What do We Mean by Work?

It is always important to be clear about what we are talking about when discussing philosophical questions. What we mean by work is important because it raises some interesting philosophical questions. For instance, John Danaher wonder whether work makes us happy, Tim Douglas wonders whether the future is workless (1), or perhaps robots will mean that in the future we will have no need to work. In this posting I want to consider what we mean when we discuss work.

The Cambridge online dictionary defines work as “an activity, such as a job, that a person uses physical or mental effort to do, usually for money.” Work seems tied to the idea of a job. In might appear that we could improve our definition of what we mean by work by considering what we mean by a job. Unfortunately, what we mean by a job, is like that of work, far from clear, moreover sometimes the definitions of work and a job seem to be intertwined. For these reasons I will restrict my discussion to what we mean by work. Let us consider an old fashioned couple, the husband works on a farm providing them with an income whilst his wife does the housework in their home. This example raises several interesting questions. Are both doing the same thing at some basic level? If they aren’t it would appear that there is a family of related definitions of what we mean by work.  Examples of members of such a family are easy to imagine, working for a wage, housework, schoolwork and someone working on improving her game or garden. Indeed it would seem perfectly natural for someone to say she is going to work in her garden. If we accept such a family of meanings do all members of this family have equal worth or does the value of work vary depending on which member of the family we are considering?

I want to reject the idea that the meaning of work is really a family of related meanings for two reasons. First, the apparent appearance of a family of different meanings might be an illusion. It seems entirely plausible that work might have only one meaning and that the appearance of a family of meanings is not due to any difference in meaning but rather to the different domains work is carried out in. Farmwork is not conceptually different from housework, the apparent difference is due to the different domains each is carried out in. Secondly let us assume that what we mean by work is a family of related meanings. If we accept the above, then it should be possible to say something about the relationship between family members. However, if we can say something meaningful about this relationship between family members then perhaps what we say could form the basis of a common definition for all forms of work.

Let us accept that there is something common to the meaning of work in different domains. Work is different from play. If considering what is meant by a job doesn’t help us to define work, then perhaps considering the differences between work and play might do so. Both are forms of work and most forms of play can be fun but play is never serious whilst all work is serious. What do I mean by serious? If someone plays at something she can simply stop playing at will because play isn’t serious. If someone works at something she can’t simply stop working for no reason because work is serious. Of course she might dislike work and be glad to stop working but work matters to her and she must have a reason to stop working. If we accept the above, then even if professional footballers are playing a game they are also working. Indeed, someone whose garden matters to her might be said to working in her garden.

Let us accept that work must matter to the worker. Accepting the above doesn’t mean the worker must like her work. Indeed, in some circumstances the worker might hate her job. I have suggested someone can simply stop playing and that stopping has no important consequences for her. The same is not true of work. Someone might well stop working at her dead end job but stopping has consequences for her that matter. Her work matters even if this is only for instrumental reasons, these reasons might simply be making a living or buying the things she values. For someone who loves her garden stopping gardening might mean the garden she loves becomes neglected. Work was defined by the Cambridge online dictionary as “an activity, such as a job, that a person uses physical or mental effort to do, usually for money.” In light of the above work might be better defined as an activity requiring physical or mental effort and that activity matters to the worker. Adopting the above definition would mean working for a wage, housework, schoolwork and playing professional sport could all be regarded as work in the same way and need not be regarded as a family of loosely connected definitions and any apparent differences could be due to the different domains the work is carried out in.

I have argued the definition of work above means that we don’t have to accept a family of loosely connected definitions. The definition I have adopted above depends on the idea that work matters, work is something we care about. Accepting this definition means we had workers before our modern ideas about workers, a Neanderthal hunter might be regarded as a worker. However, even if work might be defined one way we might care about work in two ways. First, someone might work in order to make a living or to obtain the things she desires. Work matters to her for instrumental reasons. Someone working solely to make a living would be a good example of the instrumental value of work. Secondly, someone might work at something because this something matters directly to her. Work has a kind of intrinsic value to her. Someone working in a garden she loves would be good example of such work. Work might matter for what it enables us to obtain or work might matter because we care about what we are working at. Someone working solely to make a living and someone working in a garden she loves are extreme examples and many forms of work might matter to someone because of both values. For instance, someone might drive a bus in order to make a living whilst also take pride in her driving abilities.

Let us accept that work might be defined as an activity requiring physical or mental effort that matters to the worker and that work might matter to the worker for two reasons or some combination of the two. What are the consequences of accepting the above? The first of these is that we must reject the idea that work is a family of loosely related definitions. Of course there are different kinds of work, the work of a banker is different to that of the cleaner in the bank. However, at a basic level both are undertaking some activity, requiring physical or mental effort, which matters to both of them. Of course the complexity of the activity and the domain in which the activity is carried out matter, but these considerations don’t affect this basic definition. Secondly if work must of necessity matter to someone, work isn’t play, then work must be of some value in her life. I argued above that work can have instrumental or intrinsic value, we can work for something or work at something. If someone works at something simply because it matters to her then work gives her life meaning. Moreover, the reason why it matters does not alter the fact that working at something gives someone’s life meaning. For instance, someone might work at providing relief to the starving because she believes it’s a good thing to do whilst someone else might work at studying quasars simply because she finds quasars interesting. Both of these persons work at something for different reasons, but for both of them their work has intrinsic value giving their lives meaning. Let us now consider someone who works for its instrumental value. If someone simply work for something, then this something permits her to pursue the things that matter in life to her, the things that give her life meaning. If someone works as a cleaner, then this might enable her to feed the family she loves. Lastly let us assume that work gives our lives meaning and that automation might destroy many jobs. What are the likely consequences of accepting these assumptions and how should we deal with them? Let us first consider those workers who work instrumentally to obtain the things that matter to them. Clearly some will be unable to make a living which might lead to social unrest. One solution to the above could be the introduction of some sort of universal basic income (UBI). I would suggest that in such circumstances even capitalism has an interest in introducing UBI as it is dependent on some sort of social cohesion. Unfortunately, even if automation does destroy jobs and a UBI is introduced this introduction by itself might be insufficient to maintain social cohesion. If people become bored and little matters to them then social cohesion might become eroded. Boredom in this situation wouldn’t be a minor matter but of major concern both to individuals and society. One way of dealing with this concern might be to refocus the way people work. Perhaps people should focus on working at rather than working for. Such a refocussing would accord better with stoic ideals. Someone’s ability to work at something is less dependent on her having a job. Nonetheless such a refocussing of the way we work is not straightforward as many people would need to be helped to change their focus from working for to working at. I have suggested in a previous posting that such a refocussing might be helped by a refocussing of our education system, see work, automation and happiness . The focus of education might be broadened from simply preparing people for work to helping them to lead a good life.  Such a shift might be aided by placing greater emphasis on the humanities. Once again such a change in emphasis would accord better with stoic ideals. It might be objected that I am adopting a somewhat elitist attitude. I accept this objection and offer two suggestions to combat such elitism. First, the focus of education might be broadened still further to enabling some people learn a craft. Crafts sometimes allow the craftsperson to enter a flow state giving her life some meaning. Secondly in ancient Greece the elite lead a life of leisure in which sport and the gymnasium were important. Perhaps sport participation should play a greater part in any society which finds its cohesion damaged by automation. I have suggested above that a professional footballer might be regarded as a worker if we accept the above definition an amateur footballer might be said to work at his game. Like UBI such participation would be expensive but these costs might be partly offset by health benefits.

