The Obese and Two Types of Shame

Daniel Callahan calls for an “edgier” strategy in order to reduce obesity levels in the United States (1). One element of his suggested edgier strategy would be to put social pressure on the obese. One way of putting social pressure would be to shame the obese. I have argued in a previous posting that shame could play a greater part in regulating our society and that this regulation might reduce the need for some legislation, see guilt shame and society . It might appear that I should support employing shame, however I am reluctant to do so for three reasons.

Firstly as Susan Apel points out it is important how shame is directed. It should be directed at the behaviour that leads to obesity rather than directed at the obese. It follows we must be careful when employing shame. Secondly Apel argues shaming must produce weight loss. Apel quotes her own personal experience of weight gain after having had cancer and going through the menopause. Clearly it is wrong to shame someone about her weight even if this is effective in altering her altered behaviour but produces weight loss. My third concern questions some of our underlying motives in shaming the obese. Lastly I will suggest that if we do exert social pressure on the obese that we should employ guilt rather than shame.

Let us now consider my first concern. What is shame is directed at. What do we mean by shame? Velleman defines shame as “anxiety about social disqualification” (2). It is possible that in a hunter gatherer society someone who was born crippled might feel shame due to his inability to play an active part in the tribe. Using Velleman’s definition it is also possible that someone who is obese due to some genetic condition might feel shame in our society. It might be objected no one would actually feel shame if his being obese was really due to a genetic condition. Unfortunately people may well feel such unwarranted shame. For instance when my father lost his sight as he aged he not only worried about his difficulty in seeing, but he also worried about others being able to see his difficulty. It appears to follow if we want to encourage shame in order to counteract obesity in our society we must direct our shame at the behaviour of the obese rather than the obese themselves. In practice it might prove to be difficult to direct our disapproval purely at someone’s behaviour without involving the person. For this reason it might be thought we should try to encourage guilt rather than shame. What is the difference between guilt and shame? Shame as defined above is unease with about social disqualification and disqualification requires an audience. Guilt is unease with something one has or has not done and can be private. Unfortunately, as with shame it is possible to feel unwarranted guilt. For as Velleman points out someone who has done nothing wrong may feel survivor guilt for having survived some catastrophe that has killed others (3).

It might appear that there are reasons not to encourage either guilt or shame when attempting to combat obesity. However, I would suggest the usual definition of shame fails to fully capture our intuitive ideas about shame. Perhaps there are really two types of shame. Firstly we might feel a natural shame given to us by evolution. This type might have helped our hunter gatherer ancestors to form cohesive groups. Is any other type of shame possible? Could Robinson Crusoe feel shame? In other words is private shame possible? Perhaps any shame felt by Crusoe would have been based on the culture he grew up in nonetheless I would suggest his shame was private shame. The second type of shame might help to form us to be persons, to be authentic. Velleman suggests guilt might be connected to someone’s conscience (4). Shame might also be defined as someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves and is linked to character. Perhaps the second of this second type of shame should be encouraged in order to combat obesity and other social ills. This second type of shame is connected to what someone loves. Loving as usual in my postings simply means to ‘care about’. I would now suggest that this second type of shame acts as a guardian of what someone loves. Let us assume someone loves something. If what he loves is harmed and he could have done something to prevent this harm and he feels no shame then I would question whether his love was genuine love. It might be objected that the second kind of shame defined above isn’t really shame and should be classed as guilt. In response to my objector I would point out guilt is linked to a specific event. Type two shame as I have defined it is linked to what we love and what someone loves defines what kind of person he is. Type two shame is connected to someone’s character and as a result differs from guilt. Type two shame seems of necessity to be directed at a person and cannot simply be directed at someone’s behaviour. If we employ the second type of shame in order to combat obesity we are shaming obese persons rather than directing shame at their behaviour.

Let us now address my second concern is shaming the obese effective in reducing obesity. Clearly we ought not to shame the obese if this is ineffective. If I do something which on later reflection I consider as wrong I can change my behaviour and apologise. It therefore makes sense to point out to someone that his action is wrong or misguided. If we shame someone in the second sense of shaming we are pointing out to someone that there is something wrong with their character. But people can’t just change their character at will, if they could they wouldn’t really have any character at all. Perhaps people can change their character over time but this is a slow process. It follows if we shame the obese using this second type of shame that they are more likely to withdraw from us rather than engage with us and lose weight. Shaming the obese is unlikely to help the obese in the short term.
Let us now consider my last concern. It might be argued that sometimes when we engage in shaming our motivation is not solely to change the behaviour of the shamed. It might be argued that sometimes when we shame others we do so in order to massage our own egos, even if we aren’t aware of our motivation. Perhaps when we shame the obese we are unconsciously massaging our egos. If our motivation in shaming the obese is at least partly to massage our egos then shaming is wrong because we are using the misfortune of others to serve our own ends.

I have argued that it would be wrong to employ shame in order to reduce obesity. However obesity is a major problem and we should address it through education. Might we also apply social pressure as suggested by Callahan by fostering guilt? I argued above that one reason why we should reject shaming the obese is that the shame is directed at their character rather than their behaviour. Trying to make someone feel guilty is directed at specific actions. Guilt might be defined as anxiety about social approbation concerning a specific action. Nussbaum suggests that if we disapprove of some action we should separate the doer from the deed. (5) Fostering a sense of guilt achieves this. For instance guilt might be directed at someone’s lie whilst shame would be directed at someone being a liar. Perhaps we should direct our disapproval at the amount of food someone eats or his lack of exercise rather than at his being obese. However in doing so we must be cautious for it isn’t always easy to separate the deed from the doer.

1. Callahan Daniel, 2013, Obesity: Chasing an Elusive Epidemic. Hastings Center Report, 43, pages 34–40.
2. David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95.
3. Velleman, page 99.
4. Velleman, page 101.
5. Martha Nussbaum, 2018. The Monarchy of Fear, Oxford University Press, page 217

Moral Character Enhancement and Moral Status

Intuitively most people seem to believe that provided we could morally enhance people it would be a good thing to do so. After all this is exactly what moral education is trying to do? In the age of Trump and his supporters the question of moral enhancement assumes greater importance. Many people also seem to think that provided this enhancement could be done by pharmaceutical means without any adverse side-effects that it should be attempted. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu support these intuitions and in addition argue there is an urgent need to enhance the moral character of humanity, see Persson and Savulescu. However Nicolas Agar argues that whilst it may be possible to enhance moral status that it would be wrong to do so, see Agar. Moral enhancement has two aspects, the enhancement of moral character and the enhancement of moral status. In this posting I will assume it is possible to enhance the moral character of people. I will firstly examine whether character enhancement need be linked to moral status enhancement. I will secondly examine whether, provided character enhancement is of necessity connected to the enhancement of moral status, any such character enhancement can be justified.

