love. Not however some form of sentimental love in which the lover’s interests continue to take precedence over those of her beloved. Mutual support requires someone taking the interests of her partner as her own. The form of love I’m concerned with as always in this blog is ‘caring about’. Frankfurt defines this form of love as follows,

“It is in the nature of a lover’s concern that he is invested in his beloved. That is, he is benefited when his beloved flourishes; and he suffers when it is harmed. Another way of putting it is that the lover identifies himself with what he loves. This consists of accepting the interests of his beloved as his own.” (1)

In addition I would agree with Frankfurt such love is not something we choose (2). We cannot simply choose to love someone. It follows if a couple simply choose to get married this does not automatically give them the best form of mutual support. It may of course in time lead to such support. It further follows if a couple choose to get married because they love each other they do not obtain the benefits of the best form of mutual support because they marry, they already possess this form. At this point my objector might point out there are less than ideal forms of mutual support. Forms based on self-interest. For instance in a traditional marriage a wife may support her husband in his job because it is in her interests to do so, his job supports her also. And a husband may support his wife’s staying at home looking after their children as it’s in his interests, she’s supporting his children. In response I would point out such mutual support depends on self-interest irrespective of whether the couple are married or not. In the light of the above it would appear mutual support depends on love or self-interest and that mutual support is not enhanced by marriage. I am also doubtful as to whether sexual exclusivity is a benefit of marriage. Perhaps marriage enhances sexual exclusivity but the divorce courts show it certainly doesn’t guarantee it. I will not pursue this point further.

The third benefit marriage is supposed to give its partners are certain property rights and guarantees of these rights after the death of one of the partners. These are real benefits and if gay couples are denied these benefits they are discriminated against. However in the UK and many other countries all these rights are made available by civil partnerships because the financial provisions in these mirror those in marriage. It follows the state if it prohibits gay marriage it does not deny gay couples any property rights or the guarantee of these rights after the death of one of the partners

I accept that married couples offer each other mutual support. But I have argued this mutual support is due to love or self-interest. It is not due to the fact they are married and as a result mutual support is not a benefit of marriage. I am also highly doubtful as to whether sexual exclusivity is a benefit of marriage. Marriage does give married couples some financial benefits but these benefits are available to gay couples through civil unions in countries in which these unions are available. It follows if the state prohibits gay marriage then in countries which permit civil unions the state does not deny gay couples equal access to the benefits of marriage by this prohibition. In my previous posting I argued that provided gay marriage does not harm children the state has no reason to prohibit gay marriage. In this posting I have examined whether, based on the first three benefits of marriage outlined above, the state has reasons to promote gay marriage. I have questioned whether these benefits in fact exist. It follows the state has no reasons to promote marriage based on the interests of married couples, gay or heterosexual.

I have argued that the only reason the state has to support marriage is the welfare of children. I have suggested that because the roles of husband and wife are now interchangeable the state has no reason to prohibit gay marriage, provided of course this does not harm children’s welfare. In some countries it is now possible for gay couples to adopt children, see list. It is also possible for a gay couple to have a child, by means of donor insemination or surrogacy involving IVF, which is genetically related to one of the partners. It follows if the state has reason to encourage traditional marriage because this helps children flourish it also has reason to support gay marriage. This reason can still be justified even if only a small number of gay couples wish to have children. At this point my objector might point out even if the roles of husband and wife are interchangeable the roles of mother and father are not, see for instance Virginia Ironsides. She might then suggest that because of this the children of gay couples do not flourish as well as those of heterosexual couples and as a result the state should not recognise gay marriage if this encourages gay couples to have children.

