Self Respect and Love

Kristjan Kristjansson argues too much attention is paid to promoting an individual’s self esteem and not enough to promoting his self respect. Kristjansson is referring to global self esteem, how good we feel about ourselves in general, rather than domain based self esteem, how we feel about our performance in a particular domain. The problem with Kristjansson’s argument is that in practice our ideas of self esteem and self respect easily get confused. In spite of this reservation I agree with Kristjansson that an over inflated ego based on high global self esteem is not useful to someone and may even be harmful. Kristjansson also argues that domain based self esteem is good for someone, once again I agree. Indeed if someone is a good athlete a failure to recognise this fact is a failure to recognise the truth. I further agree self respect is a useful for someone. However if we are to encourage self respect we must be clear about what we should be encouraging. In this posting I want to examine the basis of self respect.

Kristjansson believes we have a real emotionally based self rather than just a self construct. He believes self respect may be defined roughly as a disposition not to act or feel in a way that is unworthy of oneself. In Hamlet Polonius advises Laertes as follows, “This above all: to thy own self be true”. Perhaps this advice reflects what it means for someone to respect himself, to be authentic. However if someone is to be true to himself or to be authentic he must understand the nature of his self.  Kristjansson argues there are two incompatible understandings of what it means for someone to respect himself based two different concepts of a real self. One concept is Kantian and the other Aristotelian. Kristjansson favours adopting an Aristotelian concept (1). Using this concept means what really matters is that someone has certain virtues such as justice, generosity and courage. That he can feel appropriate pride and shame. Lastly he must have the courage of his convictions, he must not be easily swayed from his chosen path, and that his beliefs and convictions must have some persistence. Being true to such a self, respecting oneself, means someone must act virtuously based on his deeply held beliefs and convictions. Perhaps this is what Shakespeare meant by being true to oneself. However someone’s ability to choose his own beliefs and convictions, his autonomy, seems only to have a peripheral importance according to an Aristotelian concept of self. Perhaps then we should adopt a Kantian concept of the self. However if we adopt a Kantian concept of the self we find a self with very little substance except for the ability to choose. Such a self can choose but his self seems an unsubstantial thing giving him very little basis on which to base any choices he makes. To respect such a self we need only accept his right to choose and respect his choices provided these choices do not harm others. However even if we have reason to respect such a self it does not follow we have reason to admire such an insubstantial self.

Kristjansson believes we must choose either an Aristotelian or Kantian concept of the self. Intuitively neither of these concepts completely captures our idea of self. I would suggest that there is a concept of self which combines the idea of an autonomous and substantial self. I would suggest someone’s self is based on what he loves. A self based on what someone loves is not an insubstantial self. Moreover I would further suggest a self that makes choices based on what he loves is an autonomous self, see Frankfurt (2). Indeed if someone doesn’t love anything at all it is hard to see how he can make any meaningful decisions. Anyone who fails to love has no boundaries and has no basis on which to make decisions. He is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity, see Frankfurt (3). Of course I accept someone’s identity can change over time but his identity must have some persistence. I would also suggest that anyone who doesn’t love himself at least to some degree cannot love anything else. To love something according to Frankfurt is simply to be satisfied with what one loves. Satisfaction means someone has an absence of restlessness and has a resistance to change his relation to his beloved (4). If we accept Frankfurt’s definition loving defined by satisfaction then loving something need not involve pride. It further follows someone cannot love himself excessively, cannot respect himself excessively. Pride it seems to me is connected to self esteem rather than self respect. It be suggested at this point self respect need only involve love of self. I would reject such a suggestion. If someone only loves himself he has no substantial self to love. He is trying to love something amorphous with no fixed shape or identity. However an objector might point out that I have suggested someone who does not love himself cannot love anything else and that someone who does not love anything else cannot love himself. My objector might then suggest love so defined is impossible. My response would be that coming to love is a natural process and that when someone comes to love something he comes at the same time to love himself.

I must make it clear that Kristjansson rejects such a concept of the self (5). Personally I believe the concept of a self defined by what he loves need not differ radically from an Aristotelian conception. A self defined by what he loves cannot choose anything his choices are constrained not by others but by what he loves. Moreover it is perfectly possible for a self that is defined by what he loves to acquire some of the virtues by education provided he endorses these virtues by loving them. Such a self might be regarded as an Aristotelian self. What is the relationship between an Aristotelian self and the virtues? Does he simply possess them or love them? I would argue if loving is based on satisfaction then a virtuous person must love any virtues he possesses. It follows if an Aristotelian self must love the virtues then he might also be regarded as a self based on love. However the concept of a self defined by what he loves is a broader concept than an Aristotelian concept. A self defined by what he loves of course need not of necessity love the virtues even if a virtuous person must love the virtues.

What does self respect mean if the self is defined by what someone loves? I have argued above it does not mean someone takes pride in himself. It simply means someone is satisfied with himself. To be satisfied with something someone’s satisfaction must be both persistent and consistent. Let us agree with Kristjansson that self respect is good for someone and that it should be encouraged. Unfortunately if we also accept someone’s self respect depends on his loving something including himself then we cannot directly encourage self respect. Someone cannot decide to love something simply because he decides loving is good for him. Similarly someone cannot decide to respect himself because self respect is good for him. We can however indirectly encourage self respect by creating the conditions in which self respect can flourish. This means allowing someone the freedom to love the things that matter to him, means loving and caring about things ourselves and it the case of children suggesting, but no more than suggesting, that it is good for them to love certain things.

To conclude I want to make some more speculative comments about the importance of self respect especially if it is based on love or “caring about”. These comments are of more speculative nature because I am a philosopher not a psychologist. Many of the perpetrators of murderous massacres such as the dreadful killings in Newtown Connecticut do not seem to be mad. I would however speculate that none of these perpetrators is satisfied with themselves. None of these perpetrators has self respect. Of course it would be simplistic to suggest the reason of such massacres is just a lack of self respect. Nonetheless I would speculate such a lack is one reason for these massacres even if it is a minor one. This is one reason why it is so disappointing that we cannot directly encourage self respect. Nonetheless if directly encouraging self respect is impossible, no matter how disappointing this may be, we should not attempt to do so but instead concentrate our efforts on trying to create the conditions in which self can flourish, see my posting on Riots and the Unbearable Lightness of Simply Being . Secondly I would speculate if self respect is based loving that the search for self respect can also lead to dreadful crimes. Some people in a desperate search for self respect, for identity, for something to love may come to love something in inappropriate ways. I would suggest suicide bombers are such people, see my posting on Terrorism, Love and Self Delusion ; see also Kristjansson (6).

1. Kristjansson, K. (2010) The Self and Its Emotions. Cambridge University Press, page, 154.
2. Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page, 135.
3. Frankfurt, page 114.
4. Frankfurt, page 103.
5. Kristjansson, pages 89 90.
6. Kristjansson page 197.

Extended Consent

We usually consent to some action immediately prior to that action. Sometimes our past consent may be thought to extend into the future. Living wills or last directives are now widely accepted and may be thought of as a kind of extended consent. Even if extended consent is widely accepted there remain some problems connected to the concept. The Law Commission’s report defines extended consent in section 2.11 of "Consent in Sex Offences"   as follows,

“If what is relied on is past agreement, this will mean both, (a) that, when previously given, the agreement must have extended to the doing of the act at that later time, and (b) that it must not have been withdrawn in the meantime. We believe that it should be made clear that consent may be express or implied.”

The same report gives the following example of extended consent in section 4.54.

