Does our Concept of Happiness change as we Age?

It is generally accepted that happiness is important in our lives. However, in philosophy there is a great deal of disagreement about exactly what exactly is meant by happiness, about the concept of happiness. As we age different things make us happy as compared to when we were younger. However, there is an additional question does the way in which we are happy also change? In other words what it means to be happy changes with age; the concept of happiness applicable to us changes with age. Clearly different things please different people. I’m getting old and the things that make me happy differ from those that make my grandchildren happy. The question I wish to address does not concern such differences. The question I am concerned with in this posting is this; are people of all ages happy in the same way but with their happiness focussed on different things or is the way in which people of different ages are happy differ?

Let us firstly examine this question from a psychological perspective of happiness. According to Martin Seligman happiness consists in someone having positive emotions, being engaged with life or having flow, having meaning, achieving something and having friends (1). It is possible to question whether meaning, achieving something and having friends are an essential part of the concept of happiness or are simply one of the things which make us happy. I have suggested that meaning, love and happiness are all inescapably intertwined, see meaning, love and happiness . Clearly both my grandson and I experience positive emotions and each of us has our own friends. My grandson who is seven, goes to school and I believe he achieves things there which satisfy him. For me writing this blog is some sort of small achievement. Whilst writing it I am engaged and sometimes achieve some pleasure. I believe my grandson obtains a sense of achievement, even if this is only when he is playing minecraft. Let it be accepted that both of us find some sort of achievement in our lives either by playing the game well or in my case by writing about happiness. It follows provided we accept Seligman’s definition of happiness that my grandson and I are both happy in much the same way even if we are happy about different things. However, my grandson has a baby brother who is clearly happy at times. His baby brother has positive emotions but has no sense of meaning or achievement and has no friends because he is still a baby. Does it follow that he is happy in a different way to his elder brother and me? Using Seligman’s definition of happiness suggests the answer is yes. I however would suggest as of now he is happy in an incomplete way. I would further suggest that as he matures he will develop and become happy in a more complete way.

 

I now want to examine whether the concept of happiness applicable to people changes as they age from two different philosophical perspectives. Firstly Fred Feldman regards happiness as attitudinal hedonistic happiness (2). Basically attitudinal hedonistic happiness consists not only of sensory pleasures but also consists in our being pleased or displeased about some states of affair. Basically this means someone could be happy when eating a good meal but she could also be happy because she believes it is cooked by someone she loves. If we accept Feldman’s position then it seems all people young and old are happy in the same way even if they are happy with different things. Feldman’s position also accounts for the different ways my grandsons experience happiness. The younger clearly has sensory pleasures but as yet he takes no pleasure from states of affairs.

The second perspective from which I wish to examine the question of aging and happiness is from that of Daniel Haybron. According to Haybron,

“To be happy then, is for one’s emotional condition to be broadly positive – involving stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement – with negative central affective states and mood propensities only to a minor extent.” (3)

According to Haybron someone’s emotional condition is not just characterised by her emotions but also by her moods and dispositions. He regards being happy as a state of psychic affirmation. I believe his definition has some features in common with Seligman. Both definitions include engagement and endorsement might be seen to involve meaning. However, Seligman seems to be concerned with all affective states whilst Haybron makes a difference between central and peripheral affective states. He hints at a link between happiness and the self that does not apply in peripheral cases (4).  Intuitively Haybron seems to be justified in making a distinction between central and peripheral affective states for it seems probable that a mother would obtain more happiness from watching her child playing on a swing than from the ice cream she is enjoying whilst doing so. Being a mother is a central affective state whilst enjoying an ice cream is peripheral one. 

Let us accept that Haybron is correct and that someone’s happiness is linked to her sense of self. It might then be suggested that because we are all different, each self is different, that different concepts of happiness ought to be applied to different people. In particular, it might be suggested that because there are differences between the young and old that different concepts of happiness are applicable to the young and old. It follows that my initial suggestion that the concept of happiness changes as we age might be justified. In order to examine the plausibility of this suggestion we must understand examine how the self is linked to happiness. Firstly, let us assume that the self is linked to happiness simply because the self determines what makes someone happy. However, if this assumption is accepted then there is no real concept of happiness. If people can be happy in radically different ways, rather than each person simply determining the things that make her happy, then there would be no real meaningful concept of happiness. It follows the concept of happiness applicable to us does not change as we age because we simply don’t have such a concept. Secondly let us assume that the self is linked to happiness because the things that make us happy help define the self. If the self is linked to our happiness by the things that make us happy then as we age once again there is no reason why the concept applicable to us should change. The things that make us happy might change as we age but the way we are happy does not. Once again it appears my initial worry that the way in which we are happy might change with age is unjustified.

However, it might be objected that it is ridiculous to assume all the things that make someone happy help define her self. My objector might proceed to point out the fact a mother enjoys an ice cream while watching her child play on a swing surely doesn’t help define her self. Haybron would surely agree with the above. In reply I would suggest if a mother usually enjoys an ice cream whilst watching her child that this does indeed help define her self even if only to a very minor degree. Haybron suggests it is only central affective states that are linked to the self. Haybron further suggests what distinguishes central affective states from peripheral ones is that someone has a disposition to act on the former and no disposition to act on the latter (5). I would suggest that a central affective state means someone must have a disposition to experience that state. However, having a disposition to experience a certain affective state alone does not mean it is a central affective state. I would argue what also matters is the strength of any disposition. For instance, our mother may well have a disposition to enjoy ice cream causing her to buy ice cream as well as a disposition to care for her child. Perhaps her disposition to enjoy ice cream even defines her as a person to some minor degree as suggested above. However, if her child falls from the swing she rushes to help her child rather than finish her ice cream. Her disposition to care for her child is far stronger than her disposition to enjoy ice cream. Her disposition to care for her child defines her far greater degree as a particular person than her disposition to enjoy ice cream. It seems to me the all the affective states someone has a disposition to experience help to define her as a person but their importance in defining her depends on the strength of the disposition. If the above is accepted then once again my initial worry that, even if the things that make us happy change as we age the way in which we are happy also changes as we age, remains unjustified.

At this point my I will suggest even if our concept of happiness does not change as we age that nonetheless the relative weights of the elements within that concept do change. For instance, if we accept Feldman’s concept of attitudinal happiness it seems possible that the pleasure we obtain from our attitudes may increase whilst our sensory pleasures decrease as we age. For instance, an older mother might take pleasure when considering her children who have grown up, left home and are now prospering by themselves. Such an attitude is unavailable to a younger mother. I believe such an attitude might be regarded as satisfaction with that part of her life. Feldman holds that being satisfied is not part of happiness. In the rest of this posting I will be primarily concerned with Haybron’s concept of happiness. Let us recall that that someone is happy if her emotional condition is broadly positive and that this involves her in general being attuned to, engaged with and endorsing her emotional condition. Haybron believes that attunement is more important than engagement and that engagement is more important than endorsement with regard to our happiness. I suggest this priority might change as we age.