1. Tim Dunlop, Why the future is workless, New South Publishing.

Good Government, Democracy and Referendums

 

Government is an ongoing process. Any single referendum aimed at making a binding decision on some issue is not an ongoing process. Any such referendum is of course a process, but it is a process designed to bring about closure if the possibility of a further referendum is excluded. In this posting I will argue that accepting the result of some types of referendums, such as the Brexit one, is damaging to good government and is fundamentally undemocratic.

Democracy might be defined as the belief in freedom and equality among people. Democratic government might be defined as “a system of government in which all the people of a country can vote to elect their representatives.” (1) The two definitions are connected because if people aren’t free they can’t govern themselves. What does it mean to govern oneself? The ability to govern oneself is the ability to make decisions without being deceived or coerced and to enact those decisions. The ability to govern a state is much the same. It is the ability to decide which policies a state wishes to pursue together with the capability to enact them. The ability to govern of course applies to both dictatorships and democratic states. Democratic government takes place by its citizens determining its policies either directly, through such means as referendums, or by electing representatives. Personal government must of necessity be an ongoing process. Let us assume someone governs herself and that she decides at time t1 doing x is best thing for her to do. Let us next assume at time t2 and in a roughly similar situation she finds that she is unable to do anything other than x. I would suggest that at time t2 she is unable to fully govern himself. To be able to fully govern herself at t2 she must have the ability to revisit her past decisions and if necessary revise or change them. Accepting the above of course does not mean she must change her decision or even consider changing it. Moreover, any inability at t2 doesn’t need to be connected to any lack of further reflection on her part, she may be perfectly satisfied with her previous decision and feel no need for further reflection. However, even if she simply accepts some decision her acceptance cannot be forced onto her and she must retain the ongoing ability to accept or reject this decision. The same is also true of states. Governing a state requires that the state retains the continuing ability revise and if necessary change its own policies. Governing a state must of necessity be an ongoing process. States that don’t do so become lifeless and fossilised.

I now want to argue that the use of some sorts of referendums damage this ongoing process. It might be objected that provided the electorate in some referendum is not deceived or coerced that the result of the referendum can contribute to good government. I accept my objector’s position holds in some circumstances referendums can contribute to good government. Nonetheless I would argue that my objectors position doesn’t always hold in all circumstances. I will argue that use of some sort of democratic referendums to determine policy can damage good governance. Of course a democratic referendum might help to determine a policy. However, a democratic government must retain he ability to revise and if necessary change its own policies. If a referendum determines some government policies for the foreseeable future, then that government loses part of its ability to make and change some of its own policies in the future. The above holds even if the referendum in question was conducted democratically. In what follows I will consider referendums which determine some government policies for the foreseeable future rather than binding ones. No binding referendum binds forever, binding referendums only determine some policy for the foreseeable future. Referendums can express the will of the people but this expression isn’t the everlasting will of the people as everlasting will just doesn’t exist, people can, do and should be able to change their minds. Accepting he above means accepting that the use of a democratic referendum by any government, when the result of the referendum determines a policy for the foreseeable future, damages good government because good government is an ongoing process.

I have argued that referendums which determine government policy for the foreseeable future damage good government. It might be objected that I’m misrepresenting the point of referendums. The point of referendums is to shift the focus from elected government to a more direct form of governance. I accept my objector’s point. I accept that referendums can shift the focus from elected government to a more direct form of government. However, I will now argue that any referendum which is designed to determine long term policy damages good governance. How can direct government by the use of referendums possibly damage good governance? I am not suggesting all such referendums damage good governance. I am only suggesting that those referendums which determine some policy for the foreseeable future damage the ability of the electorate to govern themselves directly. Let us imagine a state which is governed directly by its electorate by the use of referendums. Let us assume that one of these referendums determines one of this states policies for the foreseeable future. I will now repeat my central argument as to why such a referendum damages good governance. Let us accept that government must be an ongoing process. This referendum damages this ongoing process. I have argued that someone’s ability to govern himself means she must have the retain ability to change his decision and that the same is true of voters. If voters in some referendum determine some policy for the foreseeable future, then they deprive themselves of the ability to decide on some policy at some future date. Even if referendums, which are designed to govern directly, are conducted democratically they can still damage good government and if they deprive the electorate of the ability to make further decisions on some matter are undemocratic. Both good government requires retaining the ability to react to changes in circumstances, any referendum which determines government policy for the foreseeable future destroys this ability to react. I suggested above that such referendums in spite of appearances are fundamentally undemocratic. Clearly any democratically conducted referendum which aims to elect a leader for life destroys democracy. I now want to argue that any referendum which takes place in a democracy with the aim of determining some policy for the foreseeable future damages that democracy. In a democracy the electorate must retain the ability to shape government policy. It might be objected that if the electorate have democratically determined some policy in a referendum that nothing can be more democratic than that. I would suggest soundness of this objection depends on how long such a referendum is meant to determine a state’s policy. Let us assume that a referendum determines some state’s policies for the foreseeable future. Such a referendum is undemocratic. Over time he electorate changes. Some electors die whilst others become enfranchised. It follows that the result of the referendum over time might come not represent the will of the majority of the electorate. The will of the majority might be ignored.

Let me once again make my position clear I’m not saying all referendums damage good governance or are undemocratic. Referendums which are advisory or determine short or perhaps even medium term policy need not damage a government’s ability to govern nor are they fundementally undemocratic. I am saying all referendums which determine long term policy or policy for the foreseeable future damage good governance and are undemocratic. I believe the Brexit referendum to be such a referendum. What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly, referendums should never be used to determine long term policy. Secondly if referendums must be used to determine policy in the medium term they should not be decided by a simple majority of actual voters. At the very least referendums to determine medium term policies should require a majority among all those eligible to vote in order to be valid. A larger majority should mean that the result of the referendum would remain the democratic will of the electorate for a longer period.

1. http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/democracy?q=democracy

Charlie Gard and Experimental Treatment for Children

Until recently I assumed without much reflection that it would be best if Charlie Gard was allowed to die peacefully. After some reflection I still believe this would be the most sensible option. However, after this reflection it seems to me that this case raises an important philosophical issue. What should form the basis of our decision making when deciding whether some experimental treatment might be appropriate for children. In this posting I will examine this issue. I have previously argued that autonomous adults with life threatening conditions have a right to try experimental treatments provided these treatments are privately financed, see wooler.scottus . I would argue that this right to try applies to all potential experimental treatments even when the chances of a cure are slim and possibilities of adverse side effects high. If the above is accepted, then it might appear to automatically follow that children’s parents have a right to try experimental treatment to combat their children’s life threatening conditions. I will argue this appearance is unsound and that the issues are more complicated when children are involved.

Let us accept a Millian account of autonomy is correct.  Let us accept that someone’s “own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” to preventing her from exercising her will provided this exercise does not harm to others. This acceptance implies that we must accept that autonomous adults have the right to try experimental treatments, subject to certain conditions, even when the results might be harmful. The same right does not extend to children. Parents must consider the physical, mental and moral good of their children. If parents fail to do so, then a court must decide what is in the child’s best interests. If we accept the above then it doesn’t mean children should never receive experimental treatment. However, it does mean the situation is more complicated than that in the case of adults.