“For example, at 8 pm P makes it clear that she is looking forward to having intercourse with D that night. By 11 pm she is too drunk to know what she is doing, but D has intercourse with her anyway. Can it be said that she does not (because she cannot) consent to the intercourse at the material time, namely the time of the intercourse? In our view it cannot. Consent is not a state of mind which must invariably exist at the time of the act consented to, but an expression of agreement to that act – the granting of permission for it.”

The report’s authors seem to believe P’s consent is valid and that D commits no offence. Their belief seems to be based on the assumption that there are no conceptual problems with extended consent. The starting point for this posting originated in a piece by Jeremy Stangroom in the Philosophers Magazine’s blog, see 'More Sex when drunk'. Stangroom believes, as I do, that P’s extended consent would not be valid. If we are correct then either there is no such thing as extended consent or the report’s definition is inadequate. In this posting I will attempt to give a more adequate definition of extended consent.

The concept of extended consent is certainly useful. For instance, if a patient is about to undergo surgery then her informed consent is usually sought sometime prior to the actual surgery rather than when she is being wheeled into the operating theatre. The use of extended consent in this instance is good practice as it gives the patient time to absorb the information she needs to make a balanced decision and means she is less likely to make a decision under stress than if she made her decision immediately prior to her operation. Of course such a patient may withdraw her extended consent at any point up to the time her surgery takes place. The idea of extended consent is also useful in cases in which a decision has to be made whether or not to resuscitate a terminally ill patient. Such a decision is made much easier if the patient has made a last directive or living will. It might be thought the further consent is extended into the future the more likely it is to lose its validity. However the above examples from medical practice show that in practice this is not always true. None the less I shall argue below that extended consent should not be extended too far. Intuitively someone’s consent to surgery is perfectly valid tomorrow or even the day after but the same does not apply to intercourse. In what follows I will firstly argue what really matters for extended consent is the basis on which the consent giver makes her decision and secondly how far her consent is extended.

If someone consents to intercourse on what does she base her decision? Someone certainly doesn’t make a decision to have intercourse based on pure reason. I would suggest her consent is simply based on how she feels, on her mood. If this is accepted then it is hard to see how she could possibly extend her consent for intercourse into the future. She cannot know what sort of mood she will be in, how she will feel, in a few hours time. If I am correct then consent to intercourse may only be given at the time intercourse is going to take place contrary to the Law Commissions report. However if someone consents to surgery then her mood at either the time she made her decision or when surgery takes place seems to be irrelevant. When someone consents to surgery she makes an informed consent decision. Her decision is made using practical reason and based on the information provided by her medical team together with her belief about what is best for her. Practical reason doesn’t vary as moods do. It follows provided the patient’s circumstances don’t change her consent decision would be the same tomorrow or even next week. It further follows consent based on ongoing factors using practical reason can be extended to some degree.

I now want to examine just how far consent based on continuing facts using practical reasoning can be extended. Can for instance the hypothetical withholding of consent be extended years into the future as happens with living wills? The nature of practical reason does not change over time so changes in practical reason cannot be used to justify limiting the extension of consent. An essential element of any living will is that the state of affairs relevant at the time the will is implemented is the same as the facts envisaged when the will was made. It might be thought provided this element is satisfied that there is no problem in extending the withholding of consent as expressed in living wills. Such a thought would be premature for what also matters is someone’s beliefs about what is best for her given these facts. Her belief about what is best for her depends on what she “cares about”. In this posting as in previous postings in this blog I will assume to “care about” something means someone identifies herself with which she cares about, see (1). Caring about in this sense has nothing to do with whether someone is in the mood for intercourse or not. When someone “cares about” something this “caring about” must have some persistence, see (2). Of course when someone attends to other things she doesn’t have to actively care about something she cares about but she does have to have a disposition to care about it in the appropriate circumstances. It would seem to be nonsensical to say if someone “cares about” something she could suddenly abandon this care for ever. When the term “care about” is used in the above sense it is roughly equivalent to loving something, see (3). It once again might be thought because what we love, or “care about”, must have persistence that that there is no problem in extending the withholding of consent as expressed in living wills. Once again such a thought would be premature. Love must have some persistence but both someone and what she loves can gradually change over time.

The above suggests that whilst consent can be extended there are limits to just how far this extension can go. In particular there might be problems with extended consent in relation to living wills. The first problem concerns the persistence of what someone “cares about”.  What someone “cares about” must have some persistence, perhaps a few years, but does what someone “cares about” always persist for a decade or even decades? The second problem with living wills is that they anticipate hypothetical events. The will maker may have no experience of these events to guide her. The patient giving her consent for surgery tomorrow is not simply considering a hypothetical event but one that is actually going to happen. Someone attempting to give her consent to intercourse later that night has presumably some experience of intercourse. The realness of these situations gives someone’s decisions focus. It may be that someone when faced with a hypothetical situation may believe she would choose a particular course of action in that situation. Later when actually in this situation, she may discover she was wrong and that she cannot follow that particular course of action. I would argue much the same is true of living wills. Someone may specify in a living will she would not consent to treatment in a certain hypothetical situation. However were this situation to occur she might well have consented had she been able.

In spite of these problems I believe living wills can be useful subject to the proviso that these wills are fairly recent. For instance if a patient learns she has a terminal disease this would be the ideal time to make a living will. If a living will is fairly recent it should be realistic to assume it represents a patient’s extended consent because what she “cares about” should not have changed during period between the making and the implementation of the will. I also believe if the validity of a living will is limited by time that this limitation is likely to force the will maker focus on the hypothetical situation more seriously than she would do if considering situations decades into the future. Perhaps living wills should only be valid for up to five years.

In the light of my discussion above I would redefine an extended consent decision as follows. An extended consent decision is one made using practical reason which is based on what someone “cares about” rather than her current mood, which is valid only for a limited period of at the most a few years and has not been revoked. Someone might object that this is not a useful definition in practice as it is difficult to separate what someone “cares about” from her fleeting moods and emotions. I accept this difficulty but would argue it doesn’t have the same weight when applied to extended consent. I would suggest “caring about” a decision involves being satisfied with that decision. I would further suggest this is true irrespective of whether caring about is defined as simply a matter of will or is connected to some emotional dispositions. I would further suggest that being satisfied with a decision simply means no restlessness with the decision or any desire to change it. If my suggestions are accepted then, because extended consent by its nature allows ample time for any restlessness with someone’s consent decision to become apparent, we can be satisfied in the absence of this restlessness that her decision is based on what she “cares about”.

1.      Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press page 83.

2.      Frankfurt, H. (1988), page 84.

3.     Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 165.

Prisoners and the Right to Vote

In the UK prisoners lose the right to vote whilst serving their sentence. In the US, except in Maine and Vermont, prisoners also lose this right and in some states this disenfranchisement continues after they have served their sentences. In this posting I want to examine whether prisoners should retain this right whilst serving their sentences. The vast majority of philosophical literature seems to suggest that they should. My intuitions suggest to me they should not. I hope my examination will either force me to challenge my intuitions or be able to justify them. Before proceeding I must make it clear I am only interested in whether prisoners should retain the right to vote and that I am not concerned whether the European Human Rights Court should play any part in UK legislation.