Before commencing my examination I must make an attempt to make some definitions clear. Firstly what is meant by enhancing the moral character of someone and secondly enhancing her moral status? Let us accept without argument that enhancing the moral character of someone means improving the ways she acts with respect those things that have moral status. To Agar for something to have moral status means someone has certain rights which others must respect. It follows to enhance moral status would simply mean to increase her rights. Agar sees these rights as meaning something is entitled to certain forms of beneficial treatment and a reduction in its eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. I would question whether Agar’s definition of moral status is a complete one. Of course someone’s moral status contains rights about her entitlement to benefits and her eligibility for harm but might it not also include respect for her knowledge concerning moral questions. I would argue such respect must include understanding. If we respect someone for her moral knowledge then we respect her because she can point us in the right direction. We respect her because she can highlight some of the important features attached to our moral understanding or give us an example which might make things clearer to us. We should not respect someone who simply tells us to do something for moral reasons if after some effort we cannot understand these reasons. To respect someone’s moral status because of her superior moral knowledge means we must be able to understand her moral reasoning even if she has to draw our attention to this reasoning.

There are four questions attached to moral enhancement. Firstly why should we enhance moral character? Secondly how can we enhance moral character? Thirdly why should we enhance moral status? This seems to be the question Agar is concerned with. Lastly how can we enhance moral status? Let us assume for the moment that there is no need to answer the first question for we accept the need for moral education. It appears provided there are no unforeseen adverse consequences that it is always good to enhance moral character. Improving our moral character, like improving our happiness, is always good. Let us also assume there is no need to answer the fourth question provided we accept Agar’s definition of moral status. To increase someone’s moral status we simply increase her rights to certain beneficial treatment and decrease her eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. If we accept the Agar’s definition then we are left with two important questions concerning moral enhancement. How can we enhance moral character and why should we enhance moral status? Prima facie the reasons why we should we enhance someone’s moral status seems to be unconnected to how we could enhance her moral character. It appears to follow if we enhance someone’s moral character that this enhancement should not affect her moral status.

Such a conclusion would be premature for it might be the way in which someone’s moral character is enhanced automatically leads to an increase in moral status. If this is so we must be able to justify an increase in moral status if we are to justify character enhancement. There are two ways in which someone’s moral character might be enhanced. Firstly her cognitive abilities might be increased. Secondly her capacity for empathy might be increased. If someone’s cognitive abilities could be increased it might be thought that this increase would increase her ability to understand moral problems and help her to resolve them. I’m doubtful whether cognitive enhancement alone will actually lead to moral character enhancement. For instance someone might simply use her increased cognitive abilities to exploit others. It is only when her increased cognitive abilities are directed at moral problems that this increase might actually lead to moral enhancement. Nonetheless let us put my worries to one side for the moment and assume that cognitive enhancement alone can lead to moral enhancement. Does the moral enhancement of the character, by increasing people’s cognitive abilities automatically increase their moral status? It might do so provided respect for greater moral understanding is part of moral status as I have suggested above. But such an increase in moral status based on respect would not affect the entitlement of any of the things of moral concern to certain forms of beneficial treatment or lead to any reduction in their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. It follows it would not be wrong to enhance someone’s moral character, by increasing her cognitive abilities, provided this increases her moral status based solely on respect.

However let us assume the moral enhancement of someone’s character, by increasing her cognitive abilities, would also enhance her moral status by increasing her entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment and further reducing her eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment. Would such an enhancement of moral status be wrong? Someone might suggest such enhancement would create two kinds of moral status for people. People whose character has been enhanced, which means they are entitled to additional beneficial treatment and a reduction in their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment, and those who are not. She might proceed to suggest that the creation of two kinds of moral status for people would be wrong. Let us consider her first suggestion. Will moral character enhancement by increasing cognitive abilities lead to the creation of two kinds of moral status? I am doubtful. Let us assume that cognitive enhancement can be achieved by biomedical means or genetic engineering. If cognitive enhancement is to lead to the creation of two kinds of moral status then these means must not be available to all. However it is far from clear that these artificial means will not be available to all for technology moves at a very fast pace. Moreover even if these means become only available to a few, the fact that these few are cognitively enhanced should mean these means should in time become available to all. My objector might retort that the few who are cognitively enhanced will not spread these means to others and instead will exploit them. In reply I would simply point out we are only concerned with cognitive enhancement connected to the moral enhancement of the character and that because of this, this sort cognitive enhancement should not lead to the exploitation of others. Exploitation is incompatible with moral enhancement. It appears probable that if the cognitive enhancement of character does lead to an increase in moral status that this increased status will eventually apply to all. It further appears that even if enhancement leads to two types of moral status for people that worries about exploitation are unjustified.

Let us assume that the moral enhancement of the character, by increasing someone’s cognitive abilities, does produce two kinds of moral status for persons. My objector assumes this is wrong. What reasons could she advance for this wrongness? Firstly she might suggest that those of increased moral status would have their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment increased and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment reduced, whilst the entitlements of those of lower moral status would remain the same. She might then further suggest that this disparity is unfair. In reply I would question whether those of lower moral status have the right to deny those of higher moral status increased entitlements provided their own entitlements remain the same. Allen Buchanan makes the same point (1) and asks if we would be justified in delaying India’s development in order to allow Ethiopia catch up. Secondly my objector might suggest in a world of scarce resources that those of lower moral status would be given less of these resources; that is their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment would be reduced and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment increased. In reply I would simply reiterate that such a state of affairs would be one of exploitation and that the moral enhancement of character should preclude increasing the exploitation of others.

My objector might now suggest cognitive enhancement cannot simply be tied to the character enhancement as I have assumed above. She might then suggest that cognitive enhancement can be tied to both character enhancement and exploitation. She might proceed to argue what really matters is what someone’s increased cognitive abilities are directed at. I have myself suggested above that the cognitive enhancement of someone’s moral character can only occur if cognitive enhancement is directed at moral problems. It follows I must accept my objector’s suggestion that cognitive enhancement cannot simply be tied to the character enhancement. I must also accept that purely cognitive enhancement might lead to exploitation of the un-enhanced by the enhanced. It also follows that if the cognitive enhancement of moral character is to be justified that any increased cognitive powers must be directed at moral problems in some way. The way to achieve this direction I would suggest is to increase our capacity for empathy.

Let us assume that we can enhance someone’s moral character by increasing her cognitive powers and by directing at least some of this cognitive increase towards moral problems by increasing her capacity for empathy. Let assume such dual enhancement also increases her moral status. Could such a dual enhancement lead to exploitation? Exploitation of the un-enhanced by the enhanced would mean, either that their entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment would be reduced and their eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment increased, or that their entitlement is not increased and their eligibility not reduced even when this is possible. However so doing seems incompatible with an enhanced capacity for empathy. For if the enhanced reduced the entitlement of the un-enhanced to beneficial treatment then we might question if their capacity to feel empathy really had been increased. It follows dual enhancement does not mean that the entitlement of the un-enhanced to beneficial treatment would decrease or their eligibility for harm increase. Indeed dual enhancement might mean their entitlements might increase and their eligibility decrease. The above leads me to tentatively conclude dual enhancement can be justified even if it leads to the un-enhanced people having a lesser moral status than the enhanced.

