- Silver D, (2003) Lethal Injection, Autonomy and the proper ends of Medicine, Bioethics 17(2), pp. 205-211.
This blog is concerned with most topics in applied philosophy. In particular it is concerned with autonomy, love and other emotions. comments are most welcome
Wednesday, 19 June 2019
The Logic of Relieving Suffering and Voluntary Euthanasia
Wednesday, 22 May 2019
Redesigning People
- Danaher, Mcarthur, and Migotti, 2017 Robot Sex: Social and Ethical Implications, MIT Press
- Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.
Thursday, 11 April 2019
A right to anaesthesia, a right to physician euthanasia?
In an editorial in Anaesthesia Julian Savulescu and Janet
Radcliffe‐Richards
suggest that many people who are against the deliberate killing of terminally
ill patients who wish to die should have no objection to what is known as
terminal sedation, bringing about unconsciousness for terminally ill patients until
their natural death, see Anaesthesia . I agree with
Savulescu and Radcliffe‐Richards
that most people would accept that sedation for terminally ill patients is not wrong
when death is imminent. In France in 2016 a law came into effect granting
terminally ill patients the right to anaesthesia until death. Sinmyee
et al go further and argue that a right to anaesthesia should be available
to all patients who choose to end their life by starvation or dehydration, see Sinmyee
. Would most people accept that sedation for terminally ill patients is not
wrong when death is inevitable but not imminent? Perhaps a patient has a
prognosis that he has only six months to live. Secondly would most people accept
that sedation for terminally ill patients is not wrong when used to relieve suffering
which they cause themselves by a refusal to eat or to drink? I’m not sure what
most people would find acceptable in either of these scenarios. In this posting
I will firstly briefly summarise the argument why it isn’t morally wrong to
sedate terminally ill patients even if their current suffering is due caused by
a refusal to eat or drink. I will then consider what implications accepting
this argument has for accepting physician assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia.
Let us accept that any competent person has right to refuse
to take food and water. It might be objected that in some cases the person in
question is unlikely to be competent due to eating disorders such as anorexia.
However clearly this objection doesn’t carry much weight when considering
terminally ill patients. Let us also accept that relieving pain is a legitimate
end of medicine even when this lessens a patient’s life span. Let us still further
accept that relieving pain remains a legitimate end of medicine even when this
pain is due to self-harm. We treat drug users for their addiction. Lastly let
us accept that if pain cannot be controlled by any other means that it can be
controlled by deep sedation. It appears to follow that deeply sedating a
patient suffering from a terminal illness, even if his immediate suffering is
caused by his refusal to eat or drink, is a legitimate end of medicine. It
follows that in these circumstances deep sedation would not be morally wrong.
Let us now consider how permanent deep sedation differs
from death. For a dead person conscious life is over. Conscious life is also
over anyone who will be deeply sedated until he dies. Of course for someone who
is deeply sedated some important unconscious physiological processes such as
breathing will continue. The same is not true of the dead. But do these
unconscious physiological processes matter if someone will never resume
consciousness or take part in life again? If they do matter who do they matter
to? These unconscious physiological processes certainly don’t matter to the sedated
person. If they doesn’t matter to the person involved why should they matter
morally to others? It would appear to follow that there is no significant moral
difference between being dead and being deeply sedated until death. If this is
so is there any moral difference between a doctor deeply sedating someone until
he dies and helping him die a good death if he requests help to do so? If
dying and being deeply sedated until death are equivalent for moral concerns then
we should be prepared to conclude that if we are prepared to accept deep
sedation until death that we should be prepared to accept physician assisted
suicide PAS.
It might be objected that deep sedation involves no suffering
whilst helping a patient to die might do so. However even if we accept this
objection the above question might be reframed. Is there any moral difference
between a doctor deeply sedating someone until he dies and deeply sedating
someone prior to carry out his previously expressed wishes for voluntary euthanasia?
If
there isn’t any difference then we should be prepared to conclude that if we
are prepared to accept deep sedation until death that we should be prepared to
accept voluntary euthanasia, which might require prior sedation, when requested
by a terminally ill patient.
I now want to examine two major objections to the above
conclusion. Firstly it might be objected that the above argument depends on the
concept of a person and that when considering deep sedation and voluntary euthanasia
we should consider human beings instead. My objector might argue that that
matters is not whether a person continues to exist bur whether a human being
continues to exist. What does it mean for a human being to continue existing?
Is someone who will never regain consciousness but for whom unconscious
physiological processes such as breathing continue still a human being? My
objector might conclude the answer is obvious and is affirmative. However if we
consider the concept of brain death commonly used in transplant medicine the
answer is not obvious. Someone is brain dead if he has a permanent absence of cerebral
and brainstem functions, however mechanical ventilators and other advanced
critical care services can maintain unconscious physiological processes such as
breathing for some time. Whether someone who is brain dead remains a human
being is far from obvious for we can use his organs for transplant subject to
consent. Why does brain death matter? It matters not simply because of a loss
of cerebral and brainstem functions but because the implications of these
losses. These losses lead to a permanent loss of consciousness. If the above is
accepted then substituting human for persons doesn’t affect my original
argument.
