Me and My Values

There is a tendency in philosophy to believe we define ourselves. That we define ourselves by our values or what we ‘care about’, see for instance Helm and Frankfurt.

“I have claimed that one’s identity is fundamentally a matter of the kind of life worth living and that this is determined largely by one’s personal priorities and values; ….Thus when asked who I am I do not say a 6-4 –inch former soccer player who likes chocolate and is susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy … I respond by saying that I am a philosophy professor, father of three, etc.” (1)

“It is in the nature of a lover’s concern that he is invested in his beloved. That is, he is benefited when his beloved flourishes; and he suffers when it is harmed. Another way of putting it is that the lover identifies himself with what he loves. This consists of accepting the interests of his beloved as his own.” (2)

In this posting I do not want to deny we partly define ourselves by our values or what we ‘care about’. However I will suggest there is a tendency to overstate this self-definition. Moreover I believe this overstatement applies to the importance of values and what someone ‘cares about’ and ignores other things that help define her.

Helm when asked who he is does not say he was a soccer player or that he likes chocolate and is susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy but replies by choosing certain things he values. Helm is identifying himself with his values and seems to assume others will identify him in a similar way. However there are problems with this approach. Firstly someone may be unaware of some of the values she possesses. Secondly we must be careful about the idea of choice. As I noted in my previous posting what someone values need not be identical with the values she explicitly identifies with. She can be mistaken about some of her values. Our values are determined just a much by what someone actually does as by what she thinks she should do. I believe Helm would accept this point as he argues someone sometimes discovers her values.

However even if someone is unaware of some of her values, does she sometimes choose her values and in so doing is she creating her identity like some existential hero? Personally I am unhappy with such a position. Recent research in experimental philosophy has shown that sometimes someone’s choices are influenced less by her character and more by the situation she finds herself in; see for instance Appiah (3). It follows someone’s choices may sometimes be determined less by her character and more by her situation. It further follows some of someone’s values might well be determined by the circumstances she finds herself in. Helm holds our identity is determined by our values. It still further follows if we accept Helm’s position that in practice someone’s identity is not simply chosen by her. Accepting the above is one of the reasons I rather like Helm’s idea of someone discovering her values; discovering her identity. In spite of the above I do not want to completely downplay the role someone’s explicit choices about value play in creating her identity, I only want argue such choices do not play as big a part as we might assume. The fact someone has some value may in many cases be partly be due to the fact she made a choice. But even if someone has genuinely chosen something as a value does not guarantee it is in fact value. She must also be able to live up to her choice. In some cases she may discover she cannot, see Frankfurt discussion of Sartre’s young man (4). It might be objected there is some circularity in the above arguments concerning character, value and identity. I will not pursue this objection here but believe it can be overcome, see (5).

Helm and Frankfurt hold that our identity depends on what we value or ‘care about’. However I would suggest the fact that we often appear to discover our identity means other factors play a part in determining this identity. In my posting of 12/12/11 I argued that the fact someone suffers from Asperger’s syndrome partly determines her identity. Asperger’s syndrome affects someone’s neural development and hence the way she thinks, she chooses. I would go even further than this and suggest factors independent of our neural makeup also affect our identity. Consider someone born without legs and as a result of this is confined to a wheelchair. I would argue this fact affects the choices open to her and hence her identity. She may not for instance become a mountaineer like her parents. An objector to the above might use my wheelchair example to argue against me. She might argue if a soldier who loses his legs in Afghanistan and becomes confined to a wheelchair that this does not change his identity. Our intuitions about the mountaineer’s daughter and the wounded soldier seem to lead us to a paradox. I believe this paradox can be resolved. I accept soldier’s identity is not changed at the time of his injury but I would argue his identity will be changed over time. Let us assume prior to his injury the soldier identified himself with being a soldier leading his men into battle. This option is now closed to him. Let us further assume that post his injury he becomes a Para-Olympian and identifies himself with sport. It would appear then that over time the fact he has become a wheelchair user has in some ways affected his identity.

I have argued that in practice someone’s identity is not simply chosen by her but is also determined by her physical body and the circumstances she finds herself in. Part of these circumstances is the way other people see her. It follows our identity is linked to the way others see us. Let us return to a soldier example. Let us assume our soldier is a paramedic who does not see herself as brave. Let us further assume one day she tends to a wounded colleague under enemy fire. Her colleagues see her as brave and because of this she discovers herself to be brave. Of course she was brave before her discovery but her bravery was unreflective whilst after her discovery her bravery came to play a more central part in her life, in her identity and this centrality would not have happened had not others seen her as brave.

1.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 130.

2.      Harry Frankfurt 2006, Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, Page 41.

3.      Kwame Appiah, 2008, Experiments in Ethics, Harvard University Press, chapter 2.

4.      Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 84.

5.      Helm, page 140.

Damaging Self-Love, Pride and Shame

In the New Scientist of 28/04/12 Laura Spinney examines whether too high self esteem damages us. Self-love is related to though not identical to self esteem. In this posting I will argue some forms of self-love are damaging but not by being excessive like too much self esteem. Rather I will argue that damaging forms are in some ways incomplete forms of self-love. Before setting out I must make it clear I believe we must of necessity love ourselves to some degree. For instance Frankfurt believes caring about and loving are equivalent. (1) He suggests caring about oneself is necessary to be a person,

“perhaps caring about oneself is essential to being a person. Can something to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all. Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be. There could not be a person of no importance to himself.” (2)

If we accept Frankfurt’s position, which I do, it follows a person must of necessity love himself. However if a person loves himself so much that he ignores or even harms those close to him his self-love is damaging.