At this point someone might suggest that because of the dangers of exploitation we should only attempt to enhance our capacity for empathy. I would reject such a suggestion. Consider a paedophile who uses some artificial means to increase his capacity for empathy. This increased capacity for empathy does not rid him of his urges but it does allow him to resist most of them. Indeed this increased capacity for empathy might be regarded as a form of moral enhancement. However let us consider the unlikely possibility that the abuse of this paedophile commits does not physically harm a child. Let us further assume he comes into contact with a child who is a willing participant and even enjoys the encounter. It would seem in this case he has no reason not to abuse the child. It follows that moral character enhancement based solely on empathy is compatible with this abuse. Increasing someone’s cognitive abilities allows him to better understand the concepts of autonomy and consent and would help prevent such abuse. It follows the enhancement of someone’s cognition and empathy is preferable to moral enhancement based solely on increasing someone’s capacity for empathy.

1. Allen Buchanan, 2011, Beyond Humanity, Oxford University Press, page 53.

Friendship, Love and Happiness

Positive psychologists such as Haidt and Seligman stress the importance of association and friendship in making us happy. Lonely people are often unhappy. It might appear to follow that one way an unhappy lonely person can improve his happiness is by making friends. In this posting I will argue this is not easy. I will argue the nature of friendship means if someone attempts to make friends solely in order to improve his happiness that his attempt will fail. I will however suggest that association can increase our happiness and may lead to friendship.

I will argue first that the nature of friendship means someone cannot simply choose to become friends with someone else. Let us assume that our lonely unhappy person chooses to become friends with someone else simply in order to boost his happiness. Let us further assume he attempts to share his potential friend’s interests and that she shows no inclination to respond. The resulting relationship is not one of friendship. Our unhappy person might be described as an admirer, a hanger on or perhaps even as a fan but certainly not as a friend. Intuitively it makes sense to talk of unrequited love but it makes no sense at all to talk about unrequited friendship, see Helm . Friendship is of necessity a two way relationship. Someone may attempt to become friends with someone else but he cannot choose to become friends with another in order to make himself happier.

Let us now assume that when our unhappy person chooses to become friends with someone else simply in order to boost his happiness that his potential friend reciprocates. The relationship has now become a two way one. However I will once again argue the nature of friendship means that his attempt will still fail. This relationship can be characterised as one in which the unhappy person is simply attempting to use the other as a means to achieve his own ends. According to Kantian ethics this attempt is morally wrong. However I am not interested in morality here. I am interested in whether such an attempt could actually lead to friendship? According to Aristotle the answer to this question would appear to be yes as he includes friends of utility in his classification of types of friends. However I would suggest that intuitively friends must ‘care about’ each other. It is clear that our unhappy person does not ‘care about’ his potential friend, he cares about being happy. It follows if we accept our intuitions then our unhappy person’s attempt to make friends must fail.

At this point let us assume that the unhappy person further modifies his behaviour and attempts to ‘care about’ his potential friend in order to improve his prospects of achieving friendship and hence boost his happiness. Surely at this point our unhappy person has done enough to become friends and hence boost his happiness. Once again I will argue he has not. I will argue that the nature of caring means this attempt will also fail. Frankfurt argues if someone cares about something then he identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced (1). Caring about so defined is a form of love. At this point someone may object that loving and ‘caring about’ something are not equivalent and suggest that whilst I may love my wife that I only ‘care about’ eating ice cream. It is important to have a clear understanding of what it means to ‘care about’. I would suggest I simply like ice cream and point out there is a difference between liking and ‘caring about’. There is also a difference between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’. A good nurse must ‘care for’ her patients but she need not ‘care about’ her patients. Indeed it might be argued a good nurse or doctor should not ‘care about’ her patients too much. In a clinical setting a nurse or doctor must remain detached or else she might suffer emotional burnout. However if a nurse is also a mother she should ‘care about’ her children. A good mother should identify with her children and if they are harmed she should feel harmed. Caring about in this way is a form of love. However love is not simply a matter of choice. We cannot simply choose to love someone. It follows we cannot simply choose to ‘care about’ someone. It further follows our unhappy person cannot simply modify his behaviour in order to ‘care about’ his potential friend and so improve his prospects of achieving friendship and hence boost his happiness. This conclusion seems to concur with our intuitions that someone cannot force or simply will friendship.

Even if we cannot simply will or force friendship it nonetheless plays an important part in making us happy. What can someone do if he cannot simply will friendship? He should place himself in circumstances that cultivate friendship. In order to do so he must be active and join in association with others. So doing should increase his happiness irrespective of whether it helps him make friends or strengthen any existing friendships because activity alone seems increase happiness. Activity is a form of engagement and engagement helps increase happiness, see Haybron (2) and see also my previous posting. Secondly even if he cannot simply will friendship then perhaps he can attempt to form limited friendships and this limited form might in the right circumstances lead to full friendship. However if this proposal is to be meaningful it must make sense to talk of limited friendship, see Helm’s idea of ordinary friendship (3). If I play golf once a week with someone and we share an interest in playing golf are we limited friends? I would suggest we are perhaps very limited friends. It is important to note the difference between this limited friendship and the attempted friendship of the unhappy person above. The unhappy person attempts to ‘care about’ someone only in order to improve his prospects of achieving friendship and hence boosting his happiness. By playing golf with my golf partner we share an interest in golf. If it rains and we cannot play golf both his interests and mine are frustrated. We ‘care about’ the same thing however modest this caring may be. The same does not apply to the unhappy person who attempts to make a friend simply boost his happiness. He simply ‘cares about’ being happy. Limited friends are persons who ‘care about’ the same things such as playing golf or doing philosophy. Limited friends have common interests. True friends are persons who ‘care about’ each other in addition to ‘caring about’ each other’s interests. If ‘caring about’ and loving are equivalent then true friends are persons who love each other. True friends have a common interest in each of them flourishing. If limited friends and true friends are as suggested above then it seems feasible that limited friendship may in time become true friendship. It might also help explain what Aristotle meant by the friendship of utility and why it is of value.