I now want to consider a second objection to my argument
that if we are prepared to accept deep sedation of the terminally ill patients
until death that we should also be prepared to voluntary euthanasia for such patients.
It might be objected that I have slipped too easily from considering PAS to
considering voluntary euthanasia and that the two aren’t equivalent. PAS is
self-administered whilst voluntary euthanasia is carried out by a physician. I
made this move because it has been suggested that PAS might involve suffering
by the terminally ill patient. As a philosopher I am unable to say much about whether
PAS might involve suffering. However I can say something about the possible
scenarios. Firstly if PAS doesn’t necessarily involve suffering then my original
conclusion stands. Next let us assume that PAS involves some limited suffering.
In this scenario it might be questioned whether a terminally ill patient needs
to be fully anaesthetised for PAS to take place? Perhaps a patient’s pain might
be alleviated without affecting his cognitive abilities allowing him to carry
out PAS. Once again my original conclusion stands. Lastly let us assume that
PAS involves suffering that cannot be fully alleviated without full anaesthesia.
In this scenario PAS isn’t possible with full pain relief. In this scenario the
question changes and becomes, if we are prepared to accept deep sedation until
death then why shouldn’t we be prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia?
In order to answer the above question I want to consider
two further scenarios. In both scenarios I will assume the patient is fully
competent. In the first I will assume that the patient is capable of initiating
the start of his anaesthesia before his physician takes over and delivers a
fatal dose. In this scenario why is the patient initiating his own anaesthesia?
I would suggest he isn’t only initiating a form of pain relief. He is only initiating
pain relief in order to die. In this scenario the patient’s actions resemble
those of a patient undergoing PAS.
However the two are not identical. In PAS the physician only supplies
the means and need not be present at the time of death whilst in the above
scenario the physician must not only be present but also deliver the lethal
dose. Let us accept that the physician’s presence or lack of it is not relevant
morally. However we must ask ourselves whether the fact that the physician
supplies the means of dying differs in a morally significant way from the
physician applying the lethal dose. It might be suggested that this a case in
which we could use the principle of double effect to explain the difference. I
would be reluctant to accept this suggestion. When supplying the means to die
the physician involved in PAS has the intention of allowing the patient to kill
himself, it isn’t a foreseen consequence of something else. The physician’s
intention is the same whether he is involved in PAS or voluntary euthanasia as
described in the above scenario. It seems provided the patient involved is able
to initiate his own anaesthesia that there is no morally significant difference
between voluntary euthanasia in these circumstances and PAS. Let us now
consider a second scenario in which the patient is unable to initiate his own
anaesthesia. I would suggest that there are no morally significant differences
between a physician carrying out voluntary euthanasia on a terminally ill
patient in this scenario and a physician suppling him with the means to carry
out PAS provided the degree of voluntariness is the same in both cases. However
is the degree of voluntariness the same in both cases? In the case of PAS the
patient’s intentions seem to be clear because he initiates the dying process.
If a patient can initiate his own anaesthesia I have argued he is initiating
his death and once again his intentions seem clear cut. However if a patient is
unable to initiate his own anaesthesia his intentions aren’t quite so clear
cut. Perhaps this situation can be remedied by a rigorous consent process and a
clear last directive. None the less differences remain between this scenario
and the one in which the patient initiates his own anaesthesia and for this
reason I would be reluctant to conclude that the scenario in which the patient
is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia is equivalent to PAS. The above
suggests some consequences for the process of deep sedation. Let us accept that
the deep sedation of terminally ill patients who are unable to initiate their
own sedation and voluntary are equivalent. It follows if we aren’t prepared to
accept voluntary euthanasia we shouldn’t be prepared to accept deep sedation if
the patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia.
In this posting I have argued that the deep sedation of
terminally ill patients should be morally acceptable. I further argued such
sedation was a legitimate use of medical skills. I have also assumed that most
people would find such sedation acceptable and less contentious than either PAS
or voluntary euthanasia. If most people find PA and voluntary euthanasia
unacceptable and deep sedation is a legitimate use of medical skills then such
sedation should be an option for the terminally ill. I then examined the moral
implications of accepting deep sedation. The main implications of this
acceptance are summarised below.
- If we are prepared to accept deep sedation for terminally ill patients until death then we should be prepared to accept PAS when this process does not involve suffering.
- If we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death and PAS involves some suffering then we should accept PAS provided that this suffering can be controlled without anaesthesia.
- If we are prepared to accept deep sedation until death and a patient is able to initiate his own anaesthesia then in these circumstances we should be prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia.
- If we are not prepared to accept voluntary euthanasia then we should not be prepared to accept deep sedation until death when a patient is unable to initiate his own anaesthesia.
