Stoics and Hope

 For many of us our hopes play an important part in our lives, try imagining a life without any hope. In this posting I want to examine four questions connected to hope.  First exactly what do we mean by hope?  Secondly why is hope valuable? Thirdly can a stoic hope? Intuitively I will suggest that hoping goes against stoic principles. I will then question whether the stoic idea of preferred indifferents might mean that I am mistaken. Lastly I will examine whether the idea of preferred indifferents is a meaningful one.

I will now outline a definition of hope. Intuitively someone hopes for some outcome if she desires that outcome even though this outcome is uncertain. In what follows I will make use of some of the ideas of Adrienne Martin (1). However Marin doesn’t believe hope can be accounted for by desire, in this posting I will argue that it can be provided that we understand desires correctly. Our intuitive definition seems to be an inadequate one, for instance does someone really hope for some outcome if she expects it? Does a spouse hope for a birthday present from a loving partner or simply expect it? With this in mind we might define hope as follows. 

Hoe 1.  Someone hopes for some outcome when she desires this outcome which has a low probability of being actualised. 

Unfortunately as pointed out by Martin such a desire might give rise to both hope and despair. Let us accept that emotions capture and focus our attention. If we accept this then then perhaps Martin is mistaken in believing our desires can’t account for hope. Using Martin’s example, let us consider two patients with advanced cancer who are offered a new treatment with a low probability of success. Each patient faces the same facts but the focus of each will determine whether they hope or despair. One might despairs because she focusses on probable bad outcome and the other hopes because he focusses on the low probability of a good outcome. This is a good point to make it clear how hope differs from simply wishing or being unrealistically optimistic. Hoping always involves being roughly aware of the probabilities. If someone simply wishes for some outcome then she pays no attention to the probabilities in much the same way as a bullshitter pays no attention to the truth. It might be suggested that whilst Panglossian optimism is harmful that realistic optimism can be beneficial by combatting passivity, see Tiberuus and Realistic Optimism sm . I won’t pursue this suggestion here.

 Let us now define hope as follows.

 ope 2.  If someone hopes then her desires focusses her attention mainly on some positive outcome which has a low probability of being actualises whilst being aware of the true probabilities.

However this definition seems to lack something. Hope doesn’t suddenly materialise out of a vacuum.  A pragmatic person who has never built up her hopes about anything in the past is unlikely to suddenly start hoping for some specific outcome. Hoping seems connected to being a hopeful person. The above definition might be refined as follows.

Hope 3,  If someone hopes then her desires focusses her attention mainly on some positive outcome which has a low probability of being actualises whilst being aware of the true probabilities and this desire is based on her character. .

Hope, like optimism, combats passivity. Some might argue all emotions combat passivity and that despair is mood rather than a genuine emotion. I won’t pursue this thought here. The hopeful person undertakes some sort of action, even if this is merely imagining a better future, whilst the despairing person simply does nothing. Why is combatting passivity valuable? Combatting passivity involves exercising the will and I will now argue that the exercise of the will has essentialist or intrinsic value for human beings.

How might exercising our will be valuable? The approach I will follow is based on that of Gwen Bradford (2). She introduces the idea of an essentialist value. If some capacity is essential to human beings then according to Bradford the exercise of this capacity is of value to human beings. One such capacity is the exercise of the will. It is tempting to equate essentialist value with intrinsic value. If we accept Bradford’s position then hope has essentialist value because it involves exercising the will.

Let us now consider why stoics believe hoping is harmful. Hope as I have defined it above is an emotion, it is possible to define hope in terms of ‘caring about’ or love, see What do we mean by Hope?  . I won’t pursue this further here. Let us accept that hope is an emotion. Stoics believe that we should avoid all emotions as far as possible because emotions harm us by making us vulnerable. But even if we accept that emotions harm us by making us vulnerable this alone doesn’t mean that we should avoid them. For instance a doctor might recommend surgery because it benefits a patient in the long term even if it harms her in the short term. It follows even if emotion harm us that this harm might be outweighed by some benefits. A stoic must be committed to one of two options. Either that emotions have no real value and don’t benefit us in any way or that any benefit emotions confer on us is always outweighed by the harm causes by making us vulnerable. It is difficult to accept the first option for almost everyone has some emotions and it seems unlikely that these would have evolved without benefiting us in some way. Most stoics seem to accept that emotions have some value because they accept the idea of preferred indifferents. For instance they accept that it is better to be happy rather than unhappy even if we shouldn’t pursue happiness. It would seem that most stoics must believe that the value of any emotion is always outweighed by the vulnerability it causes, but why?