It is generally accepted that parents should act in their children’s best interests and that if they fail the do a court has the right to intervene in order to protect these interests. Let us consider a case in which an experimental treatment becomes available to treat a gravely ill child. How should the child’s parents decide on whether she should undergo the treatment? Intuitively we might assume that they should decide whether the proposed treatment is in the child’s best interests. For any experimental treatment what is in the child’s best interests is a question of probability. Medical probabilities are complicated and parents and courts should usually take the advice of medical experts.

Does accepting the above mean parents should never accept any experimental treatment for a child who is gravely if this treatment is not recommended by the majority of medical experts and carries a low probability of success? Surely any treatment with a low probability of success cannot be in a child’s best interests. However, the above is not always true. In a few cases, experimental treatment might well be in a child’s best interests even if in the majority of cases it isn’t and in these cases might even be harmful. The philosophical issue I want to raise is on what basis should parents and courts use when deciding whether experimental treatment should be accepted. Most would suggest that the decision should be based on what is in the child’s best interests even if the probabilities attached to these interests are extremely hard to determine. I now want to argue such a suggestion is mistaken and that the decision should instead be based on the probability of whether any experimental treatment is likely to harm the child concerned.

Medical ethics is concerned with beneficence, non-maleficence and respect for patient autonomy. Usually parents or in some cases the courts decide whether experimental treatment is appropriate on the basis of what is in the child’s best interests. They apply the principle of beneficence. I appears that acting on the principle of beneficence excludes considerations of autonomy. I argued elsewhere that this assumption might not hold in the case of competent adults, see autonomy and beneficence . I have suggested above that in the case of a young child and experimental treatment that is sometimes impossible to ascertain what is in her best interests making it impossible to apply the principle of beneficence. Kant argued ought implies can. Let us accept Kant was right. It follows if we cannot ascertain what is in a child’s best interests that we ought not apply the principle of best interests. I would suggest that in this situation we should adopt the principle of non-maleficence. Adopting the principle of non-maleficence when considering the acceptability of using an experimental treatment for a child has two important consequences. First it means we need consider harm to the child. In the case of terminally ill children the harm of most concern must be the child’s suffering. Whether someone is suffering should be easier to determine than what is in her best interests. Secondly adopting the principle of non-maleficence brings respect for autonomy back into play. If the autonomous wishes of a sick child’s parents will not harm her then then these wishes matter.

What does accepting the above mean in practice? It might be objected that in practice it is just as difficult to act in a non-maleficent manner as it is to act beneficently. I would suggest such an objection carries little weight provided we ask and can answer three important questions concerning harm. First, we must ask whether the proposed treatment will cause any additional suffering to the child. Second, we must ask whether such treatment would extend the duration of her suffering. Thirdly, we must ask whether moving a child to receive such treatment will cause her further suffering. These questions remain difficult to answer. However, some further more practical questions might be asked to help us answer to answer the first three. I’m a philosopher and for this reason I will only tentatively outline some of these more practical questions. Is the child currently in pain? Will any experimental treatment lead to extra pain? Could any extra pain be controlled? Will the treatment cause nausea? These are clear cut questions and for this reason should be easier to answer than deciding if some treatment is in the child’s best interests. It follows that provided some experimental treatment will not cause a terminally ill child any further suffering, that from a non-maleficent basis, that there is no reason why that child should be denied such treatment provided it is privately financed. At this point I want to emphasise that I am only saying that experimental treatment should be acceptable according to the principle of non-maleficence, I’m not saying such a decision is a good decision.

What are the implications of the above in the case of Charlie Gard?  Should the wishes of his parents matter? When a court decides on what is in the welfare of a child the decision is based on what is in the child’s best interests. Accepting the above means that the wishes of Charlie Gard’s parents should play no part in the court’s decision. However, I have suggested that in cases such as that of Charlie Gard it is sometimes impossible to reach a decision based on best interests. Courts are concerned with practical matters and must make decisions. If a court cannot make a genuine decision based on beneficence then it might make a decision based on the futility of treatment in the belief that this equates with best interests. The two are not identical. Perhaps in these circumstances it would better not to fudge any decision and instead rely on the older principle of non-maleficence. It might even be argued that in these circumstances that a court deciding in a non-maleficent manner to limit a child’s suffering is also acting in a manner which might be loosely described as beneficent. I believe it would be more credible in these circumstances to simply admit acting on the principle of non-maleficence. If we accept the above, then certain questions need to be asked. Is Charlie suffering? Would any proposed experimental treatment cause him further suffering? Would moving him to receive any proposed experimental treatment cause him to suffer? Let us assume that Charlie is suffering then we must now ask whether any proposed experimental treatment likely to reduce or eliminate his suffering. If the answer is negative Charlie should be allowed to die peacefully. Let us assume Charlie isn’t suffering. It seems to me provided that the second and third questions above can be answered negatively that the wishes of his parents should matter and they should be free to seek experimental treatment provided it is privately funded. Accepting the above does not imply seeking such treatment is wise or desirable but only that it should be permissible.

In the light of the above discussion when dealing with difficult treatment options for seriously ill children we should ask the following questions when considering whether we should and if we should how to apply the principle of non-maleficence.

1. Is it possible to ascertain what is in a child’s best interests? Not just what we want to believe is in the child’s best interests. If the answer is no we can move on to apply the principle of non-maleficence.
2. Is the child suffering? If no we can move onto 4
3. Can this suffering be relieved? If yes we can go onto 4.
4. Will this proposed treatment cause further suffering which cannot be relieved. If no then such treatment is permissible according to the principle of non-maleficence even if others believe it to be futile

Autonomy and Beneficence

In this posting I want to investigate what we mean by autonomy and the relationship between autonomy and beneficence. I will firstly examine two different accounts of autonomy. In order to do so I will briefly outline the differences between a content neutral account of autonomy and a substantive one. I will then raise some difficulties with accepting a substantive account of autonomy. Next I will examine the relationship between a content neutral account of autonomy and acting beneficently. I will conclude that preference should be given to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently when these two values clash. I will then consider what specifically makes rape and slavery so wrong to support my conclusion. Lastly I will examine the implications of accepting this conclusion for the doctrine of informed consent, the age at which someone should be able to vote and the right of the disabled to make their own decisions.

John Stuart Mill defined the only way power can be rightfully exercised over another.

“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” (1)

Mill’s definition can be used to provide a definition of a content neutral account of autonomy. An autonomous person should always be free to exercise his will freely, provided this exercise doesn’t harm others. Such a definition of autonomy might be classed as a primitive or basic account. In what follows a basic account of autonomy will refer to a Millian account It might be suggested that advances in technology and medicine mean that such a basic account is an outdated one. It might be further suggested that these advances mean a more substantial account of autonomy is required. A substantive account. A substantive account of autonomy places some constraints on what an autonomous person can autonomously choose even when his choices don’t harm others. For someone’s decision to be autonomous it must accord with certain accepted norms in addition to the norm of not harming others.

