Tiberius and Realistic Optimism

In this posting I want to question whether optimism is really a virtue. The type of optimism I want to consider is realistic optimism and not some excessive Panglossian optimism. Traditionally the main virtues are wisdom, courage, humanity, justice and temperance. There are of course many more minor virtues. Valerie Tiberius (1) suggests some new virtues. These are flexibility and wisdom, perspective, moderate self-awareness and realistic optimism. In this posting I want to consider Tiberius’ approach to realistic optimism and question whether it is indeed a virtue.

Before proceeding to consider whether realistic optimism is a virtue we must be clear about what a virtue is. Tiberius considers her new virtues to be reflective virtues. For Tiberius a reflective virtue is one that is justified by its usefulness in helping an agent to live a life which she can justify on reflection. I want to consider optimism from a more traditional conception of a virtue. For the purposes of this posting a virtue is roughly a disposition to think, act and feel in certain ways which are good in some way and help the agent to flourish. An optimist is someone who has a disposition to think and act in certain ways due to her optimism. Using the above definitions mean whether optimism is a virtue or not depends on whether optimism helps an agent to flourish. There is some evidence that unbridled optimism does not help everyone to flourish. A study in Japan of 101 obese men and women undergoing a program of counselling, nutrition and exercise therapy found that slimmers with a happy-go-lucky bright outlook at the start of the therapy were less likely to succeed in losing weight see Telegraph  . It follows that optimism may not be a virtue. However it does not follow from the study that optimism is not a virtue. For instance courage is not always a virtue. Unbridled courage or rashness might be classed as simple stupidity. Aristotle believed there was a mean attached to a virtue and that someone could be either too courageous or lack courage altogether and be a coward. Further he believed the virtues had a certain unity which constrained the unbridled excesses of any single virtue. Much of the above might be applied to optimism. Perhaps Tiberius believes realistic optimism must be seen in the context of her other reflective virtues of, flexibility, perspective, and moderate self-awareness; perhaps so doing places some constraints on unbridled optimism. Perhaps a slimmer’s optimism about her weight loss should be constrained by her moderate self-awareness.

I however want to examine optimism using the more traditional definition of a virtue. Before doing so I want to consider the domain of optimism. What does Tiberius mean by realistic optimism? She does not regard realistic optimism as just the mean between unbridled optimism and pessimism. She argues that realistic optimism helps us to live a life which we can justify on reflection by combating cynicism. She limits cynicism to human nature (2). I myself cannot see how cynicism can extend to things outside human nature. One may well be pessimistic about the weather tomorrow, but can one be cynical about it? Accepting Tiberius’ position, which I do, means accepting realistic optimism is limited to the domain of human affairs. According to Tiberius,

“Cynics in my sense doubt that human beings have truly good qualities; they attribute ugly ulterior motives to others without much evidence and they react to other people with scorn and disdain, whether or not they have information about the particular person’s character.” (3).

I agree with Tiberius that cynicism is harmful. I would argue it is harmful to the cynic as it damages her agency because she is likely to attribute ugly ulterior motives to herself. Cynicism damages people’s autonomy. If someone believes the reasons she acts on are ulterior, not really hers, then she may well question why she should act at all. However even if it is accepted that cynicism is harmful it does not automatically follow we should adopt an attitude of realistic optimism. We could, as Tiberius acknowledges, simply adopt a more realistic attitude. I will present three connected arguments against adopting a purely realist attitude. I will firstly argue that a purely realist attitude is inadequate for dealing with life’s complexities. Secondly I will argue trust depends on realistic optimism. Lastly I will argue that a purely realist attitude is, like that of the cynic, harmful to agency.

Let us assume that we should adopt a purely realist attitude to life. Unfortunately in many situations we encounter we don’t have the information needed to adopt this attitude. If I meet someone for the first time having no information whatsoever about her what should I do? Should I adopt an attitude that is indifferent and detached because of this lack of information? A realistic attitude. I would suggest that I should adopt a different attitude, a pleasant and welcoming one in the hope that this will be beneficial in any future relations. Tiberius argues that we should adopt hopeful attitudes, realistically optimistic attitudes, to combat cynicism (4). Perhaps she is right but I would argue that in some circumstances, such as the above, a realistic attitude is an empty attitude and cannot form a meaningful basis on which to base our actions. It seems to me that in such circumstances we should adopt a realistically optimistic attitude. This brings us to my second reason connected to my first reason as to why we should not adopt a purely realist attitude. Society depends on trust. If we adopt a purely realistic attitude we have no basis for trust. Trust depends on us being optimistic about the good intentions of others. Lastly realistic optimism seems conducive to agency. Hume famously argued reason alone gives us no reason to act. If I am completely indifferent or detached from something then I do not care about it. If I do not care about something I have no reason to act. If I don’t believe my actions will benefit me or avoid harm I have no reason to act. It follows indifference and detachment alone give me no reason to act even if I am well informed. I may of course act; but as I have no reason to act any action, or none, will do equally well and I act wantonly. I have argued previously someone who acts wantonly is not a real person and lacks agency, see wooler.scottus  . It follows a purely realist attitude in life, like that of the cynic, damages our agency, damages our autonomy. It would seem then if we value our autonomy we should adopt an attitude that has some import to us.

Nonetheless the question still remains as to why we should adopt an optimistic attitude. The fact that we should adopt an attitude that has some import to us does not mean this import must be positive. It might be argued that pessimism might give us equally as good a reason to act as optimism. I have argued above that cynicism can damage us as autonomous agents. I would further argue that because pessimism can easily slip into cynicism we have a good reason to choose a realistically optimistic attitude over a pessimistic one. Let us accept that if we wish to preserve our agency we have reason to be realistically optimistic but the question remains is this realistic optimism a virtue, does it help us flourish? The above suggests to me that realistic optimism is a disposition to think, act and feel in certain ways which are necessary for flourishing. It follows realistic optimism is a virtue. Of course someone may be realistically optimistic and not flourish but same is true of more accepted virtues one may be brave but still not flourish.

It seems to me that games theory offers some support for the above conclusion. Let us consider the prisoners dilemma. In this game the police arrest two men but do not have enough evidence for a full conviction and so offer a deal. The deal is this if one prisoner confesses and testifies against his partner and the other does not the prisoner goes free and his partner will receive the full sentence. If both remain silent each receives a short sentence. The best outcome is achieved if both remain silent. If this game is repeated several times the most successful strategy is one called tit for tat. This strategy calls for a prisoner to remain silent initially. In subsequent round if his partner confessed in the previous round then he should confess in this round. If however his partner remained silent then he should remain silent. I would suggest tit for tat is a realistically optimistic strategy. In the first round the prisoner when choosing to remain silent is being optimistic in hoping his partner will do likewise. In subsequent rounds his choice is determined by his partner’s previous choice. Tit for tat is not however an over optimistic strategy in which the prisoner always assumes his partner will remain silent nor is it a pessimistic strategy in which the prisoner always assumes his partner will confess.