In the rest of this posting I want to examine whether such a change in priorities can occur. Haybron believes engagement involves exuberance or vitality and sometimes involves flow (6). I would suggest as someone ages her exuberance or vitality decreases which means her engagement also decreases as she ages. Next I will deal with endorsement. Haybron believes endorsement involves feelings of joy or sadness (7). To me endorsement involves satisfaction. Moreover, it might be argued satisfaction does not need to involve any emotion. Some might argue that satisfaction simply entails an absence of restlessness in someone to change whatever satisfies her, see Frankfurt (8). However, if we accept Haybron’s position that endorsement requires feelings of joy and sadness and that these feelings decrease as someone ages then the importance of endorsement might decrease also. Haybron deals with attunement at some length (9). To him attunement involves a certain tranquillity and lack of anxiety. Attunement also involves a settled confidence and lack of stress making for a more confident person. It seems to me attunement has two distinct meanings according to Haybron because tranquillity does not of necessity increase confidence. I will only deal with the first meaning here. Attunement involves a certain tranquillity and lack of anxiety. I see no reason as to why someone should become less tranquil or less anxious as she ages simply because she is aging. It appears to follow there is no reason why the priorities between someone’s attunement and endorsement should change as she ages but perhaps endorsement may become more important to her than engagement.

Haybron considers tranquillity as a form of settledness (10). If he is correct then because tranquillity is part of attunement, attunement might be seen partly as a form of settledness. I would suggest a sense of settledness is a sense of acceptance. I now want to differentiate between our ideas of acceptance and satisfaction. I have suggested above that an older mother, who takes pleasure, when considering her children who have grown up and left home and are now prospering, is experiencing satisfaction. Let us now consider another mother who smothered her continually crying child whilst suffering from severe post natal depression. For years this mother has suffered from feelings of guilt. However recently she has become more settled and simply accepts what has happened together with the fact she was not to blame. If satisfaction simply means an absence to change anything to do with what satisfies someone then acceptance, or settledness, is the same as satisfaction. It follows the mother who smothered her child could look back with satisfaction to what happened. I don’t believe this is possible. I believe that there is a difference between being satisfied with and simply accepting some past event. The above example seems to show that being satisfied must involve some positive affective state. I have used the term positive affective state here rather than positive emotion as I believe someone can be in a satisfied mood.

One consequence of accepting that being satisfied must involve some positive affective states means satisfaction shares some features with endorsement as defined by Haybron. Haybron believes endorsement involves joy and sadness. However, I see no reason why satisfaction need involve joy, Joy seems to be too strong an emotion to be a necessary element of satisfaction. Moreover, sadness seems to be connected to someone’s concept of her self and she can be dissatisfied with things that are unconnected to her concept of self. It follows sadness is also not a necessary element of satisfaction. I also see no reason why endorsement need involve joy and sadness. Endorsing something can just mean being satisfied with it. It seems clear to me that as people age acceptance and satisfaction with their past assume greater importance in their emotional condition. It follows if endorsement is defined by being satisfied with something and endorsement is part of someone’s emotional condition then the priorities attunment, engagement and endorsement play in being happy might change as we age.

Someone might object that if the pleasure of satisfaction is a weak positive emotion unlike joy then it is unlikely to come to play a more prominent part in our emotional condition as we age unless older people don’t feel strong positive emotions. My objector might proceed to point out the joy felt in orgasm, for at least some older people can feel orgasmic, far outweighs the pleasure associated with satisfaction. In reply I would argue what matters with regard to satisfaction is not only the degree of pleasure experienced but also the fact that satisfaction involves a disposition to experience that pleasure again and again. Martin Seligman believes achievement is an important element of the concept of happiness, see above. Let us assume that achieving something involves satisfaction. It follows if being satisfied is part of happiness then it possible to explain why achievement is one of the things that make us happy.

In conclusion it seems that my initial worry that our concept of happiness should change as we age is unfounded. However, the relative importance of the various elements in the concept of happiness seem to change as we age.

1. Martin Seligman, 2011, Flourish, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, Chapter 1.
2. Fred Feldman, 2010, What is this thing called Happiness? Oxford, chapter 6.
3. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 147.
4. Haybron, page 130.
5. Haybron, page 130.
6. Haybron, page 114.
7. Haybron, page 113.
8. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 103.
9. Haybron, pages 116 to 120.
10. Haybron, page 116

Self Respect and Love

Kristjan Kristjansson argues too much attention is paid to promoting an individual’s self esteem and not enough to promoting his self respect. Kristjansson is referring to global self esteem, how good we feel about ourselves in general, rather than domain based self esteem, how we feel about our performance in a particular domain. The problem with Kristjansson’s argument is that in practice our ideas of self esteem and self respect easily get confused. In spite of this reservation I agree with Kristjansson that an over inflated ego based on high global self esteem is not useful to someone and may even be harmful. Kristjansson also argues that domain based self esteem is good for someone, once again I agree. Indeed if someone is a good athlete a failure to recognise this fact is a failure to recognise the truth. I further agree self respect is a useful for someone. However if we are to encourage self respect we must be clear about what we should be encouraging. In this posting I want to examine the basis of self respect.

Kristjansson believes we have a real emotionally based self rather than just a self construct. He believes self respect may be defined roughly as a disposition not to act or feel in a way that is unworthy of oneself. In Hamlet Polonius advises Laertes as follows, “This above all: to thy own self be true”. Perhaps this advice reflects what it means for someone to respect himself, to be authentic. However if someone is to be true to himself or to be authentic he must understand the nature of his self.  Kristjansson argues there are two incompatible understandings of what it means for someone to respect himself based two different concepts of a real self. One concept is Kantian and the other Aristotelian. Kristjansson favours adopting an Aristotelian concept (1). Using this concept means what really matters is that someone has certain virtues such as justice, generosity and courage. That he can feel appropriate pride and shame. Lastly he must have the courage of his convictions, he must not be easily swayed from his chosen path, and that his beliefs and convictions must have some persistence. Being true to such a self, respecting oneself, means someone must act virtuously based on his deeply held beliefs and convictions. Perhaps this is what Shakespeare meant by being true to oneself. However someone’s ability to choose his own beliefs and convictions, his autonomy, seems only to have a peripheral importance according to an Aristotelian concept of self. Perhaps then we should adopt a Kantian concept of the self. However if we adopt a Kantian concept of the self we find a self with very little substance except for the ability to choose. Such a self can choose but his self seems an unsubstantial thing giving him very little basis on which to base any choices he makes. To respect such a self we need only accept his right to choose and respect his choices provided these choices do not harm others. However even if we have reason to respect such a self it does not follow we have reason to admire such an insubstantial self.