Unfortunately the idea of love as based simply on ‘caring about’ isn’t a very useful concept in examining damaging forms of self-love. If we accept Frankfurt’s account of love then a damaging form of self-love is perhaps one in which someone simply ‘cares about’ himself too much. But Frankfurt’s account offers us no idea of how much self-love is too much. In order to overcome this problem I will turn to Bennett Helm’s account of love (3). I will argue that damaging forms of self-love are not defined by the degree of love but rather by a lack of something. I will argue that damaging self-love is deficient.

Helm holds like Frankfurt that if someone is to be considered of as a person at all he must of necessity love himself. However unlike Frankfurt he does not believe that everything someone cares about is a form of love and defines him as a person. Helm links our identity to the things we value, our values. It is important to note what we value need not be identical with the values we explicitly identify with. Cocaine may be of value to me but when I reflect I might wish it wasn’t. Helm believes valuing is not just caring about something a lot, it is caring about something which is connected to your identity. According to Helm,

“for something to have value for one is for it to be the focus of a projectible pattern of felt evaluations. Because what is at stake in one’s values are oneself and one’s own wellbeing as this person, and because values involve an implicit understanding of the kind of life it is worth one’s living, the felt evaluations constitutive of this pattern …. are emotions like pride and shame.” (4).

A felt evaluation is an emotion which is focussed on something linked in some rational way to other emotions with the same focus. For instance, if I feel anxiety focussed on driving in dense traffic then it is rational that I should feel relief when driving in traffic if the traffic is less dense than I had anticipated. Helm argues when my focus is on me, on my values, the felt evaluations are pride and shame together with some second degree emotions, emotions about emotions. Helm holds someone’s pride and shame are a kind of attention, a kind of vigilance, about himself and his identity and that this attention or vigilance is a form of self-love. I don’t want to go into Helm’s position in greater detail but I do want to accept that someone who cannot feel pride and shame cannot truly love himself.

Accepting Helm’s ideas about the importance of pride and shame means we are now in a position to be able to see why some forms self-love might be damaging. It might be suggested that if someone has too much self-love he has excessive pride. However if someone must of necessity love himself then from the above he must at least have some pride. Nonetheless it is clear pride can damage us. Shakespeare’s Coriolanus is a deficient character who is damaged by what most people describe as his excessive pride. I will now argue what is usually described as excessive pride might be better described as either empty or exclusive pride. I will start my argument with empty pride. If someone is proud about something then intuitively it should be something which he believes to be good, which he desires and something or some quality he believes he possesses. If his pride is simply focussed on himself, rather than some of the attributes he possesses or values he holds, then it seems to me his pride is of a deficient form. Helm argues someone’s pride in his values helps to form his identity; it follows that if someone’s pride bypasses his values and simply focuses on himself it doesn’t really focus on anything at all and as a result is an empty and hence deficient form of pride.

I now want to turn to what I mean by exclusive pride. Coriolanus had real achievements to be proud of and so his pride was not simply empty pride. Nonetheless Coriolanus was damaged by his pride. An excellent discussion of Coriolanus and his pride is given by Gabriele Taylor (4). Taylor argues Coriolanus’ pride was an arrogant pride and that it was this arrogance that damaged him. I do not disagree with Taylor that Coriolanus’ arrogance damaged him but would suggest that his arrogance was due to the exclusivity of his pride. Helm argues if someone genuinely loves himself that he must feel both pride and shame. I would define exclusive pride as the pride someone feels who doesn’t or is incapable of feeling any shame. If we accept that someone must of necessity love himself and that Helm is correct, when he argues that to truly love oneself someone must be capable of feeling both pride and shame, then someone who feels exclusive pride is damaged as a person. Taylor suggests Coriolanus is damaged as a person because he lives in a world apart seeing himself as sole arbitrator of right and wrong. Coriolanus has limited perspective meaning he does not have the ability to change his focus. This inability to broaden his perspective is caused by his exclusive pride which excludes shame. I would suggest that the same argument can be applied to exclusive shame but I will not repeat the argument here.

Let us accept that the ability to feel both pride and shame is necessary for us if we are to love ourselves in a way that doesn’t damage us as individuals. In practice of course most people do feel both pride and shame. Nonetheless it appears to me that the balance between them has shifted and shame plays a less important part in most people’s psyche. Perhaps this shift was needed in the past. For instance in the past some Gay people were ashamed of their homosexuality and this unjustified shame led them to lead inauthentic lives. However it also seems to me this shift has gone too far so that it damages both individuals and society. For instance the fact that this shift has occurred at the same time as drunken behaviour in major UK cities has increased might well be significant.

1.      Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press. Page 129.

2.       Necessity, Volition, and Love, page 90

3.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.