Throughout this posting I have assumed that friendship helps make someone happy. I have argued that love or ‘caring about’ is an important element of friendship. I have also argued above limited friends or friends of utility may be of value because they lead to true friendship. What is it about friendship that makes someone happy? I would suggest it is because he loves or ‘cares about’ his friend. I would further suggest that loving something makes someone happy. This last suggestion would explain why people keep pets. Accepting these suggestions might mean friendship is important not because it makes someone happy directly but rather because it gives him something, or in this case someone, to love. Loving something is what really makes us happy not friendship. If we accept the above then two things follow. Firstly limited friendship or friendships of utility assume greater importance because they give us an opportunity to love. Secondly accepting the above tells us something about our concept of happiness. Or the relative importance of the various components of happiness. Daniel Nettle suggests that there are three levels to happiness. First there are momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure next there are judgments about feelings such as satisfaction and lastly the quality of someone’s life over time (4). Let us assume what is important for happiness is loving rather than friendship and that loving is connected to satisfaction. Someone can’t love something that dissatisfies him. It appears to follow that satisfaction is more important than momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure and even the quality of life in making someone happy.

1. Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 83.
2. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 114.
3. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford, page 282.
4. Daniel Nettle, 2005, Happiness; The Science Behind Your Smile, Oxford, page 8.

Does our Concept of Happiness change as we Age?

It is generally accepted that happiness is important in our lives. However, in philosophy there is a great deal of disagreement about exactly what exactly is meant by happiness, about the concept of happiness. As we age different things make us happy as compared to when we were younger. However, there is an additional question does the way in which we are happy also change? In other words what it means to be happy changes with age; the concept of happiness applicable to us changes with age. Clearly different things please different people. I’m getting old and the things that make me happy differ from those that make my grandchildren happy. The question I wish to address does not concern such differences. The question I am concerned with in this posting is this; are people of all ages happy in the same way but with their happiness focussed on different things or is the way in which people of different ages are happy differ?

Let us firstly examine this question from a psychological perspective of happiness. According to Martin Seligman happiness consists in someone having positive emotions, being engaged with life or having flow, having meaning, achieving something and having friends (1). It is possible to question whether meaning, achieving something and having friends are an essential part of the concept of happiness or are simply one of the things which make us happy. I have suggested that meaning, love and happiness are all inescapably intertwined, see meaning, love and happiness . Clearly both my grandson and I experience positive emotions and each of us has our own friends. My grandson who is seven, goes to school and I believe he achieves things there which satisfy him. For me writing this blog is some sort of small achievement. Whilst writing it I am engaged and sometimes achieve some pleasure. I believe my grandson obtains a sense of achievement, even if this is only when he is playing minecraft. Let it be accepted that both of us find some sort of achievement in our lives either by playing the game well or in my case by writing about happiness. It follows provided we accept Seligman’s definition of happiness that my grandson and I are both happy in much the same way even if we are happy about different things. However, my grandson has a baby brother who is clearly happy at times. His baby brother has positive emotions but has no sense of meaning or achievement and has no friends because he is still a baby. Does it follow that he is happy in a different way to his elder brother and me? Using Seligman’s definition of happiness suggests the answer is yes. I however would suggest as of now he is happy in an incomplete way. I would further suggest that as he matures he will develop and become happy in a more complete way.

 

I now want to examine whether the concept of happiness applicable to people changes as they age from two different philosophical perspectives. Firstly Fred Feldman regards happiness as attitudinal hedonistic happiness (2). Basically attitudinal hedonistic happiness consists not only of sensory pleasures but also consists in our being pleased or displeased about some states of affair. Basically this means someone could be happy when eating a good meal but she could also be happy because she believes it is cooked by someone she loves. If we accept Feldman’s position then it seems all people young and old are happy in the same way even if they are happy with different things. Feldman’s position also accounts for the different ways my grandsons experience happiness. The younger clearly has sensory pleasures but as yet he takes no pleasure from states of affairs.

The second perspective from which I wish to examine the question of aging and happiness is from that of Daniel Haybron. According to Haybron,

“To be happy then, is for one’s emotional condition to be broadly positive – involving stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement – with negative central affective states and mood propensities only to a minor extent.” (3)

According to Haybron someone’s emotional condition is not just characterised by her emotions but also by her moods and dispositions. He regards being happy as a state of psychic affirmation. I believe his definition has some features in common with Seligman. Both definitions include engagement and endorsement might be seen to involve meaning. However, Seligman seems to be concerned with all affective states whilst Haybron makes a difference between central and peripheral affective states. He hints at a link between happiness and the self that does not apply in peripheral cases (4).  Intuitively Haybron seems to be justified in making a distinction between central and peripheral affective states for it seems probable that a mother would obtain more happiness from watching her child playing on a swing than from the ice cream she is enjoying whilst doing so. Being a mother is a central affective state whilst enjoying an ice cream is peripheral one. 

Let us accept that Haybron is correct and that someone’s happiness is linked to her sense of self. It might then be suggested that because we are all different, each self is different, that different concepts of happiness ought to be applied to different people. In particular, it might be suggested that because there are differences between the young and old that different concepts of happiness are applicable to the young and old. It follows that my initial suggestion that the concept of happiness changes as we age might be justified. In order to examine the plausibility of this suggestion we must understand examine how the self is linked to happiness. Firstly, let us assume that the self is linked to happiness simply because the self determines what makes someone happy. However, if this assumption is accepted then there is no real concept of happiness. If people can be happy in radically different ways, rather than each person simply determining the things that make her happy, then there would be no real meaningful concept of happiness. It follows the concept of happiness applicable to us does not change as we age because we simply don’t have such a concept. Secondly let us assume that the self is linked to happiness because the things that make us happy help define the self. If the self is linked to our happiness by the things that make us happy then as we age once again there is no reason why the concept applicable to us should change. The things that make us happy might change as we age but the way we are happy does not. Once again it appears my initial worry that the way in which we are happy might change with age is unjustified.

However, it might be objected that it is ridiculous to assume all the things that make someone happy help define her self. My objector might proceed to point out the fact a mother enjoys an ice cream while watching her child play on a swing surely doesn’t help define her self. Haybron would surely agree with the above. In reply I would suggest if a mother usually enjoys an ice cream whilst watching her child that this does indeed help define her self even if only to a very minor degree. Haybron suggests it is only central affective states that are linked to the self. Haybron further suggests what distinguishes central affective states from peripheral ones is that someone has a disposition to act on the former and no disposition to act on the latter (5). I would suggest that a central affective state means someone must have a disposition to experience that state. However, having a disposition to experience a certain affective state alone does not mean it is a central affective state. I would argue what also matters is the strength of any disposition. For instance, our mother may well have a disposition to enjoy ice cream causing her to buy ice cream as well as a disposition to care for her child. Perhaps her disposition to enjoy ice cream even defines her as a person to some minor degree as suggested above. However, if her child falls from the swing she rushes to help her child rather than finish her ice cream. Her disposition to care for her child is far stronger than her disposition to enjoy ice cream. Her disposition to care for her child defines her far greater degree as a particular person than her disposition to enjoy ice cream. It seems to me the all the affective states someone has a disposition to experience help to define her as a person but their importance in defining her depends on the strength of the disposition. If the above is accepted then once again my initial worry that, even if the things that make us happy change as we age the way in which we are happy also changes as we age, remains unjustified.