I now want to present two arguments against adopting a substantive account of autonomy. My first argument will suggest that adopting a substantive account of autonomy would mean that autonomy becomes a superfluous concept. Let us consider a substantive account of autonomy in which someone’s decisions are only accepted as autonomous ones provided they would be regarded as reasonable by most reasonable people. It might be objected it would be hard to define which people are reasonable and what such reasonable people might find to be reasonable. For the sake of argument let us ignore this objection. Why does autonomy matter? It matters because it differentiates between those decisions we should always respect and others. Let us accept that an autonomous choice should be a reasonable one which would be accepted by most reasonable people. In this situation it seems that to talk of respect for autonomy becomes mere rhetoric. In this situation the concept of autonomy is doing nothing useful. Someone wanting to know which decisions he must respect, by deciding if they are autonomous decisions must first know that which decisions would be accepted by all reasonable people. I would argue that this is all he needs to know in order to respect someone’s autonomy. In this situation we simply don’t need the concept of autonomy. I would suggest the same argument can be applied to any other norms which might be applied in any other substantive account of autonomy such as, someone’s best interests, acceptability to society or giving no offence to religious standards. It appears to follow that those who advocate the need for a more sophisticated account of autonomy, a substantive one, make the concept of autonomy a redundant one.

I have argued above that respecting someone’s autonomy cannot simply mean acting to further someone’s best interests because if we do so the idea of respecting autonomy seems to do no useful work. I might act in my dog’s best interests but this doesn’t mean I respect him or believe he is an autonomous dog. Caring about someone or someone doesn’t seem to be the same as respecting autonomy. What then is meant by respect? Respecting someone doesn’t simply mean saying nice things about him for if this was so there would seem to be no difference between respect and flattery. I would suggest respecting someone involves admiration and that admiration is linked to valuing. For instance, if I respect someone I might do so because I admire his honesty, determination or his ability to make good decisions. I can admire someone because he is a certain kind of person but what qualities do I admire and value if I admire someone simply as person? What is a person? Christine Korsgaard argues that a person is not identical to the human being the person supervenes on. She suggests that,

“When you deliberately decide what sort of effects you will bring about in the world, you are deliberately deciding what sort of cause you will be. And that means you are deciding who you are.” (2)

It would be difficult to call anyone who was unable to make any decisions a person. However, whilst the ability to make decisions is a necessary condition for personhood it isn’t a sufficient one. Some who makes all his decisions randomly or based on mere whims might be regarded as a wanton according to Frankfurt (3). To be a person someone must have the capacity to make decisions based on what he cares about or values. What does the above tell us about respecting someone simply as a person? It would seem that if respect involves admiration then respect for a person involves admiration for a creature which can make his own decisions based on what he cares about. I have suggested that respect, admiration and valuing are linked. I would now suggest that respecting a person requires accepting his decisions. If we don’t do so, our supposed admiration and valuing of him as the kind of creature who can make his own decisions based on what he values, becomes mere rhetoric.

A defender of a substantive account of autonomy might object to the above and argue that we can respect someone’s autonomy by respecting him as the sort of creature that can make some of his own decisions. He might proceed to argue we need only accept those of his decisions which don’t harm his best interests. He might suggest that by doing so we then are still respecting his autonomy, we are just according it less importance. I would reject such a suggestion and. will now present two arguments to support my rejection.

Firstly, let us assume that we can respect someone’s autonomy by only accepting those of his decisions which are in his best interests. It might then be argued that provided we do so we are still respecting him as a person. But if we do so are we respecting someone simply as a person or a particular kind of person? For instance, I can respect someone simply as a person whilst at the same time failing to respect him as a particular kind of person.  I believe for instance that he is a bad parent. It seems if we respect someone’s autonomy, by only accepting those of his decisions which are in his best interests, that we are respecting a particular kind of person. We are only respecting those persons who make good decisions. Alternatively, we might only respect someone when he makes good decisions. Does this matter? Let us assume we only respect the autonomy of those people who make good decisions and that we should adopt a beneficent attitude to those who don’t. I have argued above that what defines someone simply as a person is his ability to make his own decisions, to shape his life. It appears if we only respect the autonomy of people who make good decisions that we fail to recognise some people simply as persons. Next let us assume that we only respect someone’s autonomy when he makes what we regard as good decisions. If we do so I can employ the argument used above and question whether respect for autonomy really does any useful work. It follows if we respect peoples’ autonomy by only accepting those of their decisions which we think are in their best interests that either we won’t be respecting some people simply as persons or we are only respecting people as a part time persons.

I now want to argue that if we respect someone’s autonomy by only accepting those of his decisions which we believe to be in his best interests that we aren’t acting in a fully caring way. It might be objected that we are only acting in this way because we really do care about people. In response I would suggest that in this situation because we decide what is in someone’s best interests we might be accused of epistemic arrogance. However, let us lay this suggestion aside and assume that respecting someone’s autonomy in this way doesn’t mean we are exhibiting epistemic arrogance. I would still suggest that this form caring is a deficient form. I accept if we act in such a way we are acting sympathetically but I would argue we aren’t acting empathically. True empathic care means we must care about what someone cares about rather than simply what we believe to be in his best interests. Someone might suggest sympathetic caring is as good as empathic caring. I would reject such a suggestion. I can care about someone or something sympathetically simply because I want him to flourish. This is the way someone might care for a dog he loves. Empathic caring isn’t so simple. If I care about someone empathically I must care about what he cares about in addition to what I believe are in his best interests. Empathic caring is a more complicated way of caring than caring based on sympathy. However, because something is more complicated doesn’t automatically mean it is better. People don’t want to be cared for in the same way as dogs. But why, surely it’s good to be loved, cherished and beneficently cared for? People don’t want to be cared for in the same way as pets because they value being recognised as persons which requires recognising them as the kind of creatures who can decide their own future. It follows if we care about people as persons we must care about what they care about and this requires caring about them in an empathic way.

Even if the above is accepted an objector might argue that if we care about someone empathically that whilst we must always care about what he cares about, in some situations we should give priority to acting beneficently. This argument supposes a particular concept of beneficence. This concept holds that to act beneficently is to act in someone’s best interests. It also holds that to act beneficently towards someone doesn’t always means acting in what he perceives to be in his best interests. This means we must act in accordance with some accepted standard, perhaps a standard that most reasonable people would accept. But if we act beneficently in this way who are we acting beneficently towards? We are certainly acting beneficently to human beings but towards persons? We are acting as if someone can be a part time person. It might be objected that there can’t be such a thing as part time person. I find this objection unconvincing. Children can make some decisions for themselves whilst their parents make others in their best interests. Children might be regarded as part time persons. Nonetheless I would suggest that most adults don’t want to be part time persons being a person is central to them. Perhaps this is one reason why children want to grow up. Being a person is central to most people’s interests. Can we be said to be acting truly beneficently towards someone if we are prepared to ignore what he perceives to be central to his interests? I would suggest we can’t. If we accept the above, it follows that acting truly beneficently requires acting in accordance with someone’s perceived best interests and not what we perceive to be in his best interests. It further follows if we act in a way that serves someone’s best interests, as we see them, that we are acting in a caring way, however our caring even if well intentioned is an incomplete form of caring.