4.      Helm, page 109.

5.      Gabriele Taylor, 2006, Deadly Vices, Oxford, chapter 5.

6.      Taylor, page 79.

Tiberius and Realistic Optimism

In this posting I want to question whether optimism is really a virtue. The type of optimism I want to consider is realistic optimism and not some excessive Panglossian optimism. Traditionally the main virtues are wisdom, courage, humanity, justice and temperance. There are of course many more minor virtues. Valerie Tiberius (1) suggests some new virtues. These are flexibility and wisdom, perspective, moderate self-awareness and realistic optimism. In this posting I want to consider Tiberius’ approach to realistic optimism and question whether it is indeed a virtue.

Before proceeding to consider whether realistic optimism is a virtue we must be clear about what a virtue is. Tiberius considers her new virtues to be reflective virtues. For Tiberius a reflective virtue is one that is justified by its usefulness in helping an agent to live a life which she can justify on reflection. I want to consider optimism from a more traditional conception of a virtue. For the purposes of this posting a virtue is roughly a disposition to think, act and feel in certain ways which are good in some way and help the agent to flourish. An optimist is someone who has a disposition to think and act in certain ways due to her optimism. Using the above definitions mean whether optimism is a virtue or not depends on whether optimism helps an agent to flourish. There is some evidence that unbridled optimism does not help everyone to flourish. A study in Japan of 101 obese men and women undergoing a program of counselling, nutrition and exercise therapy found that slimmers with a happy-go-lucky bright outlook at the start of the therapy were less likely to succeed in losing weight see Telegraph  . It follows that optimism may not be a virtue. However it does not follow from the study that optimism is not a virtue. For instance courage is not always a virtue. Unbridled courage or rashness might be classed as simple stupidity. Aristotle believed there was a mean attached to a virtue and that someone could be either too courageous or lack courage altogether and be a coward. Further he believed the virtues had a certain unity which constrained the unbridled excesses of any single virtue. Much of the above might be applied to optimism. Perhaps Tiberius believes realistic optimism must be seen in the context of her other reflective virtues of, flexibility, perspective, and moderate self-awareness; perhaps so doing places some constraints on unbridled optimism. Perhaps a slimmer’s optimism about her weight loss should be constrained by her moderate self-awareness.

I however want to examine optimism using the more traditional definition of a virtue. Before doing so I want to consider the domain of optimism. What does Tiberius mean by realistic optimism? She does not regard realistic optimism as just the mean between unbridled optimism and pessimism. She argues that realistic optimism helps us to live a life which we can justify on reflection by combating cynicism. She limits cynicism to human nature (2). I myself cannot see how cynicism can extend to things outside human nature. One may well be pessimistic about the weather tomorrow, but can one be cynical about it? Accepting Tiberius’ position, which I do, means accepting realistic optimism is limited to the domain of human affairs. According to Tiberius,

“Cynics in my sense doubt that human beings have truly good qualities; they attribute ugly ulterior motives to others without much evidence and they react to other people with scorn and disdain, whether or not they have information about the particular person’s character.” (3).

I agree with Tiberius that cynicism is harmful. I would argue it is harmful to the cynic as it damages her agency because she is likely to attribute ugly ulterior motives to herself. Cynicism damages people’s autonomy. If someone believes the reasons she acts on are ulterior, not really hers, then she may well question why she should act at all. However even if it is accepted that cynicism is harmful it does not automatically follow we should adopt an attitude of realistic optimism. We could, as Tiberius acknowledges, simply adopt a more realistic attitude. I will present three connected arguments against adopting a purely realist attitude. I will firstly argue that a purely realist attitude is inadequate for dealing with life’s complexities. Secondly I will argue trust depends on realistic optimism. Lastly I will argue that a purely realist attitude is, like that of the cynic, harmful to agency.

Let us assume that we should adopt a purely realist attitude to life. Unfortunately in many situations we encounter we don’t have the information needed to adopt this attitude. If I meet someone for the first time having no information whatsoever about her what should I do? Should I adopt an attitude that is indifferent and detached because of this lack of information? A realistic attitude. I would suggest that I should adopt a different attitude, a pleasant and welcoming one in the hope that this will be beneficial in any future relations. Tiberius argues that we should adopt hopeful attitudes, realistically optimistic attitudes, to combat cynicism (4). Perhaps she is right but I would argue that in some circumstances, such as the above, a realistic attitude is an empty attitude and cannot form a meaningful basis on which to base our actions. It seems to me that in such circumstances we should adopt a realistically optimistic attitude. This brings us to my second reason connected to my first reason as to why we should not adopt a purely realist attitude. Society depends on trust. If we adopt a purely realistic attitude we have no basis for trust. Trust depends on us being optimistic about the good intentions of others. Lastly realistic optimism seems conducive to agency. Hume famously argued reason alone gives us no reason to act. If I am completely indifferent or detached from something then I do not care about it. If I do not care about something I have no reason to act. If I don’t believe my actions will benefit me or avoid harm I have no reason to act. It follows indifference and detachment alone give me no reason to act even if I am well informed. I may of course act; but as I have no reason to act any action, or none, will do equally well and I act wantonly. I have argued previously someone who acts wantonly is not a real person and lacks agency, see wooler.scottus  . It follows a purely realist attitude in life, like that of the cynic, damages our agency, damages our autonomy. It would seem then if we value our autonomy we should adopt an attitude that has some import to us.