Kristjansson believes we must choose either an Aristotelian or Kantian concept of the self. Intuitively neither of these concepts completely captures our idea of self. I would suggest that there is a concept of self which combines the idea of an autonomous and substantial self. I would suggest someone’s self is based on what he loves. A self based on what someone loves is not an insubstantial self. Moreover I would further suggest a self that makes choices based on what he loves is an autonomous self, see Frankfurt (2). Indeed if someone doesn’t love anything at all it is hard to see how he can make any meaningful decisions. Anyone who fails to love has no boundaries and has no basis on which to make decisions. He is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity, see Frankfurt (3). Of course I accept someone’s identity can change over time but his identity must have some persistence. I would also suggest that anyone who doesn’t love himself at least to some degree cannot love anything else. To love something according to Frankfurt is simply to be satisfied with what one loves. Satisfaction means someone has an absence of restlessness and has a resistance to change his relation to his beloved (4). If we accept Frankfurt’s definition loving defined by satisfaction then loving something need not involve pride. It further follows someone cannot love himself excessively, cannot respect himself excessively. Pride it seems to me is connected to self esteem rather than self respect. It be suggested at this point self respect need only involve love of self. I would reject such a suggestion. If someone only loves himself he has no substantial self to love. He is trying to love something amorphous with no fixed shape or identity. However an objector might point out that I have suggested someone who does not love himself cannot love anything else and that someone who does not love anything else cannot love himself. My objector might then suggest love so defined is impossible. My response would be that coming to love is a natural process and that when someone comes to love something he comes at the same time to love himself.

I must make it clear that Kristjansson rejects such a concept of the self (5). Personally I believe the concept of a self defined by what he loves need not differ radically from an Aristotelian conception. A self defined by what he loves cannot choose anything his choices are constrained not by others but by what he loves. Moreover it is perfectly possible for a self that is defined by what he loves to acquire some of the virtues by education provided he endorses these virtues by loving them. Such a self might be regarded as an Aristotelian self. What is the relationship between an Aristotelian self and the virtues? Does he simply possess them or love them? I would argue if loving is based on satisfaction then a virtuous person must love any virtues he possesses. It follows if an Aristotelian self must love the virtues then he might also be regarded as a self based on love. However the concept of a self defined by what he loves is a broader concept than an Aristotelian concept. A self defined by what he loves of course need not of necessity love the virtues even if a virtuous person must love the virtues.

What does self respect mean if the self is defined by what someone loves? I have argued above it does not mean someone takes pride in himself. It simply means someone is satisfied with himself. To be satisfied with something someone’s satisfaction must be both persistent and consistent. Let us agree with Kristjansson that self respect is good for someone and that it should be encouraged. Unfortunately if we also accept someone’s self respect depends on his loving something including himself then we cannot directly encourage self respect. Someone cannot decide to love something simply because he decides loving is good for him. Similarly someone cannot decide to respect himself because self respect is good for him. We can however indirectly encourage self respect by creating the conditions in which self respect can flourish. This means allowing someone the freedom to love the things that matter to him, means loving and caring about things ourselves and it the case of children suggesting, but no more than suggesting, that it is good for them to love certain things.

To conclude I want to make some more speculative comments about the importance of self respect especially if it is based on love or “caring about”. These comments are of more speculative nature because I am a philosopher not a psychologist. Many of the perpetrators of murderous massacres such as the dreadful killings in Newtown Connecticut do not seem to be mad. I would however speculate that none of these perpetrators is satisfied with themselves. None of these perpetrators has self respect. Of course it would be simplistic to suggest the reason of such massacres is just a lack of self respect. Nonetheless I would speculate such a lack is one reason for these massacres even if it is a minor one. This is one reason why it is so disappointing that we cannot directly encourage self respect. Nonetheless if directly encouraging self respect is impossible, no matter how disappointing this may be, we should not attempt to do so but instead concentrate our efforts on trying to create the conditions in which self can flourish, see my posting on Riots and the Unbearable Lightness of Simply Being . Secondly I would speculate if self respect is based loving that the search for self respect can also lead to dreadful crimes. Some people in a desperate search for self respect, for identity, for something to love may come to love something in inappropriate ways. I would suggest suicide bombers are such people, see my posting on Terrorism, Love and Self Delusion ; see also Kristjansson (6).

1. Kristjansson, K. (2010) The Self and Its Emotions. Cambridge University Press, page, 154.
2. Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page, 135.
3. Frankfurt, page 114.
4. Frankfurt, page 103.
5. Kristjansson, pages 89 90.
6. Kristjansson page 197.

Extended Consent

We usually consent to some action immediately prior to that action. Sometimes our past consent may be thought to extend into the future. Living wills or last directives are now widely accepted and may be thought of as a kind of extended consent. Even if extended consent is widely accepted there remain some problems connected to the concept. The Law Commission’s report defines extended consent in section 2.11 of "Consent in Sex Offences"   as follows,

“If what is relied on is past agreement, this will mean both, (a) that, when previously given, the agreement must have extended to the doing of the act at that later time, and (b) that it must not have been withdrawn in the meantime. We believe that it should be made clear that consent may be express or implied.”

The same report gives the following example of extended consent in section 4.54.

“For example, at 8 pm P makes it clear that she is looking forward to having intercourse with D that night. By 11 pm she is too drunk to know what she is doing, but D has intercourse with her anyway. Can it be said that she does not (because she cannot) consent to the intercourse at the material time, namely the time of the intercourse? In our view it cannot. Consent is not a state of mind which must invariably exist at the time of the act consented to, but an expression of agreement to that act – the granting of permission for it.”

The report’s authors seem to believe P’s consent is valid and that D commits no offence. Their belief seems to be based on the assumption that there are no conceptual problems with extended consent. The starting point for this posting originated in a piece by Jeremy Stangroom in the Philosophers Magazine’s blog, see 'More Sex when drunk'. Stangroom believes, as I do, that P’s extended consent would not be valid. If we are correct then either there is no such thing as extended consent or the report’s definition is inadequate. In this posting I will attempt to give a more adequate definition of extended consent.