At this point a further objection might be raised. It might be suggested that I’m presenting a misleading view of substantive autonomy. A substantive account of autonomy might be better defined as an account that places some constraints on what an autonomous person can choose, even when his choices don’t harm others, in some limited circumstances but in all other circumstances we should respect his choices. My objector might agree that in the past a basic account of autonomy was sufficient to protect our freedoms. He might now suggest that technological progress and modern medicine mean we have a need for a more sophisticated account of autonomy and that a substantive account satisfies this need. I have questioned above whether any substantive account of autonomy is actually an account of autonomy. I would suggest that any such proposed account is in reality an account of how to balance respect and caring about someone. How to balance respecting autonomy and acting beneficently. My objector might suggest that it is perfectly legitimate to balance these two. In response I would argue that whilst someone might well have a legitimate aim of respecting autonomy and acting beneficently when these two values don’t clash that this clash. A clash of these values depends on a particular account of beneficence. To act beneficently according to this account is to act in someone’s best interests and this doesn’t always means acting in what he perceives to be in his best interests. I have argued above that acting in this way is a deficient form of beneficence and is an incomplete form.

I have argued that we should reject a substantive account of autonomy for two main reasons. Firstly, if we adopt a substantive account of autonomy this account makes itself redundant. Secondly, if we adopt such an account we are not acting in a truly beneficent or caring way. Accepting the above means we must always accept someone’s basic autonomous decisions. It also means we cannot ignore such decisions or coerce someone into changing such a decision. Accepting the above also means we must sometimes accept bad decisions. Autonomous decisions needn’t be good decisions. In such cases we should attempt to persuade the decision maker to change his decision when it is unwise, however if our persuasion fails we must be prepared to accept the decision.

I now want to consider what’s wrong with slavery. It might be argued that the wrongness of slavery is self-evident. Slaves are abused and cruelly treated. However, R M Hare (4) used a thought experiment to show this need not always apply. He imagined an island called Juba which was ruled by a benevolent elite for the good of all with no abuse or cruel punishments. He also imagined an island called Camaica on which everyone was free but all lived in abject poverty. He speculated that some free citizens of Camaica might prefer to be slaves on Juba. If we accept such a situation is possible, even if unlikely, and we believe slavery is wrong what reasons can we advance for this wrongness. What is wrong is that the slaves on Juba are not regarded as the kind of creatures who can determine their own future and this harms them because as I have argued above for any person the ability to determine his own future is central to his interests. However, I will now argue that the concept of autonomy violated is our basic concept of autonomy. Is it conceivable that the substantive autonomy of the slaves on Juba could be respected? A substantive account of autonomy might allow a slave’s decisions to be accepted as autonomous ones and respected provided they are in his best interests and any decision a slave makes which aren’t in his best interests aren’t regarded as autonomous ones. If we accept a substantive account of autonomy, then the autonomy of the slaves on Juba would be respected. The slaves on Juba would be treated as children or part time persons. Wasn’t colonialism a bit like this? Beneficent colonialism was a bit like Hare’s imaginary Juba and treated the people colonised as children or only part time persons.

Let us now explore the wrongness of rape using a thought experiment similar to that of Hare. Let us consider a gentle rapist and a compliant victim. The physical harms caused by such a gentle rape are minimal nonetheless the crime doesn’t seem to be a minor one to us. What reasons can be advanced for the seriousness of a psychically gentle rape? It might be pointed out that the harm lies not the violence inflicted but the threat of violence, the violation of bodily integrity or both of these harms. I accept these points. Let us consider the violation of bodily integrity first. The simple fact that the victim’s body was penetrated is irrelevant, this could occur during consensual intercourse. What matters was that her body was penetrated against her will and this involves failing to respect her autonomy. Let us now consider the threat of physical harm causing psychological. Let us assume the victim is aware that she will not be harmed provided she complies. She complies and is raped. She isn’t psychically harmed and because she complied moreover she had no reason to fear psychical harm so any psychological harm is not due to fear of being psychically harmed. In spite of this I would argue psychological harm occurs. It occurs because she isn’t seen as the kind of creature who has a right to decide what to do with her own body, she isn’t considered as a person, her basic autonomy isn’t respected.

If we accept a non-substantive or basic account of autonomy as the only meaningful account of autonomy what implications does this have for the doctrine of informed consent? Is the doctrine of informed consent based on respect for autonomy? If the doctrine of informed consent is based on a substantive account of autonomy, then I would suggest the doctrine isn’t actually based on respecting autonomy for the reasons given above. In this situation the doctrine of informed consent is concerned with balancing acting beneficently and respecting autonomy. The concern is to stop people making bad decisions rather than respecting autonomous ones. This balancing act assumes beneficent care means acting in someone’s best interests as seen from a particular vantage point, perhaps what most reasonable people would consider to be in someone’s best interests. I have argued above such a concept of acting beneficently is an incomplete concept and that true beneficence requires always accepting basic autonomous decisions. Autonomous decisions don’t have to be good decisions. However autonomous decisions are not made randomly or based on mere whims. Autonomous decisions are based on what we care about, based on what matters to them.

Accepting the above has important implications and I will now briefly examine three of these. We might divorce the doctrine of informed consent from respecting autonomy and simply say that the doctrine is concerned with furthering patients’ best. This would be an honest approach. However, if we do so when we ask patients for their consent are we really asking for consent or acquiescence? Alternatively, we might accept that the doctrine of informed consent is based on respect for basic autonomy. If we do so it seems to me that a patient can make an autonomous decision simply to trust his doctor’s advice, after all we trust lawyers, accountants and other professionals all the time. It also seems that the information needed to make a basic autonomous decision is less than that currently supplied when taking informed consent. This might have more to do with a fear of litigation rather than a misguided concept of autonomy, see montgomery and the information needed for informed consent . The information required for informed consent should be patient driven and be determined by how much information he needs and wants to make an autonomous decision. Secondly democracy depends on voters’ ability to make an autonomous decision. If we accept a basic concept of autonomy, then perhaps the voting aged should be lowered. Perhaps it should be lowered to the age needed to give sexual consent. Lastly the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities want more people with cognitive and psychosocial disabilities to make their own decisions, see United Nations . Let us accept that an autonomous person has the right to make his own decisions. It follows that how many people with cognitive and psychosocial disabilities should be able to make these decisions depends on the concept of autonomy employed. If as I have suggested a basic concept is employed then more disabled people should be able to make their own decisions as an autonomous decision is not the same as a good decision. The emphasis should be on helping such people make good decisions rather than making good decisions on their behalf.

1. John Stuart Mill, 1974, On Liberty, Penguin, page 69
2. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 1
3. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge, page 114
4. R. M. Hare, 1978, What is Wrong with Slavery, Philosophy and Public Affairs 8.
5. Matthew Burch, 2017, Autonomy, Respect and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Crisis, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 34(3) 

Widespread Moral Enhancement

In my last posting I examined whether we should morally bio-enhance psychopaths. I concluded that we should encourage such enhancement. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that there is a need for a much more widespread moral enhancement in order to counter the existential dangers our modern world poses (1). They argue that because our morality developed in small communities it is unsuitable for combatting these dangers. I accept that there is a need for such enhancement. In this posting I want to examine how widespread such enhancement needs to be in order to be effective and how such enhancement might be implemented.

Some might argue that if we change our society by becoming more tolerant then we will naturally morally enhance the members of society. If someone lives in a brutal society then she is more likely to act in a brutal manner, whilst if she lives in a tolerant society her toleration is likely to increase. Stephen Pinker argues that this is already be happening (2). I believe society can change people, enhance people, but that this change is extremely slow. The existential dangers we face are pressing and it seems likely that moral enhancement by creating a more tolerant society might be too slow to combat these dangers.

