Forgiving Polanski

Recently Roman Polanski was arrested in Switzerland on a warrant from the USA for a rape committed in 1978. In this posting I want to use this case to examine some ideas connected to forgiveness. Before doing so I want to make clear that there is a clear separation between justice and forgiveness. If this was not so it would seem possible for someone to criminally assault me, causing me great harm, to escape justice provided I forgave him. Justice cannot be a private matter. The victim of Polanski, Samantha Geimer, says she has forgiven him but this does not mean he should not face justice. I agree with Grayling who argues we should prosecute Polanski because “We prosecute and punish in order to maintain our determination not to countenance such crimes” (see http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6852996.ece). The fact we cannot countenance some crimes does not mean we cannot forgive the offender. The central question I want to examine in this posting is whether Polanski has met the conditions needed for forgiveness by Geimer. I will argue he has not.

Charles Griswold in (Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press, 2007) sets out the conditions needed for paradigmatic forgiveness. In these conditions Griswold outlines the following three conditions an offender must meet in order to qualify for forgiveness.
“The first of these reasons consists in the wrong-doers demonstration that she no longer wishes to stand by herself as the author of these wrongs …. Second she must repudiate her deeds (by acknowledging their wrongness) …. Third, the wrong-doer must experience and express regret at having caused that particular injury to that particular person” (pages 49, 50).
As far as I can see Polanski has not satisfied any of the above conditions. The fact that the rape happened a long time ago or because of the circumstances prevailing in Hollywood at that time doesn’t mean he wasn’t the rapist or that he doesn’t need to repudiate his action by acknowledging the wrongness of that particular rape. Polanski has also never expressed regret for having raped Geimer. It might of course be argued these paradigmatic conditions set too high a standard and that a non-paradigmatic form of forgiveness should be applied. Griswold himself argues for such a position in chapter three of his book. It might then be questioned whether Polanski meets the conditions needed for non-paradigmatic or imperfect forgiveness. Griswold argues imperfect forgiveness must meet a certain threshold and that anything failing to meet this threshold is not an example of forgiveness. One of his three conditions needed for any sort of forgiveness is that,
“the willingness – whether in fact, or imaginatively reconstructed by the victim … - of the offender to take minimal steps to qualify for forgiveness” (page 115).
Intuitively it would seem to be difficult to class some actions as forgiveness if the offender shows no remorse. I will return to this point later in my posting. However for the moment I am going to assume Griswold view is correct and move on to examine one of the minimal steps an offender must take if he is to be forgiven.

The third condition outlined above for paradigmatic forgiveness is that the offender must experience and express regret at having caused that particular injury. Basically the offender must say sorry to the victim. It is not enough for the offender just to feel sorry. I now want to argue this third condition of paradigmatic forgiveness also a threshold condition for imperfect forgiveness. Mary Warnock commenting in the Observer of 26/04/09 on the release of Ronnie Biggs from prison makes the following comment.
“But apologising is an act that may bear no more relation to contrition than "yours sincerely" bears to meaning what you say when you regretfully decline an invitation”.
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/apr/26/observer-panel-ronnie-biggs) If Warnock is correct then saying sorry is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. Let us agree with Warnock that signing something “yours sincerely” has little connection to sincerity. But it seems far from clear to me that “saying sorry” is a mere formality and has little connection to contrition. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that “saying sorry” is indeed a mere formality. However if “saying sorry” is a mere formality it seems hard to understand why Biggs and others find it hard to so do. Such cases strongly suggest that “saying sorry” is not a mere formality bereft of all real meaning. It might be objected more people apologise now than in the past. I will merely comment that often such apologies are made by individuals on behalf of an organisation like a church, a company or political party and are not instances of someone “saying sorry” for some personal action. It still seems to me that “saying sorry” for some personal act is not a mere formality.

I believe “saying sorry” is not easy because it usually involves making a move from excuse to guilt. The move from excuse to guilt involves a fundamental change in the way the offender pictures himself. It is possible someone like Polanski might excuse his conduct by believing it was just the way people like him behaved in the hedonistic Hollywood of the seventies. If such a person says sorry he not only admits his guilt and by doing so also lets go of his excuse, he becomes a simply a rapist. Let it be accepted if an offender cannot “say sorry” that he must to some degree excuse his conduct. It seems to me if an offender excuses his conduct he has no reason to take the minimal steps needed to qualify for forgiveness. It follows that “saying sorry” is not a mere formality but a necessary condition for even imperfect forgiveness. Indeed if I am correct to connect “saying sorry” with guilt then Griswold’s second condition for paradigmatic forgiveness becomes a threshold condition needed for imperfect forgiveness. It might then be concluded all forgiveness requires firstly that the offender must repudiate his deeds by acknowledging their wrongness and secondly express remorse. Accepting my conclusion implies that because Polanski has failed to meet both of these conditions Geimer cannot forgive him.