The concept of extended consent is certainly useful. For instance, if a patient is about to undergo surgery then her informed consent is usually sought sometime prior to the actual surgery rather than when she is being wheeled into the operating theatre. The use of extended consent in this instance is good practice as it gives the patient time to absorb the information she needs to make a balanced decision and means she is less likely to make a decision under stress than if she made her decision immediately prior to her operation. Of course such a patient may withdraw her extended consent at any point up to the time her surgery takes place. The idea of extended consent is also useful in cases in which a decision has to be made whether or not to resuscitate a terminally ill patient. Such a decision is made much easier if the patient has made a last directive or living will. It might be thought the further consent is extended into the future the more likely it is to lose its validity. However the above examples from medical practice show that in practice this is not always true. None the less I shall argue below that extended consent should not be extended too far. Intuitively someone’s consent to surgery is perfectly valid tomorrow or even the day after but the same does not apply to intercourse. In what follows I will firstly argue what really matters for extended consent is the basis on which the consent giver makes her decision and secondly how far her consent is extended.

If someone consents to intercourse on what does she base her decision? Someone certainly doesn’t make a decision to have intercourse based on pure reason. I would suggest her consent is simply based on how she feels, on her mood. If this is accepted then it is hard to see how she could possibly extend her consent for intercourse into the future. She cannot know what sort of mood she will be in, how she will feel, in a few hours time. If I am correct then consent to intercourse may only be given at the time intercourse is going to take place contrary to the Law Commissions report. However if someone consents to surgery then her mood at either the time she made her decision or when surgery takes place seems to be irrelevant. When someone consents to surgery she makes an informed consent decision. Her decision is made using practical reason and based on the information provided by her medical team together with her belief about what is best for her. Practical reason doesn’t vary as moods do. It follows provided the patient’s circumstances don’t change her consent decision would be the same tomorrow or even next week. It further follows consent based on ongoing factors using practical reason can be extended to some degree.

I now want to examine just how far consent based on continuing facts using practical reasoning can be extended. Can for instance the hypothetical withholding of consent be extended years into the future as happens with living wills? The nature of practical reason does not change over time so changes in practical reason cannot be used to justify limiting the extension of consent. An essential element of any living will is that the state of affairs relevant at the time the will is implemented is the same as the facts envisaged when the will was made. It might be thought provided this element is satisfied that there is no problem in extending the withholding of consent as expressed in living wills. Such a thought would be premature for what also matters is someone’s beliefs about what is best for her given these facts. Her belief about what is best for her depends on what she “cares about”. In this posting as in previous postings in this blog I will assume to “care about” something means someone identifies herself with which she cares about, see (1). Caring about in this sense has nothing to do with whether someone is in the mood for intercourse or not. When someone “cares about” something this “caring about” must have some persistence, see (2). Of course when someone attends to other things she doesn’t have to actively care about something she cares about but she does have to have a disposition to care about it in the appropriate circumstances. It would seem to be nonsensical to say if someone “cares about” something she could suddenly abandon this care for ever. When the term “care about” is used in the above sense it is roughly equivalent to loving something, see (3). It once again might be thought because what we love, or “care about”, must have persistence that that there is no problem in extending the withholding of consent as expressed in living wills. Once again such a thought would be premature. Love must have some persistence but both someone and what she loves can gradually change over time.

The above suggests that whilst consent can be extended there are limits to just how far this extension can go. In particular there might be problems with extended consent in relation to living wills. The first problem concerns the persistence of what someone “cares about”.  What someone “cares about” must have some persistence, perhaps a few years, but does what someone “cares about” always persist for a decade or even decades? The second problem with living wills is that they anticipate hypothetical events. The will maker may have no experience of these events to guide her. The patient giving her consent for surgery tomorrow is not simply considering a hypothetical event but one that is actually going to happen. Someone attempting to give her consent to intercourse later that night has presumably some experience of intercourse. The realness of these situations gives someone’s decisions focus. It may be that someone when faced with a hypothetical situation may believe she would choose a particular course of action in that situation. Later when actually in this situation, she may discover she was wrong and that she cannot follow that particular course of action. I would argue much the same is true of living wills. Someone may specify in a living will she would not consent to treatment in a certain hypothetical situation. However were this situation to occur she might well have consented had she been able.

In spite of these problems I believe living wills can be useful subject to the proviso that these wills are fairly recent. For instance if a patient learns she has a terminal disease this would be the ideal time to make a living will. If a living will is fairly recent it should be realistic to assume it represents a patient’s extended consent because what she “cares about” should not have changed during period between the making and the implementation of the will. I also believe if the validity of a living will is limited by time that this limitation is likely to force the will maker focus on the hypothetical situation more seriously than she would do if considering situations decades into the future. Perhaps living wills should only be valid for up to five years.

In the light of my discussion above I would redefine an extended consent decision as follows. An extended consent decision is one made using practical reason which is based on what someone “cares about” rather than her current mood, which is valid only for a limited period of at the most a few years and has not been revoked. Someone might object that this is not a useful definition in practice as it is difficult to separate what someone “cares about” from her fleeting moods and emotions. I accept this difficulty but would argue it doesn’t have the same weight when applied to extended consent. I would suggest “caring about” a decision involves being satisfied with that decision. I would further suggest this is true irrespective of whether caring about is defined as simply a matter of will or is connected to some emotional dispositions. I would further suggest that being satisfied with a decision simply means no restlessness with the decision or any desire to change it. If my suggestions are accepted then, because extended consent by its nature allows ample time for any restlessness with someone’s consent decision to become apparent, we can be satisfied in the absence of this restlessness that her decision is based on what she “cares about”.

1.      Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press page 83.

2.      Frankfurt, H. (1988), page 84.

3.     Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 165.

Prisoners and the Right to Vote

In the UK prisoners lose the right to vote whilst serving their sentence. In the US, except in Maine and Vermont, prisoners also lose this right and in some states this disenfranchisement continues after they have served their sentences. In this posting I want to examine whether prisoners should retain this right whilst serving their sentences. The vast majority of philosophical literature seems to suggest that they should. My intuitions suggest to me they should not. I hope my examination will either force me to challenge my intuitions or be able to justify them. Before proceeding I must make it clear I am only interested in whether prisoners should retain the right to vote and that I am not concerned whether the European Human Rights Court should play any part in UK legislation.