In order to look for an argument to support my intuitions I will firstly examine society’s aims when it sends people to prison. Firstly we send people to prison to protect ourselves by ensuring they commit no more crimes for the period of their sentence. This aim is achieved simply by sending offenders to prison. Depriving offenders of the right to vote does nothing to further this aim. Secondly we send offenders to prison in order to rehabilitate them. In the light of the re-offending figures for prisoners I’m not sure this aim is very realistic. However even if we accept this aim is realistic it is hard to see how the disenfranchisement of prisoners might further the aim. It is possible to allow prisoners to vote using a postal ballot. It follows the disenfranchisement of prisoners is not a necessary part of their imprisonment. It further follows if the disenfranchisement of prisoners is to play a meaningful part in the rehabilitation of prisoners that disenfranchisement must be justifiable by itself. Someone might argue an offender’s disenfranchisement might cause him to reconsider his attitude to life and so play some small part in his rehabilitation. I’m not convinced by such an argument, if I’m correct then it follows that depriving prisoners of the right to vote cannot be justified as part of their rehabilitation. Lastly and perhaps most importantly we send people to prison in order to punish them. It follows if we are to justify disenfranchisement as a punishment it also must be justifiable by itself. Most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment. It follows for most prisoners disenfranchisement cannot be justified because it is a punishment. However this may not be true for all prisoners as I will argue later.

I have argued that for most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment and hence disenfranchisement cannot be justified as such. However even if we accept the above as I do, it does not automatically follow if such prisoners are already disenfranchised that we have a reason to change the status quo. I have suggested that most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment. It follows that most prisoners do not value the right to vote. If we don’t grant the right to vote to those prisoners who don’t value having this right then we do them no harm. It further follows that from a consequentialist point of view we have no reason to give most prisoners voting rights.

Someone might attempt to extend the above argument concerning valuing the right to vote to all prisoners. First she might point out voting is an essential element of any democratic society. She might then argue that prisoners don’t value society simply because they offend whereby damaging society. It follows that because prisoners don’t value society they don’t value the right to vote. It further follows if society does not grant prisoners the right to vote then it does them no harm as this right is not something they value. Lastly she might suggest prisoners see themselves as living in society rather than being part of society.

I am doubtful if in practice many prisoners actually value the right to vote. Nonetheless I would reject the above argument because I think it is possible that some prisoners do value this right even if they fail to respect society. However if some prisoners do value the right to vote then their valuation gives us a possible reason to disenfranchise them. If we deprive someone of something he values justly we may do so in order to punish him. It follows we have a possible justification to disenfranchise those prisoners who value the right to vote. To summarise I firstly argued that most prisoners do not value the right to vote and this means we no reason to change the status quo and give them this right. Secondly I argued that for those prisoners, who do value the right to vote, disenfranchisement might be justified as punishment.

Someone might object to my argument by pointing out it has been framed in consequentialist terms and the question of prisoner voting rights is a matter of fundamental human rights. I accept human beings have certain rights, see my posting of 07/10, but I am unhappy about using the term fundamental with regard to rights. Some rights are universal and apply to all human beings others are more restrictive, such as the rights of the members of a golf club. For instance I would argue we have a right not to be treated with unnecessary cruelty simply because we can feel pain but then animals must also have this right. Perhaps this right might be regarded as a universal right for all sentient creatures. In addition we have a right not to be treated as a means by others. Perhaps this right is universal for all potential autonomous creatures living among autonomous creatures. The domain of rights holders for this right is more restricted than for the domain of the right not to be treated with unnecessary cruelty. Lastly we have a right to vote because we are part of a democratic society. The domain of rights holders for the right to vote is further restricted. I would suggest it follows that someone’s right to vote is not a fundamental right based on him being a human being, but is based on him being part of a democratic society. Indeed the idea that our hunter gatherer ancestors had fundamental right to vote is nonsensical. Rights evolved as rights upholders’ ideas and their society changed and as a result different rights may have different origins. Because rights have different origins there is a wide variation in the domain of rights holders.

If we accept that the right to vote depends on us being part of democratic society then does this imply that in such a society prisoners should retain this right? It has been suggested above that prisoners see themselves as only living in rather than being part of a democratic society. I would further suggest prisoner’s behaviour shows that they do indeed see themselves as living in society rather than being part of society as they either intentionally damage society or fail to see their actions as damaging to society. It follows if prisoner’s only live in a society rather than being part of that society that they should not retain the right to vote. After all most foreigners living in a country are not usually considered as citizens and as a result do not have the right to vote even if they are law abiding and contribute to the general good by paying taxes.

I now want to consider some objections to the above. Firstly someone might suggest that many people who never offend see themselves as living in rather than being part of our society and yet still retain the right to vote. For instance people who live solely on benefits and contribute nothing to society. Nobody would seriously suggest we should disenfranchise such people. My objector might then argue if we treat these people differently from prisoners that we are acting unjustly. I would not accept my objector’s argument for two reasons. Firstly many people who contribute nothing to society financially contribute in other ways. Secondly I would argue all those who obey the law contribute to society simply by respecting the rights of others. However how much individuals contribute to society varies. Prisoners serving their sentences do not contribute to society in any other way and by offending have demonstrated that they do not respect the rights of others. My objector might now point most prisoners are not murderers or rapists but minor criminals many of whom simply snort, smoke and inject drugs in the hope of improving their happiness. I would respond by simply pointing out being inadequate may be the reason many prisoners live in society rather than being part of it and as a result gives us no reason to ensure they have the right to vote. Next my objector might suggest that giving prisoners the vote sends them a message. The message we send is that we see them as being part of society even if they don’t. But why should we send them such a message? My objector might respond by suggesting such a message can play a part in their rehabilitation by encouraging them to become part of society. I would respond by suggesting that this would be the wrong message and that disenfranchisement sends a better message that respect for the law is the minimum needed to be considered as part of society.

Lastly my objector might suggest that my argument should apply to all offenders rather than just those sent to prison. If we disenfranchise offenders who are sent to prison but not those offenders who are subject to different punishments such as fines then we are acting unjustly. I believe this objection carries some real weight. My argument depends on the assumption that prisoners see themselves as living in society rather than being part of it. My objector might now point out my assumption should apply to all offenders. She might argue that it follows drivers who are fined for speeding should also be disenfranchised for a period because they see themselves as living in rather than being part of society. Clearly most speeding drivers do see themselves as part of society rather than merely living in it. Perhaps then my assumption is false and some prisoners do see themselves as part of society rather than merely living in it. I accept the above objection and accept all offenders, except perhaps sociopaths, see themselves to some degree as part of society. However I would suggest there is a continuum in this degree ranging from sociopaths to speeders. I might then modify my argument and base it on the assumption that at below some point on this continuum offenders don’t see themselves as enough as part of society to be fully regarded as members of society. I suggest this point might be when offenders directly damage other members of society. The prime purpose of society is to protect its members against unwarranted damage and clearly offenders who directly damage other members of society do not respect society. I might then argue prisoners fall below this point and as a result should remain disenfranchised whilst most other offenders will be above this point and should not.

Does my modified argument provide some justification for my intuitions? I’m not sure and am now somewhat ambivalent about prisoner disenfranchisement. Perhaps I’m just using reflection to bolster my intuitions rather than possibly changing them, like Haidt (1) suggests most people do.

1.      Jonathan Haidt, 2012, The Rightous Mind, Allen Lane, chapter 2.

Biological and Adopted Children

In a posting on practical ethics Julian Savulescu relates the story of Brad and Melissa’s attempts to have a baby using IVF with PGD. They did so in order to avoid having a child with cystic fibrosis or a child who was a carrier of the gene for cystic fibrosis. Both Brad and Melissa were carriers of this gene. If parents have a child with cystic fibrosis this costs the state a great deal of money. Having a child cost Brad and Melissa a lot of money, in addition to their savings they had to sell their car to pay for the IVF. However the money it cost them was a great deal less than it would have cost the state had they had a child with cystic fibrosis. Savulescu argues that the state should bear the cost of IVF with PGD for parents such as Brad and Melissa because it is unjust to expect them to save the state money. In reply Khalid Jan and Elselijn Kingma suggest parents, such as Brad and Melissa, have the option of adopting a child and that because this option involves no extra costs to the state, indeed it may save the state money, that the state has no duty to pay for IVF for such parents.