Nonetheless the question still remains as to why we should adopt an optimistic attitude. The fact that we should adopt an attitude that has some import to us does not mean this import must be positive. It might be argued that pessimism might give us equally as good a reason to act as optimism. I have argued above that cynicism can damage us as autonomous agents. I would further argue that because pessimism can easily slip into cynicism we have a good reason to choose a realistically optimistic attitude over a pessimistic one. Let us accept that if we wish to preserve our agency we have reason to be realistically optimistic but the question remains is this realistic optimism a virtue, does it help us flourish? The above suggests to me that realistic optimism is a disposition to think, act and feel in certain ways which are necessary for flourishing. It follows realistic optimism is a virtue. Of course someone may be realistically optimistic and not flourish but same is true of more accepted virtues one may be brave but still not flourish.

It seems to me that games theory offers some support for the above conclusion. Let us consider the prisoners dilemma. In this game the police arrest two men but do not have enough evidence for a full conviction and so offer a deal. The deal is this if one prisoner confesses and testifies against his partner and the other does not the prisoner goes free and his partner will receive the full sentence. If both remain silent each receives a short sentence. The best outcome is achieved if both remain silent. If this game is repeated several times the most successful strategy is one called tit for tat. This strategy calls for a prisoner to remain silent initially. In subsequent round if his partner confessed in the previous round then he should confess in this round. If however his partner remained silent then he should remain silent. I would suggest tit for tat is a realistically optimistic strategy. In the first round the prisoner when choosing to remain silent is being optimistic in hoping his partner will do likewise. In subsequent rounds his choice is determined by his partner’s previous choice. Tit for tat is not however an over optimistic strategy in which the prisoner always assumes his partner will remain silent nor is it a pessimistic strategy in which the prisoner always assumes his partner will confess.

1. Valerie Tiberius, 2008, The Reflective life, Oxford.
2. Tiberius, page 140.
3. Tiberius page 141.
4. Tiberius, page 150.

Deceit and Unintentional Fathers

Elizabeth Brake (1) argues that unintentional fathers do not have an obligation to support any children they father. She bases here argument on equal rights for men and women. She argues if a women has right not to become a parent because she has a right to have an abortion then it follows that a man also has a right not to become a parent. She believes this means that a man has the right not support any child he unintentionally fathers. Her argument is based on the idea of consent. It assumes a woman must consent either explicitly or implicitly if she gestates. Her argument assumes that consent forms the basis for parental obligation. Clearly this assumption is true for adoptive parents but is it also true of biological parents? Lindsey Porter (2) argues it is not and that all parents have an obligation to support any children they create and that this obligation includes unintentional fathers. In this posting I will firstly outline Porter’s argument which I accept. I will then move on to consider a slightly different question as to whether her argument should also apply to unintentional fathers who have been deceived.

Porter points out that a biological parent is someone who causes a new person to exist. She argues biological parental obligation is based on the idea that because a biological parent is responsible for a child’s vulnerability he/she must take steps to remedy this situation. Prima facie this obligation means assuming a full parenting role in most cases. Of course there may be exceptions, for instance a fourteen year mother might best fulfil her obligation as a biological parent by allowing her child to be adopted. Unfortunately as Porter notes there is a problem with this account. Gamete donors and even IVF doctors might appear to have parental duties. Porter attempts to overcome this problem by presenting a bifurcated account of parenthood. A parent can either mean someone who causes a child to exist or secondly someone who “stands in a unique and invaluable social, personal, love relation to the child.” Her argument depends on the idea that a certain class of parents in the first meaning has a prima facie obligation to become a parent as defined by the second meaning. In what follows assuming full parental obligations means being a parent in sense of both of the above meanings. I agree with the thrust of Porter’s argument but believe we must be able to define which of those people who cause a child to exist have a prima facie duty to assume full parental obligations.

Porter correctly points out that in some cases people such as gamete donors and IVF specialists play a part in causing some children to exist. Without these people some children would not exist. It follows they cause vulnerable children to come into the world. Surely this causation means they have responsibilities. Clearly they do have responsibilities. Equally clearly gamete donors and IVF specialists should not offer their services to people who will not become good parents. However the question remains if gamete donors, IVF specialists and biological parents can all play a necessary part in causing a child to exist, then why should only biological parents have a duty to assume full parental obligations?

Of course it is impractical that gamete donors and IVF specialists should fully parent the children they cause to come into existence simply because of the numbers involved. However if they only caused one or possibly two children to come into existence is there any reason why they should not be obliged to assume full parental duties for the same reason as the biological parents are? It might be objected that in practice this just doesn’t happen and that my question is purely of theoretical interest. But this is not so let us consider two sisters Ann and Carol. Ann is married but is incapable of carrying a child because she has had a hysterectomy followed by chemotherapy due to cancer. Prior to her treatment some of Ann’s eggs were saved. Carol has two children of her own but nonetheless offers to act as a surrogate mother for Ann. Carol successfully undergoes IVF using her sister’s eggs together with her brother in laws sperm and produces a child. Let us assume Carol will never undertake surrogacy again or have any other children. Clearly Carol played a necessary part in causing Ann’s child to exist. Does it follow that in this situation that Carol has an equal obligation with Ann to assume full parental duties? I would argue it does not. Ann wanted a child. Having a child of her own was of intrinsic value to her. Carol only acted instrumentally to serve Ann’s wants. Carol may have played a necessary part in the creation of the child but she would not have done so without Ann’s need. Ann and Carol caused the child to exist in different ways. Ann’s need was the original cause of the child. Carol served this original cause instrumentally. I would suggest only those people who cause a child to exist by being the original cause of that child have a prima facie duty to assume full parental obligations. Those people who cause a child to exist by acting instrumentally to fulfil someone else’s need for a child do not. It follows that gamete donors, IVF specialists and surrogate mothers do not have a prima facie duty to fully parent any children they help to come into existence.