1. Valerie Tiberius, 2008, The Reflective life, Oxford.
2. Tiberius, page 140.
3. Tiberius page 141.
4. Tiberius, page 150.

Deceit and Unintentional Fathers

Elizabeth Brake (1) argues that unintentional fathers do not have an obligation to support any children they father. She bases here argument on equal rights for men and women. She argues if a women has right not to become a parent because she has a right to have an abortion then it follows that a man also has a right not to become a parent. She believes this means that a man has the right not support any child he unintentionally fathers. Her argument is based on the idea of consent. It assumes a woman must consent either explicitly or implicitly if she gestates. Her argument assumes that consent forms the basis for parental obligation. Clearly this assumption is true for adoptive parents but is it also true of biological parents? Lindsey Porter (2) argues it is not and that all parents have an obligation to support any children they create and that this obligation includes unintentional fathers. In this posting I will firstly outline Porter’s argument which I accept. I will then move on to consider a slightly different question as to whether her argument should also apply to unintentional fathers who have been deceived.

Porter points out that a biological parent is someone who causes a new person to exist. She argues biological parental obligation is based on the idea that because a biological parent is responsible for a child’s vulnerability he/she must take steps to remedy this situation. Prima facie this obligation means assuming a full parenting role in most cases. Of course there may be exceptions, for instance a fourteen year mother might best fulfil her obligation as a biological parent by allowing her child to be adopted. Unfortunately as Porter notes there is a problem with this account. Gamete donors and even IVF doctors might appear to have parental duties. Porter attempts to overcome this problem by presenting a bifurcated account of parenthood. A parent can either mean someone who causes a child to exist or secondly someone who “stands in a unique and invaluable social, personal, love relation to the child.” Her argument depends on the idea that a certain class of parents in the first meaning has a prima facie obligation to become a parent as defined by the second meaning. In what follows assuming full parental obligations means being a parent in sense of both of the above meanings. I agree with the thrust of Porter’s argument but believe we must be able to define which of those people who cause a child to exist have a prima facie duty to assume full parental obligations.

Porter correctly points out that in some cases people such as gamete donors and IVF specialists play a part in causing some children to exist. Without these people some children would not exist. It follows they cause vulnerable children to come into the world. Surely this causation means they have responsibilities. Clearly they do have responsibilities. Equally clearly gamete donors and IVF specialists should not offer their services to people who will not become good parents. However the question remains if gamete donors, IVF specialists and biological parents can all play a necessary part in causing a child to exist, then why should only biological parents have a duty to assume full parental obligations?

Of course it is impractical that gamete donors and IVF specialists should fully parent the children they cause to come into existence simply because of the numbers involved. However if they only caused one or possibly two children to come into existence is there any reason why they should not be obliged to assume full parental duties for the same reason as the biological parents are? It might be objected that in practice this just doesn’t happen and that my question is purely of theoretical interest. But this is not so let us consider two sisters Ann and Carol. Ann is married but is incapable of carrying a child because she has had a hysterectomy followed by chemotherapy due to cancer. Prior to her treatment some of Ann’s eggs were saved. Carol has two children of her own but nonetheless offers to act as a surrogate mother for Ann. Carol successfully undergoes IVF using her sister’s eggs together with her brother in laws sperm and produces a child. Let us assume Carol will never undertake surrogacy again or have any other children. Clearly Carol played a necessary part in causing Ann’s child to exist. Does it follow that in this situation that Carol has an equal obligation with Ann to assume full parental duties? I would argue it does not. Ann wanted a child. Having a child of her own was of intrinsic value to her. Carol only acted instrumentally to serve Ann’s wants. Carol may have played a necessary part in the creation of the child but she would not have done so without Ann’s need. Ann and Carol caused the child to exist in different ways. Ann’s need was the original cause of the child. Carol served this original cause instrumentally. I would suggest only those people who cause a child to exist by being the original cause of that child have a prima facie duty to assume full parental obligations. Those people who cause a child to exist by acting instrumentally to fulfil someone else’s need for a child do not. It follows that gamete donors, IVF specialists and surrogate mothers do not have a prima facie duty to fully parent any children they help to come into existence.

I now want return to the question as to whether unintentional fathers have full parental obligations to any children they father. I have suggested above that only those people who cause a child to exist by being the originating cause have a prima facie duty to become full parents. If my suggestion is accepted it follows most unintentional fathers do have a prima facie duty to accept parental obligations because by fathering a child a father is not usually acting instrumentally to serve someone else’s purpose. Moreover by engaging in normal sexual relations becoming a father, causing a child to exist, is a foreseeable risk. Of course not all unintentional fathers might be in a position to fully assume a full parenting role. In some cases an unintentional father or his child’s mother may be in another relationship. Or perhaps, like the fourteen year old mother mentioned above, he may be better able to discharge his parental duties in a different way. Nonetheless most unintentional fathers have a prima facie duty to assume a full parenting role.

However there is a subset of unintentional fathers to whom the above might not apply. A woman might intentionally deceive a man regarding contraception for some purpose of her own. For instance she might simply desire a child. In this case the child’s father seems to be being used by her instrumentally in much the same way a gamete donor is. Prima facie I can see no reason as to why he should be treated differently from a the donor and hence should not be subject to full parental obligations. Secondly a woman might seek to bind her partner to her by having a child. She might secretly stop taking any contraceptive measures in order to achieve her objective. In this context the man is being deceived but is he also being used instrumentally? It is of course true he is not being seen as an end in himself and this is wrong. The deceit is also wrong. However it is not clear that these wrongs mean he should be free from full parental obligations. It is clear is that this case the child is being used instrumentally by the woman to bind her partner to her. I would suggest this means the father in this case is also being used instrumentally. Once again prima facie it seems clear to me that he should also not be subject to full parental obligations.