Basically my objector is arguing that because the children of gay couples do not flourish as well as the children of heterosexual couples that gay couples should not have children. She might suggest this is because gay relationships are unnatural relationships not suited to the rearing of children or the children of gay couples might be bullied at school. In response I would point out there it appears there is no evidence that the children of gay couples do not flourish as well as those of heterosexual couples. Indeed there is some evidence that when they are young they flourish just as well as the children of heterosexual couples and perhaps even better, see Goldberg and Smith. Moreover even if the children of gay couples do not flourish as well as those of heterosexual couples this does not imply gay couples should not have children. Children in deprived areas may well not flourish as well children born into more affluent areas but no one seriously suggests that people in deprived areas should not have children. It seems inevitable to me that some gay couples will have children. Let us assume that the children of both heterosexual and gay couples who stay together flourish better than the children of couples who split up. Let us also assume marriage helps couples who stay together. Lastly let us assume the state has a duty to help children flourish. It follows from the above the state should promote gay marriage even if the number of gay couples with children is low. I accept the above conclusion and as a result have changed my mind about the desirability of gay marriage.

1. Harry Frankfurt, 2006,Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, page 41.
2. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press. Page 135.

Gay Marriage

Someone remarked to me the other day that her daughter would make someone a good wife. Her remark caused me to wonder about the roles of husband and wife in society nowadays. In the past a husband and a wife had a specific role in marriage. I’m not sure these specific roles still exist and if they do perhaps they have become interchangeable. In the past I have defended traditional marriage which prohibits same sex unions but if these roles no longer exist or are now interchangeable then perhaps I should reconsider my position.

Let us assume that marriage has evolved so that the role of husband and wife are to some degree interchangeable. I am perfectly happy to accept such a change. This evolution means a woman can play the role of husband and a man the role of wife. It follows two women can play the roles of husband and wife in a marriage and the same applies to two men. It might then be argued if the state recognises marriage between a man and a woman it should also recognise a marriage between two partners of the same sex and that my defence of traditional marriage was wrong. Perhaps even my defence was due some unconscious prejudice on my part

At this point I must make exactly clear what position I have previously defended. Let us accept that until recently in western world it has been accepted that marriage was the union of one man and one woman. I did not defend the states right to define what marriage means. I accepted that the state has no business in semantics or else we might end up in a state akin to that in George Orwell’s 1984. Nonetheless I did defend the state’s right to encourage and offer support to traditional marriages. My argument went as follows. The state supports children’s education because this helps them flourish and become good citizens. I then argued by analogy if a marriage helps the children of the marriage flourish and hence become good citizens that the state should support marriage. I pointed to evidence that the children of married couples flourish better than those of unmarried couples, see for instance Married and unmarried family breakdown .  I concluded that the state should support traditional marriage.

However even if my argument is accepted it doesn’t mean the state shouldn’t recognise gay marriage. Gay couples don’t want to radically change marriage or destroy traditional marriage they simply want it to become more inclusive. I accept my argument above doesn’t automatically preclude this possibility. Provided of course this inclusion doesn’t harm the relationship between heterosexual married couples with children. Prima facie it would appear there is no moral reason why the state should exclude gay couples from marrying. Nonetheless the above provides no reason why the state should do so. Someone might object that the state should do so for reasons of equality. If it did so straight couples will no longer be able to claim moral superiority over gay couples. In reply I would of course accept that straight couples have no moral superiority over gay couples. Nonetheless my reason why the state should recognise traditional marriage had nothing to do with equality or discrimination it was simply concerned with helping children to flourish. My objector may now question why infertile heterosexual couples should be able to enter into a traditional marriage and gay couples shouldn’t. In reply I would argue the state has no moral reason to promote the marriage of infertile heterosexual couples. It may of course do so for purely pragmatic reasons simply because it is hard to differentiate between couples who don’t want or can’t have children and those who do.

In the light of the above I was perhaps wrong to argue the state should prohibit same sex marriage. However this is not the same as saying the state should support same sex marriage. A government might of course do so purely to project itself as both caring and modern. But these reasons are based purely on the government’s interests and not on the interests of gay people. In my next posting I will consider whether the state has other reasons to justify it supporting gay marriage.