I now want return to the question as to whether unintentional fathers have full parental obligations to any children they father. I have suggested above that only those people who cause a child to exist by being the originating cause have a prima facie duty to become full parents. If my suggestion is accepted it follows most unintentional fathers do have a prima facie duty to accept parental obligations because by fathering a child a father is not usually acting instrumentally to serve someone else’s purpose. Moreover by engaging in normal sexual relations becoming a father, causing a child to exist, is a foreseeable risk. Of course not all unintentional fathers might be in a position to fully assume a full parenting role. In some cases an unintentional father or his child’s mother may be in another relationship. Or perhaps, like the fourteen year old mother mentioned above, he may be better able to discharge his parental duties in a different way. Nonetheless most unintentional fathers have a prima facie duty to assume a full parenting role.

However there is a subset of unintentional fathers to whom the above might not apply. A woman might intentionally deceive a man regarding contraception for some purpose of her own. For instance she might simply desire a child. In this case the child’s father seems to be being used by her instrumentally in much the same way a gamete donor is. Prima facie I can see no reason as to why he should be treated differently from a the donor and hence should not be subject to full parental obligations. Secondly a woman might seek to bind her partner to her by having a child. She might secretly stop taking any contraceptive measures in order to achieve her objective. In this context the man is being deceived but is he also being used instrumentally? It is of course true he is not being seen as an end in himself and this is wrong. The deceit is also wrong. However it is not clear that these wrongs mean he should be free from full parental obligations. It is clear is that this case the child is being used instrumentally by the woman to bind her partner to her. I would suggest this means the father in this case is also being used instrumentally. Once again prima facie it seems clear to me that he should also not be subject to full parental obligations.

Prima facie I have argued that those unintentional fathers who have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. Are there any reasons as to why my conclusion should not be accepted? Unfortunately applied philosophy like real morality is messy and there is at least one reason not to accept my conclusion. This reason is also concerned with deceit. Many unintentional fathers who have not been deceived might lie and say that they have been in order to avoid full parental obligations. It seems clear to me that those unintentional fathers whose partners admit to deceiving them and those for whom it can be shown that they have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. Again unfortunately this is likely to be only a small subset of unintentional fathers who have been deceived. It would appear we have almost arrived back at my starting point. Elizabeth Brake argued that unintentional fathers do not have an obligation to support any children they father due to equal rights for men and women. I have accepted Lindsey Porter’s argument that most unintentional fathers do have a prima facie obligation to fully support their children. However in the light of the above argument some might suggest that in practice, even if this obligation remains, unintentional fathers should not be made to support any children they father if they say they have been deceived and it cannot be shown that they are lying. It is not always possible to differentiate between unintentional fathers who have been deceived and those who merely say they have been deceived. In addition I have argued that unintentional fathers who have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. It might appear to follow that the right of unintentional fathers who have been deceived not to support any children they father means that all unintentional fathers, who say they have been deceived, should not be compelled to assume full parental responsibility. Personally I am reluctant to accept the above. It seems to me that children’s interests may well trump the right of unintentional fathers who have been deceived, but who are unable to show this, not to assume full parental obligations.

1. Elizabeth Brake, Fatherhood and child support; Do men have a right to choose?, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(1), 2005.

2. Lindsey Porter, Adoption is Not Abortion-Lite, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(1), 2012.

Sport, Performance Enhancing Drugs and Character

 

Julian Savulescu argues in a posting in Practical Ethics that “performance enhancement is not against the spirit of cycling; it is the spirit cycling” he goes on to suggest that “we should focus on monitoring the athletes’ health rather than on losing a war on doping”, see Practical Ethics. In this posting I will argue performance enhancement is against the spirit of sport and because cycling is a sport it is against the spirit of cycling. At first hand it might appear that this will be a difficult task for me as I have previously argued that there is nothing wrong with taking cognition enhancing drugs subject to certain safeguards, see cognitive enhancement . I still stand by this position. In addition I would also support the use moral enhancing drugs, once again subject to suitable safeguards. In must be noted drug enhancement is usually not as straightforward as it sometimes seems initially and adequate safeguards are extremely important; for instance nasal sprays containing oxytocin may not be as effective as first thought and in some circumstances may even be counter productive. 

Let us assume certain cognitive enhancing or moral enhancement drugs are as safe as any of the drugs used in medical practice, if this is so I see no reason why someone should not take these enhancement drugs. Prima facie enhancing someone’s cognitive abilities or her capacity to feel empathy will not damage her as a person. Moreover if any enhancement drug is as safe as those used in medical practice and reasonably cheap I can see no reason why this drug should give someone an unfair advantage over others. I will not pursue the argument here. Of course in this situation cognitive enhancing or moral enhancing drugs will have to be tested and approved by some appropriate authority just as the drugs used in medical practice are now. Savulescu, as I read him, believes the above should also apply to cycling. The cycling authorities rather than testing cyclists for drugs should test drugs for cyclists in order to ensure these drugs are safe for cyclists to take. Whether cyclists take advantage of these drugs would be up to them.