Prima facie I have argued that those unintentional fathers who have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. Are there any reasons as to why my conclusion should not be accepted? Unfortunately applied philosophy like real morality is messy and there is at least one reason not to accept my conclusion. This reason is also concerned with deceit. Many unintentional fathers who have not been deceived might lie and say that they have been in order to avoid full parental obligations. It seems clear to me that those unintentional fathers whose partners admit to deceiving them and those for whom it can be shown that they have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. Again unfortunately this is likely to be only a small subset of unintentional fathers who have been deceived. It would appear we have almost arrived back at my starting point. Elizabeth Brake argued that unintentional fathers do not have an obligation to support any children they father due to equal rights for men and women. I have accepted Lindsey Porter’s argument that most unintentional fathers do have a prima facie obligation to fully support their children. However in the light of the above argument some might suggest that in practice, even if this obligation remains, unintentional fathers should not be made to support any children they father if they say they have been deceived and it cannot be shown that they are lying. It is not always possible to differentiate between unintentional fathers who have been deceived and those who merely say they have been deceived. In addition I have argued that unintentional fathers who have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. It might appear to follow that the right of unintentional fathers who have been deceived not to support any children they father means that all unintentional fathers, who say they have been deceived, should not be compelled to assume full parental responsibility. Personally I am reluctant to accept the above. It seems to me that children’s interests may well trump the right of unintentional fathers who have been deceived, but who are unable to show this, not to assume full parental obligations.

1. Elizabeth Brake, Fatherhood and child support; Do men have a right to choose?, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(1), 2005.

2. Lindsey Porter, Adoption is Not Abortion-Lite, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(1), 2012.

Sport, Performance Enhancing Drugs and Character

 

Julian Savulescu argues in a posting in Practical Ethics that “performance enhancement is not against the spirit of cycling; it is the spirit cycling” he goes on to suggest that “we should focus on monitoring the athletes’ health rather than on losing a war on doping”, see Practical Ethics. In this posting I will argue performance enhancement is against the spirit of sport and because cycling is a sport it is against the spirit of cycling. At first hand it might appear that this will be a difficult task for me as I have previously argued that there is nothing wrong with taking cognition enhancing drugs subject to certain safeguards, see cognitive enhancement . I still stand by this position. In addition I would also support the use moral enhancing drugs, once again subject to suitable safeguards. In must be noted drug enhancement is usually not as straightforward as it sometimes seems initially and adequate safeguards are extremely important; for instance nasal sprays containing oxytocin may not be as effective as first thought and in some circumstances may even be counter productive. 

Let us assume certain cognitive enhancing or moral enhancement drugs are as safe as any of the drugs used in medical practice, if this is so I see no reason why someone should not take these enhancement drugs. Prima facie enhancing someone’s cognitive abilities or her capacity to feel empathy will not damage her as a person. Moreover if any enhancement drug is as safe as those used in medical practice and reasonably cheap I can see no reason why this drug should give someone an unfair advantage over others. I will not pursue the argument here. Of course in this situation cognitive enhancing or moral enhancing drugs will have to be tested and approved by some appropriate authority just as the drugs used in medical practice are now. Savulescu, as I read him, believes the above should also apply to cycling. The cycling authorities rather than testing cyclists for drugs should test drugs for cyclists in order to ensure these drugs are safe for cyclists to take. Whether cyclists take advantage of these drugs would be up to them.

Before proceeding with my argument I must make it clear the type of sport which concerns me. My argument will not concern non-competitive sports, for in these sports there seems no spirit to contravene. For instance, if someone is a lone cyclist who cycles either because she simply enjoys it or to keep fit then she is of no concern to me here. If such a cyclist takes performance enhancing drugs in order to cycle faster or further then I see no reason why she should not do so provided these drugs are safe. I hasten to add as a lone cyclist myself I personally can see no good reason to go faster or further than I am normally capable of. My argument is limited solely to competitive sports.

I want to argue that all competitive sports incorporate the ideal of fairness. A cycle race, in which only one competitor was permitted to take enhancing drugs whilst the other riders were forbidden to do so by the cycling authorities and in which the authorities rigorously tested these other riders to ensure their compliance, could not possibly be regarded as fair. Nonetheless could such a race possibly be regarded as sport? I would argue if such a race could be regarded as sport then there is no essential difference between sport and spectacle, between sport and showbiz. Someone might suggest that the demand for tickets at the Olympic opening ceremony by some supposed sports fans shows that in practice there is really no difference between sport and spectacle. I would reject such a suggestion for it seems to me even if sport can be spectacular it cannot be regarded simply as a spectacle. Intuitively the hypothetical race suggested above cannot be regarded as sport. It would appear the idea of fairness is an essential part of sport, but the question remains why? 

I would suggest fairness is an essential part of sport because it engenders what we find admirable about sport. Able bodied Olympians don’t compete with Para-Olympians, heavyweight boxers don’t compete with lightweights and golfers have handicaps to ensure fair competition. It follows what we find admirable about sport must be connected to sports men and women. What we find admirable about sportspersons cannot be that they are winners. If this was so we would not find anything admirable about the vast majority sportspersons. I would now suggest what we find admirable in sportsppersons is linked to their character and this character is connected to certain virtues. Virtues such as determination, dedication, fortitude and courage. If we accept the above then it seem competition between women born as female and women born as male damages sport. Such completion damages sport. These virtues can be best expressed if a sportsperson can compete equally, if sport is fair. Someone might object we don’t find all sportspersons admirable. She might point out we don’t have any reason to find some premiership footballers’ character as admirable. In reply I would argue we only find part of a sportsman’s character admirable. The fact that some footballer shows determination, dedication, fortitude and some courage when playing football is admirable. It may well be true that we find some of his activities off the pitch less than admirable. Nonetheless I would counter argue the fact that a footballer plays football to a high standard makes his character more admirable than if he did not. I would further argue that the same applies to amateur sportspersons who engage in sport purely for the pleasure it brings; engaging in sport may not make someone a good person but it nearly always enhances his character to some degree. Of course there may be a very few people who should not play sport due to their temperament, for instance someone might be unable to control his anger.

Savulescu might accept my argument. Nevertheless he might continue to argue if all professional cyclists could take drugs which are tested and approved by cycling authorities then cycle races would not be unfair and that we could still admire the determination, dedication, fortitude and courage of the cyclists involved. I would suggest he would be wrong to do so because such a situation would be hard to maintain. Let us assume some drugs are tested and approved by cycling authorities. However new drugs which might enhance a cyclist’s performance further might be developed. It follows the cycling authorities will have to continue testing cyclists for these new drugs to promote fairness. It follows that allowing cyclists to take some drugs would only change the current situation slightly. A partial ban on enhancing drugs would mean some drugs are acceptable whilst others are not. It would also seem to mean some new drugs initially unacceptable might, after suitable testing, become acceptable. It follows policing such a fluid situation might be much more difficult than trying to maintain the current position. Savulescu might of course revise his position and insist that cyclists should be free to take any drug and that drug testing should be abolished. It seems entirely possible that in this revised situation argue some enhancing drugs might be developed and only offered to selected cyclists. Real competition would then shift from cyclists to the scientists producing performance enhancing drugs; competitive cycling would be reduced to a mere spectacle.