At this point my I will suggest even if our concept of happiness does not change as we age that nonetheless the relative weights of the elements within that concept do change. For instance, if we accept Feldman’s concept of attitudinal happiness it seems possible that the pleasure we obtain from our attitudes may increase whilst our sensory pleasures decrease as we age. For instance, an older mother might take pleasure when considering her children who have grown up, left home and are now prospering by themselves. Such an attitude is unavailable to a younger mother. I believe such an attitude might be regarded as satisfaction with that part of her life. Feldman holds that being satisfied is not part of happiness. In the rest of this posting I will be primarily concerned with Haybron’s concept of happiness. Let us recall that that someone is happy if her emotional condition is broadly positive and that this involves her in general being attuned to, engaged with and endorsing her emotional condition. Haybron believes that attunement is more important than engagement and that engagement is more important than endorsement with regard to our happiness. I suggest this priority might change as we age.

In the rest of this posting I want to examine whether such a change in priorities can occur. Haybron believes engagement involves exuberance or vitality and sometimes involves flow (6). I would suggest as someone ages her exuberance or vitality decreases which means her engagement also decreases as she ages. Next I will deal with endorsement. Haybron believes endorsement involves feelings of joy or sadness (7). To me endorsement involves satisfaction. Moreover, it might be argued satisfaction does not need to involve any emotion. Some might argue that satisfaction simply entails an absence of restlessness in someone to change whatever satisfies her, see Frankfurt (8). However, if we accept Haybron’s position that endorsement requires feelings of joy and sadness and that these feelings decrease as someone ages then the importance of endorsement might decrease also. Haybron deals with attunement at some length (9). To him attunement involves a certain tranquillity and lack of anxiety. Attunement also involves a settled confidence and lack of stress making for a more confident person. It seems to me attunement has two distinct meanings according to Haybron because tranquillity does not of necessity increase confidence. I will only deal with the first meaning here. Attunement involves a certain tranquillity and lack of anxiety. I see no reason as to why someone should become less tranquil or less anxious as she ages simply because she is aging. It appears to follow there is no reason why the priorities between someone’s attunement and endorsement should change as she ages but perhaps endorsement may become more important to her than engagement.

Haybron considers tranquillity as a form of settledness (10). If he is correct then because tranquillity is part of attunement, attunement might be seen partly as a form of settledness. I would suggest a sense of settledness is a sense of acceptance. I now want to differentiate between our ideas of acceptance and satisfaction. I have suggested above that an older mother, who takes pleasure, when considering her children who have grown up and left home and are now prospering, is experiencing satisfaction. Let us now consider another mother who smothered her continually crying child whilst suffering from severe post natal depression. For years this mother has suffered from feelings of guilt. However recently she has become more settled and simply accepts what has happened together with the fact she was not to blame. If satisfaction simply means an absence to change anything to do with what satisfies someone then acceptance, or settledness, is the same as satisfaction. It follows the mother who smothered her child could look back with satisfaction to what happened. I don’t believe this is possible. I believe that there is a difference between being satisfied with and simply accepting some past event. The above example seems to show that being satisfied must involve some positive affective state. I have used the term positive affective state here rather than positive emotion as I believe someone can be in a satisfied mood.

One consequence of accepting that being satisfied must involve some positive affective states means satisfaction shares some features with endorsement as defined by Haybron. Haybron believes endorsement involves joy and sadness. However, I see no reason why satisfaction need involve joy, Joy seems to be too strong an emotion to be a necessary element of satisfaction. Moreover, sadness seems to be connected to someone’s concept of her self and she can be dissatisfied with things that are unconnected to her concept of self. It follows sadness is also not a necessary element of satisfaction. I also see no reason why endorsement need involve joy and sadness. Endorsing something can just mean being satisfied with it. It seems clear to me that as people age acceptance and satisfaction with their past assume greater importance in their emotional condition. It follows if endorsement is defined by being satisfied with something and endorsement is part of someone’s emotional condition then the priorities attunment, engagement and endorsement play in being happy might change as we age.

Someone might object that if the pleasure of satisfaction is a weak positive emotion unlike joy then it is unlikely to come to play a more prominent part in our emotional condition as we age unless older people don’t feel strong positive emotions. My objector might proceed to point out the joy felt in orgasm, for at least some older people can feel orgasmic, far outweighs the pleasure associated with satisfaction. In reply I would argue what matters with regard to satisfaction is not only the degree of pleasure experienced but also the fact that satisfaction involves a disposition to experience that pleasure again and again. Martin Seligman believes achievement is an important element of the concept of happiness, see above. Let us assume that achieving something involves satisfaction. It follows if being satisfied is part of happiness then it possible to explain why achievement is one of the things that make us happy.

In conclusion it seems that my initial worry that our concept of happiness should change as we age is unfounded. However, the relative importance of the various elements in the concept of happiness seem to change as we age.

1. Martin Seligman, 2011, Flourish, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, Chapter 1.
2. Fred Feldman, 2010, What is this thing called Happiness? Oxford, chapter 6.
3. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 147.
4. Haybron, page 130.
5. Haybron, page 130.
6. Haybron, page 114.
7. Haybron, page 113.
8. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 103.
9. Haybron, pages 116 to 120.
10. Haybron, page 116

Self Respect and Love

Kristjan Kristjansson argues too much attention is paid to promoting an individual’s self esteem and not enough to promoting his self respect. Kristjansson is referring to global self esteem, how good we feel about ourselves in general, rather than domain based self esteem, how we feel about our performance in a particular domain. The problem with Kristjansson’s argument is that in practice our ideas of self esteem and self respect easily get confused. In spite of this reservation I agree with Kristjansson that an over inflated ego based on high global self esteem is not useful to someone and may even be harmful. Kristjansson also argues that domain based self esteem is good for someone, once again I agree. Indeed if someone is a good athlete a failure to recognise this fact is a failure to recognise the truth. I further agree self respect is a useful for someone. However if we are to encourage self respect we must be clear about what we should be encouraging. In this posting I want to examine the basis of self respect.

Kristjansson believes we have a real emotionally based self rather than just a self construct. He believes self respect may be defined roughly as a disposition not to act or feel in a way that is unworthy of oneself. In Hamlet Polonius advises Laertes as follows, “This above all: to thy own self be true”. Perhaps this advice reflects what it means for someone to respect himself, to be authentic. However if someone is to be true to himself or to be authentic he must understand the nature of his self.  Kristjansson argues there are two incompatible understandings of what it means for someone to respect himself based two different concepts of a real self. One concept is Kantian and the other Aristotelian. Kristjansson favours adopting an Aristotelian concept (1). Using this concept means what really matters is that someone has certain virtues such as justice, generosity and courage. That he can feel appropriate pride and shame. Lastly he must have the courage of his convictions, he must not be easily swayed from his chosen path, and that his beliefs and convictions must have some persistence. Being true to such a self, respecting oneself, means someone must act virtuously based on his deeply held beliefs and convictions. Perhaps this is what Shakespeare meant by being true to oneself. However someone’s ability to choose his own beliefs and convictions, his autonomy, seems only to have a peripheral importance according to an Aristotelian concept of self. Perhaps then we should adopt a Kantian concept of the self. However if we adopt a Kantian concept of the self we find a self with very little substance except for the ability to choose. Such a self can choose but his self seems an unsubstantial thing giving him very little basis on which to base any choices he makes. To respect such a self we need only accept his right to choose and respect his choices provided these choices do not harm others. However even if we have reason to respect such a self it does not follow we have reason to admire such an insubstantial self.