Tuesday, 5 March 2019
Assisted Suicide and a Life not Worth Living
Thursday, 14 February 2019
The Philosopher's Dog
A philosopher has a pet dog, does he do anything wrong? According to Gary Francione he does because a morally just world would have no pets, no aquaria and no zoos. Francione opposes pet ownership, zoos and aquaria because such things violate the fundamental rights of animals. In this posting I will only be concerned with pets and I will argue that Francione’s view is mistaken in cases involving some kinds of animals. I will next argue that the keeping of some pets can sometimes be mutually beneficial. Lastly in the light of these benefits I will consider the sort of animals it is permissible and possibly beneficial to keep as pets.
I won’t consider a virtue ethics approach to the keeping pets because whilst virtue ethics might have something to say about how we ought to treat pets it has little to say about the permissibility of keeping pets. Neither will I consider a consequentialist approach. It might be objected problems of hungry people and environmental harm means we shouldn’t keep pets for consequentialist reasons. In what follows I will assume that either these reasons can be overcome or balanced by the benefits of keeping pets. In what follows I will examine three objections to pet keeping based on animal rights. First, a right to be free. Secondly, a right not to considered as property. And lastly, a right not to be kept in a dependent state.
Pets unlike wild animals are confined to our home or to its immediate surroundings. It follows pets are restricted by their keepers from roaming freely. It has been argued that the inability to roam freely causes pets distress and that this distress means pet keeping is wrong. However, we don’t allow young children and infants to roam freely. Many five or six-year old children would like at times to roam freely and feel frustrated when their parents prevent from doing so. Frustration is a form of distress. Nobody suggests we shouldn’t have children because we curtail their freedom to roam might cause distress. It might be argued by analogy that the same is true of pets. It might be objected that this analogy doesn’t hold because once children become adults they can decide where they want to go whilst the same doesn’t apply to pets. In response to this objection I would point out that children develop skills which means they can enjoy their freedom. Feral dogs are free from restrictions but unlike adult humans they don’t appear to have the skills to enjoy this freedom. Pet dogs appear to flourish better than feral dogs. What is true for dogs need not of course apply to all animals. Some animals we keep as pets might be happier and flourish better if they were free to roam. However accepting the above means that there is at least one kind of animal which is not damaged if its freedom to roam is curtailed. It follows the argument against keeping of at least some kinds of animals as pets based on restrictions to their freedom fails.
A pet is sometimes considered as someone’s property and it might be argued that owning an animal is wrong. This argument is really two different arguments. First it might be argued that someone can do whatever he likes with his own property and that he shouldn’t be able to do anything he likes to any pets he keeps. This argument is clearly false. Someone can only do whatever he likes with certain forms of property. Someone may do whatever he likes with his table and chairs. Pets even if they are property are not the kind of things someone can do whatever he likes with. Pets are living things and because of this the law prevents pet owners from mistreating their pets. Secondly it might be argued the simple fact of being owned damages pets? Certainly if one person owns another being owned damages the second person. This damage is due to a lack of freedom. In response to such an argument I would point out most pets are not persons. One possible exception would be a great ape and accepting the above would mean that keeping a great ape as a pet should be impermissible. Secondly as I have argued above for some sort of pets a loss of freedom doesn’t of necessity cause harm. It appears to follow even if pets are in some way owned this ownership doesn’t give us a reason not to keep some kinds of animals as pets.
Lastly let us consider the dependency argument. If some creature is dependent on another this dependence means it is in a vulnerable position. Let us assume that it is wrong to place some creature in a vulnerable position. It follows we shouldn’t place any creature in a vulnerable position and that because pets are kept in a vulnerable position that it is wrong to keep pets. I believe the above argument is unsound. The premise that is it is wrong to place any creature in a vulnerable position is false. Pets exist and for most pets to be allowed to roam at will this would increase their vulnerability. The above argument might be refined by replacing the above premise with a related one. Let us assume that it is wrong to create some creature which will be vulnerable in life. Accepting the above would mean we might keep our existing pets but it would be wrong to permit the creation of any more. Once again I find the refined argument unconvincing because I believe the revised premise is also false. Human beings are vulnerable. I believe that we do have a duty not to bring into existence any being we think would not find its life worth living. I believe that this duty cannot be extended into a duty not to bring into existence some creature which will have a life worth living but is vulnerable in some way. It would appear that the dependency argument does not give us reason to keep some kind of pets provided that our lifestyle permits us to attend to their needs.
I have argued that there are no reasons why we shouldn’t keep some types of animals as pets. I now want to argue that there are some good reasons for some people to keep some types of pets. Someone might keep a pet to showcase a lifestyle. Macho man keeps a big strong dog to demonstrate the sort of person he is. For such people pets have much the same status as their jewellery. I don’t believe keeping a pet to showcase a lifestyle is a good reason to keep a pet. Indeed I would suggest that this is a poor reason to keep pets because if someone wants to showcase the sort of person he is he should demonstrate this by his actions rather than his possessions. In spite of the above it should be permissible for such people to keep pets provided that they look after them well.