Acting from Duty, Caring For

In this posting I want to consider acting from duty. My starting point is an example given by Thomas Hurka. He asks us to imagine, 

“that you’re in hospital recovering from a painful operation and a friend comes at considerable inconvenience to visit you. When you say how much you appreciate her visit and concern for you it shows, she says it isn’t that she cares for you; she just knew that as a friend, she had a duty to visit.”(1)

Hurka uses this example to argue that in some situations acting out of duty seems to be an inferior way of acting when compared to caring. Hurka’s argument has personal interest to me. A few years ago when my father was getting old and was not as capable as he once had been I found myself travelling to see him every day and helping him out as best I could. I told my wife I was acting out of duty at the time and a few years on after reflection I still believe for the most part this was true. Should I regret acting mostly from duty? I do not. More generally is acting solely from duty in some way inferior to acting because you care?

Intuitively we seem to accept Hurka’s argument. However everyone, including Hurka’s hospital visitor acts because they care about something. Perhaps the hospital visitor only cares about doing her duty. At this point I want to make a distinction between two ways of caring. To ‘care about’ someone means the carer identifies himself with the person she cares about and becomes vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether who she cares about is diminished or enhanced. This definition is based on that of Harry Frankfurt which I use regularly in this blog. To ‘care for’ someone means to understand someone’s needs and to respond to them in an appropriate way. In the light of this distinction I will assume Hurka’s hospital patient wants his visitors to ‘care about’ him but that he wants his nurses to ‘care for’ him. A nurse who cared a ‘great deal’ about his patients but was not very good at ‘caring for’ them would not be a very good nurse. In practice most caring is a combination of ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’. However it is possible in theory to ‘care for’ someone but not ‘care about’ him. Caring for someone is related to duty and as the example of nurse shows caring for is also important. If Hurka’s hospital visitor is acting out of duty she must ‘care for’ the patient. If for instance she simply went to the hospital and did her SuDoku next to the patient each day during visiting time few people would think she was doing her duty. She must address the concerns of the patient. The hospital visitor acting out of duty must ‘care for’ the patient but it seems what the patient really wants her to do is ‘care about’ him. My original question now becomes this. Is the patient right in believing it would be better if his visitor cared about him rather than for him? Is acting from duty by ‘caring for’ someone in some way inferior to acting because you ‘care about’ him?

If someone acts from duty she must make a real effort to do her duty. Feeble attempts and gestures at doing one’s duty are not doing one’s duty, doing one’s duty is quite demanding. What must the hospital patient’s visitor do when doing her duty? She must ‘care for’ the patient. She must attempt to understand the patient’s needs and to respond in an appropriate way. Clearly she cannot respond to the patient’s medical needs and such needs must be met by the medical staff. She can and should respond to the patient’s practical and emotional needs when she can. One of the emotional needs of the patient is to be ‘cared about’, loved. It follows if the visitor is serious about doing her duty she must make an attempt whenever possible to ‘care about’ the patient. Just bringing him his paper and the fruit he asked for yesterday and then settling down to do her SuDoku for the rest of the visiting time is not doing her duty. It follows doing one’s duty need not be divorced from ‘caring about’.

Let us assume the patient’s friend cannot visit tomorrow and in her place comes his son. His son comes purely out of a sense of duty because he suffers from Aspergers syndrome. People with Aspergers are often extremely conscientious about acting from duty because they have difficultly with empathy or ‘caring about’ as I have defined it above, see Simon Baron-Cohen (2). Acting from duty is central to the lives of some people if they are to act morally. According to Neema Trivedi-Bateman there is a link between moral emotions and offending behaviour in young people, see the conservation . Her research shows that young people are more likely to carry out violent acts if they have weak empathy, shame and guilt. Unfortunately for autistic people empathy, shame and guilt are hard to acquire perhaps because they cannot read other people’s emotions. For higher functioning autistic people acting from duty is of great importance it is essential to acting morally. Parents of such children should try to inculcate a sense of duty in them rather than the moral emotions which they might find impossible to assimilate. Returning to our hospital visitor, he now has had two visitors both visiting from exactly the same sense of duty. If our patient thinks his first visitor is acting in an inferior way does he also think his son is similarly acting in an inferior way? I would guess not. Does then he then come to the view that his first visitor is not acting in an inferior way? Once again I would guess not. What reason might he advance for not changing his mind? He might suggest that whilst his son only has the option of acting out of duty his other visitor can ‘care about’ him.

Is this a reasonable suggestion? I will now argue it is not. The patient believes his visitor has the option to care for him, I believe she may not. I would argue ‘caring about’ or having empathy for someone involves loving her. A mother’s love of her child would be a good example of ‘caring about’. But as Frankfurt points out, love is not a matter of choice (3). One cannot choose to love someone. It might of course be possible to place oneself in a position so that one comes to love someone else. A successful arranged marriage might be an example of so doing. However even in these circumstances love grows and is not chosen. I do believe it is commendable for someone to cultivate the circumstances in which love can flourish. Moreover I do not deny it is good to be loved for the beloved but I do not believe a lover’s love is a matter for praise.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly acting from duty is not an inferior way of acting. Indeed for many people, such as higher functioning autistic people, it is perhaps the only way to act morally. Secondly whist caring about is good and should encouraged it isn’t always praiseworthy whilst acting from duty might be.

1. Thomas Hurka, 2011, The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters in Life, Oxford, page 127.
2. Simon Baron-Cohen, 2011, Zero Degrees of Empathy, Penguin, page 65.
3. Harry Frankfurt. 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 135.

Assisted Suicide and the Nationalisation of Morality

The Commission on Assisted Dying published its final report on 05/01/12. This report suggests a framework which would permit people with a terminal illness to be assisted to end their lives whilst protecting those who are vulnerable. I have argued in a previous posting, see Assisted Suicide, Slippery Slopes and Empathic Caring , that if we have true empathic concern those with a terminal illness it should be possible to assist them in this way. I will not repeat my arguments here. Instead I want to concentrate on one of the reasons given as to why this assistance should not be forthcoming. I accept of course that a purely private morality is nonsense but I will argue society as a whole cannot determine our morality, society as a whole can of course influence it. However, even if a purely private morality is nonsense so too is the idea of a national morality, any morality must include personal acceptance. The idea of a national morality is dangerous one.