Kristjansson believes we must choose either an Aristotelian or Kantian concept of the self. Intuitively neither of these concepts completely captures our idea of self. I would suggest that there is a concept of self which combines the idea of an autonomous and substantial self. I would suggest someone’s self is based on what he loves. A self based on what someone loves is not an insubstantial self. Moreover I would further suggest a self that makes choices based on what he loves is an autonomous self, see Frankfurt (2). Indeed if someone doesn’t love anything at all it is hard to see how he can make any meaningful decisions. Anyone who fails to love has no boundaries and has no basis on which to make decisions. He is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity, see Frankfurt (3). Of course I accept someone’s identity can change over time but his identity must have some persistence. I would also suggest that anyone who doesn’t love himself at least to some degree cannot love anything else. To love something according to Frankfurt is simply to be satisfied with what one loves. Satisfaction means someone has an absence of restlessness and has a resistance to change his relation to his beloved (4). If we accept Frankfurt’s definition loving defined by satisfaction then loving something need not involve pride. It further follows someone cannot love himself excessively, cannot respect himself excessively. Pride it seems to me is connected to self esteem rather than self respect. It be suggested at this point self respect need only involve love of self. I would reject such a suggestion. If someone only loves himself he has no substantial self to love. He is trying to love something amorphous with no fixed shape or identity. However an objector might point out that I have suggested someone who does not love himself cannot love anything else and that someone who does not love anything else cannot love himself. My objector might then suggest love so defined is impossible. My response would be that coming to love is a natural process and that when someone comes to love something he comes at the same time to love himself.

I must make it clear that Kristjansson rejects such a concept of the self (5). Personally I believe the concept of a self defined by what he loves need not differ radically from an Aristotelian conception. A self defined by what he loves cannot choose anything his choices are constrained not by others but by what he loves. Moreover it is perfectly possible for a self that is defined by what he loves to acquire some of the virtues by education provided he endorses these virtues by loving them. Such a self might be regarded as an Aristotelian self. What is the relationship between an Aristotelian self and the virtues? Does he simply possess them or love them? I would argue if loving is based on satisfaction then a virtuous person must love any virtues he possesses. It follows if an Aristotelian self must love the virtues then he might also be regarded as a self based on love. However the concept of a self defined by what he loves is a broader concept than an Aristotelian concept. A self defined by what he loves of course need not of necessity love the virtues even if a virtuous person must love the virtues.

What does self respect mean if the self is defined by what someone loves? I have argued above it does not mean someone takes pride in himself. It simply means someone is satisfied with himself. To be satisfied with something someone’s satisfaction must be both persistent and consistent. Let us agree with Kristjansson that self respect is good for someone and that it should be encouraged. Unfortunately if we also accept someone’s self respect depends on his loving something including himself then we cannot directly encourage self respect. Someone cannot decide to love something simply because he decides loving is good for him. Similarly someone cannot decide to respect himself because self respect is good for him. We can however indirectly encourage self respect by creating the conditions in which self respect can flourish. This means allowing someone the freedom to love the things that matter to him, means loving and caring about things ourselves and it the case of children suggesting, but no more than suggesting, that it is good for them to love certain things.

To conclude I want to make some more speculative comments about the importance of self respect especially if it is based on love or “caring about”. These comments are of more speculative nature because I am a philosopher not a psychologist. Many of the perpetrators of murderous massacres such as the dreadful killings in Newtown Connecticut do not seem to be mad. I would however speculate that none of these perpetrators is satisfied with themselves. None of these perpetrators has self respect. Of course it would be simplistic to suggest the reason of such massacres is just a lack of self respect. Nonetheless I would speculate such a lack is one reason for these massacres even if it is a minor one. This is one reason why it is so disappointing that we cannot directly encourage self respect. Nonetheless if directly encouraging self respect is impossible, no matter how disappointing this may be, we should not attempt to do so but instead concentrate our efforts on trying to create the conditions in which self can flourish, see my posting on Riots and the Unbearable Lightness of Simply Being . Secondly I would speculate if self respect is based loving that the search for self respect can also lead to dreadful crimes. Some people in a desperate search for self respect, for identity, for something to love may come to love something in inappropriate ways. I would suggest suicide bombers are such people, see my posting on Terrorism, Love and Self Delusion ; see also Kristjansson (6).

1. Kristjansson, K. (2010) The Self and Its Emotions. Cambridge University Press, page, 154.
2. Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page, 135.
3. Frankfurt, page 114.
4. Frankfurt, page 103.
5. Kristjansson, pages 89 90.
6. Kristjansson page 197.

Extended Consent

We usually consent to some action immediately prior to that action. Sometimes our past consent may be thought to extend into the future. Living wills or last directives are now widely accepted and may be thought of as a kind of extended consent. Even if extended consent is widely accepted there remain some problems connected to the concept. The Law Commission’s report defines extended consent in section 2.11 of "Consent in Sex Offences"   as follows,

“If what is relied on is past agreement, this will mean both, (a) that, when previously given, the agreement must have extended to the doing of the act at that later time, and (b) that it must not have been withdrawn in the meantime. We believe that it should be made clear that consent may be express or implied.”

The same report gives the following example of extended consent in section 4.54.

“For example, at 8 pm P makes it clear that she is looking forward to having intercourse with D that night. By 11 pm she is too drunk to know what she is doing, but D has intercourse with her anyway. Can it be said that she does not (because she cannot) consent to the intercourse at the material time, namely the time of the intercourse? In our view it cannot. Consent is not a state of mind which must invariably exist at the time of the act consented to, but an expression of agreement to that act – the granting of permission for it.”

The report’s authors seem to believe P’s consent is valid and that D commits no offence. Their belief seems to be based on the assumption that there are no conceptual problems with extended consent. The starting point for this posting originated in a piece by Jeremy Stangroom in the Philosophers Magazine’s blog, see 'More Sex when drunk'. Stangroom believes, as I do, that P’s extended consent would not be valid. If we are correct then either there is no such thing as extended consent or the report’s definition is inadequate. In this posting I will attempt to give a more adequate definition of extended consent.