One concern of moral philosophy is human flourishing. I now want to outline four empirical reasons why keeping pets might help some people to flourish. Firstly there seems to be a connection between keeping a pet with both physiological and psychological health, see the psychologist . Secondly keeping a pet might be useful in counteracting loneliness among some people, especially the aged. For instance walking a dog besides being beneficial to health increases the possibility of social interaction. Moreover even if someone is unable to exercise a dog keeping some sorts of pet might create a bond which could be useful in counteracting loneliness. Thirdly keeping a pet might be useful in a child’s development and help him to flourish for three reasons. Firstly children who actively care for pets, such as regularly walking a dog, might be more likely to develop a notion of responsibility. Secondly a more developed notion of responsibility might also foster a ‘caring for’ attitude. Thirdly there is some evidence that interaction with a pet might benefit some autistic people by reducing anxiety, see how animals can help autistic children . Verbal communication with a pet is a one way process. Lastly I would suggest that underlying all these reasons is a basic human need to love and be loved. This love of course isn’t romantic love but a very basic need to care about something. Indeed I would further suggest a failure to care much about anything is a failure to be fully human, someone who doesn’t care acts robotically or like a zombie. Caring about, or loving, makes us human and in some cases the keeping of a pet might help foster this caring about. Much more speculatively it might even be suggested that terrorists are unlikely to keep pets or have kept pets as children. Maybe loving a cause tends to exclude someone from loving a pet and vice versa.Perhaps this somewhat bizarre suggestion could be tested empirically.
Let us accept that it is permissible, perhaps sometimes even desirable, for someone to keep a pet. However does this apply to all animals or only to a subset of animals? What sort of animal it would be morally permissible to keep as a pet? I argued above it is permissible to restrict the freedom of certain animals such as dogs. Dogs, cats and perhaps a few other animals such as horses have adapted their way of life so they can still flourish when restricted by humans. Most wild animals would not cope well if their freedom was restricted and it would be wrong to keep such animals as pets. Let us accept that it is only morally permissible to keep as pets animals that can still flourish when restricted by humans. I now want to consider a slightly different question. What sort of animal might benefit someone if kept as a pet? I have argued above that our need to love and be loved gives us a reason to keep pets. What does accepting the above tell us about the sort of animals we should keep as pets? Let us examine our need to be loved first. Intuitively a dog can love someone whilst a fish can’t. Why is this so? I would suggest the reason is evolution has changed some animals so they can adapt to our lifestyle. Someone merely feeds fish and cleans their tank because fish haven’t adapted to our lifestyle. The same isn’t true of dogs. If we accept the above, then the type of pets we have reason to keep for the benefits they give us is limited. We have reason to keep dogs, possibly cats or even ponies but not many other kinds of animals. We definitely don’t have reason to keep snakes or fish based on our need to be loved. However, we don’t simply have a need to be loved we also have a need to love, to care about something. Is it possible to love a snake or a fish? I will now argue it isn’t. I would argue if we love something we must be capable of benefiting what we love. By love I mean ‘caring about’ and not simply ‘caring for’. Of course ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’ are connected and there is a spectrum between these two forms of caring. However, if I care about something I am benefitted when what I care about is benefitted and harmed when what I care about is harmed. The same is not true for ‘caring for’ something. I can benefit a fish by feeding but not feel benefited myself. Let us consider benefits in more detail. If someone plays with a dog and a ball he is happy because his dog is happy, much the same applies to someone stroking a purring cat. However, someone might know what harms a fish or snake but he has little or no idea about what makes these creatures are happy. She doesn’t know what benefits these creatures besides ‘caring for’ their basic needs. Someone might care for such creatures but he can’t ‘care about’, love them. It follows someone’s need to ‘care about’ love cannot be satisfied by keeping animals like fish and snakes as pets and that this need to love cannot used as a reason to justify keeping them as pets.
In conclusion it seems that it is perfectly permissible for a philosopher to keep a dog as a pet. It might also be desirable in some cases for some people to keep a pet, especially children. However the sort of animals it is permissible to keep as pets is limited to those animals who have been shaped by evolution to fit our lifestyles.
Wednesday, 16 January 2019
Nietzsche, Sport and Suffering
Sport is a passion for many people in the past this was
mostly men but this is changing and many women enjoy sport. In this posting I
want to examine the reasons for this passion and what we find admirable about sportspersons.
I will argue what we find admirable is that sport helps enhance character and
that this enhancement is connected to some of Nietzsche’s thoughts about
suffering and struggle. My discussion will be confined to sport but some of it
could also be applied to the arts, especially music.
