GM CROPS, AUTONOMY AND SATISFICING

In this posting examine the issue of GM crops. In it I will not examine the issues directly concerned with growing of these crops. Instead I will examine the different methods used in evaluating whether GM crops should be grown. Proponents of GM crops hold that the production of these crops would give us greater yields produced in a more efficient and environmentally-friendly way. Opponents of GM crops argue the potential risks associated with these crops to health and the environment mean the growing of GM crops should not be permitted. It seems clear opponents and proponents of GM crops stress the importance of different factors in the debate as to whether these crops should be grown. It seems to me this different stress results from using different methods to address the question of whether GM crops should be grown.


Proponents of the growing of GM crops are concerned with choosing the best available option; their opponents are concerned with choosing a safe option. The opponents of the growing of GM crops appear to be using a satisficing strategy, see satisficing, when making their decision. This satisficing strategy may not be explicit but it is implicit in the way the decision is made. Hebert Simon developed the idea of satisficing due to difficulties associated with maximising utility. One of these difficulties was that people find it hard to assign probabilities to various utilities. This same difficulty seems to apply to the debate concerning the growing of GM crops. In this posting I want to ignore more recent concepts of satisficing, such as those of Slote and Pettit, and concentrate on Simon’s original concept. Simon argued that when making a decision we should choose an option which satisfies two conditions. Firstly all the possible outcomes of the chosen option should satisfy us. Secondly we should choose the first option which satisfies the first condition. For example if it is decided the growing of GM crops should be permitted, one outcome of this decision might be increased yields which would to satisfy me, whilst another possible outcome might be environmental damage which would fail to satisfy me. If it is decided not to grow GM crops then one outcome would be no environmental damage associated with these crops which would satisfy me, whilst another outcome would be no associated increase in yields which might also satisfy me. Remember satisficing deals only with satisfaction. In practice I might have preferred an increase in yield associated with the growing of GM crops. Nonetheless I might still be satisfied with retaining present yields.



Proponents of the growing of GM crops sometimes argue the debate concerning GM crops should be a rational debate and that their opponents often raise false or exaggerated fears. Proponents usually assume if this debate was conducted in a more rational manner that they would win the debate. However I have shown what is at issue is not really about the rationality of any decision concerning the growing of GM crops but the manner in which people decide on this issue. Moreover it seems using a satisficing strategy in some circumstances may be completely rational. The real question that must be addressed is this, should we respect the conclusions people reach, if they adopt a satisficing criterion as opposed to a criterion which maximises utility in order to reach these conclusions? Let it be accepted that we should respect autonomous decisions. I will now argue any decision made using a satisficing methodology is an autonomous decision. Autonomy is sometimes simply defined as the second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically on their first-order desires and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in the light of higher-order preferences and values (1) An autonomous decision might then be defined as any decision made using this capacity. Consider someone who uses this capacity to decide if he is in favour of permitting the growing of GM crops. Let it be assumed due to the complexities involved he makes a decision but that he remains unhappy with his decision. Using the above definition of an autonomous decision such a decision is an autonomous decision, however intuitively such a decision is not an autonomous decision. The reason being if someone is unhappy with his decision it seems it would be hard for him to identify this decision. It might be objected in reality there are no such thing as autonomous decisions, there is only a capacity for autonomy, meaning this situation couldn’t arise. However accepting this objection would make nonsense of the modern world which relies on autonomous decision-making.



Let it be accepted that in practice there are autonomous decisions and that autonomy does not simply mean a capacity for autonomy. Accepting the above does not automatically mean we must accept our intuitive idea that an agent must identify with his autonomous decision. However autonomous decision-making is about self-government and it is again hard to see in practice how any decision the agent doesn’t care about can be part of his self-governance. It follows the idea of an autonomous decision making seems meaningless if the agent doesn’t care about his decisions. Frankfurt argues if someone cares about something he identifies himself with what he cares about (2). It might be argued Frankfurt sees autonomy as a hybrid concept, a cross between reflection and caring about. He further argues that to identify with something an agent must be wholehearted. He defines wholeheartedness as follows:

In what does his wholeheartedness with respect to these physic elements consist? It consists in his being fully satisfied that they, rather than others that inherently (i.e., non contingently) conflict with them, should be among the causes and considerations that determine his cognitive, affective, attitudinal and behavioral processes (3)

Frankfurt then proceeds to define satisfaction as follows.

What satisfaction does entail is an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change.

It seems to me provided someone is satisfied with his choice in the way Frankfurt defines above that he must be satisfied with all the outcomes of his choice. Any agent who was not satisfied with all the outcomes of some choice he makes would surely encounter some lingering desire to alter his choice. Moreover the agent’s choice must the first one he makes for he has no active interest in choosing again. It follows any decision meeting Frankfurt’s criteria for being wholehearted also meets Simon’s satisfying criteria. In the light of the above it might be suggested that any decision made using a satisfying criteria also meets Frankfurt’s criteria for being autonomous. Such a suggestion would be false. It seems it would be perfectly possible for me to make a decision to buy an ice cream using a satisficing strategy. However Frankfurt would argue such a decision was not an autonomous decision. He argues “the notion of caring, implies a certain consistency or steadiness of behaviour, and this presupposes some degree of persistence” (4). A desire for an ice cream usually has no persistence. If I fail to buy one I move on and my desire for ice cream simply fades. It follows any decision meeting Simon’s satisfying criteria does not automatically meet Frankfurt’s criteria for being autonomous. However a persistent decision meeting Simon’s satisfying criteria would also meet Frankfurt’s criteria for being autonomous. It has been accepted above that we should respect autonomous decisions. It can therefore be concluded that should we respect the persistent conclusions of people reach by adopting a satisficing attitude. It can be further concluded that in any debate about the growing of GM crops that it is perfectly legitimate for someone to use a satisficing strategy in order to make his decision even if this means he does not maximise utility.

What lessons can be learned from the above discussion? I myself believe the opponents of the growing GM crops greatly exaggerate the dangers involved. Nonetheless if the proponents of GM crops wish to win the debate their main emphasis in this debate should not be on the benefits of these crops. The proponents of these crops must concentrate on issues directly concerning the safety of growing GM crops. They must concentrate on their opponent’s ground. Moreover the same is true of any advance which the public finds hard to understand the issues, such as the future of nuclear power or human genetic enhancement, see my previous postings.

1. Dworkin, 1988, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.1988, page 20.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 83.
3. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press., page 103.
4. Frankfurt, 1988, page 84.