In the following discussion I will assume for the sake of argument that adoptive children are usually adopted as babies. I will also assume that these babies don’t have any more potential health or mental problems than children in general. In practice these assumptions are not always met. Let us assume couples in a position similar to that of Brad and Melissa can adopt. If such couples would prefer a child of their own, using IVF with PGD, to an adopted child then they must have some reasons for this preference. They must believe there is a difference between nurturing a biological child and an adopted child. In this posting I want to examine what these reasons might be.

One difference between biological and adopted parents is the way they acquire their obligations to care for their children. The vast majority of biological parents naturally acquire an obligation to care for their children simply because they create vulnerable children. They may be certain exceptions such as a fourteen year old mother, who because she is a child herself, may be unable to fulfil this obligation, see deceit and unintentional fathers . Adoptive parents consciously assume this obligation at the time of adoption. However irrespective of how parents acquire the duty to care for their children the actual caring seems to be identical. It follows the difference between the way biological and adopted parents acquire their obligations to care for their children should not make any difference to the relationship between a parent and child. It gives no reason why couples such as Brad and Melissa want a child using IVF rather than adopting one. None the less such couples are concerned with not just with having any child; they are concerned with being the child’s biological parents. After all Brad and Melissa spent a great deal of money and even had to sell their car in order to achieve this aim.

I will now suggest two reasons why parents might want to be biological parents. Firstly parents might want to be biological parents as opposed to adoptive parents simply because they believe they will have a closer bond with their children due to this bond being unique. Adopted children have both biological and adoptive parents. Many adopted children feel the need later in life to seek their biological parents. This need may weaken the bond a child feels for her adoptive parents. It does not automatically follow that the bond the adoptive parents feels for their adopted child is weakened and as a result the first reason fails. A second reason why mothers might want to be biological mothers is that they believe carrying their children will increase the maternal bond. This may well be true but I am doubtful if it is the main reason why many couples in Brad and Melissa’s position seek IVF with PGD. Let us assume such a couple could have a child with donated gametes and that the woman involved could gestate the child. I would suggest such a couple would still prefer IVF with PGD and as a result the second reason fails. The reason for this failure I would further suggest is that they care about having a child of their own. By a child of their own they mean a child who is genetically related to them. I would still further suggest when parents express a preference to be biological parents that this really means they want to be genetic parents. For instance many mothers who are unable to bear children, for health reasons such as having a hysterectomy, might prefer a surrogate to bear their children using her and her partner’s gametes rather than adopt. But why should parents care that they are genetic parents? Once again I will suggest it is because they believe that they will have a closer bond with their genetic children; that they will care about, they will love, their genetic children more than any children they adopt. In what follows I will suggest two reasons why parents might have this belief.

The first reason is simply that evolution designed us to care more for our genetic children than others. Perhaps those people who acquired caring instincts simply raised more children to adulthood. Perhaps also evolution designed us to care and to care more for those genetically related to us. Perhaps then step parents don’t care about their children as much as genetic parents do. Fairy tales and myths abound with stories about wicked step parents. Indeed there might be some evidence to support the claim that step parents care less, see Hofferth and Anderson. Of course some step parents may behave better most than genetic parents. And of course some genetic parents may behave atrociously. Someone might object that even if we do have evolved an instinct to care more for those genetically related to us this does not mean this is what we ought to do. Modern human beings are reflective creature. My objector might then argue that after reflection couples like Brad and Melissa might decide they could care as much for an adopted child as they would for a genetically related child and as a result decide that adoption is the best option. In reply I would suggest coming to care about, coming to love, is not a matter of reflection or choice, see Frankfurt (1). Of course someone may reflect on how to love or even whether her love is prudent but she cannot simply decide on whom she will love and the degree of her love. However at the present time there seems to me there is insufficient evidence to definitely conclude that evolution means genetic parents love their children more than adoptive parents do.

A second reason why parents might care about their genetic children more than any children they adopt is that they will have more common interests. My objector might now suggest that parents and children come to share interests simply by family life. A child’s interests are a product of his upbringing. I agree a child’s interests are partly a product of her upbringing but they are also partly defined her genes. For instance an adopted child may be strong, supple and as a result excel in sports due to her genes whilst her adoptive parents may be intellectuals with no interest whatsoever in sport. Moreover it seems that someone’s personality is partly determined by their genes. It follows parents who bring up their genetic children will have more interests in common with these children than any children they adopt. My objector might suggest this does not by itself show they care about their genetic children more than any adopted children. I agree with my objector that more shared interests does not supply any reason as to why genetic parents should have a greater disposition to care about their children than adoptive parents. It follows in this sense of caring about there is no reason why adoptive parents should love their children any less than biological parents. However there is more to caring about or loving than having a disposition to love; I am here assuming the terms love and care about are interchangeable. I do not actively love when I am asleep or when I am concentrating on my next golf shot. Actively loving someone means sharing her interests, if I have no concern for her interests I simply don’t love her. It is easier to share interests if these are interests I already possess, see aspergers autism and love . It follows there is a reason why genetic parents might be more loving towards their children than adoptive parents. It also follows parents carrying genes for inherited diseases can justify their desire for a child of their own using IVF with PGD.

In conclusion parents such as Brad and Melissa do have the option of adopting but most of them would prefer a child which is genetically related to them by using IVF with PGD. Moreover it would seem they have sound reasons for this preference. Personally I would support their preference. However I am not sure whether or not the State has an obligation to help them satisfy this preference. After all some children might have a preference to be adopted.

1.     Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 135.

Two Types of Respect; Too Much Respect?

In these days of political correctness, the idea of respect is important. The idea of respect is also often unclear. In this posting I want to examine what we mean by respect. It seems clear that respect must play some useful part in our lives or else it would simply cease to exist. In the past respect was linked to etiquette which played an important part in our lives by gluing society together. Etiquette encouraged inequality and stratification. In this posting I will consider respect free from etiquette and will argue that there are two important types of respect serving different purposes. I will argue that there is recognition respect which defines our domain of moral concern and appraisal respect which defines what we approve of. We can respect someone for what she is and who she is. I will proceed to argue it is damaging to conflate these different types and that sometimes we should express less respect.

We can respect a wide variety of things from persons, to institutions such as schools, to virtues like courage, to nature. This diversity suggests there are different types of respect. According to the Oxford Dictionary respect is “is a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievement.” If we accept this definition, then respect must involve our affective states. Not all philosophers would agree. For instance, someone might object a pupil’s respect for her teacher is not based on deep admiration; it is based on the norms of education. I would argue such ‘respect’ is not true respect for but merely the acceptance of these norms out of habit or for pragmatic reasons. In what follows I will assume that all types of genuine respect must involve our affective states. I will also assume that all forms of genuine respect must affect our behaviour. It seems nonsensical to hold we can respect something but that this respect does not constrain how we behave towards that we respect.