George Pitcher writing in the Daily Mail concerning the death of Geraldine McCelland at Dignitas clinic in Zurich, see Geraldine-McClellands, asks us to consider two statements.

"You are in pain and feel humiliated. We agree with you that your life is not worth living. It's your life to do with what you wish, so go ahead and kill yourself. We will help you.

Or:

"You are in pain and feel humiliated. But your life is infinitely precious and is of equal value to anyone alive. We will support you and cherish you, but we won't help you to kill yourself. We will help you."

He goes on to state it is the second statement that that our society should offer as its moral choice. And it's the one which should continue to be protected in our law. In the above Pitcher goes seamlessly from offering us two statements to talking about moral choice. All choice moral or otherwise must involve options. If Pitcher really believes society should offer the terminally ill a moral choice then what are the options related to that choice? It seems to me the only choice Pitcher and those who hold similar views to him is between dying alone, probably in great pain, and receiving palliative care. This is not a meaningful choice. Of course society doesn’t always have to give its members choice. We cannot choose to drive at any speed we would like to on a motorway for instance. However ever since Mill it seems to be generally accepted that in a free society individuals have a right to make personal choices provided these choices do no significant harm to others. Indeed I would argue it is a necessary condition for a free society. Any society that does not permit individuals the right to make such choices is not really a free society. It may of course be a caring society. For instance such a society might prohibit the consumption of tobacco. However in such a society the state makes moral decisions rather than individuals. In the case of assisted suicide society is saying to those with a terminal illness we will help you but only as society sees best. I would suggest that such a society has nationalised morality and the result might possibly be a deeply caring society but it certainly is not a truly free society.

Someone like Pitcher might object that such a society is both a free and caring society by allowing people only to make choices that are best for them. The trouble with this argument is that someone is not really free if his choices are restricted to what is good for him. My objector might respond that someone should not be able to choose assisted suicide because it isn’t good for him but rather because such a choice harms others. His objection seems to be based on the premise that if the terminally ill can commit assisted suicide then the weak and the vulnerable are harmed. I will assume the reason they are harmed is because they might feel under pressure to do likewise. It is this reason I wish to question.

I now want to consider why the weak and old might feel under such pressure. I will not use the term ‘the vulnerable’ in this context because to be vulnerable is to be susceptible to pressure and it is this susceptibility to pressure I want to question. The weak and the old might feel vulnerable for two reasons. Firstly someone may feel vulnerable simply because he is weak or old. Secondly someone may feel vulnerable for some reason connected to their age and weakness but that reason is not simply one of age or weakness. For instance someone may feel vulnerable because he needs a catheter inserted up his penis due to old age rather than simply because he is old. I want to consider the second reason first. In its evidence to the above commission The British Geriatrics Society,

“emphasised the negative impact of low quality care, and the feeling they are not valued by society, on older people’s decision-making processes: In the experience of many geriatricians, the feeling of many older people that life is unbearable in its later stages is a direct result of the reaction of others to their frailty and the care and treatment they are afforded. Our concern then is that many older people, because of the care given to them by society in general and the NHS and Social Care system in particular, will perceive themselves as a burden and feel under pressure to end their lives.”

Perhaps then the weak and old might be vulnerable because they aren’t valued, they are simply existing. They have, to borrow a phrase, an unbearable lightness of simply being. According to Pitcher our attitude to the terminally ill should be one that sees their lives infinitely precious and of equal value to anyone alive. We should support and cherish them. Perhaps then this should be our attitude to all the old and weak rather than just the terminally ill. If the old and weak are supported and cherished they should not see themselves as a burden and hence should become less vulnerable. In which case there would be no need to protect them from feeling under pressure to commit assisted suicide provided this option was available.

My objector might respond even in this improved situation an old man with a catheter up his penis may still feel under pressure to take his own life. I agree he might well want to take his own life. But I would deny he is under pressure to do so. Clearly if we see the lives of the old as infinitely precious and cherish them this old man is not subject to outside pressure. If my objector replies he is under pressure from himself then I would suggest my objector doesn’t understand pressure. If my old man wants to take his own life and is under no outside pressure, he simply desires to take his life and the idea of pressure is irrelevant. I would suggest again that if we really think the lives of the terminally ill are precious then we should also think the lives of the weak and old are precious and hence address the causes of their vulnerability rather ban assisted suicide the terminally ill.

Now let us consider the second scenario in which a few of the weak and old might be vulnerable simply because they are weak and old. In this second scenario I am perfectly willing to admit again that someone who is weak or old might want to commit assisted suicide. But his want is once again caused by his desire due weakness and age not by pressure. I would suggest he would have this desire irrespective of whether or not the terminally ill can commit assisted suicide. Of course if the terminally ill can commit assisted suicide some of old and weak might claim it is a matter of justice that they can also do so. I will not enter into this debate here.

To conclude the following seems to hold. Opponents of right of to the terminally ill to commit assisted suicide argue that this practice should be illegal in order to protect the weak and old. They argue we should do this because we are a caring society. I have argued that provided we do care for and cherish the weak and old, in practice rather than simply talk about doing so, then the weak and old would feel under no pressure to commit assisted suicide even if the terminally ill could do so. If we ban assisted suicide for the terminally ill in these circumstances we have restricted freedom in our society because of a false illusion. If however we do not care for and cherish the weak and old, but nonetheless insist on banning assisted suicide because of the harm that might come to them, then we might rightly be accused of hypocrisy.

Aspergers, Autism and Love

In this posting I want to explore the way someone loves someone else on the autistic spectrum. This exploration is partly a personal exploration as one of my grandsons is on this spectrum. My exploration starts with Charles Foster’s remark that his son is dyslexic and that he is glad . I’m not glad about my grandson’s aspergers and my reaction is one of indifference. Some might think me a very hard hearted person and that Foster’s attitude is infinitely preferable to mine. But I will argue indifference to my grandson’s condition is the only reasonable position for me to take and that being either glad or sad are inappropriate. My indifference does not mean I am indifferent to him as a person. Prior to making my argument I must examine exactly what Foster is glad about.