In order to look for an argument to support my intuitions I will firstly examine society’s aims when it sends people to prison. Firstly we send people to prison to protect ourselves by ensuring they commit no more crimes for the period of their sentence. This aim is achieved simply by sending offenders to prison. Depriving offenders of the right to vote does nothing to further this aim. Secondly we send offenders to prison in order to rehabilitate them. In the light of the re-offending figures for prisoners I’m not sure this aim is very realistic. However even if we accept this aim is realistic it is hard to see how the disenfranchisement of prisoners might further the aim. It is possible to allow prisoners to vote using a postal ballot. It follows the disenfranchisement of prisoners is not a necessary part of their imprisonment. It further follows if the disenfranchisement of prisoners is to play a meaningful part in the rehabilitation of prisoners that disenfranchisement must be justifiable by itself. Someone might argue an offender’s disenfranchisement might cause him to reconsider his attitude to life and so play some small part in his rehabilitation. I’m not convinced by such an argument, if I’m correct then it follows that depriving prisoners of the right to vote cannot be justified as part of their rehabilitation. Lastly and perhaps most importantly we send people to prison in order to punish them. It follows if we are to justify disenfranchisement as a punishment it also must be justifiable by itself. Most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment. It follows for most prisoners disenfranchisement cannot be justified because it is a punishment. However this may not be true for all prisoners as I will argue later.

I have argued that for most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment and hence disenfranchisement cannot be justified as such. However even if we accept the above as I do, it does not automatically follow if such prisoners are already disenfranchised that we have a reason to change the status quo. I have suggested that most prisoners do not see disenfranchisement as a punishment. It follows that most prisoners do not value the right to vote. If we don’t grant the right to vote to those prisoners who don’t value having this right then we do them no harm. It further follows that from a consequentialist point of view we have no reason to give most prisoners voting rights.

Someone might attempt to extend the above argument concerning valuing the right to vote to all prisoners. First she might point out voting is an essential element of any democratic society. She might then argue that prisoners don’t value society simply because they offend whereby damaging society. It follows that because prisoners don’t value society they don’t value the right to vote. It further follows if society does not grant prisoners the right to vote then it does them no harm as this right is not something they value. Lastly she might suggest prisoners see themselves as living in society rather than being part of society.

I am doubtful if in practice many prisoners actually value the right to vote. Nonetheless I would reject the above argument because I think it is possible that some prisoners do value this right even if they fail to respect society. However if some prisoners do value the right to vote then their valuation gives us a possible reason to disenfranchise them. If we deprive someone of something he values justly we may do so in order to punish him. It follows we have a possible justification to disenfranchise those prisoners who value the right to vote. To summarise I firstly argued that most prisoners do not value the right to vote and this means we no reason to change the status quo and give them this right. Secondly I argued that for those prisoners, who do value the right to vote, disenfranchisement might be justified as punishment.

Someone might object to my argument by pointing out it has been framed in consequentialist terms and the question of prisoner voting rights is a matter of fundamental human rights. I accept human beings have certain rights, see my posting of 07/10, but I am unhappy about using the term fundamental with regard to rights. Some rights are universal and apply to all human beings others are more restrictive, such as the rights of the members of a golf club. For instance I would argue we have a right not to be treated with unnecessary cruelty simply because we can feel pain but then animals must also have this right. Perhaps this right might be regarded as a universal right for all sentient creatures. In addition we have a right not to be treated as a means by others. Perhaps this right is universal for all potential autonomous creatures living among autonomous creatures. The domain of rights holders for this right is more restricted than for the domain of the right not to be treated with unnecessary cruelty. Lastly we have a right to vote because we are part of a democratic society. The domain of rights holders for the right to vote is further restricted. I would suggest it follows that someone’s right to vote is not a fundamental right based on him being a human being, but is based on him being part of a democratic society. Indeed the idea that our hunter gatherer ancestors had fundamental right to vote is nonsensical. Rights evolved as rights upholders’ ideas and their society changed and as a result different rights may have different origins. Because rights have different origins there is a wide variation in the domain of rights holders.

If we accept that the right to vote depends on us being part of democratic society then does this imply that in such a society prisoners should retain this right? It has been suggested above that prisoners see themselves as only living in rather than being part of a democratic society. I would further suggest prisoner’s behaviour shows that they do indeed see themselves as living in society rather than being part of society as they either intentionally damage society or fail to see their actions as damaging to society. It follows if prisoner’s only live in a society rather than being part of that society that they should not retain the right to vote. After all most foreigners living in a country are not usually considered as citizens and as a result do not have the right to vote even if they are law abiding and contribute to the general good by paying taxes.

I now want to consider some objections to the above. Firstly someone might suggest that many people who never offend see themselves as living in rather than being part of our society and yet still retain the right to vote. For instance people who live solely on benefits and contribute nothing to society. Nobody would seriously suggest we should disenfranchise such people. My objector might then argue if we treat these people differently from prisoners that we are acting unjustly. I would not accept my objector’s argument for two reasons. Firstly many people who contribute nothing to society financially contribute in other ways. Secondly I would argue all those who obey the law contribute to society simply by respecting the rights of others. However how much individuals contribute to society varies. Prisoners serving their sentences do not contribute to society in any other way and by offending have demonstrated that they do not respect the rights of others. My objector might now point most prisoners are not murderers or rapists but minor criminals many of whom simply snort, smoke and inject drugs in the hope of improving their happiness. I would respond by simply pointing out being inadequate may be the reason many prisoners live in society rather than being part of it and as a result gives us no reason to ensure they have the right to vote. Next my objector might suggest that giving prisoners the vote sends them a message. The message we send is that we see them as being part of society even if they don’t. But why should we send them such a message? My objector might respond by suggesting such a message can play a part in their rehabilitation by encouraging them to become part of society. I would respond by suggesting that this would be the wrong message and that disenfranchisement sends a better message that respect for the law is the minimum needed to be considered as part of society.

Lastly my objector might suggest that my argument should apply to all offenders rather than just those sent to prison. If we disenfranchise offenders who are sent to prison but not those offenders who are subject to different punishments such as fines then we are acting unjustly. I believe this objection carries some real weight. My argument depends on the assumption that prisoners see themselves as living in society rather than being part of it. My objector might now point out my assumption should apply to all offenders. She might argue that it follows drivers who are fined for speeding should also be disenfranchised for a period because they see themselves as living in rather than being part of society. Clearly most speeding drivers do see themselves as part of society rather than merely living in it. Perhaps then my assumption is false and some prisoners do see themselves as part of society rather than merely living in it. I accept the above objection and accept all offenders, except perhaps sociopaths, see themselves to some degree as part of society. However I would suggest there is a continuum in this degree ranging from sociopaths to speeders. I might then modify my argument and base it on the assumption that at below some point on this continuum offenders don’t see themselves as enough as part of society to be fully regarded as members of society. I suggest this point might be when offenders directly damage other members of society. The prime purpose of society is to protect its members against unwarranted damage and clearly offenders who directly damage other members of society do not respect society. I might then argue prisoners fall below this point and as a result should remain disenfranchised whilst most other offenders will be above this point and should not.