Persson and Savulescu favour moral bio-enhancement. According to them provided such enhancement is proven to be safe then,

“some children should be subjected to moral bio-enhancement, just as they are now subjected to traditional moral education.” (3)

What exactly do Persson and Savulescu mean by moral bio-enhancement? They argue that moral bio-enhancement should seek to increase our dispositions for altruism and justice They argue moral bio-enhancement should do so by making,

 “men in general more moral by bio-medical methods through making them more like the men who are more like women in respect of sympathy and aggression, but without the tendency to social forms of aggression.” (4)

Such bio-enhancement is aimed at changing our dispositions in respect to empathy or sympathy but does not seek to change our cognitive abilities. Let us accept that such enhancement is safe. I now want to examine two questions regarding this form of enhancement. First is it likely to be effective and secondly should such enhancement be mandatory or voluntary.

If we simply enhance our disposition for empathy is such an enhancement likely to combat the dangers facing us? Some have argued that enhancing someone’s empathy simply increases the degree of empathy she feels, but doesn’t expand the domain of her empathy. Paul Bloom questions the benefits of empathy by suggesting that increasing people’s empathy is more likely to increase tension between different groups rather than diminish it. (5) If we accept Bloom is correct then we have reason to believe moral bio-enhancement based solely on enhancing our capacity for empathy would not be very effective. However, I believe there are reasons why dual enhancement involving both our capacity for empathy and cognitive abilities might be more effective, see moral character enhancement . It seems possible that if we enhance our cognitive abilities whilst at the same enhancing our capacity for empathy that such dual enhancement might lead to a broadening of the domain of our moral concern. Bloom holds that it is useful to compare empathy with anger.

“Both are universal responses that emerge in childhood. Both are social, mainly geared toward other people, distinguishing them from emotions such as fear and disgust, which are often elicited by inanimate beings and experiences. Most of all, they are both moral, in that they connect to judgments of right and wrong.” (6)

Judgments are based on the way we view some situation. The way we view some situation depends to some degree on our cognitive abilities. It follows if judgments are similar in some way to empathy that empathy might also depend to some degree on our cognitive abilities. In the light of the above it might be sensible to also enhance our cognitive abilities if we are going to enhance our capacity for empathy.  In the light of the above I would suggest that provided it can be shown that cognitive enhancement enlarges the domain of our empathy that any moral bio-enhancement should be dual enhancement.

Let us accept that dual moral bio-enhancement is desirable and that the means of such enhancement are safe. In these circumstances should such enhancement be mandatory or voluntary? In my previous posting I argued that any moral bio-enhancement of psychopaths should be voluntary in order to respect their autonomy. I will now argue the same is true of more widespread moral bio-enhancement. It might be objected that the need to counter the threats posed by climate change and nuclear armageddon should trump respecting autonomy. Indeed, my objector might point out if we don’t deal with these existential threats there will be few people left whose autonomy we should respect. In response to my objector I would suggest that there is no need to make moral bio-enhancement mandatory in order to counter these threats. It has been assumed that such enhancement has been thoroughly tested and proved to be both safe and effective. In these circumstances it might appear that any decision about becoming morally bio-enhanced is simply a no brainer. Surely we all want to be good people? In response my objector might point out that vaccines have thoroughly tested and proved to be both safe and effective and in spite of this some people refuse to have their children vaccinated even though they desire that their children enjoy good health. She might then argue by analogy that much the same would apply to any moral bio-enhancement. I am prepared to accept that my objector is correct in her assessment that some people would not voluntarily morally bio-enhance themselves. However, I will now argue that her analogy is unsound. For any vaccination program to be effective a high percentage of the population need to be vaccinated. For moral bio-enhancement to be effective, in order to counter existential threats, I would suggest that only a majority of people need take such enhancement in a democracy. A majority is all that is needed to enact legislation to counter these threats. I would further suggest that provided moral bio-enhancement is proven to be safe and effective a majority of people would take it. It follows that even if a substantial minority refuse to take such enhancement that there is no need for such enhancement to be mandatory.

My objector now might raise a further objection. She might argue that cost of such enhancement might deter a majority of people from taking it. If the costs of any bio-enhancement are high then I am prepared to accept my objector’s objection, but I am doubtful whether in practice such costs would be high. If the majority of the population take such enhancement, then these large numbers should lower these costs. However, let us assume I am wrong and that the costs would be high. Let us accept that civilised society has duty to protect both itself and its citizens from anarchy and possible destruction. It follows if society faces anarchy and destruction due to these existential threats which could be avoided by moral bio-enhancement provided the costs of such enhancement were lower, that society should subsidise or freely provide moral bio-enhancement. In addition, such enhancement would carry further benefits for society. If someone is morally bio-enhanced, then it seems probable that she will be less likely to commit crime. More fancifully moral bio-enhancement might reduce the threat of terrorism. Reduced crime would be a saving for society. It follows that society has financial incentives to encourage moral bio-enhancement. In the light of the above it seems improbable that the cost of moral bio-enhancement is going to prevent the majority of people taking it provided it is safe.

In the above it has been assumed that moral bio-enhancement is safe. This assumption may be false because all drugs have some side effects. In these circumstances we would still be faced with existential threats and a morality which seems incapable of addressing these threats. In these circumstances there is a further alternative we might consider. Perhaps we might use algorithms to guide our decision making in response to these threats. It might be objected that the use of algorithms threatens our autonomy. I response I would argue whether this threat is meaningful depends on how we use any such algorithms. I am not suggesting we simply use algorithms to make these difficult decisions for us but rather to guide our decision making. I am suggesting that we might possibly use algorithms in assisting us in making moral decisions. Such assistance should be interactive and the algorithms in question might evolve in response to our interactions. I have dealt with algorithmic assisted moral decision making at greater length in a previous posting. Perhaps using algorithms in such a way does not threaten our autonomy.

1. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.
2. Stephen Pinker, 2011, The Better Angels of our Nature, Viking.
3. Persson & Savulescu, page 113.
4. Persson & Savelescu, page 112.
5. Bloom, Paul. Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (pp. 207-208). Random House.
6. Bloom, page 207.

Psychopaths and Moral Enhancement

 

Michael Cook questions whether psychopaths should be morally bio-enhanced. This posting will examine his question. In attempting to answer Cook’s question I will attempt to answer several related questions. A psychopath might be roughly defined as someone who lacks feelings for others and has no remorse about any of his actions, past or present. A psychopath is someone, who even if he understands moral requirements, does not accept these requirements. In this posting it will be assumed that moral bio-enhancement should be focussed on this non acceptance. The first related question I want to address is whether a psychopath’s non acceptance of moral norms is a form of disability? Secondly I will consider whether any moral bio-enhancement of psychopaths should be mandatory, I will argue it shouldn’t. Thirdly I will consider whether we have a moral duty to offer moral bio-enhancement to someone convicted of some crime due to his non acceptance of moral norms, I will argue we do. Lastly I will suggest if it is permissible to offer moral bio-enhancement to psychopaths there is no reason not to permit moral bio-enhancement more generally.