It might be pointed out the implications of my conclusion appear to be objectionable. Why should someone like Geimer, who has done no wrong and has been wronged, not be able to forgive the offender in order to leave the offence behind her and move on with the rest of her life? She might adopt the attitude of “I’m not going the let the bastard spoil my life”. I have great sympathy with this position and believe such an attitude together with moving on is commendable. However when doing philosophy, as opposed to pop psychology, we must be accurate with words we use. It would be a mistake simply to equate “moving on” with forgiveness. It seems quite feasible to “move on” by forgetting but forgiving is certainly not the same as forgetting. A victim might possibly forget by taking drugs or possibly even more bizarrely by committing suicide! Moreover the purpose of “moving on” and forgiveness are not the same. The purpose of “moving on” and getting on with the rest of her life is solely to benefit the victim. This is not so with forgiveness. The purpose of forgiveness is to benefit both the victim and offender. For these reasons I believe if an offender, such as Polanski, fails to express any genuine remorse it is impossible for a victim, such as Geimer, to genuinely forgive him. Such a victim can of course “move on” and put the offences committed against behind her.

Unconditional Forgiveness

Charles Griswold argues that there are certain conditions attached to the concept of forgiveness and that one cannot truly forgive unless these conditions are satisfied (1). It might be pointed out conditional love is inferior to unconditional love. It might then be argued by analogy in response to Griswold that conditional forgiveness is inferior to unconditional forgiveness. In response to this argument, suggested by Garrard and McNaughton (2) Griswold counter argues that for a victim just to give unconditional forgiveness means she lacks self-respect. He points out that intuitively if someone who has been wronged when the offender exhibits no remorse or indeed continues in the offence holds no resentment then the injured party has no self-respect.

I find Griswold’s argument persuasive and believe that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness does indeed mean the forgiver, the offended person, lacks self-respect. However, I want to pursue a slightly different but related argument. In this posting I want to argue that in some circumstances unconditional forgiveness means the offended person has too much respect for herself, she is over proud. Let it be accepted that all forgiveness whether unconditional or not means letting go of resentment. Intuitively this appears to be true for it seems hard to believe I have forgiven someone if I still bear resentment towards that person. For the sake of argument let us assume Sue has been morally harmed by John and that she has unconditionally forgiven him. In this context because Sue’s forgiveness is unconditional it is possible that John might remain quite happy with the fact that he has morally harmed Sue and would be fully prepared to do so again. Also in this context, because all forgiveness means letting go of resentment, Sue holds no resentment towards John.

Let us question Sue’s motives in unconditionally forgiving John. It seems to me Sue’s motives for forgiving John have nothing actually to do with John. Perhaps Sue believes that the act of forgiving is morally good. Whatever Sue’s reasons are she is committed to acting morally and she believes John is acting immorally. It follows even if she does not explicitly believe that she is better morally than John she must at least implicitly hold this view. What way might Sue believe she is better morally than John? Firstly it might be possible that Sue believes she is worthy of more moral consideration than John. Such a view runs counter to one of the basic tenets of accepted morality, namely all moral agents are worthy of equal consideration. It follows because Sue sees herself as a moral person this possibility must be rejected. The second possibility is that Sue believes she is better at acting morally than John.

Let us accept this second possibility and agree that Sue sees herself as a morally good person. Morally good people must consider all moral agents and not just a select few. I now want to argue that by unconditionally forgiving John and unconditionally letting go of her resentment Sue does not genuinely consider his moral needs. I will argue that by withdrawing her resentment Sue is removing something that might help John become a better person. Resentment, moral anger, about the way we are being treated is a protest. This protest may play a part in asserting our self-respect (3), but it also is signal to the offender that he is causing moral harm. It seems to me that by unconditionally forgiving John Sue is denying John this signal which might help him become a better person. The above suggests Sue is only considering herself morally and disregarding the moral needs of John. Sue certainly acts as if John does not deserve the same moral consideration as she does and hence runs counter to one of the basic tenets of accepted morality. However, I accept it is possible Sue acts from purely altruistic motives and believes that by forgiving John she benefits him even if in actual fact she does not. However, I would question her motives. She chooses a course of action most others would not, most people feel resentment. Moreover she too easily presumes she knows what is best morally for John. It might be suggested her presumption is based on an excess of moral pride. In the light of the above it would seem justifiable to conclude that Sue was wrong to unconditionally forgive John.

It might be countered to my conclusion is unsound. It might be pointed out that unconditional forgiveness seems to set an excellent example to others outweighing the reasons I have given for unconditional forgiveness being unsound. I will very briefly present two counter arguments to show this is not so. Firstly, I would argue the recognition of others as moral agents is even more fundamental to morality than any possible demonstration of moral excellence. Without this basic recognition no system of morality can even get started. In my example it seems to me Sue may be acting in a way she believes is best for John but none the less by so doing she is failing to recognise him as a fully moral agent. Secondly a decision to unconditionally forgive seems to lack an affective element. I would suggesr that any meaningful moral decision must at least be partly based on empathic concern, see (4). Sue’s decision to unconditionally forgive John is not even partly based on empathic concern. To conclude let us accept that unconditional forgiveness is preferable to no forgiveness. However the above suggest that conditional forgiveness is preferable to unconditional forgiveness for two reasons. Firstly unconditional forgiveness does not truly consider the moral needs of the offender and secondly the forgiver seems to exhibit an unjustified pride in his forgiveness.

1. Charles Griswold, 2007, Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press.
2. Garrard & McNaughton, 2003, In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104.
3.  Griswold, page 65.
4. Michael Slote, The ethics of Caring and Empathy, Routledge, 2007, page 31.