Does my modified argument provide some justification for my intuitions? I’m not sure and am now somewhat ambivalent about prisoner disenfranchisement. Perhaps I’m just using reflection to bolster my intuitions rather than possibly changing them, like Haidt (1) suggests most people do.

1.      Jonathan Haidt, 2012, The Rightous Mind, Allen Lane, chapter 2.

Biological and Adopted Children

In a posting on practical ethics Julian Savulescu relates the story of Brad and Melissa’s attempts to have a baby using IVF with PGD. They did so in order to avoid having a child with cystic fibrosis or a child who was a carrier of the gene for cystic fibrosis. Both Brad and Melissa were carriers of this gene. If parents have a child with cystic fibrosis this costs the state a great deal of money. Having a child cost Brad and Melissa a lot of money, in addition to their savings they had to sell their car to pay for the IVF. However the money it cost them was a great deal less than it would have cost the state had they had a child with cystic fibrosis. Savulescu argues that the state should bear the cost of IVF with PGD for parents such as Brad and Melissa because it is unjust to expect them to save the state money. In reply Khalid Jan and Elselijn Kingma suggest parents, such as Brad and Melissa, have the option of adopting a child and that because this option involves no extra costs to the state, indeed it may save the state money, that the state has no duty to pay for IVF for such parents.

In the following discussion I will assume for the sake of argument that adoptive children are usually adopted as babies. I will also assume that these babies don’t have any more potential health or mental problems than children in general. In practice these assumptions are not always met. Let us assume couples in a position similar to that of Brad and Melissa can adopt. If such couples would prefer a child of their own, using IVF with PGD, to an adopted child then they must have some reasons for this preference. They must believe there is a difference between nurturing a biological child and an adopted child. In this posting I want to examine what these reasons might be.

One difference between biological and adopted parents is the way they acquire their obligations to care for their children. The vast majority of biological parents naturally acquire an obligation to care for their children simply because they create vulnerable children. They may be certain exceptions such as a fourteen year old mother, who because she is a child herself, may be unable to fulfil this obligation, see deceit and unintentional fathers . Adoptive parents consciously assume this obligation at the time of adoption. However irrespective of how parents acquire the duty to care for their children the actual caring seems to be identical. It follows the difference between the way biological and adopted parents acquire their obligations to care for their children should not make any difference to the relationship between a parent and child. It gives no reason why couples such as Brad and Melissa want a child using IVF rather than adopting one. None the less such couples are concerned with not just with having any child; they are concerned with being the child’s biological parents. After all Brad and Melissa spent a great deal of money and even had to sell their car in order to achieve this aim.

I will now suggest two reasons why parents might want to be biological parents. Firstly parents might want to be biological parents as opposed to adoptive parents simply because they believe they will have a closer bond with their children due to this bond being unique. Adopted children have both biological and adoptive parents. Many adopted children feel the need later in life to seek their biological parents. This need may weaken the bond a child feels for her adoptive parents. It does not automatically follow that the bond the adoptive parents feels for their adopted child is weakened and as a result the first reason fails. A second reason why mothers might want to be biological mothers is that they believe carrying their children will increase the maternal bond. This may well be true but I am doubtful if it is the main reason why many couples in Brad and Melissa’s position seek IVF with PGD. Let us assume such a couple could have a child with donated gametes and that the woman involved could gestate the child. I would suggest such a couple would still prefer IVF with PGD and as a result the second reason fails. The reason for this failure I would further suggest is that they care about having a child of their own. By a child of their own they mean a child who is genetically related to them. I would still further suggest when parents express a preference to be biological parents that this really means they want to be genetic parents. For instance many mothers who are unable to bear children, for health reasons such as having a hysterectomy, might prefer a surrogate to bear their children using her and her partner’s gametes rather than adopt. But why should parents care that they are genetic parents? Once again I will suggest it is because they believe that they will have a closer bond with their genetic children; that they will care about, they will love, their genetic children more than any children they adopt. In what follows I will suggest two reasons why parents might have this belief.

The first reason is simply that evolution designed us to care more for our genetic children than others. Perhaps those people who acquired caring instincts simply raised more children to adulthood. Perhaps also evolution designed us to care and to care more for those genetically related to us. Perhaps then step parents don’t care about their children as much as genetic parents do. Fairy tales and myths abound with stories about wicked step parents. Indeed there might be some evidence to support the claim that step parents care less, see Hofferth and Anderson. Of course some step parents may behave better most than genetic parents. And of course some genetic parents may behave atrociously. Someone might object that even if we do have evolved an instinct to care more for those genetically related to us this does not mean this is what we ought to do. Modern human beings are reflective creature. My objector might then argue that after reflection couples like Brad and Melissa might decide they could care as much for an adopted child as they would for a genetically related child and as a result decide that adoption is the best option. In reply I would suggest coming to care about, coming to love, is not a matter of reflection or choice, see Frankfurt (1). Of course someone may reflect on how to love or even whether her love is prudent but she cannot simply decide on whom she will love and the degree of her love. However at the present time there seems to me there is insufficient evidence to definitely conclude that evolution means genetic parents love their children more than adoptive parents do.

A second reason why parents might care about their genetic children more than any children they adopt is that they will have more common interests. My objector might now suggest that parents and children come to share interests simply by family life. A child’s interests are a product of his upbringing. I agree a child’s interests are partly a product of her upbringing but they are also partly defined her genes. For instance an adopted child may be strong, supple and as a result excel in sports due to her genes whilst her adoptive parents may be intellectuals with no interest whatsoever in sport. Moreover it seems that someone’s personality is partly determined by their genes. It follows parents who bring up their genetic children will have more interests in common with these children than any children they adopt. My objector might suggest this does not by itself show they care about their genetic children more than any adopted children. I agree with my objector that more shared interests does not supply any reason as to why genetic parents should have a greater disposition to care about their children than adoptive parents. It follows in this sense of caring about there is no reason why adoptive parents should love their children any less than biological parents. However there is more to caring about or loving than having a disposition to love; I am here assuming the terms love and care about are interchangeable. I do not actively love when I am asleep or when I am concentrating on my next golf shot. Actively loving someone means sharing her interests, if I have no concern for her interests I simply don’t love her. It is easier to share interests if these are interests I already possess, see aspergers autism and love . It follows there is a reason why genetic parents might be more loving towards their children than adoptive parents. It also follows parents carrying genes for inherited diseases can justify their desire for a child of their own using IVF with PGD.