However, I am not concerned with all forms of affective respect which alter our behaviour. We might for instance I might respect the sea by fearing it and by only going swimming on a safe beach with a lifeguard. Fear is an affective state and it affects my behaviour by causing me to only to swim on a safe beach. In this posting I am not concerned with respect for inanimate objects. We might also ‘respect’ a gang member by fearing him. Indeed, gang members might demand such respect. However once again I’m not sure such ‘respect’ is genuine respect. I would suggest genuine respect must be freely given. Regardless of whether the above suggestion is correct or not in this posting I am restricting my discussion to respect which is freely given. Such respect might take two forms, recognition and appraisal respect. For instance, we may respect someone simply because she is a person but we may also respect her because she is a doctor, which required determination and dedication on her part qualities we approve of. Respect for persons, as the kind of creatures who can determine their own future and for whom we should feel some empathy is recognition respect and should be universal, such respect need not involve any appraisal of someone’s attributes. Appraisal respect need not be universal and must include a positive appraisal. 

Let us accept that we should always respect someone by recognising what she is, a person. This respect need not involve any admiration. When we respect someone for who she is then respect must involve admiration. For instance, if someone is a thief preying on old vulnerable people we should only respect her by recognising her to be a person. However, if she is a doctor we might respect her as a person by admiring her for who she is and what she has achieved. I now want to argue if we conflate the expression of recognition and appraisal respect, then we limit the usefulness of respect by sending a confusing message.

In order to make my argument I need to differentiate between the uses of recognition and appraisal respect. Recognition respect defines who and even perhaps what we regard as members of our society; defines the domain of a society.  Recognition respect is not useful in binding society together. If we fail to see someone as the same kind of creature as ourselves who can determine her own future, then we simply do not see that person as part of our society. All persons are owed recognition respect. Not everyone is owed appraisal respect, appraisal respect has to be earned. Appraisal respect always includes a positive appraisal such as admiration. If our appraisal was negative, whatever we felt it certainly wouldn’t be respect. Appraisal respect for someone means admiring her and responding in ways which are appropriate to our admiration. However simply admiring someone’s characteristics and responding in an appropriate fashion is not a sufficient condition for appraisal respect. We might admire someone’s strength and act appropriately, but such admiration and appropriate action aren’t respect. They might be envy and envy certainly isn’t respect. I would suggest that appraisal respect is of necessity linked to admiring someone’s character. This admiration need not be limited to someone’s moral character but includes any character traits which aid someone to flourish, character traits such as wisdom or courage. It might be objected that by suggesting appraisal respect is of necessity linked to character I am contradicting myself as suggested above someone might respect her doctor. In response I would point out anyone who wants to become a doctor must cultivate wisdom and determination, character traits which enable her to flourish. Appraisal respect aids flourishing and if we believe flourishing should be encouraged then appraisal respect should also be encouraged. Let us consider flattery. Flattery might appear to be a form of admiration but in the long term flattery damages relationships because it doesn’t represent our true feelings. The same is true if we conflate recognition and appraisal respect. Consider someone who has a character we don’t admire. Of course we should respect her as the kind of creature who can determine her own future. However, it does not follow that we admire her character. Moreover, if we conflate recognition with appraisal respect then this is precisely the message we are sending to her. This false view, like flattery, is likely to damage our long term relationship with her because it is based on a misunderstanding.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above. First we must be careful about how and how often we express our respect. I would suggest that in most normal contexts there is no need for us to explicitly express recognition respect. We should express recognition respect simply by our behaviour, simply accepting people as members of our moral community. We should do so by accepting how others live and letting them explicitly express their views even if we believe these views to be mistaken provided their lifestyle and beliefs do not harm others. I would further suggest that in most normal contexts it is a mistake to explicitly express recognition respect. By doing so others might sometimes mistakenly believe we respect rather than accept their character, their lifestyles. In addition, because our character is related to our beliefs others might sometimes mistakenly believe we respect their beliefs rather than simply accept their right to express them. It seems to me that if we are careless in expressing our respect we might be expressing too much respect leading to misunderstandings which can damage society.

I

Happiness and Satisfaction

In my previous posting I considered happiness in the light of Feldman and Haybron’s concepts. Both concepts differ, but both accept that someone’s affective states play an essential part of any meaningful concept of happiness. Intuitively the affective states concerned seem to those of joy or pleasure. In this posting I accept if someone is happy then he must have some feeling of joy or pleasure. Both Feldman and Haybron agree that one cannot simply equate happiness with satisfaction. Once again I accept their position. Nonetheless satisfaction is an important element in someone’s life. In this posting I want to examine the relative importance of happiness and satisfaction in life.

Before proceeding with my examination I want to show that being satisfied in life is not the same as being happy even though the two terms are often used interchangeably. For instance Mill seems to have used the terms interchangeably. In Utilitarianism Mill argued actions are right if they promote happiness and wrong if they promote unhappiness he then proceeded to argue “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied”. Psychologists also sometimes equate satisfaction with happiness. Daniel Nettle for instance suggests that there are three levels to happiness. First there are momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure. Secondly there are judgements about feelings such as satisfaction and lastly the quality of someone’s life over time. Nettle for the most part seems to equate happiness with satisfaction (1). However it seems to me someone could be completely satisfied with some decision or state of affairs but still not be considered to be happy. Let us consider someone suffering from a painful terminal illness. Such a person might well consider going to the Dignitas Clinic in Zurich to end his life. It seems to me such a person could be satisfied with his decision. However it also seems to me it would be wrong to describe such a person as happy. It follows being satisfied with some event, decision or even state of affairs does not equate to being happy. My terminally ill patient is unlikely to feel any joy or pleasure emanating from his decision.

In the rest of this posting I will assume that being happy must involve the emotions of joy or pleasure. Happiness that includes these elements, regardless of how this inclusion is done, is important to our lives. Satisfaction is also important to our lives. I have argued above that happiness and satisfaction are not identical. I now want to examine the relative importance of being satisfied with our lives and being happy. I will conclude that at the least a little happiness and an ability to be satisfied are essential to our identity as persons. I will also conclude that we ought to give greater priority in our lives to seeking satisfaction rather than seeking happiness.

Is satisfaction more important in our lives than happiness? The first possible reason as to why satisfaction might matter more than happiness is that it might be argued that someone cannot be happy if he isn’t satisfied. Accepting the above would mean being satisfied is a necessary condition for being happy even if it is not a sufficient one. What exactly does it mean for someone to be satisfied? According to Frankfurt a satisfied person simply has an absence of restlessness or resistance to change. He may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change (2). It follows if someone is not satisfied he is restless or resists his current state of affairs. It might then be argued this restlessness or resistance means he cannot be happy and as a result satisfaction is a necessary condition for happiness. Such an argument would be mistaken. I have accepted that being happy must involve the emotions of joy or pleasure. However being happy is compatible with someone feeling pain or sorrow. To be happy someone’s joys or pleasures must simply outweigh his pains and sorrows. It is therefore conceivable that someone, who may be restless and resist his current state of affairs, is nonetheless happy provided his joys or pleasures outweigh this restlessness and resistance.