Perhaps they believe this because they believe that we are essentially rational creatures rather than emotional ones. What reason might they give for this belief? They might suggest that having a will is essential to being a human being. Let us accept this. However a stoic must also believe that we only express our will through our rationality and that we simply experience emotions. A stoic seems committed to the idea that emotions serve no purpose. Unfortunately for their argument it seems highly unlikely that emotions evolved to serve no purpose. It follows that if emotions serve some purpose then they aren’t totally irrational. For instance in some circumstances it can make sense to be angry because anger might focus someone’s attention on righting a wrong. It follows that even if we accept that we are essentially rational creatures that we don’t have reason to ignore our emotions. Emotions are connected to our rationality. Indeed it might be argued that a failure to attend to our emotions is itself irrational. At this point a stoic might modify her argument and suggest that not only are human beings rational but that they are also free to some degree. A stoic holds this view because she believes that even if we aren’t free to choose our fate we are always free to choose our attitude towards it. She might then argue even if emotions are rational that they deny our freedom by making us slaves to our passions. I would reject such an argument. I accept that we might become a slave to my age but my anger can be controlled and modified. For instance we might choose to retain our anger if an apology isn’t forthcoming and dismiss it if one is. It follows that we aren’t just slaves to our passions and that by controlling the emotions appropriate to us in different situations we shape ourselves. Human beings aren’t robots which act solely rationally without reference to emotions. Acting like a robot denies our nature. If we accept the above then stoics are mistaken in denying the importance of the emotions. Emotions, including hope, matter because they are part of our essential nature.

At this point a stoic might suggest that my treatment of emotions is too simple. She might further suggest that I should differentiate between experiencing an emotion and desiring one. She might move on to suggest that of course stoics prefer experience being happy but that they shouldn’t desire being happy. They believe that the pursuit of happiness makes us vulnerable and usually makes us unhappy and as a result we should remain indifferent to pursuing it. This is a very rough outline of the stoic idea of preferred indifferents. In response I would question whether it is possible to simply experience an emotion. If someone is in an affective state and this state creates no desire, either to avoid or maintain it, then I would suggest that she is experiencing a mood rather than an emotion. I would suggest that whilst there might be a grey area between emotions and moods that we can usually differentiate between the two. We can simply experience a mood because it serves no purpose, the same isn’t true of emotions. I argued above that it can be rational to experience some emotion which means emotions have some purpose. It follows that if an emotion serve some purpose that it is either illogical or impossible to remain indifferent towards them and simply experience them. It further follows that the idea of preferred indifferents makes no sense because it is impossible simply to experience an emotion.

In conclusion it appears to me that stoicism has a distorted notion of the emotions and that this distorted notion leads them to downplay emotions such as love and hope which have essentialist value to human beings. It might be concluded that stoicism hinders someone from living up to her full potential.

1.   Martin, Adrienne. 2014, How We Hope: A Moral Psychology, Princeton University Press.

2.   Gwen Bradford, 2015, Achievement, Oxford University Press

Stoicism, Covid-19 and Fortitude

The pandemic caused by the covid-19 virus raises many ethical concerns. In this posting I won’t consider these concerns directly but instead examine the sort of attitude that we should cultivate in the face of the pandemic. Of course the attitude adopted has some ethical implications. In particular I want to examine whether we should cultivate a stoical attitude. At the outset I would make it plain whilst I have a lot of sympathy for some stoic ideas I am at best only a partial stoic. The virus causes health problems for many and for a few death. At present there is no effective treatment available or vaccine available to treat covid-19. An excellent simple explanation of the effects of covid-19 and some of the ethical implications is provided by Massimo Pigliucci in Medium .