Let us accept that if someone suffers from a disability and we can mitigate the effects of his disability that we have a prima facie duty to do so provided the costs associated with so doing are not too onerous. Let us also accept that some form of safe moral bio-enhancement becomes possible, such safe enhancement is unavailable at the present time. It appears to follow in such circumstances provided that a psychopath’s failure to accept moral norms is a form of disability that we have a prima facie duty to mitigate the effects of this disability. It further appears to follow that if we can only mitigate this disability by bio-enhancement that we have a duty to do so provided such enhancement is safe. Is a psychopaths non acceptance of moral norms a disability? Most psychopaths are able to understand moral requirements and so their failure to act in accordance with these requirements is not caused by an inability to understand moral norms. It appears to follow that a psychopath’s non acceptance of moral norms is not a disability. This appearance is too simplistic. Let us accept that most psychopaths can understand moral norms even if they don’t accept these norms. Perhaps this lack of acceptance might be due to an inability to feel the force of moral norms and that this inability to feel should be classed as a disability. It follows that a psychopath’s failure to accept moral norms might be regarded as a disability.

Does this moral disability matter? I will now argue whether it matters depends on the context. It has been suggested that some CEO of some large companies have psychopathic tendencies. Having psychopathic tendencies might be seen as enhancing by a CEO whilst the same tendencies might be seen as a disability by someone if they lead to him being imprisoned for some crime. I argued above that if someone suffers from a disability and that we can mitigate the effects of his disability then we have a moral duty to do so, provided the costs associated with doing so are not too onerous. It follows if a psychopath lives in circumstances in which his condition might be classed as a disability he should be morally bio-enhanced. This enhancement should only take place subject to the provision that means used are safe and costs involved aren’t too onerous.

The above conclusion needs some clarification. A psychopath who is the CEO of a large company might not want to be morally enhanced even if his condition disables him in some social contexts. I would suggest that we only have a duty to offer moral enhancement to psychopaths. It might be objected that my suggestion is too weak. My objector might point out that some psychopaths damage society and other people. He might proceed to argue that for such people moral enhancement should be mandatory rather than voluntary due to the need to protect society. I accept that we need to protect people and society from psychopaths but I do not accept we must do so by means of mandatory biomedical moral enhancement. We can protect society from those psychopaths who harm it by restricting their freedom. Let us assume there is a safe bio-medical form of enhancement which prevents psychopaths from committing crimes due to their condition. My objector might now argue that mandatory moral bio-enhancement is both a cheaper and a more humane way of treating psychopaths who have committed crimes than detention. Mandatory moral bio-enhancement would be better for both psychopaths and society.

I would reject such an argument which could easily be extended to include paedophiles. Let us accept most psychopaths retain their autonomy. Unfortunately, whilst exercising their autonomy some psychopaths damage society. My objector wants to limit the damage done to society by removing some of a psychopath’s capacity for autonomy. Is it possible to remove some of someone’s capacity for autonomy? We can of course restrict the exercise of someone’s autonomy but this is not the same as removing some of someone’s capacity for autonomous action. I would suggest that we should limit the damage psychopaths do to society by limiting his ability to exercise his autonomy rather than modifying his autonomy for autonomous action. Some might question whether there is a meaningful difference between these two approaches. I now want to argue there is. If someone’s ability to make autonomous decisions is modified, then he is changed as a person. If someone’s ability to exercise his autonomy is removed, then he is not changed as a person even though the exercise of his will is frustrated. Does the difference between changing someone as a person and frustrating his will matter? If we change someone as a person we treating him simply as a thing. We are treating him in much the same way as something we can own and can do with it as we please. Psychopaths may differ from most of us but they are still human beings and should be treated as such, they should not be treated in the same way as something we own, should not be treated in the same way as an animal. If we frustrate a psychopath’s will by detaining him, we are not treating him as something we own but merely protecting ourselves. We are still accepting him as a person, albeit a damaged person. In the light of the above I would suggest that the mandatory moral bio-enhancement of psychopaths would be wrong. I also would suggest that psychopaths should be offered voluntary moral bio-enhancement. It seems probable most psychopaths would accept such enhancement on a voluntary basis if the alternative might be compulsory detention. Accepting the above would mean that we are still respecting the autonomy of those psychopaths who need to be detained.

I have argued that we should offer voluntary moral bio-enhancement to psychopaths but it is feasible that the exactly the same form of enhancement might be offered to people in general. Prima facie such an enhancement would not be regarded as correcting some disability. It might then be argued that because such enhancement is not correcting any disability that it cannot be argued by analogy that a more general moral bio-enhancement is desirable. I would reject such argument because I don’t believe the prima facie assumption stands up to close examination. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu suggest we are unfit to face the feature as our morality has not developed enough to permit us to cope with technological progress (1). What exactly does unfit mean? I would suggest being unfit means we are unable to counter some of the dangers created by our technology. If we are unable to do something in some circumstances, then we have an inability, in these circumstances we have a disability. It is conceivable that prior to our most recent technological advances our morality was fit for purpose. It might be argued our morality remains fit for purpose but that these advances have made it difficult for us to accept the full implications of our moral norms disabling us in much the same way psychopaths are disabled. It follows that the prima facie assumption that a more general moral enhancement by bio-medical means should not be regarded as correcting some disability is unsound. It might be concluded that if technological changes make our morality unfit for our purposes by morally disabling people that it can be argued by analogy that more general moral enhancement by bio-medical means is desirable. It might be objected that this conclusion is not the only option available in these circumstances, we might try to change our current circumstances. My objector might suggest that instead of a more general moral enhancement we should reject our most recent technological advances and seek to return to circumstances in which we accept the norms of our evolved morality. Such a suggestion seems impractical for two reasons. First, once the genie is out of the bottle it is hard to put it back in. Secondly I am doubtful if our morality was ever fit for purpose once we ceased being hunter gatherers.

We live in a dangerous world, provided safe moral bio-enhancement becomes available should such enhancement be mandatory? In the light of the dangers we face such an option seems to be an attractive one, but I would somewhat reluctantly reject it. Mandatory moral bio-enhancement would damage our autonomy. Our autonomy forms the basis of us being moral agents and damaging our agency would also damage our moral systems. If safe moral bio-enhancement becomes available, then it should encouraged, perhaps subsidised, but it should remain voluntary.

1. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.

Automation, Work and Education

Our world is becoming increasingly automated and this increase appears to be having an effect on the number of jobs available. It is possible that in the future automation might not only lead to a decrease in the number of existing jobs but also create an increasing number of different jobs. A second possibility is that automation will mostly lead to a decrease in the number of jobs. In this posting I want to examine some of the consequences this second possibility has for work and education.

Pessimists might argue that a widespread loss of jobs will lead to widespread hardship and poverty. I believe such a pessimistic outcome is unlikely because such an outcome would threaten the survival of both the state and the market economy. In this situation both the state and the markets would have reasons to introduce some form of universal basic income, UBI. According to Tim Dunlop UBI means,

“A basic income, on the other hand, is the idea that everyone should be paid a minimum monthly income that allows them to meet their basic economic needs.” (1)

It is important to note that UBI in response to increasing unemployment caused by automation is not some attempt to reform the benefits system but rather an attempt to counter an existential threat which might be posed to the state due to this unemployment. It might be speculated that UBI might not just be useful in combating the effects of unemployment but might also be necessary for the continuation of capitalism. In an age of large scale automation, capitalism might survive without workers but it seems doubtful if it could survive without consumers In the rest of this posting I am going to assume that if automation causes widespread job losses in any state that that state will introduce some form of UBI in order to counter this existential threat. I will further assume that UBI will be large enough to permit people to live in moderate comfort.