Before proceeding with my argument I must make it clear the type of sport which concerns me. My argument will not concern non-competitive sports, for in these sports there seems no spirit to contravene. For instance, if someone is a lone cyclist who cycles either because she simply enjoys it or to keep fit then she is of no concern to me here. If such a cyclist takes performance enhancing drugs in order to cycle faster or further then I see no reason why she should not do so provided these drugs are safe. I hasten to add as a lone cyclist myself I personally can see no good reason to go faster or further than I am normally capable of. My argument is limited solely to competitive sports.

I want to argue that all competitive sports incorporate the ideal of fairness. A cycle race, in which only one competitor was permitted to take enhancing drugs whilst the other riders were forbidden to do so by the cycling authorities and in which the authorities rigorously tested these other riders to ensure their compliance, could not possibly be regarded as fair. Nonetheless could such a race possibly be regarded as sport? I would argue if such a race could be regarded as sport then there is no essential difference between sport and spectacle, between sport and showbiz. Someone might suggest that the demand for tickets at the Olympic opening ceremony by some supposed sports fans shows that in practice there is really no difference between sport and spectacle. I would reject such a suggestion for it seems to me even if sport can be spectacular it cannot be regarded simply as a spectacle. Intuitively the hypothetical race suggested above cannot be regarded as sport. It would appear the idea of fairness is an essential part of sport, but the question remains why? 

I would suggest fairness is an essential part of sport because it engenders what we find admirable about sport. Able bodied Olympians don’t compete with Para-Olympians, heavyweight boxers don’t compete with lightweights and golfers have handicaps to ensure fair competition. It follows what we find admirable about sport must be connected to sports men and women. What we find admirable about sportspersons cannot be that they are winners. If this was so we would not find anything admirable about the vast majority sportspersons. I would now suggest what we find admirable in sportsppersons is linked to their character and this character is connected to certain virtues. Virtues such as determination, dedication, fortitude and courage. If we accept the above then it seem competition between women born as female and women born as male damages sport. Such completion damages sport. These virtues can be best expressed if a sportsperson can compete equally, if sport is fair. Someone might object we don’t find all sportspersons admirable. She might point out we don’t have any reason to find some premiership footballers’ character as admirable. In reply I would argue we only find part of a sportsman’s character admirable. The fact that some footballer shows determination, dedication, fortitude and some courage when playing football is admirable. It may well be true that we find some of his activities off the pitch less than admirable. Nonetheless I would counter argue the fact that a footballer plays football to a high standard makes his character more admirable than if he did not. I would further argue that the same applies to amateur sportspersons who engage in sport purely for the pleasure it brings; engaging in sport may not make someone a good person but it nearly always enhances his character to some degree. Of course there may be a very few people who should not play sport due to their temperament, for instance someone might be unable to control his anger.

Savulescu might accept my argument. Nevertheless he might continue to argue if all professional cyclists could take drugs which are tested and approved by cycling authorities then cycle races would not be unfair and that we could still admire the determination, dedication, fortitude and courage of the cyclists involved. I would suggest he would be wrong to do so because such a situation would be hard to maintain. Let us assume some drugs are tested and approved by cycling authorities. However new drugs which might enhance a cyclist’s performance further might be developed. It follows the cycling authorities will have to continue testing cyclists for these new drugs to promote fairness. It follows that allowing cyclists to take some drugs would only change the current situation slightly. A partial ban on enhancing drugs would mean some drugs are acceptable whilst others are not. It would also seem to mean some new drugs initially unacceptable might, after suitable testing, become acceptable. It follows policing such a fluid situation might be much more difficult than trying to maintain the current position. Savulescu might of course revise his position and insist that cyclists should be free to take any drug and that drug testing should be abolished. It seems entirely possible that in this revised situation argue some enhancing drugs might be developed and only offered to selected cyclists. Real competition would then shift from cyclists to the scientists producing performance enhancing drugs; competitive cycling would be reduced to a mere spectacle.

Acting from Duty, Caring For

In this posting I want to consider acting from duty. My starting point is an example given by Thomas Hurka. He asks us to imagine, 

“that you’re in hospital recovering from a painful operation and a friend comes at considerable inconvenience to visit you. When you say how much you appreciate her visit and concern for you it shows, she says it isn’t that she cares for you; she just knew that as a friend, she had a duty to visit.”(1)

Hurka uses this example to argue that in some situations acting out of duty seems to be an inferior way of acting when compared to caring. Hurka’s argument has personal interest to me. A few years ago when my father was getting old and was not as capable as he once had been I found myself travelling to see him every day and helping him out as best I could. I told my wife I was acting out of duty at the time and a few years on after reflection I still believe for the most part this was true. Should I regret acting mostly from duty? I do not. More generally is acting solely from duty in some way inferior to acting because you care?

