Genetic Enhancement and the bondage of future people by present people

In chapter 8 of “Enhancing Evolution” Harris considers the view of Habernas that the use of genetically enhancing technologies might involve the bondage of future people by present people. This is an example of good rhetoric, but what does in mean if anything. In this posting I will examine exactly what is meant by “the bondage of future people”. I will assume the bondage of future people must affect their ability to make autonomous decisions. It follows I must consider how genetic enhancement might affect autonomy. Autonomy might be affected in two possible ways.
1. Genetic enhancement might mean the choices available to some future agent are curtailed.
2. Genetic enhancement means a future agent’s capacity to make autonomous decisions is damaged.

In this posting I will not consider the second of these possibilities. The reason being I believe any genetic manipulation which damages someone’s capacity to make autonomous decisions cannot be a genuine enhancement. Prima facie it might seem, provided genetic enhancement does not damage a future agent’s capacity to make autonomous decisions, that genetic enhancement does not affect his autonomy. Consider the possible genetic enhancements mentioned by Harris such as an increased resistance to the development of cancer or life extension. Clearly if such enhancements do not directly affect an agent’s mental status they do not affect his capacity to make autonomous decisions. Moreover it would still possible for an agent to jeopardise his enhanced status by engaging in dangerous pastimes such as motor racing.
It might of course be argued the fact an agent has an increased resistance to cancer and the prospect of greater longevity means he doesn’t see the prospect of engaging in dangerous pastimes as a sensible option. It might then be concluded that because genetic enhancement might cut down on an agent’s available options, even if his capacity for autonomy is unaltered, his ability to make autonomous decisions is slightly damaged. Harris argues future agents would gladly accept such a slight limitation on their ability to make autonomous decisions in exchange for the benefits of enhancement. He further argues vaccination of children against childhood diseases may slightly limit their ability to make future choices, but that no one seriously questions such vaccination. Indeed it might be argued limiting someone’s future choices does not damage their ability to make autonomous decisions. Someone may wantonly choose among a large array of options; yet few would argue such decisions are autonomous, see Frankfurt (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 106). It might then be further argued for an agent to retain the ability to act autonomously he does not need a large number of options, he only needs options he can care about. According to this view for an agent to act autonomously simply means he is able to do what he wants. If this simple view of autonomy is accepted then even if genetic enhancement limits the options available to an agent it does not necessarily limit his ability to make autonomous decisions provided he has options he can identify with. It is very easy to imagine future agents identifying with living longer and not getting cancer! It can be concluded even genetic enhancements limit the options available to an agent that this might not affect his ability to make autonomous decisions.
I believe such a conclusion depends on a simplistic view of autonomy. Autonomy is a hybrid concept. This concept includes identifying with one’s choices, caring about something, and making a reflective choice. Furthermore whilst autonomy clearly has instrumental value it also has intrinsic value. To me the intrinsic value of autonomy lies in being recognised as the kind of person who has the right to make his own decisions. Moreover it seems to me if people now take decisions on behalf people in the future they are failing to recognise the intrinsic value of their autonomy. As has been noted above Harris assumes future persons would gladly give up some autonomy in order to benefit from enhancements. It seems to me there are two objections to this assumption.
1. Provided we are recognised as the kind of person who has the right to determine his own future then any attempt to determine our future fails to recognise the intrinsic value of our autonomy.
2. Harris automatically assumes future people would want to be enhanced even if this limits their autonomy. Such an assumption is dangerous for as was pointed out by Berlin (1969, Four essays on liberty, The Clarendon Press, page 132) this assumption seems to be based on what some idealised future person would choose rather than an actual person.

Harris would doubtless reply to my objections by arguing many of the things parents do for their children affect their future autonomy; education for example. He might further argue that by doing so parents do not damage their children’s future status as the kind of persons who have the right to make their own decisions. It would follow not all attempts to benefit someone damages the intrinsic value of his autonomy. I accept parents do not usually damage the intrinsic value of their children’s autonomy. However I am not at all sure it can then be argued by analogy that some genetic enhancements also do not damage the intrinsic value of autonomy. It seems to me the analogy fails to work because the usual benefits parents confer to their children differ in a significant way from genetic enhancement. The usual benefits parents confer to their children may be rejected by these children later in life. For instance someone may reject the benefits of his education and lead a slothful or purely hedonistic life. It seems non genetic benefits may be accepted or rejected. This ability to accept or reject these non genetic benefits means the intrinsic value of an agent’s autonomy is not damaged in this context. However it might be impossible for an agent to reject a genetic enhancement. It follows even if a particular genetic enhancement does not greatly damage the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy the cumulative effect of many enhancements might. It might then be concluded Habernas is correct in his belief that the use of genetically enhancing technologies might involve the bondage of future people by present people.
In the light of the above discussion some might possibly conclude that genetic enhancement should not be permitted. I believe such a conclusion would be premature and that genetic enhancement should be permitted subject to safeguards. I argued above the way some parents attempt benefit their children might seem to partly determine their future. I further argued in practice such attempts do not damage these children’s autonomy because these benefits may be accepted or rejected. These benefits may be seen as gifts. It seems to me provided genetic enhancements can also be seen as gifts that these enhancements should be permitted. It follows Habernas’ belief may be wrong and that genetic enhancements do not bind future generations, provided these enhancements can be seen as a gift. However the idea of genetic enhancement as a gift must be explored a little further. It must be asked if a genetic enhancement is a gift to who is the gift intended. There seem to be two possible answers to this question.
1. The enhancement is a gift to those people who are enhanced.
2. The enhancement is a gift to future generations.

A gift it something the recipient can reject. You cannot force someone to accept a gift. It may of course be bad manners to reject a gift. Let it be assumed that some genetic enhancement is seen as a gift to future generations. It follows if a genetic enhancement is a gift then it must be possible to undo this enhancement for these future generations; even if the enhancement cannot be undone for particular individuals. I suggest in this context no genetic enhancement should be permitted until it is possible to undo this enhancement for future generations. Let it be assumed that some genetic enhancement is seen as a gift to those people who are enhanced. It follows the enhanced person must be able to see his genetic enhancement as a gift which he must be able to decide to use or not use. I suggest in this context any enhancements someone must use should not be permissible.