Nietzsche argued that which doesn’t kill you makes you
stronger. He linked this to suffering which he argued makes someone a better
person,
“Examine the life of the best and most productive men and
nations, and ask yourselves whether a tree which is to grow proudly skywards
can dispense with bad weather and storms. Whether misfortune and opposition, or
every kind of hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, distrust, severity, greed, and
violence do not belong to the favourable conditions without which a great
growth even of virtue is hardly possible? (1)
It is important to note that Nietzsche is not saying all
suffering benefits someone but that if she is to live up to her potential some
suffering is necessary. Chronic illnesses doesn’t benefit the sufferer. However
it is worth noting that some people such as Havi Carel argue that even chronic
illness can bring some limited benefits (2). Let us agree with Nietzsche that
some suffering can indirectly lead to some benefits. Consider the Eloi in H G
Well’s book ‘The Time Machine’. The Eloi appear to lead a life of ease with no
need to struggle in order to exist. However they lack natural curiosity and
their lives seem to be lacking in some essential elements making such lives
seem pointless to us. Of course the Eloi’s lives might seem pointless to us
simply because they lack curiosity rather than because they fail to struggle to
protect themselves from the Morlocks. I would suggest that if someone has to
struggle in her life that she must consider how to overcome her problems and
this facilitates her curiosity and by doing so might possibly even facilitate
her wisdom. I now want to follow Michael Brady by arguing that suffering can
facilitate other virtues. (3) I would suggest that if someone struggles to
overcome her suffering that this struggle will enhance her courage, fortitude,
resilience and patience. These virtues are instrumental virtues and that
someone who possesses might be said to possess grit. I would argue that we enhance these virtues
by exercising them in much the same way as an athlete enhances her muscles by
exercise. If someone struggles to overcome her suffering then she will need to
exercise her courage, fortitude, resilience and patience. Of course no one admires
someone simply because she suffers, one pities her. We admire someone who struggles
to overcome her suffering. I would suggest that we should find her character
admirable because it displays the above virtues. To summarise the above simply
to suffer doesn’t benefit anyone, however if someone struggles to overcome her
suffering she enhances some elements of her character helping her to flourish.
I now want to consider what we find admirable about
sportspersons. Sport is connected to competition. I go out alone on my bike I
am exercising rather than taking part in sport. Sport concerns competition.
However sport is not simply about competition and winning for after all wars
are about winning and wars aren’t sport. Winning is important in sport because
it sets the goal in some competition. However wars are also about competition.
The competition in war and sport differs. All competition is about winning but
in war the way the war is won isn’t central whilst in sport winning matters but
the way someone wins is of central importance. A war should be a just war but
the rules of war play no part in the definition of war. If some country wages
war by massacring innocent civilians and ignoring the rules of war we would
still say it was waging war, we might of course add that it wasn’t waging a
just war. Sport is by definition must be played according to some rules. Sport
must also be fair. If a team of professional footballers play an under 13 years
old girls team even if this was played paying scrupulous attention to the rules
this game would not be regarded as sport. Fairness is central to the definition
of sport and this is reflected in the organisation of sport. Able bodied
Olympians don’t compete with Para-Olympians, heavyweight boxers don’t compete
with lightweights and golfers have handicaps to ensure fair competition. Let us
accept that sport is concerned with winning and fairness. Winning and fairness
are in some ways an odd combination. We find fairness admirable because it
fosters justice. We find winning admirable because it represents achievement. I
would suggest that we find sportspersons admirable because the combination of
winning and fairness found in sport allows them to exhibit and develop certain
characteristics connected to good character. This suggestion seems to be
supported by the way we talk about sport, especially football, we talk about
determination, patience, courage and not letting one’s head drop which seems to
me to be a form of resilience.
Let us accept that one of the main reasons why we find
participation in sport admirable is that it allows sportspersons to exhibit and
develop character. In what follows I will only consider sport and the
development or enhancement of good character. I have argued above that
suffering helps develop courage, fortitude, resilience and patience. I now want
to argue that sport develops these virtues by suffering. It might be objected
that many professional sportspersons don’t suffer. Professional sportspersons
are well paid, have trainers, dieticians, physiotherapists and even sports
psychologists help them achieve their goals. I accept some sportspersons aren’t
deprived people. However it is important to note that some people embrace sport
as a way out of deprivation. For such people sport and suffering are directly
connected. I now want argue that even well paid professional sportspersons
suffer. What does it mean to suffer? To suffer means someone is in some
unpleasant state she would rather not be in. This definition is not a complete
definition of suffering but I believe it is adequate for the purposes of this
posting. Sport helps develop good character because sportspersons have to
struggle to master their sport and this involves courage, fortitude, resilience
and patience. If someone is completely satisfied she has no need to struggle.
Someone struggles only when she is dissatisfied with something. Being
dissatisfied is an unpleasant state which someone wishes she wasn’t in. All
struggling is a reaction to some suffering even if this suffering is mild. It follows
that if what we find admirable about sport is that it enhances character and
that this enhancement is achieved by struggling which is facilitated by
suffering. This struggle might be of especial importance to disabled athletes as
their greater struggle leads to greater character enhancement and empowerment.
I have argued above that one of the main reasons we find
participation in sport admirable is that it helps sportspersons to exhibit and
develop good character. It might be objected that I’m presenting a very limited
picture. My objector might suggest that the main reason we find participation
in sport admirable is that it simply that it allows sportspersons to exhibit
their skills without any reference to character. I accept that people enjoy
exhibiting or the exhibition of sporting skills. However I am examining what
people find admirable about participation in sport and admiration isn’t the same
as enjoyment. Do we really admire the exhibition of these skills without
reference to character? Would we admire the exhibition of these skills if they
were exhibited by a robot? Would we admire them if they had been acquired
solely by the use of performance enhancing drugs? I would suggest we would not.