The second possible reason as to why satisfaction might matter more than happiness in our lives is that satisfaction is more central to us as persons than happiness is. Frankfurt argues caring about oneself is essential to being a person and that there couldn’t be a person of no importance to himself (3). If we accept Frankfurt then it follows that anyone who cares about himself must seek to satisfy some of his desires. Anyone who doesn’t care about anything has no basis to make any decisions. Anyone who has no basis to make any decisions can hardly be regarded as a person at all. It follows satisfaction, or at the very least attempted satisfaction, is central to our lives as persons. Someone might accept the above but suggest satisfaction is a positive emotion. He might then suggest positive emotions must involve joy, or at the very least some pleasure, and so satisfaction involves happiness. Satisfaction is a sufficient condition for happiness. He might then conclude if satisfaction is central to us as persons then so is happiness. If the above is accepted then we must also accept that my terminally ill patient who decides to go to Dignitas in order to commit assisted suicide is not only satisfied with his decision but also happy with this decision. It seems to me that in this situation the patient’s satisfaction is not a positive emotion but a response he finds appropriate. Appropriate to him as the person he sees himself to be. Satisfaction if it is viewed as an appropriate response can be seen as a matter of fit or congruence rather than a positive emotion. Accepting the above means it does not follow that happiness must be central to our lives just because satisfaction is.

Nevertheless happiness may be central to our lives for reasons which have nothing to do with satisfaction. Let us accept that happiness is an important element of our lives. But is happiness central to our lives? Someone might argue even if happiness is an important element of our lives that it is not as central to our lives as satisfaction is because happiness does not endure in the way satisfaction does. If Frankfurt is correct in believing that satisfaction entails an absence of restlessness or resistance to a state of affairs then as long as this state of affairs endures then satisfaction endures. The same is not true for happiness. If some situation increases our happiness then as time progresses we adapt to this new situation and our happiness returns to its former level (4). It would appear then that happiness does not endure as satisfaction does. Perhaps the reason for this that evolution developed joy and pleasure to drive us towards certain goals. Once these goals are attained the need for joy or pleasure ceases, see (5). It might appear because happiness does not endure in our lives the way satisfaction does it is less central to our lives than satisfaction is.

I have reservations about accepting the above; just because happiness doesn’t endure doesn’t mean it isn’t central to our lives. Can there be a person who isn’t happy and who never has been happy about anything. Of course there can be a person who is deeply unhappy because he has a great deal more to be unhappy about than happy about. Of course it makes sense to talk about an unhappy person. But can we really imagine a person who is not and never has been happy about anything at all? Even my terminally ill patient may have been happy in the past and perhaps his memories still give him some happiness even if he is unhappy now. Someone might suggest it is possible for a person to act purely for moral reasons and that such a person need never be happy about anything. Personally I am doubtful whether such a person can exist but I am even more doubtful that if a person acted purely on moral grounds that he would never take even the slightest pleasure in his actions. I’m not sure how to answer the question as whether there could ever be a person who isn’t happy and who never has been happy about anything. My inclination is to say there cannot be such a person. If my inclination is correct then it follows that being happy, at least to some small degree, is essential to being a person. Having some happiness and caring are both central to our identity as a person.

However I would suggest that even if some minimal level happiness and an ability to care both play an essential part in making us the persons we are it does not follow that we should give the same weight to increasing our happiness as to satisfying our desires. It is possible to achieve modest improvements in our happiness, see Seligman . Moreover it seems to me that provided we have realistic expectations that it is easier to increase our overall satisfaction in life by paying more attention to the things we care about rather than increase our happiness. It follows we should give greater weight to increasing our satisfaction rather than increasing our happiness provided of course that we cannot do both.

1. Daniel Nettle, 2005, Happiness; The Science Behind Your Smile, Oxford, page 8.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 103.
3. Frankfurt, page 90.
4. Jonathan Haidt, 2006, The Happiness Hypothesis, Heinemann, page 86.
5. Nettle, chapter 7.

Feldman, Haybron and Happy Dispositions

Normally most people would understand what I meant if I said someone had a happy disposition. In this posting I want to explore the connection between a happy disposition and our concept of happiness. Haybron suggests that,

“Happiness has two components: a person’s central affective states and second, her mood propensity …. What brings these states together, I would suggest is their dispositionality.”(1)

Feldman argues Haybron’s suggestion is untenable because it doesn’t allow for the idea of fragile happiness (2). What is fragile happiness? Someone could be happy whilst being unaware that a tumour will soon end her happiness. Her happiness could be called fragile but this fragility does not rule out her having a disposition to be happy. Feldman uses the example of a Grandma suffering from depression and who takes a drug which allows her to be happy, in this case her happiness is fragile and she does not have a disposition to be happy. It would appear that Feldman is correct in his assertion that someone can be happy and not have a happy disposition.

I am inclined to agree with Feldman that someone can be happy and that she need not have a disposition to be happy. However the question I want to examine is a slightly different one; could someone be a happy person and not have a disposition to be happy? Feldman believes someone is happy now if when we consider all the propositions with which she is currently intrinsically attitudinally (dis)pleased with and we then consider the degree to which she is (dis)pleased with these propositions and find the sum to be positive. Feldman uses this idea of momentary happiness to calculate someone’s happiness over an interval. He suggests that in order to calculate someone’s happiness over an interval we use her momentary happiness over time to plot a graph. The x axis measures time and the y axis the subject’s happiness. The area between the graph line and the x axis can then be used to calculate her happiness over the chosen interval. Areas above the x axis are positive and areas below are negative. The subject’s happiness over the chosen interval is just the sum of these areas. From the above I would construe that Feldman believes someone is a happy person if she is happy over some long term interval. This interval might be five years or even a lifetime. A happy person so defined need not have a happy disposition.

However I have some difficulty in accepting such a definition. Let us assume if someone has a positive balance of happiness over ten years that she can be regarded as a happy person. Let us consider Imogen. Imogen was never either really happy or unhappy during her childhood and adolescence. When Imogen was twenty she meet Tom and was blissfully happy for a year. Let us say throughout that year she experienced 10 units of happiness. Unfortunately at the end of the year Tom left Imogen for her best friend Annabel. Imogen is now thirty and for the last nine years she has constantly experienced -0.5 units of happiness. If I am correct in my construction of a happy person according to Feldman then he would regard Imogen as a happy person. Intuitively I would regard Imogen as an unhappy person.

Let us assume that if someone is a happy person she must have disposition to be happy. If my assumption is accepted then we must also accept Feldman’s Grandma is not a happy person. It might appear this acceptance runs counter to our intuitions. In what follows I will try to differentiate between a happy person and a person who is happy. A person who is happy is simply a person who is currently happy. For instance Feldman’s Grandma is a person who is happy. If someone is a person who is currently happy then this fact alone gives me no reason to assume she will be happy tomorrow. I may of course believe she will be happy tomorrow because tomorrow will be her birthday, but the fact she is happy currently, by itself, gives me no reason to predict her future happiness. If however I believe someone to be a happy person I normally expect her to be happy tomorrow. The fact she is a happy person by itself gives me a solid reason for my expectation. If I accept the fact that someone is a happy person alone gives me a reason to predict her future happiness then this reason must be based on something about her as a person. She might have a happy nature, a happy personality or she might simply be a realistic optimist as suggested by Tiberius (4). Feldman’s Grandma’s personality by itself gives me no reason to believe she will be happy tomorrow. The fact Grandma will continue to take her drugs does give me a reason to predict she will be happy tomorrow but this fact is not part of her personality. I would suggest Grandma is not a happy person. I would further suggest a happy person must have some sort of disposition to be happy.