Some might think that automation and UBI will lead to some golden age. In the ancient world the upper classes in Greek and Roman society led a life of leisure in which most of the work was done by slaves. It might be argued by analogy that automation might introduce a golden age in which we live a life of leisure with most work either becoming automated or done by robots. I believe such a golden age is an illusion for two reasons. First, upper class Greeks and Romans may have lead happier lives than their slaves but there is no evidence that they lead happier lives than people living now. The ancient golden age at least for some appears to be an illusion and so any argument by analogy fails. Secondly if we live in a world in which all the work is automated or done by robots we might suffer from the unbearable lightness of simply being. We might feel our world has lost all purpose and that we simply exist. We might become bored. Limited boredom might encourage us to take steps to alleviate our boredom but prolonged boredom is harmful. According to Harry Frankfurt boredom is not some innocuous discomfort but something that threatens our psychic survival. (2) I have previously argued that a world whose inhabitants are bored and feel they are simply existing is a dangerous world, see riots and the unbearable lightness of simply being . It is possible that even if automation frees people from work and that the resultant widespread loss of jobs does not lead to widespread hardship and poverty that it might also lead to people’s lives being degraded rather than some golden age.

The above pessimistic scenario seems to be a realistic possibility and I now want to examine what might be done to counter the negative effects of such a possibility. Prior to my examination I want consider what we mean by work. Work might be roughly defined as making an effort for some economic reward or hope of such a reward. However, such a definition is at best an incomplete one. I have suggested previously that someone might work in her garden purely for the pleasure it brings her without any thought of economic reward. Hannah Arendt suggested there is a difference between work and labour. According to Arendt labour is what we do in the normal process of living in order to survive. For Arendt work might be simply defined as any human activity which is not driven by our need to survive. Arendt’s definitions are interesting but also seem to be incomplete ones to me, dancing is not working. Intuitively work requires some effort. Work might be now defined as any human activity requiring effort which is not driven by our need to survive. Such a refined definition also seems an incomplete one. If I am running away from a bull I might make a great effort but I’m not working. Work might be now defined as any human activity which matters to us requiring effort which is not driven by our need to survive. I believe Arendt’s insight is important and I will use it to define two different ways of working. I believe it might be better to label labouring as ‘working for’ something we need to survive. ‘Working for’ something has mostly instrumental value. Work defined as a human activity which matters to us requiring effort which is not driven by our need to survive might be labelled as ‘working at’. ‘Working at’ has mostly intrinsic value.

Let us now examine the possible effects of increasing automation bearing in mind these two definitions of work. Let us assume that automation might decrease or even eliminate our need to ‘work for’ things, to work instrumentally. Does this decrease matter? I would suggest it does matter to someone if she doesn’t ‘work at’ something. In such a situation it seems highly probable that such a person might suffer from the unbearable sense of simply being. She might feel her world has lost all purpose and that she’s simply existing. It follows we have some reason to fear the effects of increasing automation.

Assuming we aren’t Luddites and don’t want to or can’t stop the progress of automation what steps should we take to mitigate some of the worst effects of not ‘working for’ anything? First, if automation greatly decreases our need to ‘work for’ we would need to refocus our education system. At the present time at lot of education focusses on equipping people for jobs, to ‘work for’. Let us assume people no longer need to ‘work for’ and that a purely hedonistic lifestyle also leads to a lightness of simply being. In such a situation ‘working at’ something might help counter someone’s sense of simply existing due to her ceasing to ‘work for’ something. In this situation education should focus on enabling people to ‘work at’. In order to do so science education remains important because we need to understand how the world we live in works. But we also need to simply understand how to live in such a world and to enable us to do so education should place greater emphasis on the humanities.

I have argued in a highly automated age people need to become better at ‘working at’ something. All work can be good or bad and this includes ‘working at’. Someone might ‘work at’ doing crosswords all day. I would suggest this is not good work. If ‘Working at’ is to replace working for it must be good work. Samuel Clark defines one element of good work is that it requires some skill. According to Clark,

“the development of a skill requires: (1) a complex object and (2) a self-directed and sometimes self-conscious relation to that object.” (3)

I now want to consider each of these requirements. According to Clark good work involves working at something which must have some complexity. According to Clark the something we work at must have a complex internal landscape of depth and obstacles (4). He gives as examples of a skilled activity, music, mathematics, carpentry, philosophy and medicine. Doing crosswords might be a difficult task but it lacks complexity. Clark argues good work must be self-directed. Let us assume someone is self-directed to work at some complex task purely to mitigate her sense of simply being. I would suggest that such self-direction fails. Why does it fail? It fails because in order to prevent this sense of simply being someone must work at something that satisfies her. For an activity to satisfy someone she must care about that activity. Let us accept that Frankfurt is correct when he argues ‘caring about’ is a kind of love because the carer must identify with what she cares about. It might be concluded that good work is doing something complex which the doer ‘cares about’ or loves. It might then be suggested that provided people can ‘work at’ something and that this is good work and that this ‘working at’ might mitigate the some of the effects of job losses due to automation.

 However even if we accept the above difficulties remain. Let us assume any good work either ‘working for’ or ‘working at’ requires some skilfull action. Let us further assume a skilful action requires that the doer must identify with her actions by ‘caring about’ or loving them. Unfortunately, ‘caring about’ or loving is not a matter of choice.

“In this respect, he is not free. On the contrary, he is in the very nature of the case captivated by his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice.” (5)

It further if someone simply chooses to ‘work at’ something in order to compensate for her loss of ‘working for’ that this ‘working at’ need not be good work and as a result won’t mitigate her sense of boredom. Someone cannot simply choose to do anything to alleviate her boredom. If she simply chooses it seems probable her choice will bore her. She must ‘care about’ what she chooses. If society is help mitigate the effects of job losses, due to automation, then it must create the conditions in which people can come to care about doing complex things. I have suggested above that education might help in this task. W B Yeats said ‘education is not the filling of a pail, but rather the lighting of a fire’ perhaps education must fire peoples’ enthusiasms every bit as much as enabling their abilities. Perhaps also we should see learning as a lifelong process. Lifelong education broadly based which fires peoples’ enthusiasms might help create the conditions in which people can ‘work at’ things hence mitigating some of the harmful effects of job loss due to automation.

Lastly there are activities which might mitigate some of the harmful loss of jobs which have little to do with work. Music and Sport would be examples of such things. Of course it is possible to ‘work at’ music and sport, we have professional sportspersons and musicians, but most people just play at such activities. Play is a light hearted pleasant activity done for its own sake. Play is important; especially for children. It might be suggested that some forms of play are a form of good ‘working at’. All work is goal directed and so is some play. Perhaps there is a continuum between work and play with the importance of the goal varying. Perhaps in an automated age play should become more important to older people also. Activities playing sport or music require some infrastructure and perhaps in an automated age it is even more important that society helps build this infrastructure. At the present time governments foster elite sport. Perhaps this fostering should change direction to fostering participation rather than funding elite athletes.

1. Tim Dunlop, Why the future is workless, (Kindle Locations 1748-1749). New South. Kindle Edition.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 2006, The Reasons of Love, Princetown, University Press, page 54
3. Samuel Clark, 2017, Good Work, Journal of Applied Philosophy 34(1), Page 66.
4. Clark, page 66.
5. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 135.

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