My objector might respond by suggesting that we wouldn’t only because the use
enhancement drugs is cheating rather than anything to do with sportsperson’s
character. Cheating and character are linked. Let us assume some sport permits
the use of performance enhancing drugs and that taking these drugs ceases to be
cheating. I would suggest that we would find little to admire about
participation in such a sport. Nonetheless might we find the exhibition of sporting
skills involved in this sport enjoyable? Perhaps we might enjoy the exhibition
as a spectacle but it would be hard to enjoy as a sporting contest as the any
contest has moved from the sportspersons involved to the scientists producing
the enhancers.
Let us accept that being involved sport helps fight obesity
and fosters good health and for this reason active participation in sport
should be encouraged I have argued that the reason why we find participation in
sport admirable is that it allows sportspersons to exhibit and develop
character. It might be objected that I’m idealising some impossible Corinthian
picture of sport which has no relevance in the modern era. In response I point
out that character matters to both to amateur and professional sportspersons.
Andy Murray is a professional tennis player and I would suggest that we admire
him just as much for his struggle to win Wimbledon as for the victory itself.
If we accept that character matters in sport then we have a further reason to
encourage active participation in sport. The struggle involved in sport helps
to enhance certain virtues which are instrumentally useful to us. Clearly
enhancing someone’s courage, fortitude, resilience and patience benefits her
but I would argue such individual enhancement also benefits society as a whole.
It follows society has an interest in promoting participation in sport and that
government policies which reduce the sporting facilities which enable people to
do so are mistaken. Playing fields and other sporting facilities matter. Of
course not everyone wants to participate in sport but I would suggest that other
activities involving struggle such as learning to play a musical instrument can
be equally beneficial. In the light of the above discussion I would further suggest
that some struggle in life is important for us all and can lead to more
widespread benefits. In ‘The Coddling of the American Mind’ Haidt and Lukianoff
endorse an anti-fragility type of parenting. (4) I would interpret
anti-fragility parenting to mean not overprotecting or coddling children but
rather encouraging them to struggle to achieve things in life. Socrates
famously argued that the unexamined life wasn’t worth living perhaps a life
without some struggle might be worth living but none the less be a deficient
sort of life. Perhaps such a life might be worth living but would it be a happy
life? Perhaps Seligman is right when he suggests that accomplishment matters
for happiness if so a happy life requires some struggle, some suffering. Lastly
I would suggest that whilst we admired Steven Hawking for increasing our
knowledge of the universe that we also admired him because of his struggles to
overcome adversity.
- The Gay Science : First Book, 19
- Havi Carel, 2013, Illness, Routledge
- Michael Brady, 2018, Suffering, Oxford University Press
- Haidt & Lukianoff, 2018, The Coddling of the American Mind, Penguin Press
Wednesday, 14 November 2018
What do We Mean by Hope
In this posting I want to examine what we mean by hope. Firstly I will suggest that the traditional philosophical definition of hope is an inadequate one. I will then argue that if desire in the traditional definition is replaced by ‘caring about’ or loving that we will have a more complete definition. I will move on to consider whether hoping is beneficial and hoping might be encouraged.
What do we mean by hope? Intuitively someone hopes for some
outcome if he desires that outcome. However hope is not the same as
expectation. If some desired outcome has a 0.9 probability does someone really hope
for this outcome or does he expect it. I would suggest that if the desired
outcome materialises then how he feels will differ depending on whether he
hoped for the outcome or expected it. If he hoped for the outcome he will be
pleased whilst if he expected the outcome he will still be pleased but to a
much lesser degree. Similarly if the expected outcome doesn’t materialise he will
be disappointed whilst if he had hoped for the outcome he will again be
disappointed but to a much lesser degree. In the rest of this posting I will
assume if the desired outcome has a probability of 0.5 or greater that someone
expects that outcome and someone hopes for some outcome when the probability is
less than 0.5. According to the traditional philosophical definition of hope someone
hopes for some outcome when he desires this outcome which has a low probability
of being actualised. Unfortunately as pointed out by Adrienne Martin
such a definition might also be used to define despairing (1). Martin uses the
example of two terminally ill cancer sufferers to illustrate her point. Both
are offered treatment in a trial which offers a very small probability of
achieving a good outcome. Let us assume that the probability of a good outcome
due to their participation in the trail is 0.01. One sufferer nonetheless sees
this low probability as offering hope, he might believe this low probability
licences him to hope, whilst the other sufferer sees this low probability as a
reason to despair. Both sufferers accept the same probability and both desire
the good outcome but one hopes and the other despairs. It follows even that
both a desired outcome and a low probability are necessary conditions for hope
they don’t offer sufficient conditions to define hope.
How can we explain the difference between hope and despair?