Pornography and the Corrosion of Character

David Cameron the British Prime Minister has declared war on pornography, see telegraph . He believes pornography corrodes childhood. He therefore proposes that every internet user in the UK will be asked whether they wish to receive pornography and that the default position will be they do not. In this posting I will not consider the effectiveness of his proposal or consider it’s implications on our freedom. I agree pornography corrodes but would argue this corrosion is not limited to children. In this posting I will argue that pornography might damage someone’s sense of personhood, that it might mean he is a deficient sort of person and that it always corrodes character.

In a thoughtful piece in the Independent Archie Bland says he is pretty confident that he is able to keep fantasy and reality distinct. I now want to examine this split. Of course we must be able to split fantasy from reality or else we would go round in a dream state. Moreover there is nothing wrong with some fantasies. There is nothing wrong with someone fantasying about what he would do if he won the lottery provided of course such a fantasy did not come to dominate his life. I will now argue not all fantasies are the same. Fantasies such as becoming rich need not harm others even if they became true. In such cases if the split between fantasy and reality becomes blurred or ceases no harm is done. The split between fantasy and reality is not essential. This is not true of much of pornography. In what follows for the sake of simplicity I will assume that men are the main users of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst being aware some women may also use pornography. I will also assume women are the objects of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst again being aware that many other forms exist. Much of pornography portrays women as being dominated or harmed. These forms of pornography would be harmful if the fantasies involved became true. I will accept some forms of pornography in which women or others are not dominated or harmed may not be harmful to third parties. In the rest of this piece pornography will refer to pornography which involves fantasies which imagine dominating or harming others unless stated otherwise. It follows for these forms of pornography any blurring of the split between fantasy and reality might be harmful to others. In this context the maintenance of the split between fantasy and reality is absolutely essential. The maintenance between fantasy and reality may also be essential in another context. There now an increasing use of sexbots. Sex with a robot is a kind of fantasy. If this fantasy involves domination and harm then once again any blurring of the split between this fantasy and reality might be harmful to others.

Bland is confident that he is able to keep fantasy and reality distinct but this might not be true for all men. It appears to follow the use of pornography is dangerous and a case can be made for the state attempting to control pornography in order to limit this danger. Of course it might be argued the state should not do so as any such attempt would limit personal freedom. I will not pursue this argument here as I am mainly concerned with the type of harm pornography causes. It might be objected at this point that men who are already likely to harm women use pornography, rather than pornography causes some men to become more likely to harm women. Personally I am extremely doubtful about my objector’s point. Nonetheless I must accept that whether pornography causes harm to women or men who use pornography harm women is an empirical question which can only be settled by good evidence and not by philosophy. However even if my objector is right I still believe splitting fantasy and reality is damaging to the user of pornography.

I suggest the use of pornography by a man damages his relationships with women in general. Firstly the use of pornography may limit his real engagement with women. Perhaps more importantly someone, who may be able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality so he will not harm women, will nonetheless find that this split taints his engagement with women. He sees women both as objects that may be used as he wills and creatures who are essentially the same as himself and limit his will. At this point my objector might suggest there is a distinction between fantasy women who may be used and real women who limit a man’s will and it is possible for someone to completely separate the two in his mind. If this is so my objector might conclude we have no reason to believe a man’s use of pornography will taint his engagement with real women. In theory my objector may be correct but as above I remain extremely doubtful. Moreover in this case there seems to be some evidence to support my doubts. If the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete then there is no reason why a man who uses such pornography should keep it secret. If his partner asks him if he uses such material he has no reason to lie. I would argue he has two reasons to lie. Firstly let assume he is truthful. If he is truthful it seems probable his relationship with his partner will be damaged. His partner is unlikely to believe he can maintain the separation between fantasy and real women in his mind and as a result sees him as someone who sees her as someone who can be used. Secondly the man involved will not be truthful because he feels ashamed. But why should he be ashamed if the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete? I have previously argued there are two types of shame . One type of shame is anxiety about social disqualification as suggested by Velleman, see (1). Another type of shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves. Because pornography is regarded socially as reprehensible it follows a user of pornography may fear social disqualification even if he is able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality. He might also feel shame because deep down he feels this separation is incomplete.