Why should we adopt a stoical attitude to the coronavirus outbreak? A stoic might argue that should adopt such an attitude because fear prevents us from thinking rationally and as a result also prevents us from living as well as we might in the face of the outbreak. A stoic tries to rule herself by reason rather than her emotions. To stoics many emotions are illogical. Anger is pointless because anger can’t change the past and fear of the inevitable is also pointless because someone's fate cannot be changed. Let us accept that being fearful means being in an unpleasant state. It follows if a stoic becomes infected by the virus that she should accept this and only concern herself with the things she can change because her fear serves no useful purpose and is harmful. The things she can change include her attitude to the difficulties she faces and anything she can do to mitigate these difficulties. A stoical attitude similar to acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) in which the client is encouraged to accept her state and commit to changing that which can be changed. The situation is slightly different in the case of a stoic who hasn’t already become infected by the virus. Of course she must accept the fact that she might become infected and not deceive herself by thinking that this is unlikely to happen to her. In this situation is her fear also pointless and should she seek to eliminate it? To say someone might become infected by covid-19 is really to say that there is a probability that she will become infected. Someone might change the probability of contracting cancer by giving up smoking. Similarly someone might change the probability of becoming infected by covid-19 by measures such as effective handwashing, social distancing or self-isolation. If someone becomes paralysed by fear which stops her from taking these measures then she should seek to eliminate her fear. However it might be argued that if fear sometimes helps someone to take these sensible measures then fear is useful and she shouldn’t eliminate it. Fear of lung cancer might help someone give up smoking more effectively than reason alone. Perhaps fear might act as a catalyst. In response a stoic might argue if we eliminate fear rationality alone can give us reason to take these measures.

Let us accept that the stoic is correct in her assertion that being afraid of the inevitable is both harmful and serves no useful purpose. A perfectly rational being shouldn’t fear the inevitable. She might of course consider how she would react to it.  However human beings aren’t perfectly rational creatures. Because of this it might be suggested that a stoic should cultivate courage in order to control her fear. Perhaps, but I will argue that it would be better to cultivate fortitude in response to covid-19 outbreak. Both courage and fortitude are concerned with strength of character. This strength is the ability to face up to dangerous and in some cases difficult situations without becom ing paralysed by fear. However the two aren’t identical. For instance courage is useful to people like soldiers, mountaineers and whistle blowers. Courage is concerned with our actions and is proactive. Fortitude is useful to people facing illness or financial ruin. Fortitude helps people face misfortune and is a reactive rather than a proactive attitude. Someone may also be courageous intermittently but someone can’t be said to have fortitude intermittently. It follows that fortitude is more closely linked to character than courage. How does fortitude help people facing misfortune? If certainly doesn’t simply mean accepting our fate. Exhibiting fatalism isn’t expressing fortitude. Simply accepting our fate is completely compatible with abandoning our values and giving in to sapping self-pity which destroys character. Fortitude is connected to character by helping us hold on to those things we can hold on to and is important in maintaining character. Fortitude helps us to maintain our values, things we can control, and in doing so helps us to maintain value in life. A father who struggles to maintain his family after becoming redundant rather than becoming apathetic would be an example of fortitude. Similarly a mother who continues to care for her family as best she can after becoming infected by covid-19 requires fortitude. Fortitude requires that we keep calm and carry on. Fortitude requires patience and patience might be particularly useful when coming out of lockdown. Easing lockdown too quickly would be imprudent. Fortitude is has similarities to grit a term used by the authentic happiness movement. Grit is described as the tendency to sustain interest in and effort toward very long-standing goals and is often connected to self-control, see authentichappiness.sas.upenn .

Let us accept that fortitude is a useful virtue to cultivate in the face of the coronavirus pandemic. Roughly speaking a stoic seeks to accept the things she can’t change and only concerns herself with the things she can such as her attitude to external events. A stoic seeks to limit her vulnerability. A stoical attitude like one based on fortitude is a reactive attitude rather than proactive one. Moreover I have argued that fortitude is connected to character and we talk of a stoic character. It might appear that a stoic should be able to cultivate the virtue of fortitude with some ease.