The concept of extended consent is certainly useful. For instance, if a patient is about to undergo surgery then her informed consent is usually sought sometime prior to the actual surgery rather than when she is being wheeled into the operating theatre. The use of extended consent in this instance is good practice as it gives the patient time to absorb the information she needs to make a balanced decision and means she is less likely to make a decision under stress than if she made her decision immediately prior to her operation. Of course such a patient may withdraw her extended consent at any point up to the time her surgery takes place. The idea of extended consent is also useful in cases in which a decision has to be made whether or not to resuscitate a terminally ill patient. Such a decision is made much easier if the patient has made a last directive or living will. It might be thought the further consent is extended into the future the more likely it is to lose its validity. However the above examples from medical practice show that in practice this is not always true. None the less I shall argue below that extended consent should not be extended too far. Intuitively someone’s consent to surgery is perfectly valid tomorrow or even the day after but the same does not apply to intercourse. In what follows I will firstly argue what really matters for extended consent is the basis on which the consent giver makes her decision and secondly how far her consent is extended.

If someone consents to intercourse on what does she base her decision? Someone certainly doesn’t make a decision to have intercourse based on pure reason. I would suggest her consent is simply based on how she feels, on her mood. If this is accepted then it is hard to see how she could possibly extend her consent for intercourse into the future. She cannot know what sort of mood she will be in, how she will feel, in a few hours time. If I am correct then consent to intercourse may only be given at the time intercourse is going to take place contrary to the Law Commissions report. However if someone consents to surgery then her mood at either the time she made her decision or when surgery takes place seems to be irrelevant. When someone consents to surgery she makes an informed consent decision. Her decision is made using practical reason and based on the information provided by her medical team together with her belief about what is best for her. Practical reason doesn’t vary as moods do. It follows provided the patient’s circumstances don’t change her consent decision would be the same tomorrow or even next week. It further follows consent based on ongoing factors using practical reason can be extended to some degree.

I now want to examine just how far consent based on continuing facts using practical reasoning can be extended. Can for instance the hypothetical withholding of consent be extended years into the future as happens with living wills? The nature of practical reason does not change over time so changes in practical reason cannot be used to justify limiting the extension of consent. An essential element of any living will is that the state of affairs relevant at the time the will is implemented is the same as the facts envisaged when the will was made. It might be thought provided this element is satisfied that there is no problem in extending the withholding of consent as expressed in living wills. Such a thought would be premature for what also matters is someone’s beliefs about what is best for her given these facts. Her belief about what is best for her depends on what she “cares about”. In this posting as in previous postings in this blog I will assume to “care about” something means someone identifies herself with which she cares about, see (1). Caring about in this sense has nothing to do with whether someone is in the mood for intercourse or not. When someone “cares about” something this “caring about” must have some persistence, see (2). Of course when someone attends to other things she doesn’t have to actively care about something she cares about but she does have to have a disposition to care about it in the appropriate circumstances. It would seem to be nonsensical to say if someone “cares about” something she could suddenly abandon this care for ever. When the term “care about” is used in the above sense it is roughly equivalent to loving something, see (3). It once again might be thought because what we love, or “care about”, must have persistence that that there is no problem in extending the withholding of consent as expressed in living wills. Once again such a thought would be premature. Love must have some persistence but both someone and what she loves can gradually change over time.

The above suggests that whilst consent can be extended there are limits to just how far this extension can go. In particular there might be problems with extended consent in relation to living wills. The first problem concerns the persistence of what someone “cares about”.  What someone “cares about” must have some persistence, perhaps a few years, but does what someone “cares about” always persist for a decade or even decades? The second problem with living wills is that they anticipate hypothetical events. The will maker may have no experience of these events to guide her. The patient giving her consent for surgery tomorrow is not simply considering a hypothetical event but one that is actually going to happen. Someone attempting to give her consent to intercourse later that night has presumably some experience of intercourse. The realness of these situations gives someone’s decisions focus. It may be that someone when faced with a hypothetical situation may believe she would choose a particular course of action in that situation. Later when actually in this situation, she may discover she was wrong and that she cannot follow that particular course of action. I would argue much the same is true of living wills. Someone may specify in a living will she would not consent to treatment in a certain hypothetical situation. However were this situation to occur she might well have consented had she been able.

In spite of these problems I believe living wills can be useful subject to the proviso that these wills are fairly recent. For instance if a patient learns she has a terminal disease this would be the ideal time to make a living will. If a living will is fairly recent it should be realistic to assume it represents a patient’s extended consent because what she “cares about” should not have changed during period between the making and the implementation of the will. I also believe if the validity of a living will is limited by time that this limitation is likely to force the will maker focus on the hypothetical situation more seriously than she would do if considering situations decades into the future. Perhaps living wills should only be valid for up to five years.

In the light of my discussion above I would redefine an extended consent decision as follows. An extended consent decision is one made using practical reason which is based on what someone “cares about” rather than her current mood, which is valid only for a limited period of at the most a few years and has not been revoked. Someone might object that this is not a useful definition in practice as it is difficult to separate what someone “cares about” from her fleeting moods and emotions. I accept this difficulty but would argue it doesn’t have the same weight when applied to extended consent. I would suggest “caring about” a decision involves being satisfied with that decision. I would further suggest this is true irrespective of whether caring about is defined as simply a matter of will or is connected to some emotional dispositions. I would further suggest that being satisfied with a decision simply means no restlessness with the decision or any desire to change it. If my suggestions are accepted then, because extended consent by its nature allows ample time for any restlessness with someone’s consent decision to become apparent, we can be satisfied in the absence of this restlessness that her decision is based on what she “cares about”.

1.      Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press page 83.

2.      Frankfurt, H. (1988), page 84.

3.     Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 165.

Prisoners and the Right to Vote

In the UK prisoners lose the right to vote whilst serving their sentence. In the US, except in Maine and Vermont, prisoners also lose this right and in some states this disenfranchisement continues after they have served their sentences. In this posting I want to examine whether prisoners should retain this right whilst serving their sentences. The vast majority of philosophical literature seems to suggest that they should. My intuitions suggest to me they should not. I hope my examination will either force me to challenge my intuitions or be able to justify them. Before proceeding I must make it clear I am only interested in whether prisoners should retain the right to vote and that I am not concerned whether the European Human Rights Court should play any part in UK legislation.