In conclusion parents such as Brad and Melissa do have the option of adopting but most of them would prefer a child which is genetically related to them by using IVF with PGD. Moreover it would seem they have sound reasons for this preference. Personally I would support their preference. However I am not sure whether or not the State has an obligation to help them satisfy this preference. After all some children might have a preference to be adopted.

1.     Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 135.

Two Types of Respect; Too Much Respect?

In these days of political correctness, the idea of respect is important. The idea of respect is also often unclear. In this posting I want to examine what we mean by respect. It seems clear that respect must play some useful part in our lives or else it would simply cease to exist. In the past respect was linked to etiquette which played an important part in our lives by gluing society together. Etiquette encouraged inequality and stratification. In this posting I will consider respect free from etiquette and will argue that there are two important types of respect serving different purposes. I will argue that there is recognition respect which defines our domain of moral concern and appraisal respect which defines what we approve of. We can respect someone for what she is and who she is. I will proceed to argue it is damaging to conflate these different types and that sometimes we should express less respect.

We can respect a wide variety of things from persons, to institutions such as schools, to virtues like courage, to nature. This diversity suggests there are different types of respect. According to the Oxford Dictionary respect is “is a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievement.” If we accept this definition, then respect must involve our affective states. Not all philosophers would agree. For instance, someone might object a pupil’s respect for her teacher is not based on deep admiration; it is based on the norms of education. I would argue such ‘respect’ is not true respect for but merely the acceptance of these norms out of habit or for pragmatic reasons. In what follows I will assume that all types of genuine respect must involve our affective states. I will also assume that all forms of genuine respect must affect our behaviour. It seems nonsensical to hold we can respect something but that this respect does not constrain how we behave towards that we respect.

However, I am not concerned with all forms of affective respect which alter our behaviour. We might for instance I might respect the sea by fearing it and by only going swimming on a safe beach with a lifeguard. Fear is an affective state and it affects my behaviour by causing me to only to swim on a safe beach. In this posting I am not concerned with respect for inanimate objects. We might also ‘respect’ a gang member by fearing him. Indeed, gang members might demand such respect. However once again I’m not sure such ‘respect’ is genuine respect. I would suggest genuine respect must be freely given. Regardless of whether the above suggestion is correct or not in this posting I am restricting my discussion to respect which is freely given. Such respect might take two forms, recognition and appraisal respect. For instance, we may respect someone simply because she is a person but we may also respect her because she is a doctor, which required determination and dedication on her part qualities we approve of. Respect for persons, as the kind of creatures who can determine their own future and for whom we should feel some empathy is recognition respect and should be universal, such respect need not involve any appraisal of someone’s attributes. Appraisal respect need not be universal and must include a positive appraisal. 

Let us accept that we should always respect someone by recognising what she is, a person. This respect need not involve any admiration. When we respect someone for who she is then respect must involve admiration. For instance, if someone is a thief preying on old vulnerable people we should only respect her by recognising her to be a person. However, if she is a doctor we might respect her as a person by admiring her for who she is and what she has achieved. I now want to argue if we conflate the expression of recognition and appraisal respect, then we limit the usefulness of respect by sending a confusing message.

In order to make my argument I need to differentiate between the uses of recognition and appraisal respect. Recognition respect defines who and even perhaps what we regard as members of our society; defines the domain of a society.  Recognition respect is not useful in binding society together. If we fail to see someone as the same kind of creature as ourselves who can determine her own future, then we simply do not see that person as part of our society. All persons are owed recognition respect. Not everyone is owed appraisal respect, appraisal respect has to be earned. Appraisal respect always includes a positive appraisal such as admiration. If our appraisal was negative, whatever we felt it certainly wouldn’t be respect. Appraisal respect for someone means admiring her and responding in ways which are appropriate to our admiration. However simply admiring someone’s characteristics and responding in an appropriate fashion is not a sufficient condition for appraisal respect. We might admire someone’s strength and act appropriately, but such admiration and appropriate action aren’t respect. They might be envy and envy certainly isn’t respect. I would suggest that appraisal respect is of necessity linked to admiring someone’s character. This admiration need not be limited to someone’s moral character but includes any character traits which aid someone to flourish, character traits such as wisdom or courage. It might be objected that by suggesting appraisal respect is of necessity linked to character I am contradicting myself as suggested above someone might respect her doctor. In response I would point out anyone who wants to become a doctor must cultivate wisdom and determination, character traits which enable her to flourish. Appraisal respect aids flourishing and if we believe flourishing should be encouraged then appraisal respect should also be encouraged. Let us consider flattery. Flattery might appear to be a form of admiration but in the long term flattery damages relationships because it doesn’t represent our true feelings. The same is true if we conflate recognition and appraisal respect. Consider someone who has a character we don’t admire. Of course we should respect her as the kind of creature who can determine her own future. However, it does not follow that we admire her character. Moreover, if we conflate recognition with appraisal respect then this is precisely the message we are sending to her. This false view, like flattery, is likely to damage our long term relationship with her because it is based on a misunderstanding.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above. First we must be careful about how and how often we express our respect. I would suggest that in most normal contexts there is no need for us to explicitly express recognition respect. We should express recognition respect simply by our behaviour, simply accepting people as members of our moral community. We should do so by accepting how others live and letting them explicitly express their views even if we believe these views to be mistaken provided their lifestyle and beliefs do not harm others. I would further suggest that in most normal contexts it is a mistake to explicitly express recognition respect. By doing so others might sometimes mistakenly believe we respect rather than accept their character, their lifestyles. In addition, because our character is related to our beliefs others might sometimes mistakenly believe we respect their beliefs rather than simply accept their right to express them. It seems to me that if we are careless in expressing our respect we might be expressing too much respect leading to misunderstandings which can damage society.

I

Happiness and Satisfaction

In my previous posting I considered happiness in the light of Feldman and Haybron’s concepts. Both concepts differ, but both accept that someone’s affective states play an essential part of any meaningful concept of happiness. Intuitively the affective states concerned seem to those of joy or pleasure. In this posting I accept if someone is happy then he must have some feeling of joy or pleasure. Both Feldman and Haybron agree that one cannot simply equate happiness with satisfaction. Once again I accept their position. Nonetheless satisfaction is an important element in someone’s life. In this posting I want to examine the relative importance of happiness and satisfaction in life.