However it is important to be clear that even if a stoical person shares some things in common with a fortitudinous person that the two aren’t identical. Central to stoic ideas is accepting our those things we can't change and by doing so limiting our vulnerability. However it is important to be clear accepting our fate isn't the same as as accepting our vulnerability. The stoic ideal is a sage who is impervious to the emotions. This isn’t true of fortitude. A fortitudinous person might see herself as vulnerable but her main drive isn’t to limit to her vulnerability but to accept it whilst moving on. Fortitude is essentially forward looking in helping us maintain our values. It might be objected to the above that stoicism is also forward looking in that a stoic seeks to remain virtuous. I am prepared to accept my objectors point to a certain degree. However I would suggest that whilst a fortitudinous person might look forward to some future event with hope a stoic seeks to avoid hope because by hoping she increases her vulnerability. A stoic seeks to adopt a purely rational approach to future events based on realistic probabilities rather than hopeful ones. However it might be questioned whether a stoic can even value probabilistic outcomes. For a stoic difficulties in assigning values to probabilistic outcomes arise because if she tries to do so she would have to care about some outcomes more than others making herself vulnerable to less favoured outcomes. If we accept that to ‘care about’ is a primitive form of love then a stoic’s reluctance to assign values to probabilistic outcomes damages her capacity to love. Of course Panglossian optimism is harmful but the capacity to hope realistically is needed for the capacity to love and is part of what makes us human, see what do we mean by hope . During the course of the coronavirus pandemic it is inevitable that some of us will feel grief. However to a stoic such as Seneca we should battle grief even if we can’t totally eliminate it. However even for a stoic battling grief is hard. On the death of his brother Cato the younger was overcome by grief and spared no expense on his funeral. I would suggest that when confronted by grief we should seek to control rather than battle it. If we fight or seek to eliminate our grief we are seeking to make ourselves less vulnerable. Unfortunately we become less vulnerable by caring less about the deceased whereby damaging our capacity to love, see grief . Adopting a purely rational attitude, if that is even possible for human beings, damages our capacity to love, to be truly human.

In conclusion I have argued that facing the dangers posed by the covid-19 with fortitude is preferable to facing them stoically. I also suggested that fortitude is connected to character and for that reason is neither quickly nor easily obtained. It follows that if someone doesn’t already possess fortitude it might benefit him to act stoically in the face of the outbreak. However acting stoically is also not easy and carries some dangers outlined above. Some acting stoically must be careful not to become too hard hearted as this will damage his humanity.

Why I'm not a Stoic

I admire fortitude, detachment and many other stoic virtues but believe full blown stoicism is damaging. Let us accept that for someone living in an extremely deprived environment with limited options that these virtues can help him to survive. An account of how stoicism can help people survive in such circumstance is given by James Stockdale who was shot down in the Vietnam War and detained in Hanoi, see Stockdale . Someone who suffers from a life limiting disease might also find himself in an extremely deprived environment and once again with few options. In these deprived circumstances adopting a stoical perspective seems to be a sensible option.

Fortunately, most of us don’t live in such circumstances. The question I wish to address is this, in more normal circumstances should we lead a stoic life? Some stoics believe that the only thing that always makes us happy in life is leading a life of virtue.

“The only thing that always contributes to happiness, as it is necessary and sufficient for the condition, is virtue. Conversely the only thing that necessitates misery and is “bad” or “evil” is the corruption of reason, namely vice.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Perhaps virtue is the only thing that always makes us happy but I will argue there are some things which even if they don’t always make us happy are nonetheless essential for a happy life. Certain things such as fame and material goods might make us happy temporarily.  However, we can’t always attain these goods and once attained these goods might not always make us happy. Let us accept that the excessive pursuit of these goods can damage our happiness in three ways. Firstly, we might be disappointed if we fail to obtain these goods, secondly even if we do obtain them they might fail to meet our expectations once again leading to disappointment, lastly the pursuit of these goods might divert us from the one thing that always makes us happy namely virtue. Let us consider the harm done by disappointment first. A stoic would argue that in order to avoid such disappointment that whilst we might prefer such goods we should remain indifferent to them. I would suggest that with regard to disappointment stoicism is a philosophy of pessimism by rejecting hope. A stoic shouldn’t hope because hope would make him vulnerable to disappointment. Let us assume that the excessive pursuit of fame or material goods hinders us from pursuing the only thing that always makes us happy, virtue. A stoic would argue we should always pursue virtue and as a result we not pursue those things which damage this pursuit. Let us agree with our stoic that we should first of all pursue virtue. Let us also agree that the excessive pursuit of fame or material goods damages this pursuit. However, it is by no means clear that using balanced Aristotelian moderation in pursuit of these goods will damage our pursuit of virtue. Accepting the above means that in normal circumstances that we have no clear reasons to accept or reject Stoicism.