Intuitively we seem to accept Hurka’s argument. However everyone, including Hurka’s hospital visitor acts because they care about something. Perhaps the hospital visitor only cares about doing her duty. At this point I want to make a distinction between two ways of caring. To ‘care about’ someone means the carer identifies himself with the person she cares about and becomes vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether who she cares about is diminished or enhanced. This definition is based on that of Harry Frankfurt which I use regularly in this blog. To ‘care for’ someone means to understand someone’s needs and to respond to them in an appropriate way. In the light of this distinction I will assume Hurka’s hospital patient wants his visitors to ‘care about’ him but that he wants his nurses to ‘care for’ him. A nurse who cared a ‘great deal’ about his patients but was not very good at ‘caring for’ them would not be a very good nurse. In practice most caring is a combination of ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’. However it is possible in theory to ‘care for’ someone but not ‘care about’ him. Caring for someone is related to duty and as the example of nurse shows caring for is also important. If Hurka’s hospital visitor is acting out of duty she must ‘care for’ the patient. If for instance she simply went to the hospital and did her SuDoku next to the patient each day during visiting time few people would think she was doing her duty. She must address the concerns of the patient. The hospital visitor acting out of duty must ‘care for’ the patient but it seems what the patient really wants her to do is ‘care about’ him. My original question now becomes this. Is the patient right in believing it would be better if his visitor cared about him rather than for him? Is acting from duty by ‘caring for’ someone in some way inferior to acting because you ‘care about’ him?

If someone acts from duty she must make a real effort to do her duty. Feeble attempts and gestures at doing one’s duty are not doing one’s duty, doing one’s duty is quite demanding. What must the hospital patient’s visitor do when doing her duty? She must ‘care for’ the patient. She must attempt to understand the patient’s needs and to respond in an appropriate way. Clearly she cannot respond to the patient’s medical needs and such needs must be met by the medical staff. She can and should respond to the patient’s practical and emotional needs when she can. One of the emotional needs of the patient is to be ‘cared about’, loved. It follows if the visitor is serious about doing her duty she must make an attempt whenever possible to ‘care about’ the patient. Just bringing him his paper and the fruit he asked for yesterday and then settling down to do her SuDoku for the rest of the visiting time is not doing her duty. It follows doing one’s duty need not be divorced from ‘caring about’.

Let us assume the patient’s friend cannot visit tomorrow and in her place comes his son. His son comes purely out of a sense of duty because he suffers from Aspergers syndrome. People with Aspergers are often extremely conscientious about acting from duty because they have difficultly with empathy or ‘caring about’ as I have defined it above, see Simon Baron-Cohen (2). Acting from duty is central to the lives of some people if they are to act morally. According to Neema Trivedi-Bateman there is a link between moral emotions and offending behaviour in young people, see the conservation . Her research shows that young people are more likely to carry out violent acts if they have weak empathy, shame and guilt. Unfortunately for autistic people empathy, shame and guilt are hard to acquire perhaps because they cannot read other people’s emotions. For higher functioning autistic people acting from duty is of great importance it is essential to acting morally. Parents of such children should try to inculcate a sense of duty in them rather than the moral emotions which they might find impossible to assimilate. Returning to our hospital visitor, he now has had two visitors both visiting from exactly the same sense of duty. If our patient thinks his first visitor is acting in an inferior way does he also think his son is similarly acting in an inferior way? I would guess not. Does then he then come to the view that his first visitor is not acting in an inferior way? Once again I would guess not. What reason might he advance for not changing his mind? He might suggest that whilst his son only has the option of acting out of duty his other visitor can ‘care about’ him.

Is this a reasonable suggestion? I will now argue it is not. The patient believes his visitor has the option to care for him, I believe she may not. I would argue ‘caring about’ or having empathy for someone involves loving her. A mother’s love of her child would be a good example of ‘caring about’. But as Frankfurt points out, love is not a matter of choice (3). One cannot choose to love someone. It might of course be possible to place oneself in a position so that one comes to love someone else. A successful arranged marriage might be an example of so doing. However even in these circumstances love grows and is not chosen. I do believe it is commendable for someone to cultivate the circumstances in which love can flourish. Moreover I do not deny it is good to be loved for the beloved but I do not believe a lover’s love is a matter for praise.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly acting from duty is not an inferior way of acting. Indeed for many people, such as higher functioning autistic people, it is perhaps the only way to act morally. Secondly whist caring about is good and should encouraged it isn’t always praiseworthy whilst acting from duty might be.

1. Thomas Hurka, 2011, The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters in Life, Oxford, page 127.
2. Simon Baron-Cohen, 2011, Zero Degrees of Empathy, Penguin, page 65.
3. Harry Frankfurt. 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 135.

Assisted Suicide and the Nationalisation of Morality

The Commission on Assisted Dying published its final report on 05/01/12. This report suggests a framework which would permit people with a terminal illness to be assisted to end their lives whilst protecting those who are vulnerable. I have argued in a previous posting, see Assisted Suicide, Slippery Slopes and Empathic Caring , that if we have true empathic concern those with a terminal illness it should be possible to assist them in this way. I will not repeat my arguments here. Instead I want to concentrate on one of the reasons given as to why this assistance should not be forthcoming. I accept of course that a purely private morality is nonsense but I will argue society as a whole cannot determine our morality, society as a whole can of course influence it. However, even if a purely private morality is nonsense so too is the idea of a national morality, any morality must include personal acceptance. The idea of a national morality is dangerous one.

George Pitcher writing in the Daily Mail concerning the death of Geraldine McCelland at Dignitas clinic in Zurich, see Geraldine-McClellands, asks us to consider two statements.