Let it be accepted that Foster like all good parents is glad to have his son, is glad his son exists. But is there any connection between his natural gladness and dyslexia? What exactly is Foster glad about when talking about his son’s dyslexia? Firstly, Foster might be glad his son is dyslexic or secondly he might be glad his son has dyslexia? To answer the above questions it is important to differentiate clearly between what is meant by being dyslexic and having dyslexia. Being dyslexic means someone’s character is inevitably tied to his dyslexia; his dyslexia helps determine his character. Having dyslexia means someone suffers from dyslexia and that his character is not inevitably tied to his dyslexia. If Foster is glad his son has dyslexia then it is hard to see what he is being glad about in addition to being glad about having his son. It seems to me that Foster must mean he is glad that his son is dyslexic. In this context it seems if he is glad about his son he is glad about the dyslexia only because he believes his son’s dyslexia is inevitably tied to his son’s character; is inevitably tied to his son as a person. I am by no means convinced that dyslexia is inevitably tied to character as having dyslexia doesn’t appear to alter the underlying emotional structure of the dyslexic. I will not pursue this question further here. Unfortunately, aspergers syndrome affects someone’s underlying emotional structure which I believe means it is inevitably tied to his character.

In the light of the above am I not being both unreasonable and hardhearted with my indifference to my grandson’s aspergers? Am I not being indifferent to his character and perhaps even his essential being? Clearly it seems this is what Foster would believe. Before proceeding I had better clarify exactly what I mean by my being indifferent. Being indifferent means I hope that I am neither hard hearted nor callous, but on the other hand I’m not glad either. Moreover, my indifference is not simply a grudging one because I have no choice and wish things were otherwise. I simply accept my grandson’s condition. My acceptance, my indifference, is not expressed as some kind of emotion but rather as a lack of any desire on my part to change the situation. In addition my acceptance includes a lack of desire that the situation might have been different. In the light of some of my previous postings concerning the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt it is important to make it clear my acceptance is simply acceptance and is not a form of loving or ‘caring about’. Loving or ‘caring about’ involves the agent identifying himself with what he cares about. I simply accept or am indifferent to my grandson’s aspergers, to the cause of his character. However, there is no reason why my indifference should carry over to his actual character. This indifference should give no reason why I should fail to identify myself with him and what he ‘cares about’. I have no reason not to love him and many reasons to do so. Does Foster’s being glad at his son’s dyslexia involve any more than my simple acceptance? I’m not sure, but if it does doesn’t his gladness imply that if his son was not dyslexic he would be less happy?

Intuitively my indifference seems to make more sense than being glad about my grandson’s condition. However, should I be sad about his aspergers? Am I not wrong to be indifferent to this condition? I will argue I am not. Firstly, Foster believes if we could take away his son’s dyslexia he would be a different person. I’m not sure Foster is correct. However, I am sure that if we could take away my grandson’s aspergers he would be a different person. If I was sad about my grandson’s condition what exactly would I be sad about? I cannot be sad about him not being a more social person for this is impossible. As a more social person he would be a different person. Provided I cannot reasonably be sad he isn’t the same person but with additional talents then it would appear if I am sad I must be sad he is not someone else. It appears to follow I must be sad he exists provided that he could be replaced by someone else without aspergers syndrome. However, I love my grandson and I believe this love rules out such a thought. Someone might object that I could love someone else with additional talents instead. It is of course true I could love someone else, perhaps an additional grandchild, but I would argue I couldn’t love someone else instead. Frankfurt argues ‘caring about’ someone is equivalent to loving her. Caring about someone means you identify yourself with that person and become vulnerable to his losses and susceptible to what benefits him (1). Moreover, the lover is not free he is captivated by his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice (2). If I love my wife I can’t simply swap her for a younger woman with a Phd. My objector might counter that this is exactly what lovers do all the time especially rich middle aged men. I would counter argue that my objector is construing the terms ‘lover’ and ‘partner’ as being interchangeable. Partners need not be lovers. A patriot cannot simply swap the love of his country for a bigger and better one any more than a football supporter change his allegiance and support a more successful team. It seems inconceivable that a lover of Newcastle United could simply change his allegiance to a more successful team. It follows a lover cannot easily love someone else instead of his beloved. His love is constrained or captured by his beloved. It further follows that because I love my grandson I cannot want to replace my grandson by someone else. It still further follows that I have no reason to be sad about his aspergers and hence my indifference to this condition is a perfectly reasonable.

Nevertheless, even if it is accepted my indifference to his condition is a reasonable position a personally awkward question arises.  People are easily deluded and perhaps I am deluding myself when I say I don’t see why his condition should make me love him less? Perhaps all I'm doing is adopting a stoical attitude and stoics have problems with love, see why I'm not a stoic. I suggested above if you love someone you identify yourself with him and become vulnerable to his losses and susceptible to what benefits him. You ‘care about’ his interests. Accepting the above my objector might suggest that I must care less about my grandson because his aspergers means his interests make it more difficult for me to ‘care about’ him. This lessening of my ability to care might occur for two reasons. First it might be suggested someone with aspergers has narrower interests than most people. Second it might be suggested that even if someone with aspergers does not have fewer interests than most people that nonetheless he has different interests. This second suggestion seems plausible after all someone with aspergers often has difficulty with social relationships and these are of major concern to most people. Moreover, those with aspergers are attracted by routine and order. My objector might now proceed to point out most people find it more difficult to ‘care about’ routine and order rather than social relationships. This follows because to ‘care about’ requires an emotional response. She might then argue this difficulty causes me to love my grandson to a lesser degree due to his aspergers.

If this is all there is to loving then I have to concede that my objector might well have a point and even if I am not being hypocritical I might nonetheless be deluding myself about the true extent of my love. Perhaps for instance I am deluding myself because I love my daughter. Perhaps however there is more to loving, ‘caring about’, than making yourself vulnerable to your beloved’s losses and benefits. The important question is this, do you simply identify with your beloved and this means you become vulnerable to his losses and benefits? Or do you simply become vulnerable to his losses and benefits? I am inclined to favour the first option. However my objector might well ask me if I could love someone who was in a coma and had nothing that would consciously benefit or harm him. She might proceed to further stipulate this person has always been in a coma in order to rule out my being swayed by anything that would previously have consciously benefited or harmed him. Being truthful I would have to admit I could not identify with such a person. Nonetheless I am reluctant to accept the second option as it seems imply that the lover simply loves the properties of the beloved rather than the beloved. This the position Plato adopted in the symposium.