 

At this point someone might object I am misunderstanding the stoic idea of happiness. I am confusing stoic ideas with Epicurean ones. An Epicurean is concerned with hedonistic happiness whilst to a Stoic happiness is concerned to living our lives in accordance with essential nature as rational creatures. For the sake of argument let us accept my objector’s point. Let us also accept that stoics believe that if someone leads his life in accordance with his essential nature that he will flourish.

 

I now want to examine what is meant by flourishing. Flourishing is a slippery concept. For instance, could it really be said that a creature, which leaves behind plenty of descendants, flourishes? Using a Darwinian idea of flourishing it certainly does. Moreover, it might be argued evolution means leaving behind plenty of descendants is selected for and hence is part of the nature of all living things. However, a Darwinian idea of flourishing, at best, plays only a small part in most people’s idea of flourishing. A stoic idea of flourishing seems to depend on the essential nature of a creature which defines it. For instance it is part of the nature of bees to collect nectar to make honey and a bee flourishes if it makes lots of honey. It is part of bee eater’s nature to eat bees and it flourishes if it eats lots of bees. The stoics emphasise it is an essential part of human nature to act rationally. According to the stoics a human being who acts completely rationally should flourish. Let us now consider a rational person who is virtuous, ratiomal, rich and healthy but lacks any positive affection for any of these things. According to a stoic this person flourishes. However intuitively we would not say such a person was flourishing. Indeed, we might feel that there is something defective about him. He lacks something that is necessary for flourishing. Perhaps one of the things he lacks is happiness and we should leading a stoic life can lead to happiness. I won’t pursue this point any further here. However, I would suggest one of the things a stoic lacks is a caring attitude to things in general.

 

Let us accept that stoics belief it is our nature to be rational. I have suggested above that such a belief is too simplistic and that other things are an essentIAL part of our nature. I will now present two arguments in an attempt to show that caring about things is An essential part of our nature. First, let us accept that someone’s ideals are defined by what he cares about. Now according to Harry Frankfurt,

“a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity.” (1)

Someone without fixed shape or identity is still of course a human being but she isn’t really a person. Almost all human beings develop into persons. Being a person is part of our nature. It follows caring about something must also be part of our nature. Secondly let us assume that caring about things is not part of our nature. If this is so being rational becomes pointless. It is impossible to apply rationality unless we care about something; it is impossible for rationality to get any purchase if we don’t care about anything. All our rational decisions are equally good and we have no basis to choose between competing options. It follows if caring about something is not an essential part of our nature then it isn’t possible to act rationally without caring about some things. Rationality is one of these things but isn’t sufficient. In the rest of this posting I will assume that caring about something is an essential part of our nature.

 

Even if we accept that caring about things is an essential part of our nature this give us reason why we should reject stoic ideals. A stoic might point out that he cares about virtue and rationality. The question is not whether a stoic cares about things but whether he cares about enough things. I will argue that he doesn’t. In order to make my argument I must make it clear what I mean by ‘care about’. David Hume famously argued reason is the slave of the passions. However, I want to argue what we care about doesn’t simply means that we feel passionate or emotional about something. Indeed, I would agree with the stoic idea that reason can control our emotions, at least to some degree. Reason can sort out our conflicting emotions and add stability to our sense of ever changing emotions. However, let us accept that reason alone cannot cause us to act. Our actions are based on what we will which is based on what we care about. According to Frankfurt “the formation of a person’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others” (2). Also according to Frankfurt cares about’ something then he, “identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced”. (3) A similar but slightly different approach concerning identity is taken by Bennett Helm who argues we are identified by what we love (4). If we accept the above definition of ‘caring about’ it can be regarded as a form of loving. In the rest of this posting I will use the word love to mean ‘caring about’ as defined above. It is important to note the use of the word love in this way is using a broader definition of love than simple romantic or erotic love. Let us accept that loving is an essential part of our nature, let us now also accept that to love something or someone means to identify oneself with that thing or persin and that to identify with something makes one vulnerable.