It might be argued that the difference can be explained by what our attention
is directed at. Let us assume emotions matter because they capture our
attention. It might be suggested that the difference between hope and despair
is simply that the hopeful person undertakes some actions, even if this is only
imagining a better future, whilst the despairing person simply does nothing.
This suggestion may well hold in some cases but not in all. For instance our
despairing cancer patient might make plans to end his life because he despairs
of his future. Emotions not only capture our attention but also focus it. I now
want to argue that the main difference between hope and despair is the focus of
our attention. This focus is sometimes converted into action by the despairing
person and always converted into action, even if this action is merely
imagining the good outcome, by the hopeful person. The focus of the hopeful person
is on the good outcome and he acts accordingly whilst the focus of despairing
person is on the bad outcome and she acts accordingly.
It might be objected that the focus of a hopeful or a despairing person should be on the probabilities rather than the outcomes and that their actions should accord with these probabilities. Indeed it might be argued that the actions of the hopeful and the despairing should be identical in identical situations. However in practice even if two people agree about the probability of some outcome their subsequent actions often differ significantly. I now want to suggest that this difference is due to how they value the outcomes. How someone reacts to some situation might be based on the probabilities of the different outcomes and also on how he values these different outcomes. Let consider another of Martin’s examples. Let us assume the if someone buys a lottery ticket one possible outcome is losing £2 and the other is winning £1000,000. I have suggested that the difference between hope and despair is caused by the difference in how much someone values the different outcomes. In what follows it will be assumed that to value something means that someone ‘cares about’ or loves that thing. Some might care greatly about winning £1000,000 whilst regarding the loss of £2 as insignificant. At this point it might be objected all I am really saying is how much someone hopes depends on how much he desires the different outcomes. If my objector is correct and ‘caring about’ is just some extra strong desire then ’caring about’ cannot account for the difference between hope and despair. The fact that someone desperately desires some outcome might be a cause for despair when he considers the slim probability of the desperately desired outcome materialising. In response I would suggest ‘caring about’ is not the same as desiring. An addict might desire drugs but wishes he didn’t, taking drugs is something he doesn’t value or care about.
What is the difference between desiring something and ‘caring about’ something? It might be suggested that ‘caring about’ something has more persistence than desire. However some desires are quite persistent. A drug addict’s desire for drugs might be a persistent one. I would suggest that whilst persistence is a necessary condition for ‘caring about’ is not a sufficient one. However the drug addict example does suggest one way caring about might differ from desiring. Someone simply has desires and these need not be endorsed whilst what someone ‘cares about’ is endorsed at some in some way. On my interpretation of Martin she might believe such endorsement might be achieved by the carer being able to give reasons for what he ‘cares about’. If we accept the above then for someone to hope means he cares about some outcome which has a low probability and he is able to give reasons for his ‘caring about’. I’m doubtful whether Martin would accept such a position. This definition is a variation of the traditional definition in which desiring has been replaced by ‘caring about’ and to ‘care about’ some behaviour means to be able to endorse this behaviour at some higher level by giving reasons. A second way caring about differs from desiring is that caring about is connected to someone’s agency. What someone cares about is a persistent way of behaving which is endorsed by the carer being satisfied with his behaviour. This idea of ‘caring about’ or loving is that of Harry Frankfurt. In this context satisfaction doesn’t involve some smug feeling but entails an absence of restlessness or resistance to his behaviour. Frankfurt argues that to ‘care about’ something is to love that thing in some way. He argues the nature of a lover’s concern means that she identifies herself with what she loves (2). It is now possible to introduce a second definition of hope based on the traditional one. Someone hopes for some outcome which has a low probability of becoming true if he ‘cares about’ that outcome and ‘caring about’ means he is satisfied with his actions and identifies himself by his ‘caring about’, his behaviour is focussed on that outcome.
Does it make any difference which amended version of the traditional definition we adopt? Both definitions licence us to hope. It seems plausible that someone might be able to hope for some outcome without being able to give reasons for his hope, ‘I just hope that’. Martin might object that even if someone can’t fully articulate his reasons for hoping that nonetheless he has some underlying reasons supporting his hope. However it seems possible that someone might hope for some outcome simply because he is a hopeful person. It might then be argued that if we accept that someone may hope for some outcome simply because he is a hopeful person that we should adopt the second of our two amended traditional definitions of hope. Hoping is not the same as being an optimist. Let us accept that an optimist is a hopeful person. Perhaps an optimist might be better defined as someone who has a disposition to hope. If we accept the above definition then an optimist is defined by reference to hope. Unfortunately we cannot define hope by reference to a hopeful person for to do so would mean we had already defined hope. In the light of the above it might appear that to that we should adopt the first amended definition of hope. Someone doesn’t have to be an optimist to hope for some outcome he only has to ‘care about’ the outcome and to be able to give reasons for his ‘caring about’. At this point it might be objected that a pessimist might also hope for some outcome by ‘caring about’ that outcome and justify his ‘caring about’ by simply being satisfied with his actions. I am somewhat reluctant to accept the above, can someone really be said to be satisfied with his actions he is unable to give reasons for his satisfaction? For this reason I would suggest that the first amended traditional definition of hope should be adopted. For someone to hope for some outcomes means that he ‘cares about’ for this outcome which has a low probability of becoming true and ‘caring about’ means she is able to give reasons for her hope.