In order to consider whether I love my grandson to a lesser degree because of his aspergers I want to consider loving from a different angle. Do I love someone when I am asleep or when I am concentrating hard on something else. When sleeping and at certain particular moments it seems clear I am not actively loving, ‘caring about’, my beloved. Does the above lead to the conclusion that at these moments I do not love my beloved? Most people would be reluctant to accept such a conclusion as it is so counter intuitive. If such a conclusion is unacceptable then it would appear loving someone involves both actually ‘caring about’ a beloved’s interests and having a disposition to ‘care about’ these interests. My objector might nonetheless continue to suggest that a disposition to ‘care about’ is not an essential part of loving someone; loving someone should only concern actual ‘caring about’. However, accepting my objector’s suggestion seems to mean accepting that loving someone is really a series of discrete disconnected events separated by periods when the lover’s concentration is focussed elsewhere. It also seems to mean accepting if you love someone today there is no reason why you should love him tomorrow. Whatever my objector may believe love is not at all like this. One of the elements of love is persistence. We question whether a fickle lover really loves or understands the demands of love. If the process of actually loving cannot be sustained continuously over very long periods of time then it seems the demand for persistence can only be met by a lover having a disposition to ‘care about’ his beloved. It follows loving someone involves both being actually ‘caring about’ a beloved’s interests and having a disposition to ‘care about’ these interests.

In the light of the above discussion do I love my grandson any less because of his aspergers? Clearly my disposition to ‘care about’ what he cares about is the same as my disposition to ‘care about’ the things my other grandchildren care about. It follows in this sense of loving I do not love him less. Moreover, when I am actively loving him, ‘caring about’ his interests I become absorbed by this activity and I see no reason why my ‘caring about’, loving, him is of to a lesser degree. Nonetheless because some of his interests may make it harder for him to share these interests with me this might mean that I whilst I always have a disposition to love him that in practices I actively love him less often. This is a highly uncomfortable conclusion for me. However, if I accept it, and after some reflection I am inclined to do so, then I must make a greater effort to make it easier for him to share these interests with me.

1.    Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press page 83.

2.   Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 135.

The virtue of forgiveness

Ernesto Garcia argues we have a moral duty to forgive but that this duty need not necessarily involve giving up resentment (1). In this posting I am going to suggest the opposite; that we should always give up resentment but that we should not always forgive.

Garcia argues there are two levels of forgiveness. Firstly there is our personal relationship with the wrongdoer and secondly we way we see his relationship with the moral community. When Garcia talks about forgiveness he means readmitting the wrongdoer to the moral community. He does not believe that this re-admittance must necessarily involve overcoming the negative emotions we feel towards him. However I would worry that readmitting the wrongdoer to the moral community without giving up resentment might be difficult to achieve in practice. Our moral concerns and emotions are not easily separated. Many philosophers from David Hume to Shaun Nichols have pointed out there is an emotive element in moral relationships. Resentment is an emotion. It follows if we hold on to resentment as suggested by Garcia it might be difficult in practice for us to forgive at the second level.

Before attempting to answer the question, as to what is involved in reaccepting a wrongdoer back into the moral community, the domain of persons needing forgiveness by this reacceptance must be clearly specified. Let it be assumed my wife and family have been murdered by someone who is delusional. Let it be further assumed that he can never be cured of his delusions. Such a person never was and never will be part of our moral community and hence cannot be reaccepted back into it. Such a person of course should be part of our moral concern but then so should animals. Secondly if a drunken driver crashes into my car causing me harm but also causing brain damage to himself which means he will never again be part of the moral community then once again he is of moral concern but there is no question of his being reaccepted back into that community. I would suggest such a person was a wrongdoer but he is not now a wrongdoer and as such is not in need of forgiveness. Lastly if my grandchild, age two pulls, my hair there is no question of his needing forgiveness and needing reacceptance back into our moral community because he isn’t yet part of that community. He is of course again of moral concern and hopefully will one day be admitted to our moral community but his admittance is independent of his previous actions. Wrongdoers who might be forgiven are only those people who at the time of their wrongdoing were part of the moral community and can again be part of that community.

Should we always forgive wrongdoers by reaccepting them back into the moral community? Should we unilaterally forgive wrongdoers who do not apologise by this reacceptance? Whether we should seems to depend on what this reacceptance involves. If reacceptance simply involves the recognition of the wrongdoer as a creature like us who can make moral decisions and be held accountable for these decisions then of course we should do so. Indeed I would argue the very idea of a wrongdoer depends on regarding him as someone who was and could again be part of the moral community. However there is a difference between accepting that someone can be part of the moral community and someone is part of that community. In what follows forgiving wrongdoers means accepting someone once again is part of the moral community. What does it mean to accept someone is part of a moral community? Garcia believes acceptance involves normal­ized moral relationships and these relationships involve impartial goodwill and civility towards him as a fellow human being. Garcia further believes we are morally obligated to normalize relations with wrongdoers and treat them with civility (2).

If someone unjustifiably harms us should we unilaterally accept that he is part of the moral community rather than just someone who could be part of this community? Garcia believes this acceptance involves impartial goodwill and civility. I agree with Garcia that once our initial anger at the harm we suffered fades we should treat the wrongdoer with civility. Should we also treat the wrongdoer with impartial goodwill? Perhaps we should. However treating someone with civility and extending our impartial goodwill towards him is not all that is involved in restoring a normalized moral relationship. After my grandchild has pulled my hair I remain pleasant with him and he retains my impartial goodwill but there is no moral relationship to be restored. It is important distinguish between my moral concern and moral relationships. Moral concern involves caring about, empathy and beneficence. Moral relationships include these elements but also include trust. It follows the normalization of moral relations involves the re-establishment of trust. Trust is very important to our decision making for as O’Neill points an inability to trust produces a total paralysis of action, see (3) If we accept the centrality of restoring trust to the restoration of normal moral relations, when we are unjustifiably harmed, then two questions naturally arise. Firstly can we unconditionally trust the wrongdoer again and secondly should we?

If someone unjustifiably harms us we are more cautious in our future dealings with him and naturally become more suspicious of his motives. However some people are naturally more suspicious than most and others are more trusting. It certainly seems possible to trust a wrongdoer again event though this might prove to be difficult to achieve in practice as I have suggested above. Should we then trust the wrongdoer? This question splits into two. Firstly should we trust the wrongdoer for prudential reasons and secondly should we trust him for moral reasons. Whether we should trust a wrongdoer for prudential reasons seems to depend on his actions post his wrongdoing. If he fails to apologise and promise not to repeat his wrongdoing and we unilaterally trust him then we would seem to be guilty of gullibility. In this context we should not trust the wrongdoer. If however the wrongdoer apologises and promises not to repeat the wrong whether we should trust him again depends on two judgements. Firstly do we judge his apology and promise to be sincere and secondly if we judge his promise to be sincere do we judge him to be capable of carrying out this promise.