 

I want to argue that if someone leads a stoic and limits his love to virtue and rationality that he stunts himself and denies himself of the opportunity to lead a good life. First however I must introduce the stoic idea of an indifferent. Sometimes being indifferent to something may be the only sensible attitude. I for instance am indifferent to my grandson’s Aspergers, see Aspergers, Autism and Love . Sometimes being indifferent can be admirable as when a patient bears his illness with great stoicism. However, I will argue someone cannot remain indifferent to some things without causing serious damage himself as a person. What then is an indifferent? If we accept the above then a stoic only really cares about virtue and being rational and he tries to be indifferent to everything else. Stoics of course don’t deny other things such as health and even wealth might help us to flourish.  However even though these other things usually contributed to someone’s flourishing they might not do so in all circumstances. Stoics split indifferents into two types. Things such as health and wealth, which usually contributed to flourishing, are called preferred indifferents. Dispreferred indifferents are things that usually damage our flourishing such as disease or poverty.

 

The idea of a preferred indifferent appears at first sight to be nonsensical. How can someone prefer something but be indifferent to it at the same time? The answer is of course he can’t. Nonetheless it is possible to prefer something in some circumstances and be indifferent to it others. For instance, someone may prefer cream cakes normally but not if he is on a diet. I will now argue that whilst the idea of preferred indifferents may make sense when applied to cream cakes that it makes no sense when applied to the things we care about or love.

 

Let us consider a mother fleeing across the Sahara desert from persecution together with her children. Let us assume on the way one of her children dies from lack of water. A stoic would argue that this mother should be indifferent to her child’s fate. He might point out that in these circumstances the mother cannot change the fate of her child so reason dictates she should indifferent towards its fate. Of course in different circumstances she would have preferred her child to live. However I would argue such a mother cannot suddenly become indifferent to her child’s fate because she loved him and still loves him because love doesn’t suddenly die. Moreover because she loves him she identifies herself with him and someone cannot change her identity suddenly. Lastly because she loves him she makes herself vulnerable to what benefits and harms him. She feels grief. According to a stoic grief is both harmful and pointless. I have argued that love is impossible without the possibility of grief and that if we seek to limit our ability to grieve we limit our ability to love, see grief . It follows if we love something we cannot suddenly become indifferent towards it even if its circumstances change and we cannot alter these circumstances.

 

If we accept the above then stoics have a problem with love because as I have argued loving is essential to being a person. A stoic might respond that stoics can love but that this love is restricted to virtue and reason.I accept that someone who only loves virtue and reason could be a person. But I would suggest she would be a deficient or incomplete sort of person. She would lack true friends because to have friends you must love your friends see Helm (4).She might of course have friends of utility, people she uses, or friends of pleasure, people who please her, but I would not class these as true friends. A stoic might respond that she can love other things but I would argue the same problem remains. For instance if a stoic loved a childhood home in which she was happy she cannot immediately become indifferent towards it if it is burnt down..

It seems to me in trying to make themselves less vulnerable to fate stoics damage that which makes us persons; the ability to love. Persons are by their very nature vulnerable and if we try to remove this vulnerability we damage our personhood. We become soulless people somewhat akin to virtuous robots. Accepting the above would explain why a stoic who loves only virtue is a deficient or incomplete sort of person. The stoic belief that the only thing which is necessary and sufficient for someone to flourish is for her to be virtuous is wrong, for someone to flourish she must be able to love. It would appear that sometimes stoic ideas damage persons.  A stoic might respond to the above by pointing out that our turbulent emotions are equally damaging to our personhood. She might then suggest that because stoicism dampens down our turbulent emotions without the need for drugs such as anti-depressants that far from damaging our personhood stoicism actually enhances it. I have two responses to my stoic First, I would suggest that most people should be cautious about dampening down their emotions and should instead use their rationality to judge how appropriate they are and if nessary to control them. Secondly I would suggest experiencing emotions is part of being a person as we regard sociopaths as being deficient persons in some way.

In conclusion I have argued that in most circumstances the stoic’s quest to reduce or eliminate his unhappiness damages his capacity to love which in turn damages his ability to experience happiness and I wouldn’t recommend a stoic life. However for a few people who live in extremely deprived circumstances a stoic life might be the best option,

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 114
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 91.
3. Frankfurt, 1988, page 83.
4. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 122.
5. Bennett Helm, chapter 8.