"You are in pain and feel humiliated. We agree with you that your life is not worth living. It's your life to do with what you wish, so go ahead and kill yourself. We will help you.

Or:

"You are in pain and feel humiliated. But your life is infinitely precious and is of equal value to anyone alive. We will support you and cherish you, but we won't help you to kill yourself. We will help you."

He goes on to state it is the second statement that that our society should offer as its moral choice. And it's the one which should continue to be protected in our law. In the above Pitcher goes seamlessly from offering us two statements to talking about moral choice. All choice moral or otherwise must involve options. If Pitcher really believes society should offer the terminally ill a moral choice then what are the options related to that choice? It seems to me the only choice Pitcher and those who hold similar views to him is between dying alone, probably in great pain, and receiving palliative care. This is not a meaningful choice. Of course society doesn’t always have to give its members choice. We cannot choose to drive at any speed we would like to on a motorway for instance. However ever since Mill it seems to be generally accepted that in a free society individuals have a right to make personal choices provided these choices do no significant harm to others. Indeed I would argue it is a necessary condition for a free society. Any society that does not permit individuals the right to make such choices is not really a free society. It may of course be a caring society. For instance such a society might prohibit the consumption of tobacco. However in such a society the state makes moral decisions rather than individuals. In the case of assisted suicide society is saying to those with a terminal illness we will help you but only as society sees best. I would suggest that such a society has nationalised morality and the result might possibly be a deeply caring society but it certainly is not a truly free society.

Someone like Pitcher might object that such a society is both a free and caring society by allowing people only to make choices that are best for them. The trouble with this argument is that someone is not really free if his choices are restricted to what is good for him. My objector might respond that someone should not be able to choose assisted suicide because it isn’t good for him but rather because such a choice harms others. His objection seems to be based on the premise that if the terminally ill can commit assisted suicide then the weak and the vulnerable are harmed. I will assume the reason they are harmed is because they might feel under pressure to do likewise. It is this reason I wish to question.

I now want to consider why the weak and old might feel under such pressure. I will not use the term ‘the vulnerable’ in this context because to be vulnerable is to be susceptible to pressure and it is this susceptibility to pressure I want to question. The weak and the old might feel vulnerable for two reasons. Firstly someone may feel vulnerable simply because he is weak or old. Secondly someone may feel vulnerable for some reason connected to their age and weakness but that reason is not simply one of age or weakness. For instance someone may feel vulnerable because he needs a catheter inserted up his penis due to old age rather than simply because he is old. I want to consider the second reason first. In its evidence to the above commission The British Geriatrics Society,

“emphasised the negative impact of low quality care, and the feeling they are not valued by society, on older people’s decision-making processes: In the experience of many geriatricians, the feeling of many older people that life is unbearable in its later stages is a direct result of the reaction of others to their frailty and the care and treatment they are afforded. Our concern then is that many older people, because of the care given to them by society in general and the NHS and Social Care system in particular, will perceive themselves as a burden and feel under pressure to end their lives.”

Perhaps then the weak and old might be vulnerable because they aren’t valued, they are simply existing. They have, to borrow a phrase, an unbearable lightness of simply being. According to Pitcher our attitude to the terminally ill should be one that sees their lives infinitely precious and of equal value to anyone alive. We should support and cherish them. Perhaps then this should be our attitude to all the old and weak rather than just the terminally ill. If the old and weak are supported and cherished they should not see themselves as a burden and hence should become less vulnerable. In which case there would be no need to protect them from feeling under pressure to commit assisted suicide provided this option was available.

My objector might respond even in this improved situation an old man with a catheter up his penis may still feel under pressure to take his own life. I agree he might well want to take his own life. But I would deny he is under pressure to do so. Clearly if we see the lives of the old as infinitely precious and cherish them this old man is not subject to outside pressure. If my objector replies he is under pressure from himself then I would suggest my objector doesn’t understand pressure. If my old man wants to take his own life and is under no outside pressure, he simply desires to take his life and the idea of pressure is irrelevant. I would suggest again that if we really think the lives of the terminally ill are precious then we should also think the lives of the weak and old are precious and hence address the causes of their vulnerability rather ban assisted suicide the terminally ill.

Now let us consider the second scenario in which a few of the weak and old might be vulnerable simply because they are weak and old. In this second scenario I am perfectly willing to admit again that someone who is weak or old might want to commit assisted suicide. But his want is once again caused by his desire due weakness and age not by pressure. I would suggest he would have this desire irrespective of whether or not the terminally ill can commit assisted suicide. Of course if the terminally ill can commit assisted suicide some of old and weak might claim it is a matter of justice that they can also do so. I will not enter into this debate here.

To conclude the following seems to hold. Opponents of right of to the terminally ill to commit assisted suicide argue that this practice should be illegal in order to protect the weak and old. They argue we should do this because we are a caring society. I have argued that provided we do care for and cherish the weak and old, in practice rather than simply talk about doing so, then the weak and old would feel under no pressure to commit assisted suicide even if the terminally ill could do so. If we ban assisted suicide for the terminally ill in these circumstances we have restricted freedom in our society because of a false illusion. If however we do not care for and cherish the weak and old, but nonetheless insist on banning assisted suicide because of the harm that might come to them, then we might rightly be accused of hypocrisy.