At this point my objector might point out not all pornography is used by heterosexual men, homosexuals also use pornography. Moreover some homosexual pornography portrays others as being used and harmed. He might question whether lesbian pornography portraying women being used and harmed damages the relationships of women who use it with other women. If it does not he might then ask why only pornography used by men which portrays women being used or harmed damages the user’s relationships with women? At the present time I cannot provide a satisfying answer my objector’s question, perhaps someone else can. I would now simply suggest that the use of pornography damages the user’s relationships with others because he/she is likely to lie about his/her use for the reasons outlined above.

I now want to argue the use of pornography damages the user even if it doesn’t damage his relationship with others. A common theme in my postings is that someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. As always in my postings to ‘care about’ means someone identifies with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Frankfurt argues that caring about oneself is essential to being a person and that someone who doesn’t care about himself can’t really be considered as a person

.

“Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be. There could not be a person of no importance to himself.” (2).

Let us accept someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. Frankfurt goes on to argue that ambivalence is a disease of the will,

“the health of the will is to be unified and in this sense wholehearted. A person is volitionally robust when he is wholehearted in his higher order attitudes and inclinations, in his preferences and decisions, and in other movements of the will.” (3).

Now pornography forces someone to maintain a split between fantasy and reality. If someone uses pornography this split threatens the unity of his will and is damaging to his identity. I would further suggest a user of sexbot risks damaging his identity for the same reason.

My objector might raise two objections to the above. Firstly he might argue a user of pornography might not really care about pornography and as a result its use plays no part in forming his identity. It just a something he has a taste for much the same as ice cream. In my last posting I suggested that an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. I further suggested if someone continually buys ice cream that his liking for ice cream plays a part, albeit a small part, in the creation of his identity. So in reply to my objector I would suggest if someone continually uses pornography this use forms part of his identity to some degree. Secondly my objector might accept that a user of pornography cares about its use but argue this use does not damage his identity. He might point out we all compartmentalise our lives and the user of pornography may put his usage into a safe compartment. He might point out Frankfurt believes that the formation of someone’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others (4). He might then argue if someone is able to order the things he cares about by how much he cares about them that his use of pornography need not harm his identity. At this point I must accept that the use of pornography may, at least in theory, not damage the user’s identity as a person provided he is able to fully order the things he cares about. However I believe this would be hard to achieve in practice and for this reason the use of pornography remains dangerous to someone’s identity.

Let us accept that for someone to be a person of any sort he must care about something. But according to Helm such an account of a person is incomplete and for someone to be a person he must have some values (5). I would argue this means he must care about what he cares about. According to Helm such meta-caring about must involve feelings of pride and shame. I believe the simple ability to care about is all that is necessary for someone to be a person. Nonetheless I believe that most people do care what they care about. They care not just about being a person but being a good person and this caring does involve feelings of pride and shame. Let us accept without argument that it is better to be a good person than simply a person who cares about things but has no pride or shame in what he cares about. It follows someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in some way a deficient person.

Let us accept that someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in a deficient kind of person. Let us also return to pornography which portrays women as being used or harmed and consider a man who uses such pornography. Let us assume this man cares what he cares about. It seems to me such a man must wish he didn’t care about pornography. Because by using pornography he is caring about using and harming others. Anyone who cares about what he cares about must have some conception of the good. He must also care about the good. I would suggest any conception of the good must exclude using or harming others for no benefit. I would further suggest this exclusion must include imaginary harm. It follows such a man is likely to feel shame at his use of pornography. This is not the type of shame as anxiety about social disqualification. It is anxiety about harming the things he cares about, in this case his conception of the good. In the light of the above I would suggest that the user of pornography, who cares about what he cares about, sees himself as a deficient person as he fails to be the sort of person he aspires to be. The character he aspires to be is corroded.

1.      David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95.

2.      Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 90.

3.      Frankfurt, page 100.

4.      Frankfurt, 1988, The importance of what we care about, Cambridge University Press, page 91,

5.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship, & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 128.