Haybron hints that if someone is happy there is a link between his happiness and the self that does not obtain in the case of (peripheral) pleasure (5). I am doubtful about his hint due to the fragility of happiness as expounded by Feldman above. However I do think there is a link between a happy person and her self. Haybron suggests there is a link between someone’s happiness and her central affective states. He further suggests what distinguishes “central affective states is that they dispose agents to experience certain affects rather than others”. However before accepting Haybron’s suggestions with regard to persons who are happy I must deal with the problems raised by the fragility of happiness as highlighted by Feldman. Let me make it clear that I believe the fact that someone is a happy person’s happiness remains fragile. Let us recall the happy person whose status as such is threatened by the tumour growing inside her. Nonetheless I would suggest the fact she is a happy person means she could cope better with the difficulties facing her ahead rather than a person, such as Grandma, who is simply a person who is happy. Her happiness is fragile but it is not as fragile as a person who is simply happy. The reason why her happiness is less fragile is that she has a disposition to be happy. Dispositions may vanish but I would suggest they don’t vanish overnight. My suggestion should be open to empirical investigation by psychologists. If my suggestion is correct it follows problems associated with the fragility of happy persons does not mean having a disposition to be happy is unimportant as far as happiness is concerned.

1. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 138.
2. Fred Feldman, 2010, what is this thing called Happiness? Oxford, page 29.
3. Feldman, page 118.
4. Valerie Tiberius, 2008, The Reflective life, Oxford, chapter 6.
5. Haybron, page 130.

Olympic Ideals and Winning

The Olympic Games are upon us and it is often claimed what really matters in the Olympics and sport in general is simply participating rather than actually winning. In this posting I want to differentiate between participating and competing and will defend the claim that winning is an essential element of any sport. My starting point for this posting will be the actions of Megan Vogel who when competing in a race in Ohio was running last but when about to pass Arden McMath, who had collapsed, stopped and helped her across the line; see Megan Vogel  . Megan’s action has rightly attracted much praise and many would suggest her action can be seen as demonstrating that what really matters in sport is taking part rather than winning.

I will begin by arguing Megan’s action was not part of sport. I do not intend to define sport precisely as I could offer several differing definitions. However prima facie it seems safe to assume any meaningful definition of sport must include the idea of competition and a set of rules. Some might question this assumption as it would rule out rock climbing and hunting as sports but might include chess. Megan’s action was certainly not competitive. Nor did her action have anything to do with the rules of athletics and as a result I would suggest had nothing to do with sport. Someone might object that even if her actions did not directly involve sport they did involve the ethos of sport, or sportsmanship. Once again as with sport I do not want to offer a precise definition of sportsmanship. I will however assume any definition must include the ideas of fairness, respect for other competitors and a degree of graciousness in accepting the result of any contest. Megan’s actions appear to have little to do with any of these assumptions. Helping Arden had nothing to do with fairness, respect for fellow competitors or graciousness in accepting the result of the race. My objector might now suggest Megan’s action demonstrated respect for Arden. I would counter suggest Megan’s action had very little to do with respect for Arden, though of course she may well have respected her, but instead demonstrated empathy. Empathy is not a necessary part of either sport or sportsmanship. I would further suggest Megan’s action demonstrated there are some things more important than sport or sportsmanship.

I have assumed that the concept of sport must include the idea of competition and a set of rules. The idea of competition is a meaningless one without the idea of winning. If someone objects I would ask her to think of any sort of competition without a winner or winners. My objector might now suggest even if sports must involve competition not all sportsmen or women are competitors. She might point to mass marathons such as those of London or New York in which the majority of participants stand no chance of winning to support her suggestion. She might then proceed to further point out these participants don’t even have intention of competing with the elite athletes. I will agree with my objector that these participants are taking part in a sporting event but I will argue many are still competing rather than just taking part in some mass ramble attached to a sporting event. Of course these participants are not competing with the elite athletes but they are seeking to achieve some goal. This goal may be a personal best, beating a friend or perhaps simply finishing the course. Achieving these goals means competing with the clock or a personal friend. However can achieving some purely personal goal such as simply finishing a marathon course be seen as some form of competition? I suppose I could make some contrived attempt to argue that achieving a personal gaol can be seen as a competition with some elements within the inner self. I will not make such an attempt and accept that achieving some personal athletic goal is not a form of competition. My objector might now argue that because all participants in a marathon are sportsmen or women and some of those are not taking part in any meaningful competition that competition is not an essential element of sport. I don’t accept my objectors premise that all participants in a large scale marathon are sportsmen or women. I would suggest there is a difference between being simply a participant and a competitor. Not all participants are competitors. It follows the concept of a sportsman or woman is not an all or nothing concept but rather a graduated one. I would further suggest that the degree to which someone should be considered a sportsman or woman depends on the amount of genuine competition involved. It follows that this objection to my prima facie assumption that sport must include the idea of competition and winning is unsound.

I have argued that competition and winning are an essential element of sport and those who merely participate in a sporting event such as a mass marathon are not really sportsmen or women. It follows what is important to being involved with sport is competing rather than merely participating and competition involves winners. Merely taking part, participating in a sporting event is not what really matters indeed it is irrelevant as far as sport is concerned.

One reason why the idea that participating in a sporting event may seem to be as important as competing in the event is that many of the virtues needed by someone to compete in an event such as a marathon race are the same as those needed by someone merely to complete the event. In order to compete or participate in a marathon someone needs to be dedicated, determined, have a little practical wisdom and a degree of temperance. This is a limited set of virtues. If someone is to have a sense of sportsmanship she needs to augment this set by adding a sense of fairness and respect for others. This set is a slightly larger set of virtues but still remains a limited set. Earl Spurgin argues we should not expect sports stars to be role models as this invades their right to privacy (1). The above suggests a further reason; the virtues needed by sports stars are a limited set and the set of virtues possessed by role models should be larger including humanity based on empathy or sympathy such as that exhibited by Megan Vogel.

1. Earl Spurgin 2012 Hey, How did I become a Role Model? Privacy and the Extent of Role Model-Obligations. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(2)

Guilt, Shame and Society

According to Max Wind-Cowie shame should be liberated rather than legislated for. By this I take Wind-Cowie to mean that shame should play a greater part in regulating our society and this regulation should replace the need for some legislation. In my posting "me and my values"  I suggested the balance between pride and shame has shifted in most people’s psyche and that this shift damages them as persons. I believe shame is important to us as persons but I also believe shame is important to society. It follows that I broadly agree with Wind-Cowie’s aim. However in what follows I will argue that whilst this aim is desirable it is by no means easy to achieve.

Wind-Cowie suggests that for “a myriad of pressing, modern problems - from tax avoidance to obesity - society needs to judge more and legislate less”. Exactly how is a more judgemental attitude linked to shame? It seems Wind-Cowie’s argument runs roughly as follows. If society was more judgemental then more people would feel shame when contemplating actions society finds unacceptable. This shame would stop them from undertaking these actions. If the above argument is sound it follows in the context of a more judgemental society there would be less need for legislation. Wind-Cowie then uses, the example of Jimmy Carr’s use of an apparently legal tax avoidance scheme and his subsequent change of heart after others judged this scheme to be morally wrong, to support his argument, see the Guardian . I have two important reservations about society becoming more judgemental even though I accept that shame should be liberated.

My first reservation is that, even if it is accepted our society needs to be more judgemental, these judgements might be carried too far. For instance in my previous posting I suggested that in the past some gay people were ashamed of their homosexuality and this unjustified shame led them to lead inauthentic lives. They were ashamed because society judged their homosexuality to be wrong. My first worry is certainly not an insubstantial one because in the past some people such as Alan Turing may have committed suicide partly in response to such judgements. Perhaps society should only be judgemental about matters that harm society rather than harm individuals. I would suggest one of the things that harms society most is unfairness. Tax avoidance even if legal is unfair. Unfortunately judgements about what harms society and what harms individuals are not always as easy to make as in the case of tax avoidance. For instance obesity harms individuals. But it might be argued the obese place an unfair burden on the non-obese if the latter are required to support them through taxes. It follows obesity also harms society. Should then society become more judgemental about obesity?