Nevertheless it remains a possibility that we should unilaterally trust a wrongdoer for moral reasons. At this point I should note I have a worry as to whether prudential and moral reasons can be completely disentangled. However for the sake of the argument I will put this worry to one side. It might be suggested that by unilaterally trusting wrongdoers we set them an example and hopefully they might come to emulate our good behaviour. It might be further suggested this is exactly what a good or virtuous person would do. I would reject these suggestions for three reasons. Firstly the virtuous person, at least in the Aristotelian sense, seems to aim at some mean. Intuitively the unilateral restoration of trust seems to breach the mean between being too gullible and too suspicious. Secondly the unilateral restoration of trust seems to over emphasise the virtue of beneficence whilst underplaying that of justice. Lastly virtue ethics is concerned with character. It seems to me virtue ethics must be concerned with the good character of others. If it were not would virtue ethics be an ethical system at all? It further seems if someone unilaterally trusts a wrongdoer hoping to set him an example, he might come to emulate, that she might be more concerned with her character than that of the wrongdoer. Let it be accepted a wrongdoer who apologises for his wrongdoing displays better character than a wrongdoer who does not. If someone unilaterally forgives all wrongdoers then she fails to differentiate between wrongdoers who apologise and those who do not. It follows she fails to pay attention to the character of the wrongdoer. An objector might attempt to rebut the above argument. She might argue an agent should only be concerned with her good character and creating the circumstances in which others can express their good character. She might further argue if we attempt to shape another’s character that all we really do is shape his behaviour rather than his character. For instance, if a wrongdoer apologises solely due to our reluctance to forgive his apology would be insincere and his character remain unreformed. She might then conclude the only way we should seek to change the character of others is by example. I would reject my objector’s argument because it is based on a view of the way we become virtuous which I would reject. My objector seems to believe someone becomes virtuous simply by copying the virtuous. I would suggest as does Julia Annas that if someone becomes virtuous simply by copying he might come to merely mimic virtue rather than be truly virtuous, see (4). I would agree with Annas that if we are to become truly virtuous that this requires learning. Learning requires understanding and that understanding sometimes has to taught rather than simply acquired through observation. Being taught why apology is sometimes necessary means expressing our disapproval by expressing what is wrong with the wrongdoer’s actions rather than simply unilaterally forgiving.

However not everyone is a virtue ethicist. Should we unilaterally trust a wrongdoer for moral reasons independent of virtue? It seems clear that part of any ethical system must be some sort of duty at least to preserve and perhaps even enhance moral relationships. It also seems clear moral relationships depend on some norms, some rules of behaviour. In practice we expect people to act morally. We don’t usually check whether others are behaving morally towards we simply trust them. For any system of morality to be reasonably functional we have to take a view of others based on trust, see O’Neill above. A wrongdoer can harm us in many different ways but if we are aware of his wrongdoing then he always harms us by damaging our trust. It might be objected this damage is restricted solely to us as persons and need not of necessity damage our moral relationships. It then might be further objected trusting is not part of a moral relationship. Trusting is only of instrumental value in preserving this relationship. Trust might be seen simply as a lubricant that oils the machinery of morality. I accept trust is instrumental in preserving moral relationships and oils the machinery of morality. Let it be accepted trust helps preserve moral relationships. However if we also accept we have a duty at least to preserve moral relationships then trusting others is also part of moral relationships and we have a duty to preserve. I would suggest that we are less likely to trust wrongdoers who do not seek forgiveness than wrongdoers who do. I would further suggest that unilaterally trusting wrongdoers is likely to make at least some wrongdoers less likely to seek forgiveness. It follows we should not unilaterally forgive wrongdoers as this will make them less likely to seek forgiveness damaging trust which in damages, rather than preserves, moral relationships.

At this point someone might object basing forgiveness purely on the restoration of moral relations restricts the domain of forgiveness. My objector might use the example of Eric Lomax who forgave Nagase Takashi (5). In 1942 Lomax was forced to build the Burma to Siam railway. During this time he was tortured and Takashi was the translator present. Lomax developed a deep hatred of the Japanese and this hatred was focussed on Takashi. Fifty years later Lomax met and forgave Takashi. Lomax wrote “meeting Nagase has turned him from a hated enemy, with whom friendship would have been unthinkable, into a blood brother”. My objector might point out in cases of forgiveness such as this it is possible that the participants will never met again. She might further point out any relationship between such participants will be non existent or extremely limited. In the light of the above she might then suggest we would do better to consider forgiveness in terms of the restoration of moral standing rather than moral relationships. She might argue that doing so would increase the domain of forgiveness. This expanded domain she might suggest would include people who are separated by large distances and who will have no future contact. I accept that the restoration of moral standing is important but I don’t believe moral standing can be detached from moral relationships. Moral standing is not simply moral concern. If we restore someone’s moral standing we must of necessity see them as someone who we could enter a moral relationship with, someone we could trust.

At the beginning of this posting I suggested we should do as Bishop Butler suggested and let go of our resentment towards wrongdoers. For Bishop Butlers forgiveness and the subsequent letting go of resentment is a moral matter. I have argued above we should not readmit a wrongdoer back into the moral community without an apology. It follows I do not believe holding on to resentment is necessary for us express our moral disapproval. I do however believe we should let go of resentment for prudential reasons. A resentful person is basically someone who characteristically sees himself as being undervalued whilst at the same time not expressing this feeling. This feeling when unresolved can become an emotionally debilitating condition. People who don’t have the ability to express this feeling of being undervalued run the risk of undervaluing themselves because of this inability. It seems clear having a resentful character harms an agent. However it is important to differentiate between having a resentful character and simply being morally resentful. Moral resentment involves seeing ourselves as someone who has been wronged. Moral resentment is connected to anger and indignation. I would suggest these are simple emotions which do not contain a cognitive element whilst moral resentment does. I would further suggest anger and indignation express our outrage at the wrong done to us and then like any emotion, free of a cognitive element, fade. However it seems to me moral resentment if unexpressed by anger or indignation may well persist because it contains a cognitive element. This persistence means the agent runs the risk of acquiring a resentful character which is harmful. In the light of the above it seems it would be better for someone who has been morally wronged to express his anger and indignation and let go of moral resentment even if he excludes the wrongdoer from those he regards as part of the normal moral community.

1. Ernesto Garcia, 2011 Bishop Butler on Forgiveness and Resentment, Philosophers Imprint, 11(10).
2. Garcia, page 17.
3. Onora O’Niell, 2002, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge University Press, page 12).
4. Julia Annas, 2011, Intelligent virtue, Oxford, page 17).
5. Eric Lomax, 1995, The Railway Man, Vintage.