Before proceeding with my examination I want to show that being satisfied in life is not the same as being happy even though the two terms are often used interchangeably. For instance Mill seems to have used the terms interchangeably. In Utilitarianism Mill argued actions are right if they promote happiness and wrong if they promote unhappiness he then proceeded to argue “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied”. Psychologists also sometimes equate satisfaction with happiness. Daniel Nettle for instance suggests that there are three levels to happiness. First there are momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure. Secondly there are judgements about feelings such as satisfaction and lastly the quality of someone’s life over time. Nettle for the most part seems to equate happiness with satisfaction (1). However it seems to me someone could be completely satisfied with some decision or state of affairs but still not be considered to be happy. Let us consider someone suffering from a painful terminal illness. Such a person might well consider going to the Dignitas Clinic in Zurich to end his life. It seems to me such a person could be satisfied with his decision. However it also seems to me it would be wrong to describe such a person as happy. It follows being satisfied with some event, decision or even state of affairs does not equate to being happy. My terminally ill patient is unlikely to feel any joy or pleasure emanating from his decision.

In the rest of this posting I will assume that being happy must involve the emotions of joy or pleasure. Happiness that includes these elements, regardless of how this inclusion is done, is important to our lives. Satisfaction is also important to our lives. I have argued above that happiness and satisfaction are not identical. I now want to examine the relative importance of being satisfied with our lives and being happy. I will conclude that at the least a little happiness and an ability to be satisfied are essential to our identity as persons. I will also conclude that we ought to give greater priority in our lives to seeking satisfaction rather than seeking happiness.

Is satisfaction more important in our lives than happiness? The first possible reason as to why satisfaction might matter more than happiness is that it might be argued that someone cannot be happy if he isn’t satisfied. Accepting the above would mean being satisfied is a necessary condition for being happy even if it is not a sufficient one. What exactly does it mean for someone to be satisfied? According to Frankfurt a satisfied person simply has an absence of restlessness or resistance to change. He may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change (2). It follows if someone is not satisfied he is restless or resists his current state of affairs. It might then be argued this restlessness or resistance means he cannot be happy and as a result satisfaction is a necessary condition for happiness. Such an argument would be mistaken. I have accepted that being happy must involve the emotions of joy or pleasure. However being happy is compatible with someone feeling pain or sorrow. To be happy someone’s joys or pleasures must simply outweigh his pains and sorrows. It is therefore conceivable that someone, who may be restless and resist his current state of affairs, is nonetheless happy provided his joys or pleasures outweigh this restlessness and resistance.

The second possible reason as to why satisfaction might matter more than happiness in our lives is that satisfaction is more central to us as persons than happiness is. Frankfurt argues caring about oneself is essential to being a person and that there couldn’t be a person of no importance to himself (3). If we accept Frankfurt then it follows that anyone who cares about himself must seek to satisfy some of his desires. Anyone who doesn’t care about anything has no basis to make any decisions. Anyone who has no basis to make any decisions can hardly be regarded as a person at all. It follows satisfaction, or at the very least attempted satisfaction, is central to our lives as persons. Someone might accept the above but suggest satisfaction is a positive emotion. He might then suggest positive emotions must involve joy, or at the very least some pleasure, and so satisfaction involves happiness. Satisfaction is a sufficient condition for happiness. He might then conclude if satisfaction is central to us as persons then so is happiness. If the above is accepted then we must also accept that my terminally ill patient who decides to go to Dignitas in order to commit assisted suicide is not only satisfied with his decision but also happy with this decision. It seems to me that in this situation the patient’s satisfaction is not a positive emotion but a response he finds appropriate. Appropriate to him as the person he sees himself to be. Satisfaction if it is viewed as an appropriate response can be seen as a matter of fit or congruence rather than a positive emotion. Accepting the above means it does not follow that happiness must be central to our lives just because satisfaction is.

Nevertheless happiness may be central to our lives for reasons which have nothing to do with satisfaction. Let us accept that happiness is an important element of our lives. But is happiness central to our lives? Someone might argue even if happiness is an important element of our lives that it is not as central to our lives as satisfaction is because happiness does not endure in the way satisfaction does. If Frankfurt is correct in believing that satisfaction entails an absence of restlessness or resistance to a state of affairs then as long as this state of affairs endures then satisfaction endures. The same is not true for happiness. If some situation increases our happiness then as time progresses we adapt to this new situation and our happiness returns to its former level (4). It would appear then that happiness does not endure as satisfaction does. Perhaps the reason for this that evolution developed joy and pleasure to drive us towards certain goals. Once these goals are attained the need for joy or pleasure ceases, see (5). It might appear because happiness does not endure in our lives the way satisfaction does it is less central to our lives than satisfaction is.

I have reservations about accepting the above; just because happiness doesn’t endure doesn’t mean it isn’t central to our lives. Can there be a person who isn’t happy and who never has been happy about anything. Of course there can be a person who is deeply unhappy because he has a great deal more to be unhappy about than happy about. Of course it makes sense to talk about an unhappy person. But can we really imagine a person who is not and never has been happy about anything at all? Even my terminally ill patient may have been happy in the past and perhaps his memories still give him some happiness even if he is unhappy now. Someone might suggest it is possible for a person to act purely for moral reasons and that such a person need never be happy about anything. Personally I am doubtful whether such a person can exist but I am even more doubtful that if a person acted purely on moral grounds that he would never take even the slightest pleasure in his actions. I’m not sure how to answer the question as whether there could ever be a person who isn’t happy and who never has been happy about anything. My inclination is to say there cannot be such a person. If my inclination is correct then it follows that being happy, at least to some small degree, is essential to being a person. Having some happiness and caring are both central to our identity as a person.

However I would suggest that even if some minimal level happiness and an ability to care both play an essential part in making us the persons we are it does not follow that we should give the same weight to increasing our happiness as to satisfying our desires. It is possible to achieve modest improvements in our happiness, see Seligman . Moreover it seems to me that provided we have realistic expectations that it is easier to increase our overall satisfaction in life by paying more attention to the things we care about rather than increase our happiness. It follows we should give greater weight to increasing our satisfaction rather than increasing our happiness provided of course that we cannot do both.

1. Daniel Nettle, 2005, Happiness; The Science Behind Your Smile, Oxford, page 8.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 103.
3. Frankfurt, page 90.
4. Jonathan Haidt, 2006, The Happiness Hypothesis, Heinemann, page 86.
5. Nettle, chapter 7.