Let us accept making society more judgemental carries dangers as well as benefits. My second reservation is whether Wind-Cowie’s argument outlined above is a sound one. For surely it would be wrong to encourage a more judgemental society, if its judgements were not effective in solving society’s problems, due to the problems outlined above. Clearly society’s judgement was effective in the case of Jimmy Carr. But is society’s judgement always just as effective? For instance, if the judgement of the majority of society condemns some action but a sizeable subsection of that society condones the same action then the majority’s condemnation seems likely to be ineffective. Consider the traders working for Barclays Bank who tried to manipulate the Libor rate in order to benefit the bank. The majority of people would have condemned such an action. However these traders were not rogue traders and it seems possible that their colleagues and traders in other banks might well have condoned their actions. It further seems possible that despite society’s condemnation these traders might have felt no shame. They might have felt no shame because their actions were just the actions of any average bank trader.

Nevertheless even if these traders did not feel ashamed of their actions it seems probable that they did feel some negative emotions with regard to these actions for after all they kept them secret. In everyday usage the terms guilt and shame are often treated as interchangeable. At this point I want to try and differentiate between these terms. I must make it clear I am only interested in guilt as an emotion. David Velleman defines guilt as anxiety about being in an indefensible position that might warrant one’s being cut off from social interaction (1). Let us accept this definition. The traders who attempted to manipulate the Libor rate may well have felt no shame but I would suggest that they might well have worried about damaging their social interactions. Of course they would not have worried about damaging their social interactions with fellow traders nor would they have worried about being cut off totally from social interaction. Nevertheless they might have worried that their actions, if fully public, would have damaged their social interactions with the majority of the population. I would suggest such a worry is a form of guilt. Velleman also suggests guilt might be connected to the loss of love of one’s conscience (2). Guilt may well be tied to one’s conscience but I don’t believe it is tied to loss of love of one’s conscience. Shame however may be tied to loss of love of one’s conscience. Bennett Helm links pride and shame to our identity as a person (3). Let us accept that someone must love himself at least to some degree to be considered a person at all. Someone who feels absolutely no love for himself has no reason to act and so becomes a wanton. It might then be argued that for someone, who feels shame and as a result comes to love himself less, his shame acts a guardian of his identity. I would suggest shame can be partly defined as someone’s worry about the loss, at least in part, of his identity. I would further suggest the traders who attempted to manipulate the Libor were not worried about their identity and that any negative emotions they felt as a result should be characterised as guilt rather than shame.

I have attempted to differentiate between guilt and shame by claiming that guilt is a worry about social exclusion whilst shame is a worry about someone’s identity. If my claim is accepted then the following would seem to hold; because guilt is a worry about social exclusion whether we feel guilt depends on society’s judgements whilst because shame is worry about our identity shame is not. It follows if society becomes more judgemental it will liberate guilt rather then shame. Personally I see no reason why guilt should not be liberated in some contexts. For instance liberating guilt about tax avoidance would be acceptable whilst fostering guilt about someone’s homosexuality or obesity would be wrong. How then are we to differentiate between contexts in which liberating guilt is desirable and those in which it is not? It might be suggested that our politically correct society places restraints on our natural inclination to criticise and all that is needed is to remove these restraints. Unfortunately our natural inclination to criticise in a social setting usually applies to all those who don’t observe society’s norms. These norms may well include sexual orientation.  Nonetheless I still believe it would benefit society to remove some of the restraints society places on people in order to make society more judgemental and by so doing liberate guilt. An unfair society is an unjust society. It should always be perfectly acceptable in society to criticise unfairness.

My argument suggests that a more judgemental society would rely on guilt rather than shame. Nonetheless I still believe shame is important to society and that society should foster shame. What basis do I have for believing society should foster shame? I would argue the quality of any society depends in part on the qualities of the individuals who make up that society. A society composed mostly of rogues is likely to be a very limited poor quality society. I have previously argued shame makes people better people it follows fostering shame makes for better society. I would further suggest a society that is regulated for the most part by individual morality is a better one than one mostly governed by legislation. How then may society foster shame if society becoming more judgemental cannot be do this? To answer this question we must first ask why people feel shame. Let it be accepted the ability to feel shame makes someone a better person. Why is this so? I would suggest that shame like pride is essential in helping someone maintain his identity. I have frequently argued in this blog that someone’s identity is linked to Frankfurt’s ideas on loving or ‘caring about’. Frankfurt believes when someone cares about something he,

“identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced.” (4)

In what follows I will follow Frankfurt is assuming that ‘caring about’ as defined above is equivalent to loving. Loving so defined differs from erotic love and the beloved may be for instance a person, a place or even an ideal. I would suggest that one of the ways someone who causes losses or damages to what he loves, becomes vulnerable, is because he feels shame. I would further suggest anyone who doesn’t love anything cannot feel shame. It follows if we want to foster shame we must foster a society in which people come to love things.

Someone might object it can’t be that simple and fostering a society in which people come to love things need not be any better than a society in which people don’t. She might suggest someone could come to love, identify himself with, getting rich and feel shame if he failed to do so. I have two responses to this objection. Firstly I doubt if someone can actually feel shame at his failure to become rich. I don’t deny someone may feel shame at his failure to support his family but this is different from becoming rich. It is easy to see how someone might identify himself with supporting his family but I would question whether someone can identify himself with becoming rich. This is an empirical question and it seems to me an experimental philosopher could do some useful work on shame. My second response is that if we foster a society in which people love things that help them to flourish. Becoming rich is not one of these things.

How do we foster people coming to love certain things that help them flourish? The certain things in this context being ideals or virtues. We teach them. My objector might respond you can’t teach people to love something. She might point out that love has an affective element and cannot be taught like arithmetic or even philosophy. In reply I would argue even if we can’t teach someone in a conventional sense to come to love something we can nevertheless help or foster him to learn to love something. For instance we may point out the things we love. We may encourage someone to persist in some activity in the hope he later learns to love it. We must make it clear what we love in the hope someone may emulate us. By so doing we are not becoming judgemental about someone else’s actions as Wind-Cowie would have us do but we are being judgemental about what we love and demonstrating this judgement. Lastly we may simply introduce someone to what we love in the hope he will come to love much the same sort of thing.

I believe fostering shame would benefit society as Wind-Cowie hopes. Unfortunately as I have argued fostering shame cannot be achieved by society becoming more judgemental even if by so doing we liberate guilt. Fostering shame is difficult. Indeed fostering a genuine sense of shame is best achieved in children by helping them become virtuous. It follows fostering a sense of shame is a long term process. Shame is related to our identities and should be fostered by fostering our identities by fostering our loving in ways I have suggested above. Because fostering shame is a long term process and society’s problems are pressing it might be argued that these problems are better addressed by liberating guilt or government legislation. In reply I would suggest many of society’s problems are related to personal problems and as such are best solved by helping people come to love or value certain things. For instance it seems to me that the problem of obesity is mostly a personal problem better dealt with by shame about what people ‘care about’ rather than making fat people feel guilty or forcing legislation onto reluctant food manufacturers as some sort of bandage. I would further suggest many of the problems facing society are not the kind that are amenable to quick fixes and can only be dealt with in the long term.

1. David Velleman 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 99.
2. Velleman, page 101
3.  Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford, page 109
4. Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press page 83.