In order to look for an argument to support my intuitions I will firstly examine society’s aims when it sends people to prison. Firstly we send people to prison to protect ourselves by ensuring they commit no more crimes for the period of their sentence. This aim is achieved simply by sending offenders to prison. Depriving offenders of the right to vote does nothing to further this aim. Secondly we send offenders to prison in order to rehabilitate them. In the light of the re-offending figures for prisoners I’m not sure this aim is very realistic. However even if we accept this aim is realistic it is hard to see how the disenfranchisement of prisoners might further the aim. It is possible to allow prisoners to vote using a postal ballot. It follows the disenfranchisement of prisoners is not a necessary part of their imprisonment. It further follows if the disenfranchisement of prisoners is to play a meaningful part in the rehabilitation of prisoners that disenfranchisement must be justifiable by itself. Someone might argue an offender’s disenfranchisement might cause him to reconsider his attitude to life and so play some small part in his rehabilitation. I’m not convinced by such an argument, if I’m correct then it follows that depriving prisoners of the right to vote cannot be justified as part of their rehabilitation. Lastly and perhaps most importantly we send people to prison in order to punish them. It follows if we are to justify disenfranchisement as a punishment it also must be justifiable by itself. Most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment. It follows for most prisoners disenfranchisement cannot be justified because it is a punishment. However this may not be true for all prisoners as I will argue later.

I have argued that for most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment and hence disenfranchisement cannot be justified as such. However even if we accept the above as I do, it does not automatically follow if such prisoners are already disenfranchised that we have a reason to change the status quo. I have suggested that most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment. It follows that most prisoners do not value the right to vote. If we don’t grant the right to vote to those prisoners who don’t value having this right then we do them no harm. It further follows that from a consequentialist point of view we have no reason to give most prisoners voting rights.

Someone might attempt to extend the above argument concerning valuing the right to vote to all prisoners. First she might point out voting is an essential element of any democratic society. She might then argue that prisoners don’t value society simply because they offend whereby damaging society. It follows that because prisoners don’t value society they don’t value the right to vote. It further follows if society does not grant prisoners the right to vote then it does them no harm as this right is not something they value. Lastly she might suggest prisoners see themselves as living in society rather than being part of society.

I am doubtful if in practice many prisoners actually value the right to vote. Nonetheless I would reject the above argument because I think it is possible that some prisoners do value this right even if they fail to respect society. However if some prisoners do value the right to vote then their valuation gives us a possible reason to disenfranchise them. If we deprive someone of something he values justly we may do so in order to punish him. It follows we have a possible justification to disenfranchise those prisoners who value the right to vote. To summarise I firstly argued that most prisoners do not value the right to vote and this means we no reason to change the status quo and give them this right. Secondly I argued that for those prisoners, who do value the right to vote, disenfranchisement might be justified as punishment.

Someone might object to my argument by pointing out it has been framed in consequentialist terms and the question of prisoner voting rights is a matter of fundamental human rights. I accept human beings have certain rights, see my posting of 07/10, but I am unhappy about using the term fundamental with regard to rights. Some rights are universal and apply to all human beings others are more restrictive, such as the rights of the members of a golf club. For instance I would argue we have a right not to be treated with unnecessary cruelty simply because we can feel pain but then animals must also have this right. Perhaps this right might be regarded as a universal right for all sentient creatures. In addition we have a right not to be treated as a means by others. Perhaps this right is universal for all potential autonomous creatures living among autonomous creatures. The domain of rights holders for this right is more restricted than for the domain of the right not to be treated with unnecessary cruelty. Lastly we have a right to vote because we are part of a democratic society. The domain of rights holders for the right to vote is further restricted. I would suggest it follows that someone’s right to vote is not a fundamental right based on him being a human being, but is based on him being part of a democratic society. Indeed the idea that our hunter gatherer ancestors had fundamental right to vote is nonsensical. Rights evolved as rights upholders’ ideas and their society changed and as a result different rights may have different origins. Because rights have different origins there is a wide variation in the domain of rights holders.

If we accept that the right to vote depends on us being part of democratic society then does this imply that in such a society prisoners should retain this right? It has been suggested above that prisoners see themselves as only living in rather than being part of a democratic society. I would further suggest prisoner’s behaviour shows that they do indeed see themselves as living in society rather than being part of society as they either intentionally damage society or fail to see their actions as damaging to society. It follows if prisoner’s only live in a society rather than being part of that society that they should not retain the right to vote. After all most foreigners living in a country are not usually considered as citizens and as a result do not have the right to vote even if they are law abiding and contribute to the general good by paying taxes.

I now want to consider some objections to the above. Firstly someone might suggest that many people who never offend see themselves as living in rather than being part of our society and yet still retain the right to vote. For instance people who live solely on benefits and contribute nothing to society. Nobody would seriously suggest we should disenfranchise such people. My objector might then argue if we treat these people differently from prisoners that we are acting unjustly. I would not accept my objector’s argument for two reasons. Firstly many people who contribute nothing to society financially contribute in other ways. Secondly I would argue all those who obey the law contribute to society simply by respecting the rights of others. However how much individuals contribute to society varies. Prisoners serving their sentences do not contribute to society in any other way and by offending have demonstrated that they do not respect the rights of others. My objector might now point most prisoners are not murderers or rapists but minor criminals many of whom simply snort, smoke and inject drugs in the hope of improving their happiness. I would respond by simply pointing out being inadequate may be the reason many prisoners live in society rather than being part of it and as a result gives us no reason to ensure they have the right to vote. Next my objector might suggest that giving prisoners the vote sends them a message. The message we send is that we see them as being part of society even if they don’t. But why should we send them such a message? My objector might respond by suggesting such a message can play a part in their rehabilitation by encouraging them to become part of society. I would respond by suggesting that this would be the wrong message and that disenfranchisement sends a better message that respect for the law is the minimum needed to be considered as part of society.

Lastly my objector might suggest that my argument should apply to all offenders rather than just those sent to prison. If we disenfranchise offenders who are sent to prison but not those offenders who are subject to different punishments such as fines then we are acting unjustly. I believe this objection carries some real weight. My argument depends on the assumption that prisoners see themselves as living in society rather than being part of it. My objector might now point out my assumption should apply to all offenders. She might argue that it follows drivers who are fined for speeding should also be disenfranchised for a period because they see themselves as living in rather than being part of society. Clearly most speeding drivers do see themselves as part of society rather than merely living in it. Perhaps then my assumption is false and some prisoners do see themselves as part of society rather than merely living in it. I accept the above objection and accept all offenders, except perhaps sociopaths, see themselves to some degree as part of society. However I would suggest there is a continuum in this degree ranging from sociopaths to speeders. I might then modify my argument and base it on the assumption that at below some point on this continuum offenders don’t see themselves as enough as part of society to be fully regarded as members of society. I suggest this point might be when offenders directly damage other members of society. The prime purpose of society is to protect its members against unwarranted damage and clearly offenders who directly damage other members of society do not respect society. I might then argue prisoners fall below this point and as a result should remain disenfranchised whilst most other offenders will be above this point and should not.

Does my modified argument provide some justification for my intuitions? I’m not sure and am now somewhat ambivalent about prisoner disenfranchisement. Perhaps I’m just using reflection to bolster my intuitions rather than possibly changing them, like Haidt (1) suggests most people do.

1.      Jonathan Haidt, 2012, The Rightous Mind, Allen Lane, chapter 2.