In what follows amended definition of hope will refer to
the first amended version of the traditional definition of hope unless stated
otherwise. Two important points can be made about accepting this definition.
Firstly optimism remains closely connected to hoping. It would seem probable
that because an optimist has a disposition to hope that he will also have a
disposition to seek reasons to justify his hope. Secondly I agree with
Korsgaard that our actions are connected to our identity. Actions without
reasons aren’t really actions at all and are something akin to a twitch. It
follows if reasons are connected to action then they are connected to agency.
It further follows hope is connected to agency.
Let us accept without any argument that despair is bad. It
follows when faced by troubles we can act in two ways. We simply accept these
troubles and accommodate our behaviour accordingly or if there is some small
probability that these troubles might pass could we hope for this outcome. A
stoic would argue that whilst we shouldn’t despair we should accept these
troubles and accommodate our behaviour accordingly and not make ourselves
vulnerable to disappointment by hoping. However it seems to me a life in which
we try to curtail our hopes would be an incomplete sort of life which fails to
grasp all that life might offer. An optimist would hope. What reasons do we
have to foster hope?
I will now briefly outline four ways in which someone’s
hope might benefit him when focussed on outcomes which matter to him, I then
outline one reason why someone’s hope might benefit someone else when focussed
on that person. Firstly in certain cases like Martin’s cancer example hope
might have some placebo like effect. Simply hoping for some outcome might make
that outcome slightly more probable. Secondly hoping might help us cope better
with some trial we are undergoing. For instance someone suffering from cancer
might feel better when coping with his cancer if he has some hope rather simply
accepting his condition. Such hope of course shouldn’t be some Panglossian type
of hope which pays no attention to outcomes other than the desired one. Thirdly,
and more importantly, hope may further someone’s ends. If hope is connected to
‘caring about’ as I have argued above then to hope means to take means to
achieve these ends when this is possible. Someone cannot be said to ‘care about’,
love, something if he takes no steps to further the end he loves when this is possible.
For instance, if when released from prison an offender takes a hopeful attitude
to his reoffending his hope might encourage him to take steps to stop himself
from committing further crimes. However it might be possible for someone to
desire something and takes no active steps to fulfil his desire, he might believe
the object of his desire as too hard or too improbable to achieve. Fourthly,
and also importantly, hope supports someone’s agency or autonomy and combats both
cynicism and passivity. If someone becomes overly cynical or passive then he
has fewer reasons to act. Someone starting on a diet with a cynical attitude is
unlikely to succeed. If someone sees few reasons to act then this lack of
reasons damages his sense of agency. Frankfurt regards someone who has no sense
of agency as a wanton (3) and as I have argued elsewhere such a person might
suffer from the
unbearable lightness of simply being. Someone suffering from cancer
might see himself as simply a sufferer. Lastly I would suggest that someone’s
hope is focussed on another person the expression of his hope might benefit
that person. If someone hopes that someone else will do the right thing he
sends a signal to the other that she has faith in him, he encourages her. For
instance if a mother hopes her child will do his homework she signals her faith
in him to do so. Signalling one’s hope in this way might encourage Mark
Alfano’s factious virtue
.
In the light of the above reasons for being hopeful it
might be assumed that we should encourage people to hope. However this isn’t
straightforward and I will now examine two objections to accepting this
assumption. The first might be termed the stoic objection. A stoic might argue
someone shouldn’t hope because the low probability of the desired outcome being
actualised means he is setting himself up for disappointment and that the disappointment
will harms him. Perhaps my stoic is right to some degree and some sort of
Panglossian hope is harmful. Perhaps completely unrealistic hopes removes us
too far from reality and damages agency. However as I have argued above a more
measured form of hope enhances someone’s agency. The real enemies of agency are
boredom and despair. The second objection against encouraging hope is that such
encouragement simply doesn’t work. I have argued that hope is based on ‘caring
about’ rather than on desires. It might then be argued that coming to ‘care
about’ is not simply a matter of choice but is constrained and hence not
responsive to encouragement (4). If a virtue is something that helps us to
flourish and something we can cultivate then if we accept the above hope is not
something we can cultivate as we can’t encourage it. This objection carries
some weight if we adopt the second amended definition of hope based on someone
being satisfied with his hope. However if we adopt the first amended definition
then caring about is endorsed by reasons and this means that we can give
reasons to encourage and support ‘caring about’, reasons to encourage and
support the virtue of realistic hope.
- Martin, Adrienne. 2014, How We Hope: A Moral Psychology (p. 11). Princeton University
- Harry Frankfurt, 2006, Taking Ourselves Seriously, , Stanford University Press 2006, p 41
- Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 106.
- Frankfurt, 1999, page 165
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